visaljs 0.0.2 → 0.0.4

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/div.cc.inc

@@ -0,0 +1,738 @@
+// Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+#if (defined(OPENSSL_X86) || defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)) && defined(_MSC_VER) && \
+    !defined(__clang__)
+#define HAVE_MSVC_DIV_INTRINSICS
+#include <immintrin.h>
+#if defined(OPENSSL_X86)
+#pragma intrinsic(_udiv64)
+#else
+#pragma intrinsic(_udiv128)
+#endif
+#endif
+
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+// bn_div_words divides a double-width `h`,`l` by `d` and returns the result,
+// which must fit in a `BN_ULONG`, i.e. `h < d`.
+[[maybe_unused]]
+static BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d) {
+  assert(h < d);
+  BN_ULONG dh, dl, q, ret = 0, th, tl, t;
+  int i, count = 2;
+
+  if (d == 0) {
+    return BN_MASK2;
+  }
+
+  i = BN_num_bits_word(d);
+  assert((i == BN_BITS2) || (h <= (BN_ULONG)1 << i));
+
+  i = BN_BITS2 - i;
+  if (h >= d) {
+    h -= d;
+  }
+
+  if (i) {
+    d <<= i;
+    h = (h << i) | (l >> (BN_BITS2 - i));
+    l <<= i;
+  }
+  dh = (d & BN_MASK2h) >> BN_BITS4;
+  dl = (d & BN_MASK2l);
+  for (;;) {
+    if ((h >> BN_BITS4) == dh) {
+      q = BN_MASK2l;
+    } else {
+      q = h / dh;
+    }
+
+    th = q * dh;
+    tl = dl * q;
+    for (;;) {
+      t = h - th;
+      if ((t & BN_MASK2h) ||
+          ((tl) <= ((t << BN_BITS4) | ((l & BN_MASK2h) >> BN_BITS4)))) {
+        break;
+      }
+      q--;
+      th -= dh;
+      tl -= dl;
+    }
+    t = (tl >> BN_BITS4);
+    tl = (tl << BN_BITS4) & BN_MASK2h;
+    th += t;
+
+    if (l < tl) {
+      th++;
+    }
+    l -= tl;
+    if (h < th) {
+      h += d;
+      q--;
+    }
+    h -= th;
+
+    if (--count == 0) {
+      break;
+    }
+
+    ret = q << BN_BITS4;
+    h = (h << BN_BITS4) | (l >> BN_BITS4);
+    l = (l & BN_MASK2l) << BN_BITS4;
+  }
+
+  ret |= q;
+  return ret;
+}
+
+// bn_div_rem_words divides a double-width numerator (high half `nh` and low
+// half `nl`) with a single-width divisor. It sets `*quotient_out` and
+// `*rem_out` to be the quotient and numerator, respectively. The quotient must
+// fit in a `BN_ULONG`, i.e. `nh < d`.
+static void bn_div_rem_words(BN_ULONG *quotient_out, BN_ULONG *rem_out,
+                             BN_ULONG nh, BN_ULONG nl, BN_ULONG d) {
+  assert(nh < d);
+  // This operation is the x86 and x86_64 DIV instruction, but it is difficult
+  // for the compiler to emit it. Dividing a `BN_ULLONG` by a `BN_ULONG` does
+  // not work because, a priori, the quotient may not fit in `BN_ULONG` and DIV
+  // will trap on overflow, not truncate. The compiler will instead emit a call
+  // to a more expensive support function (e.g. `__udivdi3`). Thus we use inline
+  // assembly or intrinsics to get the instruction.
+  //
+  // These is specific to x86 and x86_64; Arm and RISC-V do not have double-wide
+  // division instructions.
