visaljs 0.0.2 → 0.0.4

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/ssl/d1_both.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,1137 @@
+// Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <algorithm>
+#include <optional>
+#include <utility>
+#include <variant>
+
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/bytestring/internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/mem_internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+// TODO(davidben): 28 comes from the size of IP + UDP header. Is this reasonable
+// for these values? Notably, why is kMinMTU a function of the transport
+// protocol's overhead rather than, say, what's needed to hold a minimally-sized
+// handshake fragment plus protocol overhead.
+
+// kMinMTU is the minimum acceptable MTU value.
+static const unsigned int kMinMTU = 256 - 28;
+
+// kDefaultMTU is the default MTU value to use if neither the user nor
+// the underlying BIO supplies one.
+static const unsigned int kDefaultMTU = 1500 - 28;
+
+// BitRange returns a `uint8_t` with bits `start`, inclusive, to `end`,
+// exclusive, set.
+static uint8_t BitRange(size_t start, size_t end) {
+  assert(start <= end && end <= 8);
+  return static_cast<uint8_t>(~((1u << start) - 1) & ((1u << end) - 1));
+}
+
+// FirstUnmarkedRangeInByte returns the first unmarked range in bits `b`.
+static DTLSMessageBitmap::Range FirstUnmarkedRangeInByte(uint8_t b) {
+  size_t start, end;
+  for (start = 0; start < 8; start++) {
+    if ((b & (1u << start)) == 0) {
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+  for (end = start; end < 8; end++) {
+    if ((b & (1u << end)) != 0) {
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+  return DTLSMessageBitmap::Range{start, end};
+}
+
+bool DTLSMessageBitmap::Init(size_t num_bits) {
+  if (num_bits + 7 < num_bits) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    return false;
+  }
+  size_t num_bytes = (num_bits + 7) / 8;
+  size_t bits_rounded = num_bytes * 8;
+  if (!bytes_.Init(num_bytes)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  MarkRange(num_bits, bits_rounded);
+  first_unmarked_byte_ = 0;
+  return true;
+}
+
+void DTLSMessageBitmap::MarkRange(size_t start, size_t end) {
+  assert(start <= end);
+  // Don't bother touching bytes that have already been marked.
+  start = std::max(start, first_unmarked_byte_ << 3);
+  // Clamp everything within range.
+  start = std::min(start, bytes_.size() << 3);
+  end = std::min(end, bytes_.size() << 3);
+  if (start >= end) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if ((start >> 3) == (end >> 3)) {
+    bytes_[start >> 3] |= BitRange(start & 7, end & 7);
+  } else {
+    bytes_[start >> 3] |= BitRange(start & 7, 8);
+    for (size_t i = (start >> 3) + 1; i < (end >> 3); i++) {
+      bytes_[i] = 0xff;
+    }
+    if ((end & 7) != 0) {
+      bytes_[end >> 3] |= BitRange(0, end & 7);
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Maintain the `first_unmarked_byte_` invariant. This work is amortized
+  // across all `MarkRange` calls.
+  while (first_unmarked_byte_ < bytes_.size() &&
+         bytes_[first_unmarked_byte_] == 0xff) {
+    first_unmarked_byte_++;
+  }
+  // If the whole message is marked, we no longer need to spend memory on the
+  // bitmap.
+  if (first_unmarked_byte_ >= bytes_.size()) {
+    bytes_.Reset();
+    first_unmarked_byte_ = 0;
+  }
+}
+
+DTLSMessageBitmap::Range DTLSMessageBitmap::NextUnmarkedRange(
+    size_t start) const {
+  // Don't bother looking at bytes that are known to be fully marked.
+  start = std::max(start, first_unmarked_byte_ << 3);
+
+  size_t idx = start >> 3;
+  if (idx >= bytes_.size()) {
+    return Range{0, 0};
+  }
+
+  // Look at the bits from `start` up to a byte boundary.
+  uint8_t byte = bytes_[idx] | BitRange(0, start & 7);
+  if (byte == 0xff) {
+    // Nothing unmarked at this byte. Keep searching for an unmarked bit.
+    for (idx = idx + 1; idx < bytes_.size(); idx++) {
+      if (bytes_[idx] != 0xff) {
+        byte = bytes_[idx];
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+    if (idx >= bytes_.size()) {
+      return Range{0, 0};
+    }
+  }
+
+  Range range = FirstUnmarkedRangeInByte(byte);
+  assert(!range.empty());
+  bool should_extend = range.end == 8;
+  range.start += idx << 3;
+  range.end += idx << 3;
+  if (!should_extend) {
+    // The range did not end at a byte boundary. We're done.
+    return range;
+  }
+
+  // Collect all fully unmarked bytes.
+  for (idx = idx + 1; idx < bytes_.size(); idx++) {
+    if (bytes_[idx] != 0) {
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+  range.end = idx << 3;
+
+  // Add any bits from the remaining byte, if any.
