visaljs 0.0.2 → 0.0.4

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/dh/dh.cc.inc

@@ -0,0 +1,401 @@
+// Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <iterator>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+
+#include "../../internal.h"
+#include "../../mem_internal.h"
+#include "../bn/internal.h"
+#include "../service_indicator/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+DH *DH_new() { return New<DHImpl>(); }
+
+void DH_free(DH *dh) {
+  if (dh != nullptr) {
+    FromOpaque(dh)->DecRefInternal();
+  }
+}
+
+unsigned DH_bits(const DH *dh) { return BN_num_bits(FromOpaque(dh)->p.get()); }
+
+const BIGNUM *DH_get0_pub_key(const DH *dh) {
+  return FromOpaque(dh)->pub_key.get();
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *DH_get0_priv_key(const DH *dh) {
+  return FromOpaque(dh)->priv_key.get();
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *DH_get0_p(const DH *dh) { return FromOpaque(dh)->p.get(); }
+
+const BIGNUM *DH_get0_q(const DH *dh) { return FromOpaque(dh)->q.get(); }
+
+const BIGNUM *DH_get0_g(const DH *dh) { return FromOpaque(dh)->g.get(); }
+
+void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **out_pub_key,
+                 const BIGNUM **out_priv_key) {
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(dh);
+  if (out_pub_key != nullptr) {
+    *out_pub_key = impl->pub_key.get();
+  }
+  if (out_priv_key != nullptr) {
+    *out_priv_key = impl->priv_key.get();
+  }
+}
+
+int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key) {
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(dh);
+  if (pub_key != nullptr) {
+    impl->pub_key.reset(pub_key);
+  }
+
+  if (priv_key != nullptr) {
+    impl->priv_key.reset(priv_key);
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **out_p, const BIGNUM **out_q,
+                 const BIGNUM **out_g) {
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(dh);
+  if (out_p != nullptr) {
+    *out_p = impl->p.get();
+  }
+  if (out_q != nullptr) {
+    *out_q = impl->q.get();
+  }
+  if (out_g != nullptr) {
+    *out_g = impl->g.get();
+  }
+}
+
+int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g) {
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(dh);
+  if ((impl->p == nullptr && p == nullptr) ||
+      (impl->g == nullptr && g == nullptr)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (p != nullptr) {
+    impl->p.reset(p);
+  }
+
+  if (q != nullptr) {
+    impl->q.reset(q);
+  }
+
+  if (g != nullptr) {
+    impl->g.reset(g);
+  }
+
+  // Invalidate the cached Montgomery parameters.
+  impl->method_mont_p = nullptr;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int DH_set_length(DH *dh, unsigned priv_length) {
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(dh);
+  impl->priv_length = priv_length;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int DH_generate_key(DH *dh) {
+  boringssl_ensure_ffdh_self_test();
+
+  if (!dh_check_params_fast(dh)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(dh);
+  UniquePtr<BN_CTX> ctx(BN_CTX_new());
+  if (ctx == nullptr) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&impl->method_mont_p, &impl->method_mont_p_lock,
+                              impl->p.get(), ctx.get())) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Only generate a private key if there's already one. Otherwise,
+  // `DH_generate_key` recomputes the public key.
+  const BIGNUM *priv_key = impl->priv_key.get();
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> new_priv_key;
+  if (priv_key == nullptr) {
+    new_priv_key.reset(BN_new());
+    if (new_priv_key == nullptr) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    if (impl->q) {
+      // Section 5.6.1.1.4 of SP 800-56A Rev3 generates a private key uniformly
+      // from [1, min(2ᴺ-1, q-1)].
+      //
+      // Although SP 800-56A Rev3 now permits a private key length N,
+      // `impl->priv_length` historically was ignored when q is available. We
+      // continue to ignore it and interpret such a configuration as N = len(q).