+#if defined(BN_CAN_USE_INLINE_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86)
+  __asm__ volatile("divl %4"
+                   : "=a"(*quotient_out), "=d"(*rem_out)
+                   : "a"(nl), "d"(nh), "rm"(d)
+                   : "cc");
+#elif defined(BN_CAN_USE_INLINE_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
+  __asm__ volatile("divq %4"
+                   : "=a"(*quotient_out), "=d"(*rem_out)
+                   : "a"(nl), "d"(nh), "rm"(d)
+                   : "cc");
+#elif defined(HAVE_MSVC_DIV_INTRINSICS) && defined(OPENSSL_X86)
+  BN_ULLONG n = (((BN_ULLONG)nh) << BN_BITS2) | nl;
+  unsigned rem;
+  *quotient_out = _udiv64(n, d, &rem);
+  *rem_out = rem;
+#elif defined(HAVE_MSVC_DIV_INTRINSICS) && defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
+  unsigned __int64 rem;
+  *quotient_out = _udiv128(nh, nl, d, &rem);
+  *rem_out = rem;
+#else
+#if defined(BN_CAN_DIVIDE_ULLONG)
+  BN_ULLONG n = (((BN_ULLONG)nh) << BN_BITS2) | nl;
+  *quotient_out = (BN_ULONG)(n / d);
+#else
+  *quotient_out = bn_div_words(nh, nl, d);
+#endif  // BN_CAN_DIVIDE_ULLONG
+  *rem_out = nl - (*quotient_out * d);
+#endif
+}
+
+int BN_div(BIGNUM *quotient, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *numerator,
+           const BIGNUM *divisor, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  // This function implements long division, per Knuth, The Art of Computer
+  // Programming, Volume 2, Chapter 4.3.1, Algorithm D. This algorithm only
+  // divides non-negative integers, but we round towards zero, so we divide
+  // absolute values and adjust the signs separately.
+  //
+  // Inputs to this function are assumed public and may be leaked by timing and
+  // cache side channels. Division with secret inputs should use other
+  // implementation strategies such as Montgomery reduction.
+  if (BN_is_zero(divisor)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  BN_CTXScope scope(ctx);
+  BIGNUM *tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  BIGNUM *snum = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  BIGNUM *sdiv = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  BIGNUM *res = quotient == nullptr ? BN_CTX_get(ctx) : quotient;
+  int norm_shift, num_n, loop, div_n;
+  BN_ULONG d0, d1;
+  if (tmp == nullptr || snum == nullptr || sdiv == nullptr || res == nullptr) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Knuth step D1: Normalise the numbers such that the divisor's MSB is set.
+  // This ensures, in Knuth's terminology, that v1 >= b/2, needed for the
+  // quotient estimation step.
+  norm_shift = BN_BITS2 - (BN_num_bits(divisor) % BN_BITS2);
+  if (!BN_lshift(sdiv, divisor, norm_shift) ||
+      !BN_lshift(snum, numerator, norm_shift)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // This algorithm relies on `sdiv` being minimal width. We do not use this
+  // function on secret inputs, so leaking this is fine. Also minimize `snum` to
+  // avoid looping on leading zeros, as we're not trying to be leak-free.
+  bn_set_minimal_width(sdiv);
+  bn_set_minimal_width(snum);
+  div_n = sdiv->width;
+  d0 = sdiv->d[div_n - 1];
+  d1 = (div_n == 1) ? 0 : sdiv->d[div_n - 2];
+  assert(d0 & (((BN_ULONG)1) << (BN_BITS2 - 1)));
+
+  // Extend `snum` with zeros to satisfy the long division invariants:
+  // - `snum` must have at least `div_n` + 1 words.
+  // - `snum`'s most significant word must be zero to guarantee the first loop
+  //   iteration works with a prefix greater than `sdiv`. (This is the extra u0
+  //   digit in Knuth step D1.)
+  num_n = snum->width <= div_n ? div_n + 1 : snum->width + 1;
+  if (!bn_resize_words(snum, num_n)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Knuth step D2: The quotient's width is the difference between numerator and
+  // denominator. Also set up its sign and size a temporary for the loop.
+  loop = num_n - div_n;
+  res->neg = snum->neg ^ sdiv->neg;
+  if (!bn_wexpand(res, loop) ||  //
+      !bn_wexpand(tmp, div_n + 1)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  res->width = loop;
+
+  // Knuth steps D2 through D7: Compute the quotient with a word-by-word long
+  // division. Note that Knuth indexes words from most to least significant, so
+  // our index is reversed. Each loop iteration computes res->d[i] of the
+  // quotient and updates snum with the running remainder. Before each loop
+  // iteration, the div_n words beginning at snum->d[i+1] must be less than
+  // snum.
+  for (int i = loop - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+    // The next word of the quotient, q, is floor(wnum / sdiv), where wnum is
+    // the div_n + 1 words beginning at snum->d[i]. i starts at
+    // num_n - div_n - 1, so there are at least div_n + 1 words available.
+    //
+    // Knuth step D3: Compute q', an estimate of q by looking at the top words
+    // of wnum and sdiv. We must estimate such that q' = q or q' = q + 1.