+  if (idx < bytes_.size()) {
+    Range extra = FirstUnmarkedRangeInByte(bytes_[idx]);
+    if (extra.start == 0) {
+      range.end += extra.end;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return range;
+}
+
+// Receiving handshake messages.
+
+DTLSIncomingMessage::DTLSIncomingMessage(const DTLSHandshakeHeader &hdr)
+    : type_(hdr.type), seq_(hdr.seq), msg_(FragmentList{{}, hdr.msg_len}) {}
+
+static bool AppendU24(Vector<uint8_t> *out, uint32_t v) {
+  uint8_t bytes[3] = {static_cast<uint8_t>(v >> 16),
+                      static_cast<uint8_t>(v >> 8), static_cast<uint8_t>(v)};
+  return out->Append(bytes);
+}
+
+bool DTLSIncomingMessage::AddFragment(uint32_t offset,
+                                      Span<const uint8_t> data) {
+  assert(offset <= msg_len());
+  assert(data.size() <= msg_len() - offset);
+
+  if (auto *list = std::get_if<FragmentList>(&msg_); list != nullptr) {
+    if (list->fragments.size() + data.size() < list->msg_len) {
+      // Including this new fragment, it is not yet possible for the message to
+      // be complete yet. Avoid allocating a ReassemblyBuffer.
+      //
+      // `list->fragments.size()` includes a six-byte header per fragment, so
+      // this comparison is loose. We may switch to ReassemblyBuffer before it
+      // is possible for to have complete message, but this is fine.
+      return AppendU24(&list->fragments, offset) &&
+             AppendU24(&list->fragments, static_cast<uint32_t>(data.size())) &&
+             list->fragments.Append(data);
+    }
+
+    // Convert the saved fragments to a ReassemblyBuffer. We have received
+    // enough that the memory use is proportional to data received.
+    ReassemblyBuffer new_buf;
+    if (!new_buf.msg.InitForOverwrite(DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + list->msg_len) ||
+        !new_buf.reassembly.Init(list->msg_len)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    // Reconstruct an unfragmented message header.
+    CBB cbb;
+    BSSL_CHECK(CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, new_buf.msg.data(), new_buf.msg.size()));
+    BSSL_CHECK(CBB_add_u8(&cbb, type_));
+    BSSL_CHECK(CBB_add_u24(&cbb, list->msg_len));
+    BSSL_CHECK(CBB_add_u16(&cbb, seq_));
+    BSSL_CHECK(CBB_add_u24(&cbb, 0 /* frag_off */));
+    BSSL_CHECK(CBB_add_u24(&cbb, list->msg_len));
+
+    // Replay the saved fragments.
+    CBS fragments(list->fragments);
+    while (CBS_len(&fragments) != 0) {
+      uint32_t saved_offset;
+      CBS saved_data;
+      BSSL_CHECK(CBS_get_u24(&fragments, &saved_offset));
+      BSSL_CHECK(CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&fragments, &saved_data));
+      new_buf.AddFragment(saved_offset, saved_data);
+    }
+
+    msg_ = std::move(new_buf);
+  }
+
+  auto &buf = std::get<ReassemblyBuffer>(msg_);
+  buf.AddFragment(offset, data);
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool DTLSIncomingMessage::IsComplete() const {
+  auto *buf = std::get_if<ReassemblyBuffer>(&msg_);
+  return buf != nullptr && buf->reassembly.IsComplete();
+}
+
+std::optional<SSLMessage> DTLSIncomingMessage::GetMessage() const {
+  auto *buf = std::get_if<ReassemblyBuffer>(&msg_);
+  if (buf == nullptr || !buf->reassembly.IsComplete()) {
+    return std::nullopt;
+  }
+
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  msg.type = type_;
+  msg.raw = CBS(buf->msg);
+  msg.body = CBS(Span(buf->msg).subspan(DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH));
+  msg.is_v2_hello = false;
+  return msg;
+}
+
+void DTLSIncomingMessage::ReassemblyBuffer::AddFragment(
+    uint32_t offset, Span<const uint8_t> data) {
+  if (reassembly.IsComplete()) {
+    // The message is already assembled.
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Copy the body into the fragment.
+  Span<uint8_t> dest =
+      Span(msg).subspan(DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH).subspan(offset, data.size());
+  assert(dest.size() == data.size());
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(dest.data(), data.data(), data.size());
+  reassembly.MarkRange(offset, offset + data.size());
+}
+
+// dtls1_is_current_message_complete returns whether the current handshake
+// message is complete.
+[[maybe_unused]] static bool dtls1_is_current_message_complete(
+    const SSLImpl *ssl) {
+  size_t idx = ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq % SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT;
+  const DTLSIncomingMessage *frag = ssl->d1->incoming_messages[idx].get();
+  return frag != nullptr && frag->IsComplete();
+}
+
+// dtls1_get_incoming_message returns the incoming message corresponding to
+// `msg_hdr`. If none exists, it creates a new one and inserts it in the
+// queue. Otherwise, it checks `msg_hdr` is consistent with the existing one. It
+// returns NULL on failure. The caller does not take ownership of the result.
