visaljs 0.0.2 → 0.0.4

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/x509/v3_utl.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,1311 @@
+// Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+/* X509 v3 extension utilities */
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <utility>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "../conf/internal.h"
+#include "../internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+static char *strip_spaces(char *name);
+static int sk_strcmp(const char *const *a, const char *const *b);
+static UniquePtr<STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING)> get_email(const X509_NAME *name,
+                                                     const GENERAL_NAMES *gens);
+static void str_free(OPENSSL_STRING str);
+static int append_ia5(UniquePtr<STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING)> *sk,
+                      const ASN1_IA5STRING *email);
+
+static int ipv4_from_asc(uint8_t v4[4], const char *in);
+static int ipv6_from_asc(uint8_t v6[16], const char *in);
+static int ipv6_cb(const char *elem, size_t len, void *usr);
+static int ipv6_hex(uint8_t *out, const char *in, size_t inlen);
+
+// Add a CONF_VALUE name value pair to stack
+
+static int x509V3_add_len_value(const char *name, const char *value,
+                                size_t value_len, int omit_value,
+                                STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist) {
+  CONF_VALUE *vtmp = nullptr;
+  char *tname = nullptr, *tvalue = nullptr;
+  int extlist_was_null = *extlist == nullptr;
+  if (name && !(tname = OPENSSL_strdup(name))) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!omit_value) {
+    // `CONF_VALUE` cannot represent strings with NULs.
+    if (OPENSSL_memchr(value, 0, value_len)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_VALUE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    tvalue = OPENSSL_strndup(value, value_len);
+    if (tvalue == nullptr) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+  if (!(vtmp = CONF_VALUE_new())) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!*extlist && !(*extlist = sk_CONF_VALUE_new_null())) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  vtmp->section = nullptr;
+  vtmp->name = tname;
+  vtmp->value = tvalue;
+  if (!sk_CONF_VALUE_push(*extlist, vtmp)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  return 1;
+err:
+  if (extlist_was_null) {
+    sk_CONF_VALUE_free(*extlist);
+    *extlist = nullptr;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_free(vtmp);
+  OPENSSL_free(tname);
+  OPENSSL_free(tvalue);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int bssl::X509V3_add_value(const char *name, const char *value,
+                           STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist) {
+  return x509V3_add_len_value(name, value, value != nullptr ? strlen(value) : 0,
+                              /*omit_value=*/value == nullptr, extlist);
+}
+
+int bssl::x509V3_add_value_asn1_string(const char *name,
+                                       const ASN1_STRING *value,
+                                       STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist) {
+  return x509V3_add_len_value(name, (const char *)value->data, value->length,
+                              /*omit_value=*/0, extlist);
+}
+
+// Free function for STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE)
+
+void X509V3_conf_free(CONF_VALUE *conf) {
+  if (!conf) {
+    return;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_free(conf->name);
+  OPENSSL_free(conf->value);
+  OPENSSL_free(conf->section);
+  OPENSSL_free(conf);
+}
+
+int bssl::X509V3_add_value_bool(const char *name, int asn1_bool,
+                                STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist) {
+  if (asn1_bool) {
+    return X509V3_add_value(name, "TRUE", extlist);
+  }
+  return X509V3_add_value(name, "FALSE", extlist);
+}
+
+static char *bignum_to_string(const BIGNUM *bn) {
+  char *tmp, *ret;
+
+  // Display large numbers in hex and small numbers in decimal. Converting to
+  // decimal takes quadratic time and is no more useful than hex for large
+  // numbers.
+  if (BN_num_bits(bn) < 32) {
+    return BN_bn2dec(bn);
+  }
+
+  tmp = BN_bn2hex(bn);
+  if (tmp == nullptr) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // Prepend "0x", but place it after the "-" if negative.