+    BN_ULONG q, rm = 0;
+    BN_ULONG *wnum = snum->d + i;
+    BN_ULONG n0 = wnum[div_n];
+    BN_ULONG n1 = wnum[div_n - 1];
+    if (n0 == d0) {
+      // Estimate q' = b - 1, where b is the base.
+      q = BN_MASK2;
+      // Knuth also runs the fixup routine in this case, but this would require
+      // computing rm and is unnecessary. q' is already close enough. That is,
+      // the true quotient, q is either b - 1 or b - 2.
+      //
+      // By the loop invariant, q <= b - 1, so we must show that q >= b - 2. We
+      // do this by showing wnum / sdiv >= b - 2. Suppose wnum / sdiv < b - 2.
+      // wnum and sdiv have the same most significant word, so:
+      //
+      //    wnum >= n0 * b^div_n
+      //    sdiv <  (n0 + 1) * b^(d_div - 1)
+      //
+      // Thus:
+      //
+      //    b - 2 > wnum / sdiv
+      //          > (n0 * b^div_n) / (n0 + 1) * b^(div_n - 1)
+      //          = (n0 * b) / (n0 + 1)
+      //
+      //         (n0 + 1) * (b - 2) > n0 * b
+      //    n0 * b + b - 2 * n0 - 2 > n0 * b
+      //                      b - 2 > 2 * n0
+      //                    b/2 - 1 > n0
+      //
+      // This contradicts the normalization condition, so q >= b - 2 and our
+      // estimate is close enough.
+    } else {
+      // Estimate q' = floor(n0n1 / d0). Per Theorem B, q' - 2 <= q <= q', which
+      // is slightly outside of our bounds.
+      assert(n0 < d0);
+      bn_div_rem_words(&q, &rm, n0, n1, d0);
+
+      // Fix the estimate by examining one more word and adjusting q' as needed.
+      // This is the second half of step D3 and is sufficient per exercises 19,
+      // 20, and 21. Although only one iteration is needed to correct q + 2 to
+      // q + 1, Knuth uses a loop. A loop will often also correct q + 1 to q,
+      // saving the slightly more expensive underflow handling below.
+      if (div_n > 1) {
+        BN_ULONG n2 = wnum[div_n - 2];
+#ifdef BN_ULLONG
+        BN_ULLONG t2 = (BN_ULLONG)d1 * q;
+        for (;;) {
+          if (t2 <= ((((BN_ULLONG)rm) << BN_BITS2) | n2)) {
+            break;
+          }
+          q--;
+          rm += d0;
+          if (rm < d0) {
+            // If rm overflows, the true value exceeds BN_ULONG and the next
+            // t2 comparison should exit the loop.
+            break;
+          }
+          t2 -= d1;
+        }
+#else   // !BN_ULLONG
+        BN_ULONG t2l, t2h;
+        BN_UMULT_LOHI(t2l, t2h, d1, q);
+        for (;;) {
+          if (t2h < rm || (t2h == rm && t2l <= n2)) {
+            break;
+          }
+          q--;
+          rm += d0;
+          if (rm < d0) {
+            // If rm overflows, the true value exceeds BN_ULONG and the next
+            // t2 comparison should exit the loop.
+            break;
+          }
+          if (t2l < d1) {
+            t2h--;
+          }
+          t2l -= d1;
+        }
+#endif  // !BN_ULLONG
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Knuth step D4 through D6: Now q' = q or q' = q + 1, and
+    // -sdiv < wnum - sdiv * q < sdiv. If q' = q + 1, the subtraction will
+    // underflow, and we fix it up below.
+    tmp->d[div_n] = bn_mul_words(tmp->d, sdiv->d, div_n, q);
+    if (bn_sub_words(wnum, wnum, tmp->d, div_n + 1)) {
+      q--;
+      // The final addition is expected to overflow, canceling the underflow.
+      wnum[div_n] += bn_add_words(wnum, wnum, sdiv->d, div_n);
+    }
+
+    // q is now correct, and wnum has been updated to the running remainder.
+    res->d[i] = q;
+  }
+
+  // Trim leading zeros and correct any negative zeros.
+  bn_set_minimal_width(snum);
+  bn_set_minimal_width(res);
+
+  // Knuth step D8: Unnormalize. snum now contains the remainder.