+static DTLSIncomingMessage *dtls1_get_incoming_message(
+    SSLImpl *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, const DTLSHandshakeHeader &msg_hdr) {
+  if (msg_hdr.seq < ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
+      msg_hdr.seq - ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq >= SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  size_t idx = msg_hdr.seq % SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT;
+  DTLSIncomingMessage *frag = ssl->d1->incoming_messages[idx].get();
+  if (frag != nullptr) {
+    assert(frag->seq() == msg_hdr.seq);
+    // The new fragment must be compatible with the previous fragments from this
+    // message.
+    if (frag->type() != msg_hdr.type || frag->msg_len() != msg_hdr.msg_len) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_FRAGMENT_MISMATCH);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+    return frag;
+  }
+
+  // This is the first fragment from this message.
+  ssl->d1->incoming_messages[idx] = MakeUnique<DTLSIncomingMessage>(msg_hdr);
+  if (!ssl->d1->incoming_messages[idx]) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  return ssl->d1->incoming_messages[idx].get();
+}
+
+bool dtls1_process_handshake_fragments(SSLImpl *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                       DTLSRecordNumber record_number,
+                                       Span<const uint8_t> record) {
+  bool implicit_ack = false;
+  bool skipped_fragments = false;
+  CBS cbs = record;
+  while (CBS_len(&cbs) > 0) {
+    // Read a handshake fragment.
+    DTLSHandshakeHeader msg_hdr;
+    CBS body;
+    if (!dtls1_parse_fragment(&cbs, &msg_hdr, &body)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_RECORD);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    const size_t frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
+    const size_t frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
+    const size_t msg_len = msg_hdr.msg_len;
+    if (frag_off > msg_len || frag_len > msg_len - frag_off) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_RECORD);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    if (msg_hdr.seq < ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
+        ssl->d1->handshake_read_overflow) {
+      // Ignore fragments from the past. This is a retransmit of data we already
+      // received.
+      //
+      // TODO(crbug.com/383016430): Use this to drive retransmits.
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    if (record_number.epoch() != ssl->d1->read_epoch.epoch ||
+        ssl->d1->next_read_epoch != nullptr) {
+      // New messages can only arrive in the latest epoch. This can fail if the
+      // record came from `prev_read_epoch`, or if it came from `read_epoch` but
+      // `next_read_epoch` exists. (It cannot come from `next_read_epoch`
+      // because `next_read_epoch` becomes `read_epoch` once it receives a
+      // record.)
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESS_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    if (msg_len > ssl_max_handshake_message_len(ssl)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_in_init(ssl) && ssl_has_final_version(ssl) &&
+        ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+      // During the handshake, if we receive any portion of the next flight, the
+      // peer must have received our most recent flight. In DTLS 1.3, this is an
+      // implicit ACK. See RFC 9147, Section 7.1.
+      //
+      // This only applies during the handshake. After the handshake, the next
+      // message may be part of a post-handshake transaction. It also does not
+      // apply immediately after the handshake. As a client, receiving a
+      // KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket does not imply the server has received
+      // our Finished. The server may have sent those messages in half-RTT.
+      implicit_ack = true;
+    }
+
+    if (msg_hdr.seq - ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq >= SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT) {
+      // Ignore fragments too far in the future.
+      skipped_fragments = true;
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    DTLSIncomingMessage *frag =
+        dtls1_get_incoming_message(ssl, out_alert, msg_hdr);
+    if (frag == nullptr) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    if (!frag->AddFragment(frag_off, body)) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (implicit_ack) {
+    dtls1_stop_timer(ssl);
+    dtls_clear_outgoing_messages(ssl);
+  }
+
+  if (!skipped_fragments) {
+    ssl->d1->records_to_ack.PushBack(record_number);
+
+    if (ssl_has_final_version(ssl) &&
+        ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION &&
+        !ssl->d1->ack_timer.IsSet() && !ssl->d1->sending_ack) {
+      // Schedule sending an ACK. The delay serves several purposes:
+      // - If there are more records to come, we send only one ACK.
+      // - If there are more records to come and the flight is now complete, we
+      //   will send the reply (which implicitly ACKs the previous flight) and
+      //   cancel the timer.
+      // - If there are more records to come, the flight is now complete, but
+      //   generating the response is delayed (e.g. a slow, async private key),
+      //   the timer will fire and we send an ACK anyway.
+      OPENSSL_timeval now = ssl_ctx_get_current_time(ssl->ctx.get());
+      ssl->d1->ack_timer.StartMicroseconds(
+          now, uint64_t{ssl->d1->timeout_duration_ms} * 1000 / 4);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+ssl_open_record_t dtls1_open_handshake(SSLImpl *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
+                                       uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in) {
+  uint8_t type;
+  DTLSRecordNumber record_number;
+  Span<uint8_t> record;
+  auto ret = dtls_open_record(ssl, &type, &record_number, &record, out_consumed,
+                              out_alert, in);
+  if (ret != ssl_open_record_success) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+
+  switch (type) {
+    case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
+      // In DTLS 1.2, out-of-order application data may be received between
+      // ChangeCipherSpec and Finished. Discard it.
