visaljs 0.0.2 → 0.0.4

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/slhdsa/slhdsa.cc.inc

@@ -0,0 +1,690 @@
+// Copyright 2014 The BoringSSL Authors
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/base.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "../../internal.h"
+#include "../bcm_interface.h"
+#include "address.h"
+#include "fors.h"
+#include "merkle.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
+
+DEFINE_STATIC_ONCE(g_slhdsa_keygen_self_test_once)
+DEFINE_STATIC_ONCE(g_slhdsa_sign_self_test_once)
+DEFINE_STATIC_ONCE(g_slhdsa_verify_self_test_once)
+
+#endif
+
+namespace {
+
+namespace fips {
+void ensure_keygen_self_test();
+void ensure_sign_self_test();
+void ensure_verify_self_test();
+}  // namespace fips
+
+// The OBJECT IDENTIFIER header is also included in these values, per the spec.
+const uint8_t kSHA256OID[] = {0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01,
+                              0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01};
+const uint8_t kSHA384OID[] = {0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01,
+                              0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02};
+#define MAX_OID_LENGTH 11
+#define MAX_CONTEXT_LENGTH 255
+
+bcm_infallible generate_key_from_seed_no_self_test(const slh_dsa_config *config,
+                                                   uint8_t *out_public_key,
+                                                   uint8_t *out_secret_key,
+                                                   const uint8_t *seed) {
+  // Initialize SK.seed || SK.prf || PK.seed from seed.
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_secret_key, seed, 3 * config->n);
+
+  // Initialize PK.seed from seed.
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_public_key, seed + 2 * config->n, config->n);
+
+  uint8_t addr[32] = {0};
+  slhdsa_set_layer_addr(config, addr, config->d - 1);
+
+  // Set PK.root
+  slhdsa_treehash(config, out_public_key + config->n, out_secret_key, 0,
+                  config->tree_height, out_public_key, addr);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_secret_key + 3 * config->n, out_public_key + config->n,
+                 config->n);
+
+  // FIPS 140-3 IG 10.3.A comment 1 says of the pair-wise consistency test for
+  // SLH-DSA:
+  //
+  // "For key pairs generated for use with approved algorithms in SP 800-208 and
+  // FIPS 205, the PCT (described by the tester in TE10.35.02) may be limited to
+  // confirming the same key identifier (I in the case of LMS, SEED in the case
+  // of XMSS and PK.SEED for SLH-DSA) is shared by the resulting public and
+  // private key following generation."
+  //
+  // Since this is cheap, we always do this.
+
+  if (boringssl_fips_break_test("SLHDSA_PWCT")) {
+    out_public_key[0] ^= 1;
+  }
+  if (OPENSSL_memcmp(out_public_key, out_secret_key + 2 * config->n,
+                     config->n) != 0) {
+    abort();
+  }
+
+  return bcm_infallible::not_approved;
+}
+
+uint64_t load_tree_index(const slh_dsa_config *config, const uint8_t *in) {
+  const size_t tree_bits = slhdsa_tree_bits(config);
+  const size_t tree_bytes = slhdsa_tree_bytes(config);
+  BSSL_CHECK(tree_bits <= 64);
+  BSSL_CHECK(tree_bytes <= 8);
+
+  uint8_t buf[8] = {0};
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(buf + (sizeof(buf) - tree_bytes), in, tree_bytes);
+  uint64_t index = CRYPTO_load_u64_be(buf);
+  if (tree_bits < 64) {
+    index &= (~(uint64_t)0) >> (64 - tree_bits);
+  }
+  return index;
+}
+
+// Implements Algorithm 22: slh_sign function (Section 10.2.1, page 39)
+bcm_infallible sign_internal_no_self_test(
+    const slh_dsa_config *config, uint8_t *out_signature,
+    const uint8_t *secret_key,
+    const uint8_t header[BCM_SLHDSA_M_PRIME_HEADER_LEN], const uint8_t *context,
+    size_t context_len, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
+    const uint8_t *entropy) {
+  const size_t n = config->n;
+  const uint8_t *sk_seed = secret_key;
+  const uint8_t *sk_prf = secret_key + n;
+  const uint8_t *pk_seed = secret_key + 2 * n;
+  const uint8_t *pk_root = secret_key + 3 * n;
+
+  // Derive randomizer R and copy it to signature
+  uint8_t R[SLHDSA_MAX_N];
+  slhdsa_thash_prfmsg(config, R, sk_prf, entropy, header, context, context_len,
+                      msg, msg_len);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_signature, R, n);
+
+  // Compute message digest
+  uint8_t digest[SLHDSA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+  slhdsa_thash_hmsg(config, digest, R, pk_seed, pk_root, header, context,