+  if (rem != nullptr && !BN_rshift(rem, snum, norm_shift)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int BN_nnmod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (!(BN_mod(r, m, d, ctx))) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (!r->neg) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  // now -d < r < 0, so we have to set r := r + d. Ignoring the sign bits, this
+  // is r = d - r.
+  return BN_usub(r, d, r);
+}
+
+BN_ULONG bssl::bn_reduce_once(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG carry,
+                              const BN_ULONG *m, size_t num) {
+  assert(r != a);
+  // `r` = `a` - `m`. `bn_sub_words` performs the bulk of the subtraction, and
+  // then we apply the borrow to `carry`.
+  carry -= bn_sub_words(r, a, m, num);
+  // We know 0 <= `a` < 2*`m`, so -`m` <= `r` < `m`.
+  //
+  // If 0 <= `r` < `m`, `r` fits in `num` words and `carry` is zero. We then
+  // wish to select `r` as the answer. Otherwise -m <= r < 0 and we wish to
+  // return `r` + `m`, or `a`. `carry` must then be -1 or all ones. In both
+  // cases, `carry` is a suitable input to `bn_select_words`.
+  //
+  // Although `carry` may be one if it was one on input and `bn_sub_words`
+  // returns zero, this would give `r` > `m`, violating our input assumptions.
+  declassify_assert(carry + 1 <= 1);
+  bn_select_words(r, carry, a /* r < 0 */, r /* r >= 0 */, num);
+  return carry;
+}
+
+BN_ULONG bssl::bn_reduce_once_in_place(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG carry,
+                                       const BN_ULONG *m, BN_ULONG *tmp,
+                                       size_t num) {
+  // See `bn_reduce_once` for why this logic works.
+  carry -= bn_sub_words(tmp, r, m, num);
+  declassify_assert(carry + 1 <= 1);
+  bn_select_words(r, carry, r /* tmp < 0 */, tmp /* tmp >= 0 */, num);
+  return carry;
+}
+
+void bssl::bn_mod_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
+                            const BN_ULONG *m, BN_ULONG *tmp, size_t num) {
+  // r = a - b
+  BN_ULONG borrow = bn_sub_words(r, a, b, num);
+  // tmp = a - b + m
+  bn_add_words(tmp, r, m, num);
+  bn_select_words(r, 0 - borrow, tmp /* r < 0 */, r /* r >= 0 */, num);
+}
+
+void bssl::bn_mod_add_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
+                            const BN_ULONG *m, BN_ULONG *tmp, size_t num) {
+  BN_ULONG carry = bn_add_words(r, a, b, num);
+  bn_reduce_once_in_place(r, carry, m, tmp, num);
+}
+
+int bssl::bn_div_consttime(BIGNUM *quotient, BIGNUM *remainder,
+                           const BIGNUM *numerator, const BIGNUM *divisor,
+                           unsigned divisor_min_bits, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (BN_is_negative(numerator) || BN_is_negative(divisor)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NEGATIVE_NUMBER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (BN_is_zero(divisor)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // This function implements long division in binary. It is not very efficient,
+  // but it is simple, easy to make constant-time, and performant enough for RSA
+  // key generation.
+
+  BN_CTXScope scope(ctx);
+  BIGNUM *q = quotient, *r = remainder;
+  if (quotient == nullptr || quotient == numerator || quotient == divisor) {
+    q = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  }
+  if (remainder == nullptr || remainder == numerator || remainder == divisor) {
+    r = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  }
+  BIGNUM *tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  int initial_words;
+  if (q == nullptr || r == nullptr || tmp == nullptr ||
+      !bn_wexpand(q, numerator->width) || !bn_wexpand(r, divisor->width) ||
+      !bn_wexpand(tmp, divisor->width)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_memset(q->d, 0, numerator->width * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+  q->width = numerator->width;
+  q->neg = 0;
+
+  OPENSSL_memset(r->d, 0, divisor->width * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+  r->width = divisor->width;
+  r->neg = 0;
+
+  // Incorporate `numerator` into `r`, one bit at a time, reducing after each
+  // step. We maintain the invariant that `0 <= r < divisor` and
+  // `q * divisor + r = n` where `n` is the portion of `numerator` incorporated
+  // so far.
+  //
+  // First, we short-circuit the loop: if we know `divisor` has at least
+  // `divisor_min_bits` bits, the top `divisor_min_bits - 1` can be incorporated
+  // without reductions. This significantly speeds up `RSA_check_key`. For
+  // simplicity, we round down to a whole number of words.