+      return ssl_open_record_discard;
+
+    case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+      if (record.size() != 1u || record[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+        *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        return ssl_open_record_error;
+      }
+
+      // We do not support renegotiation, so encrypted ChangeCipherSpec records
+      // are illegal.
+      if (record_number.epoch() != 0) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+        *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+        return ssl_open_record_error;
+      }
+
+      // Ignore ChangeCipherSpec from a previous epoch.
+      if (record_number.epoch() != ssl->d1->read_epoch.epoch) {
+        return ssl_open_record_discard;
+      }
+
+      // Flag the ChangeCipherSpec for later.
+      // TODO(crbug.com/383078468): Should we reject this in DTLS 1.3?
+      ssl->d1->has_change_cipher_spec = true;
+      ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+                          record);
+      return ssl_open_record_success;
+
+    case SSL3_RT_ACK:
+      return dtls1_process_ack(ssl, out_alert, record_number, record);
+
+    case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
+      if (!dtls1_process_handshake_fragments(ssl, out_alert, record_number,
+                                             record)) {
+        return ssl_open_record_error;
+      }
+      return ssl_open_record_success;
+
+    default:
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+      return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+}
+
+bool dtls1_get_message(const SSLImpl *ssl, SSLMessage *out) {
+  size_t idx = ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq % SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT;
+  const DTLSIncomingMessage *frag = ssl->d1->incoming_messages[idx].get();
+  if (frag == nullptr) {
+    assert(!dtls1_is_current_message_complete(ssl));
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  std::optional<SSLMessage> msg = frag->GetMessage();
+  assert(dtls1_is_current_message_complete(ssl) == msg.has_value());
+  if (!msg.has_value()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  *out = *msg;
+  if (!ssl->s3->has_message) {
+    ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, out->raw);
+    ssl->s3->has_message = true;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+void dtls1_next_message(SSLImpl *ssl) {
+  assert(ssl->s3->has_message);
+  assert(dtls1_is_current_message_complete(ssl));
+  size_t index = ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq % SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT;
+  ssl->d1->incoming_messages[index].reset();
+  ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
+  if (ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq == 0) {
+    ssl->d1->handshake_read_overflow = true;
+  }
+  ssl->s3->has_message = false;
+  // If we previously sent a flight, mark it as having a reply, so
+  // `on_handshake_complete` can manage post-handshake retransmission.
+  if (ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_complete) {
+    ssl->d1->flight_has_reply = true;
+  }
+}
+
+bool dtls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data(const SSLImpl *ssl) {
+  size_t current = ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq % SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT;
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT; i++) {
+    // Skip the current message.
+    if (ssl->s3->has_message && i == current) {
+      assert(dtls1_is_current_message_complete(ssl));
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (ssl->d1->incoming_messages[i] != nullptr) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+bool dtls1_parse_fragment(CBS *cbs, DTLSHandshakeHeader *out_hdr,
+                          CBS *out_body) {
+  *out_hdr = DTLSHandshakeHeader{};
+  if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &out_hdr->type) ||
+      !CBS_get_u24(cbs, &out_hdr->msg_len) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(cbs, &out_hdr->seq) ||
+      !CBS_get_u24(cbs, &out_hdr->frag_off) ||
+      !CBS_get_u24(cbs, &out_hdr->frag_len) ||
+      !CBS_get_bytes(cbs, out_body, out_hdr->frag_len)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+ssl_open_record_t dtls1_open_change_cipher_spec(SSLImpl *ssl,
+                                                size_t *out_consumed,
+                                                uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                                Span<uint8_t> in) {
+  if (!ssl->d1->has_change_cipher_spec) {
+    // dtls1_open_handshake processes both handshake and ChangeCipherSpec.
+    auto ret = dtls1_open_handshake(ssl, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
+    if (ret != ssl_open_record_success) {
+      return ret;
+    }
+  }
+  if (ssl->d1->has_change_cipher_spec) {
+    ssl->d1->has_change_cipher_spec = false;
+    return ssl_open_record_success;
+  }
+  return ssl_open_record_discard;
+}
+
+
+// Sending handshake messages.
+
+void dtls_clear_outgoing_messages(SSLImpl *ssl) {
+  ssl->d1->outgoing_messages.clear();
+  ssl->d1->sent_records = nullptr;
+  ssl->d1->outgoing_written = 0;
+  ssl->d1->outgoing_offset = 0;
+  ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_complete = false;
+  ssl->d1->flight_has_reply = false;
+  ssl->d1->sending_flight = false;
+  dtls_clear_unused_write_epochs(ssl);
+}
+
+void dtls_clear_unused_write_epochs(SSLImpl *ssl) {
+  ssl->d1->extra_write_epochs.EraseIf(
+      [ssl](const UniquePtr<DTLSWriteEpoch> &write_epoch) -> bool {
+        // Non-current epochs may be discarded once there are no incomplete
+        // outgoing messages that reference them.
