visaljs 0.0.2 → 0.0.4

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/ssl/ssl_cipher.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,1762 @@
+// Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+// Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+// Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <iterator>
+#include <optional>
+
+#include <openssl/aead.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+static constexpr SSL_CIPHER kCiphers[] = {
+    // The RSA ciphers
+
+    // Cipher 0A
+    {
+        SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+        "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA",
+        SSL_CIPHER_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+        SSL_kRSA,
+        SSL_aRSA_DECRYPT,
+        SSL_3DES,
+        SSL_SHA1,
+        SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+
+    // New AES ciphersuites
+
+    // Cipher 2F
+    {
+        TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+        "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
+        SSL_CIPHER_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+        SSL_kRSA,
+        SSL_aRSA_DECRYPT,
+        SSL_AES128,
+        SSL_SHA1,
+        SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher 35
+    {
+        TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+        "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
+        SSL_CIPHER_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+        SSL_kRSA,
+        SSL_aRSA_DECRYPT,
+        SSL_AES256,
+        SSL_SHA1,
+        SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    // PSK cipher suites.
+
+    // Cipher 8C
+    {
+        TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+        "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
+        SSL_CIPHER_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+        SSL_kPSK,
+        SSL_aPSK,
+        SSL_AES128,
+        SSL_SHA1,
+        SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher 8D
+    {
+        TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+        "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
+        SSL_CIPHER_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+        SSL_kPSK,
+        SSL_aPSK,
+        SSL_AES256,
+        SSL_SHA1,
+        SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    // GCM ciphersuites from RFC 5288
+
+    // Cipher 9C
+    {
+        TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+        "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
+        SSL_CIPHER_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+        SSL_kRSA,
+        SSL_aRSA_DECRYPT,
+        SSL_AES128GCM,
+        SSL_AEAD,
+        SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher 9D
+    {
+        TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+        "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384",
+        SSL_CIPHER_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+        SSL_kRSA,
+        SSL_aRSA_DECRYPT,
+        SSL_AES256GCM,
+        SSL_AEAD,
+        SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
+    },
+
+    // TLS 1.3 suites.
+
+    // Cipher 1301
+    {
+        TLS1_3_RFC_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+        "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
+        SSL_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+        SSL_kGENERIC,
+        SSL_aGENERIC,
+        SSL_AES128GCM,
+        SSL_AEAD,
+        SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher 1302
+    {
+        TLS1_3_RFC_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+        "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384",
+        SSL_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+        SSL_kGENERIC,
+        SSL_aGENERIC,
+        SSL_AES256GCM,
+        SSL_AEAD,
+        SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher 1303
+    {
+        TLS1_3_RFC_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+        "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256",
+        SSL_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+        SSL_kGENERIC,
+        SSL_aGENERIC,
+        SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
+        SSL_AEAD,
+        SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher C009
+    {
+        TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+        "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
+        SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+        SSL_kECDHE,
+        SSL_aECDSA,
+        SSL_AES128,
+        SSL_SHA1,
+        SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher C00A
+    {
+        TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+        "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
+        SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+        SSL_kECDHE,
+        SSL_aECDSA,
+        SSL_AES256,
+        SSL_SHA1,
+        SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher C013
+    {
+        TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+        "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
+        SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+        SSL_kECDHE,
+        SSL_aRSA_SIGN,
+        SSL_AES128,
+        SSL_SHA1,
+        SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher C014
+    {
+        TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+        "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
+        SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+        SSL_kECDHE,
+        SSL_aRSA_SIGN,
+        SSL_AES256,
+        SSL_SHA1,
+        SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    // HMAC based TLS v1.2 ciphersuites from RFC5289
+
+    // Cipher C023 (deprecated)
+    {
+        TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+        "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256",
+        SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+        SSL_kECDHE,
+        SSL_aECDSA,
+        SSL_AES128,
+        SSL_SHA256,
+        SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher C027 (deprecated)
+    {
+        TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+        "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256",
+        SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+        SSL_kECDHE,
+        SSL_aRSA_SIGN,
+        SSL_AES128,
+        SSL_SHA256,
+        SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    // GCM based TLS v1.2 ciphersuites from RFC 5289
+
+    // Cipher C02B
+    {
+        TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+        "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
+        SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+        SSL_kECDHE,
+        SSL_aECDSA,
+        SSL_AES128GCM,
+        SSL_AEAD,
+        SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher C02C
+    {
+        TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+        "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384",
+        SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+        SSL_kECDHE,
+        SSL_aECDSA,
+        SSL_AES256GCM,
+        SSL_AEAD,
+        SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher C02F
+    {
+        TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+        "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
+        SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+        SSL_kECDHE,
+        SSL_aRSA_SIGN,
+        SSL_AES128GCM,
+        SSL_AEAD,
+        SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher C030
+    {
+        TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+        "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384",
+        SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+        SSL_kECDHE,
+        SSL_aRSA_SIGN,
+        SSL_AES256GCM,
+        SSL_AEAD,
+        SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
+    },
+
+    // ECDHE-PSK cipher suites.
+
+    // Cipher C035
+    {
+        TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+        "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
+        SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+        SSL_kECDHE,
+        SSL_aPSK,
+        SSL_AES128,
+        SSL_SHA1,
+        SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher C036
+    {
+        TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+        "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
+        SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+        SSL_kECDHE,
+        SSL_aPSK,
+        SSL_AES256,
+        SSL_SHA1,
+        SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    // ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suites.