+  if (OPENSSL_asprintf(&ret, "%s0x%s", (tmp[0] == '-') ? "-" : "",
+                       (tmp[0] == '-') ? tmp + 1 : tmp) == -1) {
+    ret = nullptr;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+char *i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                          const ASN1_ENUMERATED *a) {
+  BIGNUM *bntmp = nullptr;
+  char *strtmp = nullptr;
+  if (!a) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  if (!(bntmp = ASN1_ENUMERATED_to_BN(a, nullptr)) ||
+      !(strtmp = bignum_to_string(bntmp))) {
+  }
+  BN_free(bntmp);
+  return strtmp;
+}
+
+char *i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, const ASN1_INTEGER *a) {
+  BIGNUM *bntmp = nullptr;
+  char *strtmp = nullptr;
+  if (!a) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  if (!(bntmp = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(a, nullptr)) ||
+      !(strtmp = bignum_to_string(bntmp))) {
+  }
+  BN_free(bntmp);
+  return strtmp;
+}
+
+ASN1_INTEGER *s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
+                               const char *value) {
+  BIGNUM *bn = nullptr;
+  ASN1_INTEGER *aint;
+  int isneg, ishex;
+  int ret;
+  if (!value) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_VALUE);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  bn = BN_new();
+  if (value[0] == '-') {
+    value++;
+    isneg = 1;
+  } else {
+    isneg = 0;
+  }
+
+  if (value[0] == '0' && ((value[1] == 'x') || (value[1] == 'X'))) {
+    value += 2;
+    ishex = 1;
+  } else {
+    ishex = 0;
+  }
+
+  if (ishex) {
+    ret = BN_hex2bn(&bn, value);
+  } else {
+    // Decoding from decimal scales quadratically in the input length. Bound the
+    // largest decimal input we accept in the config parser. 8,192 decimal
+    // digits allows values up to 27,213 bits. This exceeds the largest RSA,
+    // DSA, or DH modulus we support, and those are not usefully represented in
+    // decimal.
+    if (strlen(value) > 8192) {
+      BN_free(bn);
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_NUMBER);
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+    ret = BN_dec2bn(&bn, value);
+  }
+
+  if (!ret || value[ret]) {
+    BN_free(bn);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_BN_DEC2BN_ERROR);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  if (isneg && BN_is_zero(bn)) {
+    isneg = 0;
+  }
+
+  aint = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn, nullptr);
+  BN_free(bn);
+  if (!aint) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_BN_TO_ASN1_INTEGER_ERROR);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  if (isneg) {
+    aint->type |= V_ASN1_NEG;
+  }
+  return aint;
+}
+
+int bssl::X509V3_add_value_int(const char *name, const ASN1_INTEGER *aint,
+                               STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist) {
+  char *strtmp;
+  int ret;
+  if (!aint) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  if (!(strtmp = i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(nullptr, aint))) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  ret = X509V3_add_value(name, strtmp, extlist);
+  OPENSSL_free(strtmp);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int bssl::X509V3_bool_from_string(const char *str, ASN1_BOOLEAN *out_bool) {
+  if (!strcmp(str, "TRUE") || !strcmp(str, "true") || !strcmp(str, "Y") ||
+      !strcmp(str, "y") || !strcmp(str, "YES") || !strcmp(str, "yes")) {
+    *out_bool = ASN1_BOOLEAN_TRUE;
+    return 1;
+  }
+  if (!strcmp(str, "FALSE") || !strcmp(str, "false") || !strcmp(str, "N") ||
+      !strcmp(str, "n") || !strcmp(str, "NO") || !strcmp(str, "no")) {
+    *out_bool = ASN1_BOOLEAN_FALSE;
+    return 1;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_BOOLEAN_STRING);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int bssl::X509V3_get_value_bool(const CONF_VALUE *value,
+                                ASN1_BOOLEAN *out_bool) {
+  const char *btmp = value->value;
+  if (btmp == nullptr) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_BOOLEAN_STRING);
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!X509V3_bool_from_string(btmp, out_bool)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  return 1;
+
+err:
+  X509V3_conf_err(value);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int bssl::X509V3_get_value_int(const CONF_VALUE *value, ASN1_INTEGER **aint) {
+  ASN1_INTEGER *itmp;
+  if (!(itmp = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(nullptr, value->value))) {
+    X509V3_conf_err(value);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  ASN1_INTEGER_free(*aint);
+  *aint = itmp;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+#define HDR_NAME 1
+#define HDR_VALUE 2
+
+STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *bssl::X509V3_parse_list(const char *line) {
+  char *p, *q, c;
+  char *ntmp, *vtmp;
+  STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values = nullptr;
+  char *linebuf;
+  int state;
+  // We are going to modify the line so copy it first
+  // TODO(davidben): Rewrite this parser with `std::string_view`. It doesn't
+  // need to copy the string.