+        //
+        // TODO(crbug.com/381113363): Epoch 1 (0-RTT) should be retained until
+        // epoch 3 (app data) is available.
+        for (const auto &msg : ssl->d1->outgoing_messages) {
+          if (msg.epoch == write_epoch->epoch() && !msg.IsFullyAcked()) {
+            return false;
+          }
+        }
+        return true;
+      });
+}
+
+bool dtls1_init_message(const SSLImpl *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type) {
+  // Pick a modest size hint to save most of the `realloc` calls.
+  if (!CBB_init(cbb, 64) ||                                   //
+      !CBB_add_u8(cbb, type) ||                               //
+      !CBB_add_u24(cbb, 0 /* length (filled in later) */) ||  //
+      !CBB_add_u16(cbb, ssl->d1->handshake_write_seq) ||      //
+      !CBB_add_u24(cbb, 0 /* offset */) ||                    //
+      !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, body)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool dtls1_finish_message(const SSLImpl *ssl, CBB *cbb,
+                          Array<uint8_t> *out_msg) {
+  if (!CBBFinishArray(cbb, out_msg) ||
+      out_msg->size() < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Fix up the header. Copy the fragment length into the total message
+  // length.
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_msg->data() + 1,
+                 out_msg->data() + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 3, 3);
+  return true;
+}
+
+// add_outgoing adds a new handshake message or ChangeCipherSpec to the current
+// outgoing flight. It returns true on success and false on error.
+static bool add_outgoing(SSLImpl *ssl, bool is_ccs, Array<uint8_t> data) {
+  if (ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_complete) {
+    // If we've begun writing a new flight, we received the peer flight. Discard
+    // the timer and the our flight.
+    dtls1_stop_timer(ssl);
+    dtls_clear_outgoing_messages(ssl);
+  }
+
+  if (!is_ccs) {
+    if (ssl->d1->handshake_write_overflow) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+      return false;
+    }
+    // TODO(svaldez): Move this up a layer to fix abstraction for SSLTranscript
+    // on hs.
+    if (ssl->s3->hs != nullptr && !ssl->s3->hs->transcript.Update(data)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return false;
+    }
+    ssl->d1->handshake_write_seq++;
+    if (ssl->d1->handshake_write_seq == 0) {
+      ssl->d1->handshake_write_overflow = true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  DTLSOutgoingMessage msg;
+  msg.data = std::move(data);
+  msg.epoch = ssl->d1->write_epoch.epoch();
+  msg.is_ccs = is_ccs;
+  // Zero-length messages need 1 bit to track whether the peer has received the
+  // message header. (Normally the message header is implicitly received when
+  // any fragment of the message is received at all.)
+  if (!is_ccs && !msg.acked.Init(std::max(msg.msg_len(), size_t{1}))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // This should not fail if `SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT` was sized correctly.
+  //
+  // TODO(crbug.com/42290594): This can currently fail in DTLS 1.3. The caller
+  // can configure how many tickets to send, up to kMaxTickets. Additionally, if
+  // we send 0.5-RTT tickets in 0-RTT, we may even have tickets queued up with
+  // the server flight.
+  if (!ssl->d1->outgoing_messages.TryPushBack(std::move(msg))) {
+    assert(false);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool dtls1_add_message(SSLImpl *ssl, Array<uint8_t> data) {
+  return add_outgoing(ssl, false /* handshake */, std::move(data));
+}
+
+bool dtls1_add_change_cipher_spec(SSLImpl *ssl) {
+  // DTLS 1.3 disables compatibility mode, which means that DTLS 1.3 never sends
+  // a ChangeCipherSpec message.
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) > TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  return add_outgoing(ssl, true /* ChangeCipherSpec */, Array<uint8_t>());
+}
+
+// dtls1_update_mtu updates the current MTU from the BIO, ensuring it is above
+// the minimum.
+static void dtls1_update_mtu(SSLImpl *ssl) {
+  // TODO(davidben): No consumer implements `BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU` and the
+  // only `BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU` implementation could use
+  // `SSL_set_mtu`. Does this need to be so complex?
+  if (ssl->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu() &&
+      !(SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
+    long mtu = BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio.get(), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, nullptr);
+    if (mtu >= 0 && mtu <= (1 << 30) && (unsigned)mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu()) {
+      ssl->d1->mtu = (unsigned)mtu;
+    } else {
+      ssl->d1->mtu = kDefaultMTU;
+      BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio.get(), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU, ssl->d1->mtu, nullptr);
+    }
+  }
+
+  // The MTU should be above the minimum now.