+
+    // Cipher CCA8
+    {
+        TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+        "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256",
+        SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+        SSL_kECDHE,
+        SSL_aRSA_SIGN,
+        SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
+        SSL_AEAD,
+        SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher CCA9
+    {
+        TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+        "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256",
+        SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+        SSL_kECDHE,
+        SSL_aECDSA,
+        SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
+        SSL_AEAD,
+        SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher CCAB
+    {
+        TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+        "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256",
+        SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+        SSL_kECDHE,
+        SSL_aPSK,
+        SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
+        SSL_AEAD,
+        SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+};
+
+Span<const SSL_CIPHER> AllCiphers() { return kCiphers; }
+
+namespace {
+constexpr size_t NumTLS13Ciphers() {
+  size_t num = 0;
+  for (const auto &cipher : kCiphers) {
+    if (cipher.algorithm_mkey == SSL_kGENERIC) {
+      num++;
+    }
+  }
+  return num;
+}
+
+#define CIPHER_ADD 1
+#define CIPHER_KILL 2
+#define CIPHER_DEL 3
+#define CIPHER_ORD 4
+#define CIPHER_SPECIAL 5
+
+typedef struct cipher_order_st {
+  const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+  bool active;
+  bool in_group;
+  struct cipher_order_st *next, *prev;
+} CIPHER_ORDER;
+
+typedef struct cipher_alias_st {
+  // name is the name of the cipher alias.
+  const char *name = nullptr;
+
+  // The following fields are bitmasks for the corresponding fields on
+  // `SSL_CIPHER`. A cipher matches a cipher alias iff, for each bitmask, the
+  // bit corresponding to the cipher's value is set to 1. If any bitmask is
+  // all zeroes, the alias matches nothing. Use `~0u` for the default value.
+  uint32_t algorithm_mkey = ~0u;
+  uint32_t algorithm_auth = ~0u;
+  uint32_t algorithm_enc = ~0u;
+  uint32_t algorithm_mac = ~0u;
+
+  // min_version, if non-zero, matches all ciphers which were added in that
+  // particular protocol version.
+  uint16_t min_version = 0;
+
+  // include_deprecated, if true, means this alias includes deprecated ciphers.
+  bool include_deprecated = false;
+} CIPHER_ALIAS;
+const CIPHER_ALIAS kCipherAliases[] = {
+    {"ALL", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+
+    // The "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" rule is omitted. It matches nothing.
+
+    // key exchange aliases
+    // (some of those using only a single bit here combine
+    // multiple key exchange algs according to the RFCs.
+    {"kRSA", SSL_kRSA, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+
+    {"kECDHE", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"kEECDH", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"ECDH", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+
+    {"kPSK", SSL_kPSK, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+
+    // server authentication aliases
+    {"aRSA", ~0u, SSL_aRSA_SIGN | SSL_aRSA_DECRYPT, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"aECDSA", ~0u, SSL_aECDSA, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"ECDSA", ~0u, SSL_aECDSA, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"aPSK", ~0u, SSL_aPSK, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+
+    // aliases combining key exchange and server authentication
+    {"ECDHE", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"EECDH", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"RSA", SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA_SIGN | SSL_aRSA_DECRYPT, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"PSK", SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+
+    // symmetric encryption aliases
+    {"3DES", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_3DES, ~0u, 0, /*include_deprecated=*/true},
+    {"AES128", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128 | SSL_AES128GCM, ~0u, 0,
+     /*include_deprecated=*/false},
+    {"AES256", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES256 | SSL_AES256GCM, ~0u, 0,
+     /*include_deprecated=*/false},
+    {"AES", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES, ~0u, 0},
+    {"AESGCM", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM, ~0u, 0,
+     /*include_deprecated=*/false},
+    {"CHACHA20", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, ~0u, 0,
+     /*include_deprecated=*/false},
+
+    // MAC aliases
+    {"SHA1", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_SHA1, 0},
+    {"SHA", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_SHA1, 0},
+
+    // Legacy protocol minimum version aliases. "TLSv1" is intentionally the
+    // same as "SSLv3".
+    {"SSLv3", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, TLS1_VERSION},
+    {"TLSv1", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, TLS1_VERSION},
+    {"TLSv1.2", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, TLS1_2_VERSION},
+
+    // Legacy strength classes.
+    {"HIGH", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"FIPS", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+};
+}  // namespace
+
+bool ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(const EVP_AEAD **out_aead,
+                             size_t *out_mac_secret_len,
+                             size_t *out_fixed_iv_len, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher,
+                             uint16_t version) {
+  *out_aead = nullptr;
+  *out_mac_secret_len = 0;
+  *out_fixed_iv_len = 0;
+
+  if (cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD) {
+    if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128GCM) {
+      if (version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+        *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_tls12();
+      } else {
+        *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_tls13();
+      }
+      *out_fixed_iv_len = 4;
+    } else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256GCM) {
+      if (version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+        *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_tls12();
+      } else {
+        *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_tls13();
+      }
+      *out_fixed_iv_len = 4;
+    } else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) {
+      *out_aead = EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305();
+      *out_fixed_iv_len = 12;
+    } else {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    // In TLS 1.3, the iv_len is equal to the AEAD nonce length whereas the code
+    // above computes the TLS 1.2 construction.