+  linebuf = OPENSSL_strdup(line);
+  if (linebuf == nullptr) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  state = HDR_NAME;
+  ntmp = nullptr;
+  // Go through all characters
+  for (p = linebuf, q = linebuf; (c = *p) && (c != '\r') && (c != '\n'); p++) {
+    switch (state) {
+      case HDR_NAME:
+        if (c == ':') {
+          state = HDR_VALUE;
+          *p = 0;
+          ntmp = strip_spaces(q);
+          if (!ntmp) {
+            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_NAME);
+            goto err;
+          }
+          q = p + 1;
+        } else if (c == ',') {
+          *p = 0;
+          ntmp = strip_spaces(q);
+          q = p + 1;
+          if (!ntmp) {
+            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_NAME);
+            goto err;
+          }
+          X509V3_add_value(ntmp, nullptr, &values);
+        }
+        break;
+
+      case HDR_VALUE:
+        if (c == ',') {
+          state = HDR_NAME;
+          *p = 0;
+          vtmp = strip_spaces(q);
+          if (!vtmp) {
+            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_VALUE);
+            goto err;
+          }
+          X509V3_add_value(ntmp, vtmp, &values);
+          ntmp = nullptr;
+          q = p + 1;
+        }
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (state == HDR_VALUE) {
+    vtmp = strip_spaces(q);
+    if (!vtmp) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_VALUE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    X509V3_add_value(ntmp, vtmp, &values);
+  } else {
+    ntmp = strip_spaces(q);
+    if (!ntmp) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_NAME);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    X509V3_add_value(ntmp, nullptr, &values);
+  }
+  OPENSSL_free(linebuf);
+  return values;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(linebuf);
+  sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(values, X509V3_conf_free);
+  return nullptr;
+}
+
+// Delete leading and trailing spaces from a string
+static char *strip_spaces(char *name) {
+  char *p, *q;
+  // Skip over leading spaces
+  p = name;
+  while (*p && OPENSSL_isspace((unsigned char)*p)) {
+    p++;
+  }
+  if (!*p) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  q = p + strlen(p) - 1;
+  while ((q != p) && OPENSSL_isspace((unsigned char)*q)) {
+    q--;
+  }
+  if (p != q) {
+    q[1] = 0;
+  }
+  if (!*p) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  return p;
+}
+
+// hex string utilities
+
+char *bssl::x509v3_bytes_to_hex(const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
+  CBB cbb;
+  if (!CBB_init(&cbb, len * 3 + 1)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+    static const char hex[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+    if ((i > 0 && !CBB_add_u8(&cbb, ':')) ||
+        !CBB_add_u8(&cbb, hex[in[i] >> 4]) ||
+        !CBB_add_u8(&cbb, hex[in[i] & 0xf])) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+  uint8_t *ret;
+  size_t unused_len;
+  if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, 0) || !CBB_finish(&cbb, &ret, &unused_len)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  return (char *)ret;
+
+err:
+  CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+  return nullptr;
+}
+
+unsigned char *bssl::x509v3_hex_to_bytes(const char *str, size_t *len) {
+  unsigned char *hexbuf, *q;
+  unsigned char ch, cl, *p;
+  uint8_t high, low;
+  if (!str) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_ARGUMENT);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  if (!(hexbuf =
+            reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(str) >> 1)))) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  for (p = (unsigned char *)str, q = hexbuf; *p;) {
+    ch = *p++;
+    if (ch == ':') {
+      continue;
+    }
+    cl = *p++;
+    if (!cl) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_ODD_NUMBER_OF_DIGITS);
+      OPENSSL_free(hexbuf);
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+    if (!OPENSSL_fromxdigit(&high, ch)) {
+      goto badhex;
+    }
+    if (!OPENSSL_fromxdigit(&low, cl)) {
+      goto badhex;
+    }
+    *q++ = (high << 4) | low;
+  }
+
+  if (len) {
+    *len = q - hexbuf;
+  }
+
+  return hexbuf;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(hexbuf);
+  return nullptr;
+
+badhex:
+  OPENSSL_free(hexbuf);
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_ILLEGAL_HEX_DIGIT);
+  return nullptr;
+}
+
+int bssl::x509v3_conf_name_matches(const char *name, const char *cmp) {
+  // `name` must begin with `cmp`.
+  size_t len = strlen(cmp);
+  if (strncmp(name, cmp, len) != 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  // `name` must either be equal to `cmp` or begin with `cmp`, followed by '.'.