+                    context_len, msg, msg_len);
+
+  uint8_t fors_digest[SLHDSA_MAX_FORS_MSG_BYTES];
+  const size_t fors_msg_bytes = slhdsa_fors_msg_bytes(config);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(fors_digest, digest, fors_msg_bytes);
+
+  size_t digest_offset = fors_msg_bytes;
+  const uint64_t idx_tree = load_tree_index(config, digest + digest_offset);
+  digest_offset += slhdsa_tree_bytes(config);
+  uint32_t idx_leaf = 0;
+  const size_t leaf_bytes = slhdsa_leaf_bytes(config);
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < leaf_bytes; ++i) {
+    idx_leaf = (idx_leaf << 8) | digest[digest_offset + i];
+  }
+  const size_t leaf_bits = slhdsa_leaf_bits(config);
+  if (leaf_bits < 32) {
+    idx_leaf &= (~(uint32_t)0) >> (32 - leaf_bits);
+  }
+
+  uint8_t addr[32] = {0};
+  slhdsa_set_tree_addr(config, addr, idx_tree);
+  slhdsa_set_type(config, addr, SLHDSA_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+  slhdsa_set_keypair_addr(config, addr, idx_leaf);
+
+  slhdsa_fors_sign(config, out_signature + n, fors_digest, sk_seed, pk_seed,
+                   addr);
+
+  uint8_t pk_fors[SLHDSA_MAX_N];
+  slhdsa_fors_pk_from_sig(config, pk_fors, out_signature + n, fors_digest,
+                          pk_seed, addr);
+
+  slhdsa_ht_sign(config, out_signature + n + slhdsa_fors_bytes(config), pk_fors,
+                 idx_tree, idx_leaf, sk_seed, pk_seed);
+  return bcm_infallible::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_status verify_internal(const slh_dsa_config *config,
+                           const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_len,
+                           const uint8_t *public_key,
+                           const uint8_t header[BCM_SLHDSA_M_PRIME_HEADER_LEN],
+                           const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len,
+                           const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
+  const size_t n = config->n;
+  if (signature_len != config->signature_bytes) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+  const uint8_t *pk_seed = public_key;
+  const uint8_t *pk_root = public_key + n;
+
+  const uint8_t *r = signature;
+  const uint8_t *sig_fors = signature + n;
+  const uint8_t *sig_ht = sig_fors + slhdsa_fors_bytes(config);
+
+  uint8_t digest[SLHDSA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+  slhdsa_thash_hmsg(config, digest, r, pk_seed, pk_root, header, context,
+                    context_len, msg, msg_len);
+
+  uint8_t fors_digest[SLHDSA_MAX_FORS_MSG_BYTES];
+  const size_t fors_msg_bytes = slhdsa_fors_msg_bytes(config);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(fors_digest, digest, fors_msg_bytes);
+
+  size_t digest_offset = fors_msg_bytes;
+  const uint64_t idx_tree = load_tree_index(config, digest + digest_offset);
+  digest_offset += slhdsa_tree_bytes(config);
+  uint32_t idx_leaf = 0;
+  const size_t leaf_bytes = slhdsa_leaf_bytes(config);
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < leaf_bytes; ++i) {
+    idx_leaf = (idx_leaf << 8) | digest[digest_offset + i];
+  }
+  const size_t leaf_bits = slhdsa_leaf_bits(config);
+  if (leaf_bits < 32) {
+    idx_leaf &= (~(uint32_t)0) >> (32 - leaf_bits);
+  }
+
+  uint8_t addr[32] = {0};
+  slhdsa_set_tree_addr(config, addr, idx_tree);
+  slhdsa_set_type(config, addr, SLHDSA_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+  slhdsa_set_keypair_addr(config, addr, idx_leaf);
+
+  uint8_t pk_fors[SLHDSA_MAX_N];
+  slhdsa_fors_pk_from_sig(config, pk_fors, sig_fors, fors_digest, pk_seed,
+                          addr);
+
+  if (!slhdsa_ht_verify(config, sig_ht, pk_fors, idx_tree, idx_leaf, pk_root,
+                        pk_seed)) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+
+  return bcm_status::approved;
+}
+
+namespace fips {
+
+#include "fips_known_values.inc"
+
+static int keygen_self_test() {
+  uint8_t seed[3 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N] = {0};
+  uint8_t pub[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES];
+  uint8_t priv[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES];
+  generate_key_from_seed_no_self_test(&kSLHDSAConfigSHA2_128s, pub, priv, seed);
+
+  if (!BORINGSSL_check_test(kExpectedPublicKey, pub, "SLH-DSA public key") ||
+      !BORINGSSL_check_test(kExpectedPrivateKey, priv, "SLH-DSA private key")) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int sign_self_test() {