+  assert(ssl->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu());
+}
+
+enum seal_result_t {
+  seal_error,
+  seal_continue,
+  seal_flush,
+};
+
+// seal_next_record seals one record's worth of messages to `out` and advances
+// `ssl`'s internal state past the data that was sealed. If progress was made,
+// it returns `seal_flush` or `seal_continue` and sets
+// `*out_len` to the number of bytes written.
+//
+// If the function stopped because the next message could not be combined into
+// this record, it returns `seal_continue` and the caller should loop again.
+// Otherwise, it returns `seal_flush` and the packet is complete (either because
+// there are no more messages or the packet is full).
+static seal_result_t seal_next_record(SSLImpl *ssl, Span<uint8_t> out,
+                                      size_t *out_len) {
+  *out_len = 0;
+
+  // Skip any fully acked messages.
+  while (ssl->d1->outgoing_written < ssl->d1->outgoing_messages.size() &&
+         ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[ssl->d1->outgoing_written].IsFullyAcked()) {
+    ssl->d1->outgoing_offset = 0;
+    ssl->d1->outgoing_written++;
+  }
+
+  // There was nothing left to write.
+  if (ssl->d1->outgoing_written >= ssl->d1->outgoing_messages.size()) {
+    return seal_flush;
+  }
+
+  const auto &first_msg = ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[ssl->d1->outgoing_written];
+  size_t prefix_len = dtls_seal_prefix_len(ssl, first_msg.epoch);
+  size_t max_in_len = dtls_seal_max_input_len(ssl, first_msg.epoch, out.size());
+  if (max_in_len == 0) {
+    // There is no room for a single record.
+    return seal_flush;
+  }
+
+  if (first_msg.is_ccs) {
+    static const uint8_t kChangeCipherSpec[1] = {SSL3_MT_CCS};
+    DTLSRecordNumber record_number;
+    if (!dtls_seal_record(ssl, &record_number, out.data(), out_len, out.size(),
+                          SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, kChangeCipherSpec,
+                          sizeof(kChangeCipherSpec), first_msg.epoch)) {
+      return seal_error;
+    }
+
+    ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, /*is_write=*/1, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+                        kChangeCipherSpec);
+    ssl->d1->outgoing_offset = 0;
+    ssl->d1->outgoing_written++;
+    return seal_continue;
+  }
+
+  // TODO(crbug.com/374991962): For now, only send one message per record in
+  // epoch 0. Sending multiple is allowed and more efficient, but breaks
+  // b/378742138.
+  const bool allow_multiple_messages = first_msg.epoch != 0;
+
+  // Pack as many handshake fragments into one record as we can. We stage the
+  // fragments in the output buffer, to be sealed in-place.
+  bool should_continue = false;
+  Span<uint8_t> fragments =
+      out.subspan(prefix_len, std::min(max_in_len, out.size() - prefix_len));
+  CBB cbb;
+  CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, fragments.data(), fragments.size());
+  DTLSSentRecord sent_record;
+  sent_record.first_msg = ssl->d1->outgoing_written;
+  sent_record.first_msg_start = ssl->d1->outgoing_offset;
+  while (ssl->d1->outgoing_written < ssl->d1->outgoing_messages.size()) {
+    const auto &msg = ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[ssl->d1->outgoing_written];
+    if (msg.epoch != first_msg.epoch || msg.is_ccs) {
+      // We can only pack messages if the epoch matches. There may be more room
+      // in the packet, so tell the caller to keep going.
+      should_continue = true;
+      break;
+    }
+
+    // Decode `msg`'s header.
+    CBS cbs(msg.data), body_cbs;
+    DTLSHandshakeHeader hdr;
+    if (!dtls1_parse_fragment(&cbs, &hdr, &body_cbs) ||  //
+        hdr.frag_off != 0 ||                             //
+        hdr.frag_len != CBS_len(&body_cbs) ||            //
+        hdr.msg_len != CBS_len(&body_cbs) ||             //
+        CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return seal_error;
+    }
+
+    // Iterate over every un-acked range in the message, if any.
+    Span<const uint8_t> body = body_cbs;
+    for (;;) {
+      auto range = msg.acked.NextUnmarkedRange(ssl->d1->outgoing_offset);
+      if (range.empty()) {
+        // Advance to the next message.
+        ssl->d1->outgoing_offset = 0;
+        ssl->d1->outgoing_written++;
+        break;
+      }
+
+      // Determine how much progress can be made (minimum one byte of progress).
+      size_t capacity = fragments.size() - CBB_len(&cbb);
+      if (capacity < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) {
+        goto packet_full;
+      }
+      size_t todo = std::min(range.size(), capacity - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+      // Empty messages are special-cased in ACK tracking. We act as if they
+      // have one byte, but in reality that byte is tracking the header.
+      Span<const uint8_t> frag;
+      if (!body.empty()) {
+        frag = body.subspan(range.start, todo);
+      }
+
+      // Assemble the fragment.