+  return name[len] == '\0' || name[len] == '.';
+}
+
+static int sk_strcmp(const char *const *a, const char *const *b) {
+  return strcmp(*a, *b);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *X509_get1_email(const X509 *x) {
+  int critical;
+  UniquePtr<GENERAL_NAMES> gens(reinterpret_cast<GENERAL_NAMES *>(
+      X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, &critical, nullptr)));
+  if (!gens && critical != -1) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  return get_email(X509_get_subject_name(x), gens.get()).release();
+}
+
+STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *X509_get1_ocsp(const X509 *x) {
+  UniquePtr<AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS> info(
+      reinterpret_cast<AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *>(
+          X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_info_access, nullptr, nullptr)));
+  if (!info) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING)> ret;
+  for (const ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *ad : info.get()) {
+    if (OBJ_obj2nid(ad->method) == NID_ad_OCSP) {
+      if (ad->location->type == GEN_URI) {
+        if (!append_ia5(&ret, ad->location->d.uniformResourceIdentifier)) {
+          return nullptr;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  sk_OPENSSL_STRING_sort_and_dedup(ret.get(), str_free);
+  return ret.release();
+}
+
+STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *X509_REQ_get1_email(const X509_REQ *x) {
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION)> exts(X509_REQ_get_extensions(x));
+  int critical;
+  UniquePtr<GENERAL_NAMES> gens(reinterpret_cast<GENERAL_NAMES *>(
+      X509V3_get_d2i(exts.get(), NID_subject_alt_name, &critical, nullptr)));
+  if (!gens && critical != -1) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  return get_email(X509_REQ_get_subject_name(x), gens.get()).release();
+}
+
+static UniquePtr<STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING)> get_email(
+    const X509_NAME *name, const GENERAL_NAMES *gens) {
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING)> ret;
+  int i = -1;
+  while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, i)) >=
+         0) {
+    const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
+    const ASN1_IA5STRING *email = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne);
+    if (!append_ia5(&ret, email)) {
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+  }
+  for (const GENERAL_NAME *gen : gens) {
+    if (gen->type == GEN_EMAIL && !append_ia5(&ret, gen->d.ia5)) {
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+  }
+  sk_OPENSSL_STRING_sort_and_dedup(ret.get(), str_free);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static void str_free(OPENSSL_STRING str) { OPENSSL_free(str); }
+
+static int append_ia5(UniquePtr<STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING)> *sk,
+                      const ASN1_IA5STRING *email) {
+  // First some sanity checks
+  if (email->type != V_ASN1_IA5STRING) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  if (email->data == nullptr || email->length == 0) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  // `OPENSSL_STRING` cannot represent strings with embedded NULs. Do not
+  // report them as outputs.
+  if (OPENSSL_memchr(email->data, 0, email->length) != nullptr) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (!*sk) {
+    sk->reset(sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new(sk_strcmp));
+  }
+  if (!*sk) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<char> emtmp(
+      OPENSSL_strndup((const char *)email->data, email->length));
+  if (emtmp == nullptr || !PushToStack(sk->get(), std::move(emtmp))) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void X509_email_free(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sk) {
+  sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(sk, str_free);
+}
+
+typedef int (*equal_fn)(const unsigned char *pattern, size_t pattern_len,
+                        const unsigned char *subject, size_t subject_len,
+                        unsigned int flags);
+
+// Compare while ASCII ignoring case.
+static int equal_nocase(const unsigned char *pattern, size_t pattern_len,
+                        const unsigned char *subject, size_t subject_len,
+                        unsigned int flags) {
+  if (pattern_len != subject_len) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  while (pattern_len) {
+    unsigned char l = *pattern;
+    unsigned char r = *subject;
+    // The pattern must not contain NUL characters.
+    if (l == 0) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    if (l != r) {
+      if (OPENSSL_tolower(l) != OPENSSL_tolower(r)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+    ++pattern;
+    ++subject;
+    --pattern_len;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// Compare using OPENSSL_memcmp.
+static int equal_case(const unsigned char *pattern, size_t pattern_len,
+                      const unsigned char *subject, size_t subject_len,
+                      unsigned int flags) {
+  if (pattern_len != subject_len) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return !OPENSSL_memcmp(pattern, subject, pattern_len);
+}
+
+// RFC 5280, section 7.5, requires that only the domain is compared in a
+// case-insensitive manner.
+static int equal_email(const unsigned char *a, size_t a_len,
+                       const unsigned char *b, size_t b_len,
+                       unsigned int unused_flags) {
+  size_t i = a_len;
+  if (a_len != b_len) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  // We search backwards for the '@' character, so that we do not have to
+  // deal with quoted local-parts.  The domain part is compared in a
+  // case-insensitive manner.
+  while (i > 0) {
+    --i;
+    if (a[i] == '@' || b[i] == '@') {
+      if (!equal_nocase(a + i, a_len - i, b + i, a_len - i, 0)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+  if (i == 0) {
+    i = a_len;
+  }
+  return equal_case(a, i, b, i, 0);
+}
+
+// Compare the prefix and suffix with the subject, and check that the
+// characters in-between are valid.