+  uint8_t header[BCM_SLHDSA_M_PRIME_HEADER_LEN] = {0};
+  uint8_t entropy[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N] = {0};
+  uint8_t sig[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_SIGNATURE_BYTES];
+  sign_internal_no_self_test(&kSLHDSAConfigSHA2_128s, sig, kExpectedPrivateKey,
+                             header, nullptr, 0, nullptr, 0, entropy);
+  uint8_t digest[32];
+  SHA256(sig, sizeof(sig), digest);
+
+  if (!BORINGSSL_check_test(kExpectedSignatureSHA256, digest,
+                            "SLH-DSA signature")) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int verify_self_test() {
+  uint8_t header[BCM_SLHDSA_M_PRIME_HEADER_LEN] = {0};
+  return verify_internal(&kSLHDSAConfigSHA2_128s, kExpectedSignature,
+                         sizeof(kExpectedSignature), kExpectedPublicKey, header,
+                         nullptr, 0, nullptr, 0) == bcm_status::approved;
+}
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
+
+void ensure_keygen_self_test() {
+  CRYPTO_once(g_slhdsa_keygen_self_test_once_bss_get(), []() {
+    if (!keygen_self_test()) {
+      BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort();
+    }
+  });
+}
+
+void ensure_sign_self_test() {
+  CRYPTO_once(g_slhdsa_sign_self_test_once_bss_get(), []() {
+    if (!sign_self_test()) {
+      BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort();
+    }
+  });
+}
+
+void ensure_verify_self_test() {
+  CRYPTO_once(g_slhdsa_verify_self_test_once_bss_get(), []() {
+    if (!verify_self_test()) {
+      BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort();
+    }
+  });
+}
+
+#else
+
+void ensure_keygen_self_test() {}
+void ensure_sign_self_test() {}
+void ensure_verify_self_test() {}
+
+#endif
+
+}  // namespace fips
+
+}  // namespace
+
+bcm_infallible bssl::BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_generate_key_from_seed(
+    uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_secret_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t seed[3 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N]) {
+  fips::ensure_keygen_self_test();
+  return generate_key_from_seed_no_self_test(
+      &kSLHDSAConfigSHA2_128s, out_public_key, out_secret_key, seed);
+}
+
+bcm_infallible bssl::BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_generate_key_from_seed(
+    uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_secret_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t seed[3 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_N]) {
+  fips::ensure_keygen_self_test();
+  return generate_key_from_seed_no_self_test(
+      &kSLHDSAConfigSHAKE_256f, out_public_key, out_secret_key, seed);
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_generate_key_from_seed_fips(
+    uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_secret_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t seed[3 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N]) {
+  if (out_public_key == nullptr || out_secret_key == nullptr) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+  BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_generate_key_from_seed(out_public_key, out_secret_key,
+                                              seed);
+  return bcm_status::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_generate_key_from_seed_fips(
+    uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_secret_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t seed[3 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_N]) {
+  if (out_public_key == nullptr || out_secret_key == nullptr) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+  BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_generate_key_from_seed(out_public_key, out_secret_key,
+                                               seed);
+  return bcm_status::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_infallible bssl::BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_generate_key(
+    uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES]) {
+  uint8_t seed[3 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N];
+  RAND_bytes(seed, 3 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N);
+  return BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_generate_key_from_seed(out_public_key,
+                                                     out_private_key, seed);
+}
+
+bcm_infallible bssl::BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_generate_key(
+    uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES]) {