+    if (version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+      *out_fixed_iv_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(*out_aead);
+    }
+  } else if (cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1) {
+    if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_3DES) {
+      if (version == TLS1_VERSION) {
+        *out_aead = EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv();
+        *out_fixed_iv_len = 8;
+      } else {
+        *out_aead = EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls();
+      }
+    } else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128) {
+      if (version == TLS1_VERSION) {
+        *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv();
+        *out_fixed_iv_len = 16;
+      } else {
+        *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls();
+      }
+    } else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256) {
+      if (version == TLS1_VERSION) {
+        *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv();
+        *out_fixed_iv_len = 16;
+      } else {
+        *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls();
+      }
+    } else {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    *out_mac_secret_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+  } else if (cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA256) {
+    if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128) {
+      *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls();
+    } else {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    *out_mac_secret_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+  } else {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *ssl_get_handshake_digest(uint16_t version,
+                                       const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  switch (cipher->algorithm_prf) {
+    case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT:
+      return version >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_md5_sha1();
+    case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256:
+      return EVP_sha256();
+    case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384:
+      return EVP_sha384();
+    default:
+      assert(0);
+      return nullptr;
+  }
+}
+
+static bool is_cipher_list_separator(char c, bool is_strict) {
+  if (c == ':') {
+    return true;
+  }
+  return !is_strict && (c == ' ' || c == ';' || c == ',');
+}
+
+// rule_equals returns whether the NUL-terminated string `rule` is equal to the
+// `buf_len` bytes at `buf`.
+static bool rule_equals(const char *rule, const char *buf, size_t buf_len) {
+  // `strncmp` alone only checks that `buf` is a prefix of `rule`.
+  return strncmp(rule, buf, buf_len) == 0 && rule[buf_len] == '\0';
+}
+
+static void ll_append_tail(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
+                           CIPHER_ORDER **tail) {
+  if (curr == *tail) {
+    return;
+  }
+  if (curr == *head) {
+    *head = curr->next;
+  }
+  if (curr->prev != nullptr) {
+    curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+  }
+  if (curr->next != nullptr) {
+    curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
+  }
+  (*tail)->next = curr;
+  curr->prev = *tail;
+  curr->next = nullptr;
+  *tail = curr;
+}
+
+static void ll_append_head(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
+                           CIPHER_ORDER **tail) {
+  if (curr == *head) {
+    return;
+  }
+  if (curr == *tail) {
+    *tail = curr->prev;
+  }
+  if (curr->next != nullptr) {
+    curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
+  }
+  if (curr->prev != nullptr) {
+    curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+  }
+  (*head)->prev = curr;
+  curr->next = *head;
+  curr->prev = nullptr;
+  *head = curr;
+}
+
+// Helper to iterate over a client cipher list and find a given cipher protocol
+// ID. Returns the index of the cipher, if found in `cipher_list`, or returns
+// std::nullopt if not found.
+static std::optional<size_t> FindProtocolID(CBS *cipher_list,
+                                            uint16_t cipher_id) {
+  assert(CBS_len(cipher_list) % 2 == 0);
+  if (CBS_len(cipher_list) == 0) {
+    return std::nullopt;
+  }
+  size_t cur_index = 0;
+  while (CBS_len(cipher_list) > 0) {
+    uint16_t cipher_suite;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16(cipher_list, &cipher_suite)) {
+      return std::nullopt;
+    }
+    if (cipher_suite == cipher_id) {
+      return cur_index;
+    }
+    ++cur_index;
+  }
+  return std::nullopt;
+}
+
+bool SSLCipherPreferenceList::Init(UniquePtr<STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)> ciphers,
+                                   Array<bool> in_group_flags) {
+  if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers.get()) != in_group_flags.size()) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+  // The last element has no next element to be in a group with.
+  if (!in_group_flags.empty() && in_group_flags.back()) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  ciphers_ = std::move(ciphers);
+  in_group_flags_ = std::move(in_group_flags);
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool SSLCipherPreferenceList::Init(Span<const uint16_t> cipher_ids,
+                                   Span<const bool> in_group_flags) {
+  if (cipher_ids.size() != in_group_flags.size()) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)> ciphers(sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null());
+  if (!ciphers) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  for (uint16_t cipher_id : cipher_ids) {
+    const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_id);
+    if (cipher == nullptr) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
+      return false;
+    }
+    if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers.get(), cipher)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  Array<bool> flags;
+  if (!flags.CopyFrom(in_group_flags)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+  return Init(std::move(ciphers), std::move(flags));
+}
+
+void SSLCipherPreferenceList::Reset() {
+  sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(ciphers_.get());
+  in_group_flags_.Reset();
+}
+
+bool SSLCipherPreferenceList::CopyFrom(const SSLCipherPreferenceList &other) {
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)> other_ciphers(
+      sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(other.ciphers()));
+  if (!other_ciphers) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  Array<bool> other_flags;
+  if (!other_flags.CopyFrom(other.in_group_flags())) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return Init(std::move(other_ciphers), std::move(other_flags));
+}
+
+void SSLCipherPreferenceList::Remove(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  size_t index;
+  if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(ciphers_.get(), &index, cipher)) {
+    return;
+  }
+  if (!in_group_flags_[index] /* last element of group */ && index > 0) {
+    in_group_flags_[index - 1] = false;
+  }
+  for (size_t i = index; i < size() - 1; ++i) {
+    in_group_flags_[i] = in_group_flags_[i + 1];
+  }
+  sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(ciphers_.get(), index);
+  in_group_flags_.Shrink(size());
+}
+
+bool SSLCipherPreferenceList::Contains(uint16_t cipher_id) const {
+  for (const SSL_CIPHER *cipher : ciphers_.get()) {
+    if (cipher->protocol_id == cipher_id) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *SSLCipherPreferenceList::ChooseCipher(
+    const CBS *client_cipher_list, bool prioritize_client_pref,
+    uint16_t version, uint32_t mask_k, uint32_t mask_a) const {
+  if (CBS_len(client_cipher_list) % 2 != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // Index of the best matching cipher suite found so far, indexed into
+  // `client_cipher_list`.