+  declassify_assert(divisor_min_bits <= BN_num_bits(divisor));
+  initial_words = 0;
+  if (divisor_min_bits > 0) {
+    initial_words = (divisor_min_bits - 1) / BN_BITS2;
+    if (initial_words > numerator->width) {
+      initial_words = numerator->width;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(r->d, numerator->d + numerator->width - initial_words,
+                   initial_words * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+  }
+
+  for (int i = numerator->width - initial_words - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+    for (int bit = BN_BITS2 - 1; bit >= 0; bit--) {
+      // Incorporate the next bit of the numerator, by computing
+      // r = 2*r or 2*r + 1. Note the result fits in one more word. We store the
+      // extra word in `carry`.
+      BN_ULONG carry = bn_add_words(r->d, r->d, r->d, divisor->width);
+      r->d[0] |= (numerator->d[i] >> bit) & 1;
+      // `r` was previously fully-reduced, so we know:
+      //      2*0 <= r <= 2*(divisor-1) + 1
+      //        0 <= r <= 2*divisor - 1 < 2*divisor.
+      // Thus `r` satisfies the preconditions for `bn_reduce_once_in_place`.
+      BN_ULONG subtracted = bn_reduce_once_in_place(r->d, carry, divisor->d,
+                                                    tmp->d, divisor->width);
+      // The corresponding bit of the quotient is set iff we needed to subtract.
+      q->d[i] |= (~subtracted & 1) << bit;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if ((quotient != nullptr && !BN_copy(quotient, q)) ||
+      (remainder != nullptr && !BN_copy(remainder, r))) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static BIGNUM *bn_scratch_space_from_ctx(size_t width, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  BIGNUM *ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  if (ret == nullptr || !bn_wexpand(ret, width)) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  ret->neg = 0;
+  ret->width = (int)width;
+  return ret;
+}
+
+// bn_resized_from_ctx returns `bn` with width at least `width` or NULL on
+// error. This is so it may be used with low-level "words" functions. If
+// necessary, it allocates a new `BIGNUM` with a lifetime of the current scope
+// in `ctx`, so the caller does not need to explicitly free it. `bn` must fit in
+// `width` words.
+static const BIGNUM *bn_resized_from_ctx(const BIGNUM *bn, size_t width,
+                                         BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  if ((size_t)bn->width >= width) {
+    // Any excess words must be zero.
+    assert(bn_fits_in_words(bn, width));
+    return bn;
+  }
+  BIGNUM *ret = bn_scratch_space_from_ctx(width, ctx);
+  if (ret == nullptr || !BN_copy(ret, bn) || !bn_resize_words(ret, width)) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int BN_mod_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
+               BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (!BN_add(r, a, b)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx);
+}
+
+int BN_mod_add_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                     const BIGNUM *m) {
+  UniquePtr<BN_CTX> ctx(BN_CTX_new());
+  return ctx != nullptr && bn_mod_add_consttime(r, a, b, m, ctx.get());
+}
+
+int bssl::bn_mod_add_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                               const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  BN_CTXScope scope(ctx);
+  a = bn_resized_from_ctx(a, m->width, ctx);
+  b = bn_resized_from_ctx(b, m->width, ctx);
+  BIGNUM *tmp = bn_scratch_space_from_ctx(m->width, ctx);
+  if (a == nullptr || b == nullptr || tmp == nullptr ||
+      !bn_wexpand(r, m->width)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  bn_mod_add_words(r->d, a->d, b->d, m->d, tmp->d, m->width);
+  r->width = m->width;
+  r->neg = 0;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int BN_mod_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
+               BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (!BN_sub(r, a, b)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx);
+}
+
+int bssl::bn_mod_sub_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                               const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  BN_CTXScope scope(ctx);
+  a = bn_resized_from_ctx(a, m->width, ctx);
+  b = bn_resized_from_ctx(b, m->width, ctx);
+  BIGNUM *tmp = bn_scratch_space_from_ctx(m->width, ctx);
+  if (a == nullptr || b == nullptr || tmp == nullptr ||
+      !bn_wexpand(r, m->width)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  bn_mod_sub_words(r->d, a->d, b->d, m->d, tmp->d, m->width);