+  uint8_t seed[3 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_N];
+  RAND_bytes(seed, 3 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_N);
+  return BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_generate_key_from_seed(out_public_key,
+                                                      out_private_key, seed);
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_generate_key_fips(
+    uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES]) {
+  if (out_public_key == nullptr || out_private_key == nullptr) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+  BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_generate_key(out_public_key, out_private_key);
+  return bcm_status::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_generate_key_fips(
+    uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    uint8_t out_private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES]) {
+  if (out_public_key == nullptr || out_private_key == nullptr) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+  BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_generate_key(out_public_key, out_private_key);
+  return bcm_status::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_infallible bssl::BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_public_from_private(
+    uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES]) {
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_public_key, private_key + 2 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N,
+                 BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N * 2);
+  return bcm_infallible::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_infallible bssl::BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_public_from_private(
+    uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES]) {
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_public_key, private_key + 2 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_N,
+                 BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_N * 2);
+  return bcm_infallible::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_sign(
+    uint8_t out_signature[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context,
+    size_t context_len) {
+  if (context_len > MAX_CONTEXT_LENGTH) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+
+  // Construct header for M' as specified in Algorithm 22
+  uint8_t M_prime_header[2];
+  M_prime_header[0] = 0;  // domain separator for pure signing
+  M_prime_header[1] = (uint8_t)context_len;
+
+  uint8_t entropy[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N];
+  RAND_bytes(entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+  BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_sign_internal(out_signature, private_key, M_prime_header,
+                                     context, context_len, msg, msg_len,
+                                     entropy);
+  return bcm_status::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_sign(
+    uint8_t out_signature[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context,
+    size_t context_len) {
+  if (context_len > MAX_CONTEXT_LENGTH) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t M_prime_header[2];
+  M_prime_header[0] = 0;
+  M_prime_header[1] = (uint8_t)context_len;
+
+  uint8_t entropy[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_N];
+  RAND_bytes(entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+  BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_sign_internal(out_signature, private_key,
+                                      M_prime_header, context, context_len, msg,
+                                      msg_len, entropy);
+  return bcm_status::approved;
+}
+
+static int slhdsa_get_context_and_oid(uint8_t *out_context_and_oid,
+                                      size_t *out_context_and_oid_len,
+                                      size_t max_out_context_and_oid,
+                                      const uint8_t *context,
+                                      size_t context_len, int hash_nid,
+                                      size_t hashed_msg_len) {
+  const uint8_t *oid;
+  size_t oid_len;
+  size_t expected_hash_len;
+  switch (hash_nid) {
+    case NID_sha256:
+      oid = kSHA256OID;
+      oid_len = sizeof(kSHA256OID);
+      static_assert(sizeof(kSHA256OID) <= MAX_OID_LENGTH);
+      expected_hash_len = 32;
+      break;
+
+    // The SLH-DSA spec only lists SHA-256 and SHA-512. This function also
+    // supports SHA-384, which is non-standard.