+  std::optional<size_t> best_index = std::nullopt;
+  const SSL_CIPHER *best_cipher = nullptr;
+
+  // Iterate over our list (the server preference list) and check for each
+  // cipher in the client's list.
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < size(); ++i) {
+    const SSL_CIPHER *const c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers_.get(), i);
+    bool in_group = in_group_flags_[i];
+    // If prioritizing the client preference list, treat all of the server's
+    // allowed ciphers as a single equipreference group so that the client's
+    // preferences dictate the choice.
+    if (prioritize_client_pref) {
+      in_group = (i < size() - 1);
+    }
+
+    if (version >= SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(c) &&
+        version <= SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(c) &&
+        (c->algorithm_mkey & mask_k) != 0 &&
+        (c->algorithm_auth & mask_a) != 0) {
+      CBS copy = *client_cipher_list;
+      std::optional<size_t> client_list_index =
+          FindProtocolID(&copy, c->protocol_id);
+      // Within a group, the client's preference order applies.
+      if (client_list_index.has_value() &&
+          (!best_index.has_value() || *best_index > *client_list_index)) {
+        best_index = *client_list_index;
+        best_cipher = c;
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Always evaluate a whole equipreference group.
+    if (in_group) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    // We are about to leave a (possibly singleton) group. If we have a match,
+    // return it because we will only see less-preferred ciphers if we keep
+    // going.
+    if (best_index.has_value()) {
+      assert(best_cipher != nullptr);
+      return best_cipher;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // The final cipher suite must end a group, so, if we found a match, we must
+  // have returned early above.
+  assert(!best_index.has_value());
+  assert(best_cipher == nullptr);
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+  return nullptr;
+}
+
+bool ssl_cipher_is_deprecated(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return cipher->protocol_id ==
+             SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ||
+         cipher->protocol_id == SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ||
+         cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_3DES;
+}
+
+// ssl_cipher_apply_rule applies the rule type `rule` to ciphers matching its
+// parameters in the linked list from `*head_p` to `*tail_p`. It writes the new
+// head and tail of the list to `*head_p` and `*tail_p`, respectively.
+//
+// - If `cipher_id` is non-zero, only that cipher is selected.
+// - Otherwise, if `strength_bits` is non-negative, it selects ciphers
+//   of that strength.
+// - Otherwise, `alias` must be non-null. It selects ciphers that matches
+//   `*alias`.
+static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(uint16_t cipher_id, const CIPHER_ALIAS *alias,
+                                  int rule, int strength_bits, bool in_group,
+                                  CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+                                  CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) {
+  CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *next, *last;
+  const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
+  bool reverse = false;
+
+  if (cipher_id == 0 && strength_bits == -1 && alias->min_version == 0 &&
+      (alias->algorithm_mkey == 0 || alias->algorithm_auth == 0 ||
+       alias->algorithm_enc == 0 || alias->algorithm_mac == 0)) {
+    // The rule matches nothing, so bail early.
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) {
+    // needed to maintain sorting between currently deleted ciphers
+    reverse = true;
+  }
+
+  head = *head_p;
+  tail = *tail_p;
+
+  if (reverse) {
+    next = tail;
+    last = head;
+  } else {
+    next = head;
+    last = tail;
+  }
+
+  curr = nullptr;
+  for (;;) {
+    if (curr == last) {
+      break;
+    }
+
+    curr = next;
+    if (curr == nullptr) {
+      break;
+    }
+
+    next = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next;
+    cp = curr->cipher;
+
+    // Selection criteria is either a specific cipher, the value of
+    // `strength_bits`, or the algorithms used.
+    if (cipher_id != 0) {
+      if (cipher_id != cp->protocol_id) {
+        continue;
+      }
+    } else if (strength_bits >= 0) {
+      if (strength_bits != SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(cp, nullptr)) {
+        continue;
+      }
+    } else {
+      if (!(alias->algorithm_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey) ||
+          !(alias->algorithm_auth & cp->algorithm_auth) ||
+          !(alias->algorithm_enc & cp->algorithm_enc) ||
+          !(alias->algorithm_mac & cp->algorithm_mac) ||
+          (alias->min_version != 0 &&
+           SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(cp) != alias->min_version) ||
+          (!alias->include_deprecated && ssl_cipher_is_deprecated(cp))) {
+        continue;
+      }
+    }
+
+    // add the cipher if it has not been added yet.
+    if (rule == CIPHER_ADD) {
+      // reverse == false
+      if (!curr->active) {
+        ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
+        curr->active = true;
+        curr->in_group = in_group;
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Move the added cipher to this location
+    else if (rule == CIPHER_ORD) {
+      // reverse == false
+      if (curr->active) {
+        ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
+        curr->in_group = false;
+      }
+    } else if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) {
+      // reverse == true
+      if (curr->active) {
+        // most recently deleted ciphersuites get best positions
+        // for any future CIPHER_ADD (note that the CIPHER_DEL loop
+        // works in reverse to maintain the order)
+        ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail);
+        curr->active = false;
+        curr->in_group = false;
+      }
+    } else if (rule == CIPHER_KILL) {
+      // reverse == false
+      if (head == curr) {
+        head = curr->next;
+      } else {
+        curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+      }
+
+      if (tail == curr) {
+        tail = curr->prev;
+      }
+      curr->active = false;
+      if (curr->next != nullptr) {
+        curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
+      }
+      if (curr->prev != nullptr) {
+        curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+      }
+      curr->next = nullptr;
+      curr->prev = nullptr;
+    }
+  }
+
+  *head_p = head;
+  *tail_p = tail;
+}
+
+static bool ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+                                     CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) {
+  // This routine sorts the ciphers with descending strength. The sorting must
+  // keep the pre-sorted sequence, so we apply the normal sorting routine as
+  // '+' movement to the end of the list.