+      if (!BN_rand_range_ex(new_priv_key.get(), 1, impl->q.get())) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        return 0;
+      }
+    } else {
+      // If q is unspecified, we expect p to be a safe prime, with g generating
+      // the (p-1)/2 subgroup. So, we use q = (p-1)/2. (If g generates a smaller
+      // prime-order subgroup, q will still divide (p-1)/2.)
+      //
+      // We set N from `impl->priv_length`. Section 5.6.1.1.4 of SP 800-56A Rev3
+      // says to reject N > len(q), or N > num_bits(p) - 1. However, this logic
+      // originally aligned with PKCS#3, which allows num_bits(p). Instead, we
+      // clamp `impl->priv_length` before invoking the algorithm.
+
+      // Compute M = min(2ᴺ, q).
+      UniquePtr<BIGNUM> priv_key_limit(BN_new());
+      if (priv_key_limit == nullptr) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        return 0;
+      }
+      if (impl->priv_length == 0 ||
+          impl->priv_length >= BN_num_bits(impl->p.get()) - 1) {
+        // M = q = (p - 1) / 2.
+        if (!BN_rshift1(priv_key_limit.get(), impl->p.get())) {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+          return 0;
+        }
+      } else {
+        // M = 2ᴺ.
+        if (!BN_set_bit(priv_key_limit.get(), impl->priv_length)) {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+          return 0;
+        }
+      }
+
+      // Choose a private key uniformly from [1, M-1].
+      if (!BN_rand_range_ex(new_priv_key.get(), 1, priv_key_limit.get())) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+    priv_key = new_priv_key.get();
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> new_pub_key(BN_new());
+  if (new_pub_key == nullptr ||
+      !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(new_pub_key.get(), impl->g.get(), priv_key,
+                                 impl->p.get(), ctx.get(),
+                                 impl->method_mont_p.get())) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  impl->pub_key = std::move(new_pub_key);
+  if (new_priv_key != nullptr) {
+    impl->priv_key = std::move(new_priv_key);
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int dh_compute_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *out_shared_key,
+                          const BIGNUM *peers_key, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(dh);
+
+  if (!dh_check_params_fast(dh)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (impl->priv_key == nullptr) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int check_result;
+  if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh, peers_key, &check_result) || check_result) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  BN_CTXScope scope(ctx);
+  BIGNUM *p_minus_1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  if (!p_minus_1 ||
+      !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&impl->method_mont_p, &impl->method_mont_p_lock,
+                              impl->p.get(), ctx)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(out_shared_key, peers_key,
+                                 impl->priv_key.get(), impl->p.get(), ctx,
+                                 impl->method_mont_p.get()) ||
+      !BN_copy(p_minus_1, impl->p.get()) || !BN_sub_word(p_minus_1, 1)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // This performs the check required by SP 800-56Ar3 section 5.7.1.1 step two.
+  if (BN_cmp_word(out_shared_key, 1) <= 0 ||
+      BN_cmp(out_shared_key, p_minus_1) == 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int bssl::dh_compute_key_padded_no_self_test(unsigned char *out,
+                                             const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) {
+  UniquePtr<BN_CTX> ctx(BN_CTX_new());
+  if (ctx == nullptr) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  BN_CTXScope scope(ctx.get());
+  int dh_size = DH_size(dh);
+  BIGNUM *shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx.get());
+  if (shared_key == nullptr ||
+      !dh_compute_key(dh, shared_key, peers_key, ctx.get()) ||
+      !BN_bn2bin_padded(out, dh_size, shared_key)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return dh_size;
+}
+
+int DH_compute_key_padded(unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) {
+  boringssl_ensure_ffdh_self_test();
+
+  return dh_compute_key_padded_no_self_test(out, peers_key, dh);
+}
+
+int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) {
+  boringssl_ensure_ffdh_self_test();
+
+  UniquePtr<BN_CTX> ctx(BN_CTX_new());
+  if (ctx == nullptr) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  BN_CTXScope scope(ctx.get());
+  BIGNUM *shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx.get());
+  if (shared_key == nullptr ||
+      !dh_compute_key(dh, shared_key, peers_key, ctx.get())) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  // A `BIGNUM`'s byte count fits in `int`.