+    case NID_sha384:
+      oid = kSHA384OID;
+      oid_len = sizeof(kSHA384OID);
+      static_assert(sizeof(kSHA384OID) <= MAX_OID_LENGTH);
+      expected_hash_len = 48;
+      break;
+
+    // If adding a hash function with a larger `oid_len`, update the size of
+    // `context_and_oid` in the callers.
+    default:
+      return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (hashed_msg_len != expected_hash_len) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  *out_context_and_oid_len = context_len + oid_len;
+  if (*out_context_and_oid_len > max_out_context_and_oid) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_context_and_oid, context, context_len);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_context_and_oid + context_len, oid, oid_len);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+bcm_infallible bssl::BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_sign_internal(
+    uint8_t out_signature[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t secret_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t header[BCM_SLHDSA_M_PRIME_HEADER_LEN], const uint8_t *context,
+    size_t context_len, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
+    const uint8_t entropy[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N]) {
+  fips::ensure_sign_self_test();
+  return sign_internal_no_self_test(&kSLHDSAConfigSHA2_128s, out_signature,
+                                    secret_key, header, context, context_len,
+                                    msg, msg_len, entropy);
+}
+
+bcm_infallible bssl::BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_sign_internal(
+    uint8_t out_signature[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t secret_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t header[BCM_SLHDSA_M_PRIME_HEADER_LEN], const uint8_t *context,
+    size_t context_len, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
+    const uint8_t entropy[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_N]) {
+  fips::ensure_sign_self_test();
+  return sign_internal_no_self_test(&kSLHDSAConfigSHAKE_256f, out_signature,
+                                    secret_key, header, context, context_len,
+                                    msg, msg_len, entropy);
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_prehash_sign(
+    uint8_t out_signature[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t *hashed_msg, size_t hashed_msg_len, int hash_nid,
+    const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len) {
+  if (context_len > MAX_CONTEXT_LENGTH) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t M_prime_header[2];
+  M_prime_header[0] = 1;  // domain separator for prehashed signing
+  M_prime_header[1] = (uint8_t)context_len;
+
+  uint8_t context_and_oid[MAX_CONTEXT_LENGTH + MAX_OID_LENGTH];
+  size_t context_and_oid_len;
+  if (!slhdsa_get_context_and_oid(context_and_oid, &context_and_oid_len,
+                                  sizeof(context_and_oid), context, context_len,
+                                  hash_nid, hashed_msg_len)) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t entropy[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N];
+  RAND_bytes(entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+  BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_sign_internal(out_signature, private_key, M_prime_header,
+                                     context_and_oid, context_and_oid_len,
+                                     hashed_msg, hashed_msg_len, entropy);
+  return bcm_status::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_prehash_sign(
+    uint8_t out_signature[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t *hashed_msg, size_t hashed_msg_len, int hash_nid,
+    const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len) {
+  if (context_len > MAX_CONTEXT_LENGTH) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t M_prime_header[2];
+  M_prime_header[0] = 1;
+  M_prime_header[1] = (uint8_t)context_len;
+
+  uint8_t context_and_oid[MAX_CONTEXT_LENGTH + MAX_OID_LENGTH];
+  size_t context_and_oid_len;
+  if (!slhdsa_get_context_and_oid(context_and_oid, &context_and_oid_len,
+                                  sizeof(context_and_oid), context, context_len,
+                                  hash_nid, hashed_msg_len)) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t entropy[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_N];
+  RAND_bytes(entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+  BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_sign_internal(
+      out_signature, private_key, M_prime_header, context_and_oid,
+      context_and_oid_len, hashed_msg, hashed_msg_len, entropy);
+  return bcm_status::approved;
+}
+
+// Implements Algorithm 24: slh_verify function (Section 10.3, page 41)
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_verify(
+    const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_len,