+  int max_strength_bits = 0;
+  CIPHER_ORDER *curr = *head_p;
+  while (curr != nullptr) {
+    if (curr->active &&
+        SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(curr->cipher, nullptr) > max_strength_bits) {
+      max_strength_bits = SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(curr->cipher, nullptr);
+    }
+    curr = curr->next;
+  }
+
+  Array<int> number_uses;
+  if (!number_uses.Init(max_strength_bits + 1)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Now find the strength_bits values actually used.
+  curr = *head_p;
+  while (curr != nullptr) {
+    if (curr->active) {
+      number_uses[SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(curr->cipher, nullptr)]++;
+    }
+    curr = curr->next;
+  }
+
+  // Go through the list of used strength_bits values in descending order.
+  for (int i = max_strength_bits; i >= 0; i--) {
+    if (number_uses[i] > 0) {
+      ssl_cipher_apply_rule(/*cipher_id=*/0, /*alias=*/nullptr, CIPHER_ORD, i,
+                            false, head_p, tail_p);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
+                                       CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+                                       CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p, bool strict) {
+  const char *l, *buf;
+  bool in_group = false, has_group = false;
+  size_t buf_len;
+  char ch;
+
+  l = rule_str;
+  for (;;) {
+    ch = *l;
+
+    if (ch == '\0') {
+      break;  // done
+    }
+
+    int rule;
+    if (in_group) {
+      if (ch == ']') {
+        if (*tail_p) {
+          (*tail_p)->in_group = false;
+        }
+        in_group = false;
+        l++;
+        continue;
+      }
+
+      if (ch == '|') {
+        rule = CIPHER_ADD;
+        l++;
+        continue;
+      } else if (!OPENSSL_isalnum(ch)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_OPERATOR_IN_GROUP);
+        return false;
+      } else {
+        rule = CIPHER_ADD;
+      }
+    } else if (ch == '-') {
+      rule = CIPHER_DEL;
+      l++;
+    } else if (ch == '+') {
+      rule = CIPHER_ORD;
+      l++;
+    } else if (ch == '!') {
+      rule = CIPHER_KILL;
+      l++;
+    } else if (ch == '@') {
+      rule = CIPHER_SPECIAL;
+      l++;
+    } else if (ch == '[') {
+      assert(!in_group);
+      in_group = true;
+      has_group = true;
+      l++;
+      continue;
+    } else {
+      rule = CIPHER_ADD;
+    }
+
+    // If preference groups are enabled, the only legal operator is +.
+    // Otherwise the in_group bits will get mixed up.
+    if (has_group && rule != CIPHER_ADD) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MIXED_SPECIAL_OPERATOR_WITH_GROUPS);
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    if (is_cipher_list_separator(ch, strict)) {
+      l++;
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    bool multi = false;
+    uint16_t cipher_id = 0;
+    CIPHER_ALIAS alias;
+    bool skip_rule = false;
+
+    // When adding, exclude deprecated ciphers by default.
+    alias.include_deprecated = rule != CIPHER_ADD;
+
+    for (;;) {
+      ch = *l;
+      buf = l;
+      buf_len = 0;
+      while (OPENSSL_isalnum(ch) || ch == '-' || ch == '.' || ch == '_') {
+        ch = *(++l);
+        buf_len++;
+      }
+
+      if (buf_len == 0) {
+        // We hit something we cannot deal with, it is no command or separator
+        // nor alphanumeric, so we call this an error.
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+        return false;
+      }
+
+      if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) {
+        break;
+      }
+
+      // Look for a matching exact cipher. These aren't allowed in multipart
+      // rules.
+      if (!multi && ch != '+') {
+        for (const SSL_CIPHER &cipher : kCiphers) {
+          if (rule_equals(cipher.name, buf, buf_len) ||
+              rule_equals(cipher.standard_name, buf, buf_len)) {
+            cipher_id = cipher.protocol_id;
+            break;
+          }
+        }
+      }
+      if (cipher_id == 0) {
+        // If not an exact cipher, look for a matching cipher alias.
+        const auto found =
+            std::find_if(std::begin(kCipherAliases), std::end(kCipherAliases),
+                         [buf, buf_len](const CIPHER_ALIAS &cipher_alias) {
+                           return rule_equals(cipher_alias.name, buf, buf_len);
+                         });
+        if (found == std::end(kCipherAliases)) {
+          skip_rule = true;
+          if (strict) {
+            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+            return false;
+          }
+        } else {
+          alias.algorithm_mkey &= found->algorithm_mkey;
+          alias.algorithm_auth &= found->algorithm_auth;
+          alias.algorithm_enc &= found->algorithm_enc;
+          alias.algorithm_mac &= found->algorithm_mac;
+
+          // When specifying a combination of aliases, if any aliases
+          // enables deprecated ciphers, deprecated ciphers are included. This
+          // is slightly different from the bitmasks in that adding aliases
+          // can increase the set of matched ciphers. This is so that an alias
+          // like "RSA" will only specify AES-based RSA ciphers, but
+          // "RSA+3DES" will still specify 3DES.
+          alias.include_deprecated |= found->include_deprecated;
+
+          if (found->min_version != 0) {
+            if (alias.min_version != 0 &&
+                alias.min_version != found->min_version) {
+              skip_rule = true;
+            } else {
+              alias.min_version = found->min_version;
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+
+      // Check for a multipart rule.
+      if (ch != '+') {
+        break;
+      }
+      l++;
+      multi = true;
+    }
+
+    // Ok, we have the rule, now apply it.