+  r->width = m->width;
+  r->neg = 0;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int BN_mod_sub_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                     const BIGNUM *m) {
+  UniquePtr<BN_CTX> ctx(BN_CTX_new());
+  return ctx != nullptr && bn_mod_sub_consttime(r, a, b, m, ctx.get());
+}
+
+int BN_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
+               BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  BN_CTXScope scope(ctx);
+  BIGNUM *t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  if (t == nullptr) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (a == b) {
+    if (!BN_sqr(t, a, ctx)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  } else {
+    if (!BN_mul(t, a, b, ctx)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_nnmod(r, t, m, ctx)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int BN_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (!BN_sqr(r, a, ctx)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // r->neg == 0,  thus we don't need BN_nnmod
+  return BN_mod(r, r, m, ctx);
+}
+
+int BN_mod_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m,
+                  BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (!BN_nnmod(r, a, m, ctx)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> abs_m;
+  if (m->neg) {
+    abs_m.reset(BN_dup(m));
+    if (abs_m == nullptr) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    abs_m->neg = 0;
+  }
+
+  return bn_mod_lshift_consttime(r, r, n, (abs_m ? abs_m.get() : m), ctx);
+}
+
+int bssl::bn_mod_lshift_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n,
+                                  const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (!BN_copy(r, a) || !bn_resize_words(r, m->width)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  BN_CTXScope scope(ctx);
+  BIGNUM *tmp = bn_scratch_space_from_ctx(m->width, ctx);
+  if (tmp == nullptr) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+    bn_mod_add_words(r->d, r->d, r->d, m->d, tmp->d, m->width);
+  }
+  r->neg = 0;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int BN_mod_lshift_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m) {
+  UniquePtr<BN_CTX> ctx(BN_CTX_new());
+  return ctx != nullptr && bn_mod_lshift_consttime(r, a, n, m, ctx.get());
+}
+
+int BN_mod_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (!BN_lshift1(r, a)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx);
+}
+
+int bssl::bn_mod_lshift1_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m,
+                                   BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  return bn_mod_add_consttime(r, a, a, m, ctx);
+}
+
+int BN_mod_lshift1_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m) {
+  UniquePtr<BN_CTX> ctx(BN_CTX_new());
+  return ctx != nullptr && bn_mod_lshift1_consttime(r, a, m, ctx.get());
+}
+
+BN_ULONG BN_div_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w) {
+  BN_ULONG ret = 0;
+  int i, j;
+
+  if (!w) {
+    // actually this an error (division by zero)
+    return (BN_ULONG)-1;
+  }
+
+  if (a->width == 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // normalize input for `bn_div_rem_words`.
+  j = BN_BITS2 - BN_num_bits_word(w);
+  w <<= j;
+  if (!BN_lshift(a, a, j)) {
+    return (BN_ULONG)-1;
+  }
+
+  for (i = a->width - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+    BN_ULONG l = a->d[i];
+    BN_ULONG d;
+    BN_ULONG unused_rem;
+    bn_div_rem_words(&d, &unused_rem, ret, l, w);
+    ret = l - (d * w);
+    a->d[i] = d;
+  }
+
+  bn_set_minimal_width(a);
+  ret >>= j;
+  return ret;
+}
+
+BN_ULONG BN_mod_word(const BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w) {
+#ifndef BN_CAN_DIVIDE_ULLONG
+  BN_ULONG ret = 0;
+#else
+  BN_ULLONG ret = 0;
+#endif
+  int i;
+
+  if (w == 0) {
+    return (BN_ULONG)-1;
+  }
+
+#ifndef BN_CAN_DIVIDE_ULLONG
+  // If `w` is too long and we don't have `BN_ULLONG` division then we need to
+  // fall back to using `BN_div_word`.
+  if (w > ((BN_ULONG)1 << BN_BITS4)) {
+    BIGNUM *tmp = BN_dup(a);
+    if (tmp == nullptr) {
+      return (BN_ULONG)-1;
+    }
+    ret = BN_div_word(tmp, w);
+    BN_free(tmp);
+    return ret;
+  }
+#endif
+
+  for (i = a->width - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+#ifndef BN_CAN_DIVIDE_ULLONG
+    ret = ((ret << BN_BITS4) | ((a->d[i] >> BN_BITS4) & BN_MASK2l)) % w;
+    ret = ((ret << BN_BITS4) | (a->d[i] & BN_MASK2l)) % w;
+#else
+    ret = (BN_ULLONG)(((ret << (BN_ULLONG)BN_BITS2) | a->d[i]) % (BN_ULLONG)w);
+#endif
+  }
+  return (BN_ULONG)ret;
+}