+static int wildcard_match(const unsigned char *prefix, size_t prefix_len,
+                          const unsigned char *suffix, size_t suffix_len,
+                          const unsigned char *subject, size_t subject_len,
+                          unsigned int flags) {
+  const unsigned char *wildcard_start;
+  const unsigned char *wildcard_end;
+  const unsigned char *p;
+  int allow_idna = 0;
+
+  if (subject_len < prefix_len + suffix_len) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (!equal_nocase(prefix, prefix_len, subject, prefix_len, flags)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  wildcard_start = subject + prefix_len;
+  wildcard_end = subject + (subject_len - suffix_len);
+  if (!equal_nocase(wildcard_end, suffix_len, suffix, suffix_len, flags)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  // If the wildcard makes up the entire first label, it must match at
+  // least one character.
+  if (prefix_len == 0 && *suffix == '.') {
+    if (wildcard_start == wildcard_end) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    allow_idna = 1;
+  }
+  // IDNA labels cannot match partial wildcards
+  if (!allow_idna && subject_len >= 4 &&
+      OPENSSL_strncasecmp((char *)subject, "xn--", 4) == 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  // The wildcard may match a literal '*'
+  if (wildcard_end == wildcard_start + 1 && *wildcard_start == '*') {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  // Check that the part matched by the wildcard contains only
+  // permitted characters and only matches a single label.
+  for (p = wildcard_start; p != wildcard_end; ++p) {
+    if (!OPENSSL_isalnum(*p) && *p != '-') {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+#define LABEL_START (1 << 0)
+#define LABEL_END (1 << 1)
+#define LABEL_HYPHEN (1 << 2)
+#define LABEL_IDNA (1 << 3)
+
+static const unsigned char *valid_star(const unsigned char *p, size_t len,
+                                       unsigned int flags) {
+  const unsigned char *star = nullptr;
+  size_t i;
+  int state = LABEL_START;
+  int dots = 0;
+  for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
+    // Locate first and only legal wildcard, either at the start
+    // or end of a non-IDNA first and not final label.
+    if (p[i] == '*') {
+      int atstart = (state & LABEL_START);
+      int atend = (i == len - 1 || p[i + 1] == '.');
+      // At most one wildcard per pattern.
+      // No wildcards in IDNA labels.
+      // No wildcards after the first label.
+      if (star != nullptr || (state & LABEL_IDNA) != 0 || dots) {
+        return nullptr;
+      }
+      // Only full-label '*.example.com' wildcards.
+      if (!atstart || !atend) {
+        return nullptr;
+      }
+      star = &p[i];
+      state &= ~LABEL_START;
+    } else if (OPENSSL_isalnum(p[i])) {
+      if ((state & LABEL_START) != 0 && len - i >= 4 &&
+          OPENSSL_strncasecmp((char *)&p[i], "xn--", 4) == 0) {
+        state |= LABEL_IDNA;
+      }
+      state &= ~(LABEL_HYPHEN | LABEL_START);
+    } else if (p[i] == '.') {
+      if ((state & (LABEL_HYPHEN | LABEL_START)) != 0) {
+        return nullptr;
+      }
+      state = LABEL_START;
+      ++dots;
+    } else if (p[i] == '-') {
+      // no domain/subdomain starts with '-'
+      if ((state & LABEL_START) != 0) {
+        return nullptr;
+      }
+      state |= LABEL_HYPHEN;
+    } else {
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // The final label must not end in a hyphen or ".", and
+  // there must be at least two dots after the star.
+  if ((state & (LABEL_START | LABEL_HYPHEN)) != 0 || dots < 2) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  return star;
+}
+
+// Compare using wildcards.
+static int equal_wildcard(const unsigned char *pattern, size_t pattern_len,
+                          const unsigned char *subject, size_t subject_len,
+                          unsigned int flags) {
+  const unsigned char *star = nullptr;
+
+  // Subject names starting with '.' can only match a wildcard pattern
+  // via a subject sub-domain pattern suffix match.
+  if (!(subject_len > 1 && subject[0] == '.')) {
+    star = valid_star(pattern, pattern_len, flags);
+  }
+  if (star == nullptr) {
+    return equal_nocase(pattern, pattern_len, subject, subject_len, flags);
+  }
+  return wildcard_match(pattern, star - pattern, star + 1,
+                        (pattern + pattern_len) - star - 1, subject,
+                        subject_len, flags);
+}
+
+int bssl::x509v3_looks_like_dns_name(const unsigned char *in, size_t len) {
+  // This function is used as a heuristic for whether a common name is a
+  // hostname to be matched, or merely a decorative name to describe the
+  // subject. This heuristic must be applied to both name constraints and the
+  // common name fallback, so it must be loose enough to accept hostname
+  // common names, and tight enough to reject decorative common names.
+
+  if (len > 0 && in[len - 1] == '.') {
+    len--;
+  }
+
+  // Wildcards are allowed in front.