+    if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) {
+      if (buf_len != 8 || strncmp(buf, "STRENGTH", 8) != 0) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+        return false;
+      }
+      if (!ssl_cipher_strength_sort(head_p, tail_p)) {
+        return false;
+      }
+
+      // We do not support any "multi" options together with "@", so throw away
+      // the rest of the command, if any left, until end or ':' is found.
+      while (*l != '\0' && !is_cipher_list_separator(*l, strict)) {
+        l++;
+      }
+    } else if (!skip_rule) {
+      ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id, &alias, rule, -1, in_group, head_p,
+                            tail_p);
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (in_group) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl_create_cipher_list(UniquePtr<SSLCipherPreferenceList> *out_cipher_list,
+                            const char *rule_str, bool strict) {
+  // Return with error if nothing to do.
+  if (rule_str == nullptr || out_cipher_list == nullptr) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // We prefer ECDHE ciphers over non-PFS ciphers. Then we prefer AEAD over
+  // non-AEAD.
+  static const uint16_t kAESCiphers[] = {
+      SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+      SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+      SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+      SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+  };
+  static const uint16_t kChaChaCiphers[] = {
+      SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+      SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+      SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+  };
+  static const uint16_t kLegacyCiphers[] = {
+      SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+      SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+      SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+      SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+      SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+      SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+      SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+      SSL_CIPHER_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+      SSL_CIPHER_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+      SSL_CIPHER_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+      SSL_CIPHER_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+      SSL_CIPHER_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+      SSL_CIPHER_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+      SSL_CIPHER_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+      SSL_CIPHER_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+  };
+
+  // Set up a linked list of ciphers.
+  CIPHER_ORDER co_list[std::size(kAESCiphers) + std::size(kChaChaCiphers) +
+                       std::size(kLegacyCiphers)];
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < std::size(co_list); i++) {
+    co_list[i].next = i + 1 < std::size(co_list) ? &co_list[i + 1] : nullptr;
+    co_list[i].prev = i == 0 ? nullptr : &co_list[i - 1];
+    co_list[i].active = false;
+    co_list[i].in_group = false;
+  }
+  CIPHER_ORDER *head = &co_list[0];
+  CIPHER_ORDER *tail = &co_list[std::size(co_list) - 1];
+
+  // Order AES ciphers vs ChaCha ciphers based on whether we have AES hardware.
+  //
+  // TODO(crbug.com/boringssl/29): We should also set up equipreference groups
+  // as a server.
+  size_t num = 0;
+  const bool has_aes_hw = EVP_has_aes_hardware();
+  if (has_aes_hw) {
+    for (uint16_t id : kAESCiphers) {
+      co_list[num++].cipher = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(id);
+      assert(co_list[num - 1].cipher != nullptr);
+    }
+  }
+  for (uint16_t id : kChaChaCiphers) {
+    co_list[num++].cipher = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(id);
+    assert(co_list[num - 1].cipher != nullptr);
+  }
+  if (!has_aes_hw) {
+    for (uint16_t id : kAESCiphers) {
+      co_list[num++].cipher = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(id);
+      assert(co_list[num - 1].cipher != nullptr);
+    }
+  }
+  for (uint16_t id : kLegacyCiphers) {
+    co_list[num++].cipher = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(id);
+    assert(co_list[num - 1].cipher != nullptr);
+  }
+  assert(num == std::size(co_list));
+  static_assert(std::size(co_list) + NumTLS13Ciphers() == std::size(kCiphers),
+                "Not all ciphers are included in the cipher order");
+
+  // If the rule_string begins with DEFAULT, apply the default rule before
+  // using the (possibly available) additional rules.
+  const char *rule_p = rule_str;
+  if (strncmp(rule_str, "DEFAULT", 7) == 0) {
+    if (!ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, &head, &tail,
+                                    strict)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    rule_p += 7;
+    if (*rule_p == ':') {
+      rule_p++;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (*rule_p != '\0' &&
+      !ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(rule_p, &head, &tail, strict)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Allocate new "cipherstack" for the result, return with error
+  // if we cannot get one.
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)> cipherstack(sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null());
+  Array<bool> in_group_flags;
+  if (cipherstack == nullptr ||
+      !in_group_flags.InitForOverwrite(std::size(kCiphers))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // The cipher selection for the list is done. The ciphers are added
+  // to the resulting precedence to the STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER).
+  size_t num_in_group_flags = 0;
+  for (CIPHER_ORDER *curr = head; curr != nullptr; curr = curr->next) {
+    if (curr->active) {
+      if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack.get(), curr->cipher)) {
+        return false;
+      }
+      in_group_flags[num_in_group_flags++] = curr->in_group;
+    }
+  }
+  in_group_flags.Shrink(num_in_group_flags);
+
+  UniquePtr<SSLCipherPreferenceList> pref_list =
+      MakeUnique<SSLCipherPreferenceList>();
+  if (!pref_list ||
+      !pref_list->Init(std::move(cipherstack), std::move(in_group_flags))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  *out_cipher_list = std::move(pref_list);
+
+  // Configuring an empty cipher list is an error but still updates the
+  // output.
+  if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num((*out_cipher_list)->ciphers()) == 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl_create_default_tls13_cipher_list(
+    SSLCipherPreferenceList *out_cipher_list) {
+  // If we have AES hardware:
+  // For a client: AES-128 > AES-256 > ChaCha20.
+  // For a server: (AES-128 | AES-256 | ChaCha20), i.e. defer to client
+  // preference.
+  static const uint16_t kCiphersAESHardware[] = {
+      SSL_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+      SSL_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+      SSL_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+  };
+  static const bool kInGroupFlagsAESHardware[] = {
+      true,
+      true,
+      false,
+  };
+  // If we do not have AES hardware:
+  // For a client: ChaCha20 > AES-128 > AES-256.