+      size_t frag_start = CBB_len(&cbb);
+      CBB child;
+      if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, hdr.type) ||                       //
+          !CBB_add_u24(&cbb, hdr.msg_len) ||                   //
+          !CBB_add_u16(&cbb, hdr.seq) ||                       //
+          !CBB_add_u24(&cbb, range.start) ||                   //
+          !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||        //
+          !CBB_add_bytes(&child, frag.data(), frag.size()) ||  //
+          !CBB_flush(&cbb)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return seal_error;
+      }
+      size_t frag_end = CBB_len(&cbb);
+
+      // TODO(davidben): It is odd that, on output, we inform the caller of
+      // retransmits and individual fragments, but on input we only inform the
+      // caller of complete messages.
+      ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, /*is_write=*/1, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+                          fragments.subspan(frag_start, frag_end - frag_start));
+
+      ssl->d1->outgoing_offset = range.start + todo;
+      if (todo < range.size()) {
+        // The packet was the limiting factor.
+        goto packet_full;
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (!allow_multiple_messages) {
+      should_continue = true;
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+
+packet_full:
+  sent_record.last_msg = ssl->d1->outgoing_written;
+  sent_record.last_msg_end = ssl->d1->outgoing_offset;
+
+  // We could not fit anything. Don't try to make a record.
+  if (CBB_len(&cbb) == 0) {
+    assert(!should_continue);
+    return seal_flush;
+  }
+
+  if (!dtls_seal_record(ssl, &sent_record.number, out.data(), out_len,
+                        out.size(), SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, CBB_data(&cbb),
+                        CBB_len(&cbb), first_msg.epoch)) {
+    return seal_error;
+  }
+
+  // If DTLS 1.3 (or if the version is not yet known and it may be DTLS 1.3),
+  // save the record number to match against ACKs later.
+  if (ssl->s3->version == 0 || ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    if (ssl->d1->sent_records == nullptr) {
+      ssl->d1->sent_records =
+          MakeUnique<MRUQueue<DTLSSentRecord, DTLS_MAX_ACK_BUFFER>>();
+      if (ssl->d1->sent_records == nullptr) {
+        return seal_error;
+      }
+    }
+    ssl->d1->sent_records->PushBack(sent_record);
+  }
+
+  return should_continue ? seal_continue : seal_flush;
+}
+
+// seal_next_packet writes as much of the next flight as possible to `out` and
+// advances `ssl->d1->outgoing_written` and `ssl->d1->outgoing_offset` as
+// appropriate.
+static bool seal_next_packet(SSLImpl *ssl, Span<uint8_t> out, size_t *out_len) {
+  size_t total = 0;
+  for (;;) {
+    size_t len;
+    seal_result_t ret = seal_next_record(ssl, out, &len);
+    switch (ret) {
+      case seal_error:
+        return false;
+
+      case seal_flush:
+      case seal_continue:
+        out = out.subspan(len);
+        total += len;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    if (ret == seal_flush) {
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+
+  *out_len = total;
+  return true;
+}
+
+static int send_flight(SSLImpl *ssl) {
+  if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->wbio == nullptr) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->d1->num_timeouts > DTLS1_MAX_TIMEOUTS) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  dtls1_update_mtu(ssl);
+
+  Array<uint8_t> packet;
+  if (!packet.InitForOverwrite(ssl->d1->mtu)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  while (ssl->d1->outgoing_written < ssl->d1->outgoing_messages.size()) {
+    uint8_t old_written = ssl->d1->outgoing_written;
+    uint32_t old_offset = ssl->d1->outgoing_offset;
+
+    size_t packet_len;
+    if (!seal_next_packet(ssl, Span(packet), &packet_len)) {
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (packet_len == 0 &&
+        ssl->d1->outgoing_written < ssl->d1->outgoing_messages.size()) {
+      // We made no progress with the packet size available, but did not reach
+      // the end.
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MTU_TOO_SMALL);
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    if (packet_len != 0) {
+      if (!BIO_write_ex(ssl->wbio.get(), packet.data(), packet_len,
+                        /*out_written=*/nullptr)) {
+        // Retry this packet the next time around.
+        ssl->d1->outgoing_written = old_written;
+        ssl->d1->outgoing_offset = old_offset;
+        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE;
+        return -1;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  ssl->d1->pending_flush = true;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void dtls1_finish_flight(SSLImpl *ssl) {
+  if (ssl->d1->outgoing_messages.empty() ||
+      ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_complete) {
+    return;  // Nothing to do.
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[0].epoch <= 2) {
+    // DTLS 1.3 handshake messages (epoch 2 and below) implicitly ACK the
+    // previous flight, so there is no need to ACK previous records. This
+    // clears the ACK buffer slightly earlier than the specification suggests.