+  if (len >= 2 && in[0] == '*' && in[1] == '.') {
+    in += 2;
+    len -= 2;
+  }
+
+  if (len == 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  size_t label_start = 0;
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+    unsigned char c = in[i];
+    if (OPENSSL_isalnum(c) || (c == '-' && i > label_start) ||
+        // These are not valid characters in hostnames, but commonly found
+        // in deployments outside the Web PKI.
+        c == '_' || c == ':') {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // Labels must not be empty.
+    if (c == '.' && i > label_start && i < len - 1) {
+      label_start = i + 1;
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// Compare an ASN1_STRING to a supplied string. If they match return 1. If
+// cmp_type > 0 only compare if string matches the type, otherwise convert it
+// to UTF8.
+
+static int do_check_string(const ASN1_STRING *a, int cmp_type, equal_fn equal,
+                           unsigned int flags, int check_type, const char *b,
+                           size_t blen, char **peername) {
+  int rv = 0;
+
+  if (!a->data || !a->length) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (cmp_type > 0) {
+    if (cmp_type != a->type) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    if (cmp_type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) {
+      rv = equal(a->data, a->length, (unsigned char *)b, blen, flags);
+    } else if (a->length == (int)blen && !OPENSSL_memcmp(a->data, b, blen)) {
+      rv = 1;
+    }
+    if (rv > 0 && peername) {
+      *peername = OPENSSL_strndup((char *)a->data, a->length);
+      if (*peername == nullptr) {
+        return -1;
+      }
+    }
+  } else {
+    int astrlen;
+    unsigned char *astr;
+    astrlen = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&astr, a);
+    if (astrlen < 0) {
+      return -1;
+    }
+    // We check the common name against DNS name constraints if it passes
+    // `x509v3_looks_like_dns_name`. Thus we must not consider common names
+    // for DNS fallbacks if they fail this check.
+    if (check_type == GEN_DNS && !x509v3_looks_like_dns_name(astr, astrlen)) {
+      rv = 0;
+    } else {
+      rv = equal(astr, astrlen, (unsigned char *)b, blen, flags);
+    }
+    if (rv > 0 && peername) {
+      *peername = OPENSSL_strndup((char *)astr, astrlen);
+      if (*peername == nullptr) {
+        return -1;
+      }
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(astr);
+  }
+  return rv;
+}
+
+static int do_x509_check(const X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen,
+                         unsigned int flags, int check_type, char **peername) {
+  int cnid = NID_undef;
+  int alt_type;
+  int rv = 0;
+  equal_fn equal;
+  if (check_type == GEN_EMAIL) {
+    cnid = NID_pkcs9_emailAddress;
+    alt_type = V_ASN1_IA5STRING;
+    equal = equal_email;
+  } else if (check_type == GEN_DNS) {
+    cnid = NID_commonName;
+    alt_type = V_ASN1_IA5STRING;
+    if (flags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_WILDCARDS) {
+      equal = equal_nocase;
+    } else {
+      equal = equal_wildcard;
+    }
+  } else {
+    alt_type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+    equal = equal_case;
+  }
+
+  int critical;
+  UniquePtr<GENERAL_NAMES> gens(reinterpret_cast<GENERAL_NAMES *>(
+      X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, &critical, nullptr)));
+  if (gens) {
+    for (const GENERAL_NAME *gen : gens.get()) {
+      if (gen->type != check_type) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      const ASN1_STRING *cstr;
+      if (check_type == GEN_EMAIL) {
+        cstr = gen->d.rfc822Name;
+      } else if (check_type == GEN_DNS) {
+        cstr = gen->d.dNSName;
+      } else {
+        cstr = gen->d.iPAddress;
+      }
+      // Positive on success, negative on error!
+      if ((rv = do_check_string(cstr, alt_type, equal, flags, check_type, chk,
+                                chklen, peername)) != 0) {
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+    return rv;
+  } else if (critical != -1) {
+    // Syntax error in the subjectAltName extension.
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // We're done if CN-ID is not pertinent
+  if (cnid == NID_undef || (flags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int j = -1;
+  const X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(x);
+  while ((j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, cnid, j)) >= 0) {
+    const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, j);
+    const ASN1_STRING *str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne);
+    // Positive on success, negative on error!