+  // For a server: ChaCha20 > (AES-128 | AES-256).
+  static const uint16_t kCiphersNoAESHardware[] = {
+      SSL_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+      SSL_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+      SSL_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+  };
+  static const bool kInGroupFlagsNoAESHardware[] = {
+      false,
+      true,
+      false,
+  };
+
+  Span<const uint16_t> ciphers = EVP_has_aes_hardware()
+                                     ? Span(kCiphersAESHardware)
+                                     : Span(kCiphersNoAESHardware);
+  Span<const bool> in_group_flags = EVP_has_aes_hardware()
+                                        ? Span(kInGroupFlagsAESHardware)
+                                        : Span(kInGroupFlagsNoAESHardware);
+
+  out_cipher_list->Reset();
+  return out_cipher_list->Init(ciphers, in_group_flags);
+}
+
+uint32_t ssl_cipher_auth_mask_for_key(const EVP_PKEY *key, bool sign_ok) {
+  switch (EVP_PKEY_id(key)) {
+    case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+      return sign_ok ? (SSL_aRSA_SIGN | SSL_aRSA_DECRYPT) : SSL_aRSA_DECRYPT;
+    case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+    case EVP_PKEY_ED25519:
+      // Ed25519 keys in TLS 1.2 repurpose the ECDSA ciphers.
+      return sign_ok ? SSL_aECDSA : 0;
+    default:
+      return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+bool ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return (cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT) != 0;
+}
+
+bool ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  // Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchanges require a ServerKeyExchange. It is
+  // optional or omitted in all others.
+  return (cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kECDHE) != 0;
+}
+
+size_t ssl_cipher_get_record_split_len(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  size_t block_size;
+  switch (cipher->algorithm_enc) {
+    case SSL_3DES:
+      block_size = 8;
+      break;
+    case SSL_AES128:
+    case SSL_AES256:
+      block_size = 16;
+      break;
+    default:
+      return 0;
+  }
+
+  // All supported TLS 1.0 ciphers use SHA-1.
+  assert(cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1);
+  size_t ret = 1 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+  ret += block_size - (ret % block_size);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+static constexpr int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a,
+                                       const SSL_CIPHER *b) {
+  if (a->protocol_id > b->protocol_id) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  if (a->protocol_id < b->protocol_id) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static int ssl_cipher_id_cmp_void(const void *in_a, const void *in_b) {
+  return ssl_cipher_id_cmp(reinterpret_cast<const SSL_CIPHER *>(in_a),
+                           reinterpret_cast<const SSL_CIPHER *>(in_b));
+}
+
+template <size_t N>
+static constexpr bool ssl_ciphers_sorted(const SSL_CIPHER (&ciphers)[N]) {
+  for (size_t i = 1; i < N; i++) {
+    if (ssl_cipher_id_cmp(&ciphers[i - 1], &ciphers[i]) >= 0) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+static_assert(ssl_ciphers_sorted(kCiphers),
+              "Ciphers are not sorted, bsearch won't work");
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_cipher_by_value(uint16_t value) {
+  SSL_CIPHER c;
+  c.protocol_id = value;
+  return reinterpret_cast<const SSL_CIPHER *>(
+      bsearch(&c, kCiphers, std::size(kCiphers), sizeof(SSL_CIPHER),
+              ssl_cipher_id_cmp_void));
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  // Historically, OpenSSL added a leading 0x03 byte to cipher IDs, to
+  // distinguish between SSL 2.0 and SSL 3.0.
+  return cipher->protocol_id | 0x03000000;
+}
+
+uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return cipher->protocol_id;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_is_aead(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return (cipher->algorithm_mac & SSL_AEAD) != 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  switch (cipher->algorithm_enc) {
+    case SSL_3DES:
+      return NID_des_ede3_cbc;
+    case SSL_AES128:
+      return NID_aes_128_cbc;
+    case SSL_AES256:
+      return NID_aes_256_cbc;
+    case SSL_AES128GCM:
+      return NID_aes_128_gcm;
+    case SSL_AES256GCM:
+      return NID_aes_256_gcm;
+    case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
+      return NID_chacha20_poly1305;
+  }
+  assert(0);
+  return NID_undef;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  switch (cipher->algorithm_mac) {
+    case SSL_AEAD:
+      return NID_undef;
+    case SSL_SHA1:
+      return NID_sha1;
+    case SSL_SHA256:
+      return NID_sha256;
+  }
+  assert(0);
+  return NID_undef;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  switch (cipher->algorithm_mkey) {
+    case SSL_kRSA:
+      return NID_kx_rsa;
+    case SSL_kECDHE:
+      return NID_kx_ecdhe;
+    case SSL_kPSK:
+      return NID_kx_psk;
+    case SSL_kGENERIC:
+      return NID_kx_any;
+  }
+  assert(0);
+  return NID_undef;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  switch (cipher->algorithm_auth) {
+    case SSL_aRSA_DECRYPT:
+    case SSL_aRSA_SIGN:
+      return NID_auth_rsa;
+    case SSL_aECDSA:
+      return NID_auth_ecdsa;
+    case SSL_aPSK:
+      return NID_auth_psk;
+    case SSL_aGENERIC:
+      return NID_auth_any;
+  }
+  assert(0);
+  return NID_undef;
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *SSL_CIPHER_get_handshake_digest(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  switch (cipher->algorithm_prf) {
+    case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT:
+      return EVP_md5_sha1();
+    case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256:
+      return EVP_sha256();
+    case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384:
+      return EVP_sha384();
+  }
+  assert(0);
+  return nullptr;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_prf_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  const EVP_MD *md = SSL_CIPHER_get_handshake_digest(cipher);
+  if (md == nullptr) {
+    return NID_undef;
+  }
+  return EVP_MD_nid(md);
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_is_block_cipher(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD;
+}
+
+uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  if (cipher->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kGENERIC ||
+      cipher->algorithm_auth == SSL_aGENERIC) {
+    return TLS1_3_VERSION;
+  }
+
+  if (cipher->algorithm_prf != SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT) {
+    // Cipher suites before TLS 1.2 use the default PRF, while all those added
+    // afterwards specify a particular hash.