+    const uint8_t public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context,
+    size_t context_len) {
+  if (context_len > MAX_CONTEXT_LENGTH) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+
+  // Construct header for M' as specified in Algorithm 24
+  uint8_t M_prime_header[2];
+  M_prime_header[0] = 0;  // domain separator for pure verification
+  M_prime_header[1] = (uint8_t)context_len;
+
+  return BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_verify_internal(
+      signature, signature_len, public_key, M_prime_header, context,
+      context_len, msg, msg_len);
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_verify(
+    const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_len,
+    const uint8_t public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context,
+    size_t context_len) {
+  if (context_len > MAX_CONTEXT_LENGTH) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t M_prime_header[2];
+  M_prime_header[0] = 0;
+  M_prime_header[1] = (uint8_t)context_len;
+
+  return BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_verify_internal(
+      signature, signature_len, public_key, M_prime_header, context,
+      context_len, msg, msg_len);
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_prehash_verify(
+    const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_len,
+    const uint8_t public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t *hashed_msg, size_t hashed_msg_len, int hash_nid,
+    const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len) {
+  if (context_len > MAX_CONTEXT_LENGTH) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t M_prime_header[2];
+  M_prime_header[0] = 1;  // domain separator for prehashed verification
+  M_prime_header[1] = (uint8_t)context_len;
+
+  uint8_t context_and_oid[MAX_CONTEXT_LENGTH + MAX_OID_LENGTH];
+  size_t context_and_oid_len;
+  if (!slhdsa_get_context_and_oid(context_and_oid, &context_and_oid_len,
+                                  sizeof(context_and_oid), context, context_len,
+                                  hash_nid, hashed_msg_len)) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+
+  return BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_verify_internal(
+      signature, signature_len, public_key, M_prime_header, context_and_oid,
+      context_and_oid_len, hashed_msg, hashed_msg_len);
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_prehash_verify(
+    const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_len,
+    const uint8_t public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t *hashed_msg, size_t hashed_msg_len, int hash_nid,
+    const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len) {
+  if (context_len > MAX_CONTEXT_LENGTH) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t M_prime_header[2];
+  M_prime_header[0] = 1;
+  M_prime_header[1] = (uint8_t)context_len;
+
+  uint8_t context_and_oid[MAX_CONTEXT_LENGTH + MAX_OID_LENGTH];
+  size_t context_and_oid_len;
+  if (!slhdsa_get_context_and_oid(context_and_oid, &context_and_oid_len,
+                                  sizeof(context_and_oid), context, context_len,
+                                  hash_nid, hashed_msg_len)) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+
+  return BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_verify_internal(
+      signature, signature_len, public_key, M_prime_header, context_and_oid,
+      context_and_oid_len, hashed_msg, hashed_msg_len);
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_verify_internal(
+    const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_len,
+    const uint8_t public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t header[BCM_SLHDSA_M_PRIME_HEADER_LEN], const uint8_t *context,
+    size_t context_len, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
+  fips::ensure_verify_self_test();
+  return verify_internal(&kSLHDSAConfigSHA2_128s, signature, signature_len,
+                         public_key, header, context, context_len, msg,
+                         msg_len);
+}
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_slhdsa_shake_256f_verify_internal(
+    const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_len,
+    const uint8_t public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHAKE_256F_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
+    const uint8_t header[BCM_SLHDSA_M_PRIME_HEADER_LEN], const uint8_t *context,
+    size_t context_len, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
+  fips::ensure_verify_self_test();
+  return verify_internal(&kSLHDSAConfigSHAKE_256f, signature, signature_len,
+                         public_key, header, context, context_len, msg,
+                         msg_len);
+}
+
+int bssl::boringssl_self_test_slhdsa() {
+  return fips::keygen_self_test() && fips::sign_self_test() &&
+         fips::verify_self_test();
+}