+    // See the discussion in
+    // https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/kjJnquJOVaWxu5hUCmNzB35eqY0/
+    ssl->d1->records_to_ack.Clear();
+    ssl->d1->ack_timer.Stop();
+    ssl->d1->sending_ack = false;
+  }
+
+  ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_complete = true;
+  ssl->d1->sending_flight = true;
+  // Stop retransmitting the previous flight. In DTLS 1.3, we'll have stopped
+  // the timer already, but DTLS 1.2 keeps it running until the next flight is
+  // ready.
+  dtls1_stop_timer(ssl);
+}
+
+void dtls1_schedule_ack(SSLImpl *ssl) {
+  ssl->d1->ack_timer.Stop();
+  ssl->d1->sending_ack = !ssl->d1->records_to_ack.empty();
+}
+
+static int send_ack(SSLImpl *ssl) {
+  assert(ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION);
+
+  // Ensure we don't send so many ACKs that we overflow the MTU. There is a
+  // 2-byte length prefix and each ACK is 16 bytes.
+  dtls1_update_mtu(ssl);
+  size_t max_plaintext =
+      dtls_seal_max_input_len(ssl, ssl->d1->write_epoch.epoch(), ssl->d1->mtu);
+  if (max_plaintext < 2 + 16) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MTU_TOO_SMALL);  // No room for even one ACK.
+    return -1;
+  }
+  size_t num_acks =
+      std::min((max_plaintext - 2) / 16, ssl->d1->records_to_ack.size());
+
+  // Assemble the ACK. RFC 9147 says to sort ACKs numerically. It is unclear if
+  // other implementations do this, but go ahead and sort for now. See
+  // https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/kjJnquJOVaWxu5hUCmNzB35eqY0/.
+  // Remove this if rfc9147bis removes this requirement.
+  InplaceVector<DTLSRecordNumber, DTLS_MAX_ACK_BUFFER> sorted;
+  for (size_t i = ssl->d1->records_to_ack.size() - num_acks;
+       i < ssl->d1->records_to_ack.size(); i++) {
+    sorted.PushBack(ssl->d1->records_to_ack[i]);
+  }
+  std::sort(sorted.begin(), sorted.end());
+
+  uint8_t buf[2 + 16 * DTLS_MAX_ACK_BUFFER];
+  CBB cbb, child;
+  CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, buf, sizeof(buf));
+  BSSL_CHECK(CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child));
+  for (const auto &number : sorted) {
+    BSSL_CHECK(CBB_add_u64(&child, number.epoch()));
+    BSSL_CHECK(CBB_add_u64(&child, number.sequence()));
+  }
+  BSSL_CHECK(CBB_flush(&cbb));
+
+  // Encrypt it.
+  uint8_t record[DTLS1_3_RECORD_HEADER_WRITE_LENGTH + sizeof(buf) +
+                 1 /* record type */ + EVP_AEAD_MAX_OVERHEAD];
+  size_t record_len;
+  DTLSRecordNumber record_number;
+  if (!dtls_seal_record(ssl, &record_number, record, &record_len,
+                        sizeof(record), SSL3_RT_ACK, CBB_data(&cbb),
+                        CBB_len(&cbb), ssl->d1->write_epoch.epoch())) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, /*is_write=*/1, SSL3_RT_ACK, CBBAsSpan(&cbb));
+
+  if (!BIO_write_ex(ssl->wbio.get(), record, record_len,
+                    /*out_written=*/nullptr)) {
+    ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE;
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  ssl->d1->pending_flush = true;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int dtls1_flush(SSLImpl *ssl) {
+  // Send the pending ACK, if any.
+  if (ssl->d1->sending_ack) {
+    int ret = send_ack(ssl);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+      return ret;
+    }
+    ssl->d1->sending_ack = false;
+  }
+
+  // Send the pending flight, if any.
+  if (ssl->d1->sending_flight) {
+    int ret = send_flight(ssl);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+      return ret;
+    }
+
+    // Reset state for the next send.
+    ssl->d1->outgoing_written = 0;
+    ssl->d1->outgoing_offset = 0;
+    ssl->d1->sending_flight = false;
+
+    // Schedule the next retransmit timer. In DTLS 1.3, we retransmit all
+    // flights until ACKed. In DTLS 1.2, the final Finished flight is never
+    // ACKed, so we do not keep the timer running after the handshake.
+    if (SSL_in_init(ssl) || ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+      if (ssl->d1->num_timeouts == 0) {
+        ssl->d1->timeout_duration_ms = ssl->initial_timeout_duration_ms;
+      } else {
+        ssl->d1->timeout_duration_ms =
+            std::min(ssl->d1->timeout_duration_ms * 2, uint32_t{60000});
+      }
+
+      OPENSSL_timeval now = ssl_ctx_get_current_time(ssl->ctx.get());
+      ssl->d1->retransmit_timer.StartMicroseconds(
+          now, uint64_t{ssl->d1->timeout_duration_ms} * 1000);
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->d1->pending_flush) {
+    if (BIO_flush(ssl->wbio.get()) <= 0) {
+      ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE;
+      return -1;
+    }
+    ssl->d1->pending_flush = false;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu() { return kMinMTU; }
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END