+    if ((rv = do_check_string(str, -1, equal, flags, check_type, chk, chklen,
+                              peername)) != 0) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+  }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_check_host(const X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen,
+                    unsigned int flags, char **peername) {
+  if (chk == nullptr) {
+    return -2;
+  }
+  if (OPENSSL_memchr(chk, '\0', chklen)) {
+    return -2;
+  }
+  return do_x509_check(x, chk, chklen, flags, GEN_DNS, peername);
+}
+
+int X509_check_email(const X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen,
+                     unsigned int flags) {
+  if (chk == nullptr) {
+    return -2;
+  }
+  if (OPENSSL_memchr(chk, '\0', chklen)) {
+    return -2;
+  }
+  return do_x509_check(x, chk, chklen, flags, GEN_EMAIL, nullptr);
+}
+
+int X509_check_ip(const X509 *x, const unsigned char *chk, size_t chklen,
+                  unsigned int flags) {
+  if (chk == nullptr) {
+    return -2;
+  }
+  return do_x509_check(x, (const char *)chk, chklen, flags, GEN_IPADD, nullptr);
+}
+
+int X509_check_ip_asc(const X509 *x, const char *ipasc, unsigned int flags) {
+  unsigned char ipout[16];
+  size_t iplen;
+
+  if (ipasc == nullptr) {
+    return -2;
+  }
+  iplen = (size_t)x509v3_a2i_ipadd(ipout, ipasc);
+  if (iplen == 0) {
+    return -2;
+  }
+  return do_x509_check(x, (const char *)ipout, iplen, flags, GEN_IPADD,
+                       nullptr);
+}
+
+// Convert IP addresses both IPv4 and IPv6 into an OCTET STRING compatible
+// with RFC 3280.
+
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a2i_IPADDRESS(const char *ipasc) {
+  unsigned char ipout[16];
+  ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ret;
+  int iplen;
+
+  iplen = x509v3_a2i_ipadd(ipout, ipasc);
+  if (!iplen) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  ret = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+  if (!ret) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ret, ipout, iplen)) {
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a2i_IPADDRESS_NC(const char *ipasc) {
+  ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ret = nullptr;
+  unsigned char ipout[32];
+  char *iptmp = nullptr, *p;
+  int iplen1, iplen2;
+  // FIXME: yes, this function takes a const pointer and writes to it!
+  p = const_cast<char *>(strchr(ipasc, '/'));
+  if (!p) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  iptmp = OPENSSL_strdup(ipasc);
+  if (!iptmp) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  p = iptmp + (p - ipasc);
+  *p++ = 0;
+
+  iplen1 = x509v3_a2i_ipadd(ipout, iptmp);
+
+  if (!iplen1) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  iplen2 = x509v3_a2i_ipadd(ipout + iplen1, p);
+
+  OPENSSL_free(iptmp);
+  iptmp = nullptr;
+
+  if (!iplen2 || (iplen1 != iplen2)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+  if (!ret) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ret, ipout, iplen1 + iplen2)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(iptmp);
+  ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret);
+  return nullptr;
+}
+
+int bssl::x509v3_a2i_ipadd(uint8_t ipout[16], const char *ipasc) {
+  // If string contains a ':' assume IPv6
+
+  if (strchr(ipasc, ':')) {
+    if (!ipv6_from_asc(ipout, ipasc)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    return 16;
+  } else {
+    if (!ipv4_from_asc(ipout, ipasc)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    return 4;
+  }
+}
+
+// get_ipv4_component consumes one IPv4 component, terminated by either '.' or
+// the end of the string, from `*str`. On success, it returns one, sets `*out`
+// to the component, and advances `*str` to the first unconsumed character. On
+// invalid input, it returns zero.
+static int get_ipv4_component(uint8_t *out_byte, const char **str) {
+  // Store a slightly larger intermediary so the overflow check is easier.
+  uint32_t out = 0;
+  for (;;) {
+    if (!OPENSSL_isdigit(**str)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    out = (out * 10) + (**str - '0');
+    if (out > 255) {
+      // Components must be 8-bit.
+      return 0;
+    }
+    (*str)++;
+    if ((**str) == '.' || (**str) == '\0') {
+      *out_byte = (uint8_t)out;
+      return 1;
+    }
+    if (out == 0) {
+      // Reject extra leading zeros. Parsers sometimes treat them as octal, so
+      // accepting them would misinterpret input.
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+// get_ipv4_dot consumes a '.' from `*str` and advances it. It returns one on
+// success and zero if `*str` does not point to a '.'.