+    return TLS1_2_VERSION;
+  }
+  return TLS1_VERSION;
+}
+
+uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  if (cipher->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kGENERIC ||
+      cipher->algorithm_auth == SSL_aGENERIC) {
+    return TLS1_3_VERSION;
+  }
+  return TLS1_2_VERSION;
+}
+
+static const char *const kUnknownCipher = "(NONE)";
+
+// return the actual cipher being used
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  if (cipher != nullptr) {
+    return cipher->name;
+  }
+
+  return kUnknownCipher;
+}
+
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return cipher->standard_name;
+}
+
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  if (cipher == nullptr) {
+    return "";
+  }
+
+  switch (cipher->algorithm_mkey) {
+    case SSL_kRSA:
+      return "RSA";
+
+    case SSL_kECDHE:
+      switch (cipher->algorithm_auth) {
+        case SSL_aECDSA:
+          return "ECDHE_ECDSA";
+        case SSL_aRSA_SIGN:
+          return "ECDHE_RSA";
+        case SSL_aPSK:
+          return "ECDHE_PSK";
+        default:
+          assert(0);
+          return "UNKNOWN";
+      }
+
+    case SSL_kPSK:
+      assert(cipher->algorithm_auth == SSL_aPSK);
+      return "PSK";
+
+    case SSL_kGENERIC:
+      assert(cipher->algorithm_auth == SSL_aGENERIC);
+      return "GENERIC";
+
+    default:
+      assert(0);
+      return "UNKNOWN";
+  }
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, int *out_alg_bits) {
+  if (cipher == nullptr) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int alg_bits, strength_bits;
+  switch (cipher->algorithm_enc) {
+    case SSL_AES128:
+    case SSL_AES128GCM:
+      alg_bits = 128;
+      strength_bits = 128;
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_AES256:
+    case SSL_AES256GCM:
+    case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
+      alg_bits = 256;
+      strength_bits = 256;
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_3DES:
+      alg_bits = 168;
+      strength_bits = 112;
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      assert(0);
+      alg_bits = 0;
+      strength_bits = 0;
+  }
+
+  if (out_alg_bits != nullptr) {
+    *out_alg_bits = alg_bits;
+  }
+  return strength_bits;
+}
+
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf,
+                                   int len) {
+  const char *kx, *au, *enc, *mac;
+  uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac;
+
+  alg_mkey = cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+  alg_auth = cipher->algorithm_auth;
+  alg_enc = cipher->algorithm_enc;
+  alg_mac = cipher->algorithm_mac;
+
+  switch (alg_mkey) {
+    case SSL_kRSA:
+      kx = "RSA";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_kECDHE:
+      kx = "ECDH";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_kPSK:
+      kx = "PSK";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_kGENERIC:
+      kx = "GENERIC";
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      kx = "unknown";
+  }
+
+  switch (alg_auth) {
+    case SSL_aRSA_DECRYPT:
+    case SSL_aRSA_SIGN:
+      au = "RSA";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_aECDSA:
+      au = "ECDSA";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_aPSK:
+      au = "PSK";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_aGENERIC:
+      au = "GENERIC";
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      au = "unknown";
+      break;
+  }
+
+  switch (alg_enc) {
+    case SSL_3DES:
+      enc = "3DES(168)";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_AES128:
+      enc = "AES(128)";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_AES256:
+      enc = "AES(256)";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_AES128GCM:
+      enc = "AESGCM(128)";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_AES256GCM:
+      enc = "AESGCM(256)";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
+      enc = "ChaCha20-Poly1305";
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      enc = "unknown";
+      break;
+  }
+
+  switch (alg_mac) {
+    case SSL_SHA1:
+      mac = "SHA1";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_SHA256:
+      mac = "SHA256";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_AEAD:
+      mac = "AEAD";
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      mac = "unknown";
+      break;
+  }
+
+  if (buf == nullptr) {
+    len = 128;
+    buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+    if (buf == nullptr) {
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+  } else if (len < 128) {
+    return "Buffer too small";
+  }
+
+  snprintf(buf, len, "%-23s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s\n", cipher->name,
+           kx, au, enc, mac);
+  return buf;
+}
+
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return "TLSv1/SSLv3";
+}
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods() { return nullptr; }
+
+int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm) { return 1; }
+
+const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp) { return nullptr; }
+
+const char *SSL_COMP_get0_name(const SSL_COMP *comp) { return comp->name; }
+
+int SSL_COMP_get_id(const SSL_COMP *comp) { return comp->id; }
+
+void SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods() {}
+
+size_t SSL_get_all_cipher_names(const char **out, size_t max_out) {
+  return GetAllNames(out, max_out, Span(&kUnknownCipher, 1), &SSL_CIPHER::name,
+                     Span(kCiphers));
+}
+
+size_t SSL_get_all_standard_cipher_names(const char **out, size_t max_out) {
+  return GetAllNames(out, max_out, Span<const char *const>(),
+                     &SSL_CIPHER::standard_name, Span(kCiphers));
+}