+static int get_ipv4_dot(const char **str) {
+  if (**str != '.') {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  (*str)++;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ipv4_from_asc(uint8_t v4[4], const char *in) {
+  if (!get_ipv4_component(&v4[0], &in) || !get_ipv4_dot(&in) ||
+      !get_ipv4_component(&v4[1], &in) || !get_ipv4_dot(&in) ||
+      !get_ipv4_component(&v4[2], &in) || !get_ipv4_dot(&in) ||
+      !get_ipv4_component(&v4[3], &in) || *in != '\0') {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+typedef struct {
+  // Temporary store for IPV6 output
+  uint8_t tmp[16];
+  // Total number of bytes in tmp
+  int total;
+  // The position of a zero (corresponding to '::')
+  int zero_pos;
+  // Number of zeroes
+  int zero_cnt;
+} IPV6_STAT;
+
+static int ipv6_from_asc(uint8_t v6[16], const char *in) {
+  IPV6_STAT v6stat;
+  v6stat.total = 0;
+  v6stat.zero_pos = -1;
+  v6stat.zero_cnt = 0;
+  // Treat the IPv6 representation as a list of values separated by ':'.
+  // The presence of a '::' will parse as one, two or three zero length
+  // elements.
+  if (!CONF_parse_list(in, ':', 0, ipv6_cb, &v6stat)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (v6stat.zero_pos == -1) {
+    // If no '::' must have exactly 16 bytes
+    if (v6stat.total != 16) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  } else {
+    // If '::' must have less than 16 bytes
+    if (v6stat.total >= 16) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    if (v6stat.zero_cnt > 3) {
+      // More than three zeroes is an error
+      return 0;
+    } else if (v6stat.zero_cnt == 3) {
+      // Can only have three zeroes if nothing else present
+      if (v6stat.total > 0) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    } else if (v6stat.zero_cnt == 2) {
+      // Can only have two zeroes if at start or end
+      if (v6stat.zero_pos != 0 && v6stat.zero_pos != v6stat.total) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    } else {
+      // Can only have one zero if *not* start or end
+      if (v6stat.zero_pos == 0 || v6stat.zero_pos == v6stat.total) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Format the result.
+  if (v6stat.zero_pos >= 0) {
+    // Copy initial part
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(v6, v6stat.tmp, v6stat.zero_pos);
+    // Zero middle
+    OPENSSL_memset(v6 + v6stat.zero_pos, 0, 16 - v6stat.total);
+    // Copy final part
+    if (v6stat.total != v6stat.zero_pos) {
+      OPENSSL_memcpy(v6 + v6stat.zero_pos + 16 - v6stat.total,
+                     v6stat.tmp + v6stat.zero_pos,
+                     v6stat.total - v6stat.zero_pos);
+    }
+  } else {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(v6, v6stat.tmp, 16);
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ipv6_cb(const char *elem, size_t len, void *usr) {
+  IPV6_STAT *s = reinterpret_cast<IPV6_STAT *>(usr);
+  // Error if 16 bytes written
+  if (s->total == 16) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (len == 0) {
+    // Zero length element, corresponds to '::'
+    if (s->zero_pos == -1) {
+      s->zero_pos = s->total;
+    } else if (s->zero_pos != s->total) {
+      // If we've already got a :: its an error
+      return 0;
+    }
+    if (s->zero_cnt >= 3) {
+      // More than three zeros is an error.
+      return 0;
+    }
+    s->zero_cnt++;
+  } else {
+    // If more than 4 characters could be final a.b.c.d form
+    if (len > 4) {
+      // Need at least 4 bytes left
+      if (s->total > 12) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+      // Must be end of string
+      if (elem[len]) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+      if (!ipv4_from_asc(s->tmp + s->total, elem)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+      s->total += 4;
+    } else {
+      if (!ipv6_hex(s->tmp + s->total, elem, len)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+      s->total += 2;
+    }
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// Convert a string of up to 4 hex digits into the corresponding IPv6 form.
+
+static int ipv6_hex(uint8_t *out, const char *in, size_t inlen) {
+  if (inlen > 4) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  uint16_t num = 0;
+  while (inlen--) {
+    uint8_t val;
+    if (!OPENSSL_fromxdigit(&val, *in++)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    num = (num << 4) | val;
+  }
+  out[0] = num >> 8;
+  out[1] = num & 0xff;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int bssl::X509V3_NAME_from_section(X509_NAME *nm,
+                                   const STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *dn_sk,
+                                   int chtype) {
+  if (!nm) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(dn_sk); i++) {
+    const CONF_VALUE *v = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(dn_sk, i);
+    const char *type = v->name;
+    // Skip past any leading X. X: X, etc to allow for multiple instances
+    for (const char *p = type; *p; p++) {
+      if ((*p == ':') || (*p == ',') || (*p == '.')) {
+        p++;
+        if (*p) {
+          type = p;
+        }
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+    int mval;
+    if (*type == '+') {
+      mval = -1;
+      type++;
+    } else {
+      mval = 0;
+    }
+    if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, type, chtype, (unsigned char *)v->value,
+                                    -1, -1, mval)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  return 1;
+}