+  return static_cast<int>(BN_bn2bin(shared_key, out));
+}
+
+int DH_compute_key_hashed(DH *dh, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+                          size_t max_out_len, const BIGNUM *peers_key,
+                          const EVP_MD *digest) {
+  *out_len = SIZE_MAX;
+
+  const size_t digest_len = EVP_MD_size(digest);
+  if (digest_len > max_out_len) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state();
+
+  int ret = 0;
+  const size_t dh_len = DH_size(dh);
+  uint8_t *shared_bytes = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(OPENSSL_malloc(dh_len));
+  unsigned out_len_unsigned;
+  if (!shared_bytes ||
+      // SP 800-56A is ambiguous about whether the output should be padded prior
+      // to revision three. But revision three, section C.1, awkwardly specifies
+      // padding to the length of p.
+      //
+      // Also, padded output avoids side-channels, so is always strongly
+      // advisable.
+      DH_compute_key_padded(shared_bytes, peers_key, dh) != (int)dh_len ||
+      !EVP_Digest(shared_bytes, dh_len, out, &out_len_unsigned, digest,
+                  nullptr) ||
+      out_len_unsigned != digest_len) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  *out_len = digest_len;
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state();
+  OPENSSL_free(shared_bytes);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int DH_size(const DH *dh) { return BN_num_bytes(FromOpaque(dh)->p.get()); }
+
+int DH_up_ref(DH *dh) {
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(dh);
+  impl->UpRefInternal();
+  return 1;
+}
+
+DH *DH_get_rfc7919_2048() {
+  // This is the prime from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7919#appendix-A.1,
+  // which is specifically approved for FIPS in appendix D of SP 800-56Ar3.
+  static const BN_ULONG kFFDHE2048Data[] = {
+      TOBN(0xffffffff, 0xffffffff), TOBN(0x886b4238, 0x61285c97),
+      TOBN(0xc6f34a26, 0xc1b2effa), TOBN(0xc58ef183, 0x7d1683b2),
+      TOBN(0x3bb5fcbc, 0x2ec22005), TOBN(0xc3fe3b1b, 0x4c6fad73),
+      TOBN(0x8e4f1232, 0xeef28183), TOBN(0x9172fe9c, 0xe98583ff),
+      TOBN(0xc03404cd, 0x28342f61), TOBN(0x9e02fce1, 0xcdf7e2ec),
+      TOBN(0x0b07a7c8, 0xee0a6d70), TOBN(0xae56ede7, 0x6372bb19),
+      TOBN(0x1d4f42a3, 0xde394df4), TOBN(0xb96adab7, 0x60d7f468),
+      TOBN(0xd108a94b, 0xb2c8e3fb), TOBN(0xbc0ab182, 0xb324fb61),
+      TOBN(0x30acca4f, 0x483a797a), TOBN(0x1df158a1, 0x36ade735),
+      TOBN(0xe2a689da, 0xf3efe872), TOBN(0x984f0c70, 0xe0e68b77),
+      TOBN(0xb557135e, 0x7f57c935), TOBN(0x85636555, 0x3ded1af3),
+      TOBN(0x2433f51f, 0x5f066ed0), TOBN(0xd3df1ed5, 0xd5fd6561),
+      TOBN(0xf681b202, 0xaec4617a), TOBN(0x7d2fe363, 0x630c75d8),
+      TOBN(0xcc939dce, 0x249b3ef9), TOBN(0xa9e13641, 0x146433fb),
+      TOBN(0xd8b9c583, 0xce2d3695), TOBN(0xafdc5620, 0x273d3cf1),
+      TOBN(0xadf85458, 0xa2bb4a9a), TOBN(0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
+  };
+
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> ffdhe2048_p(BN_new());
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> ffdhe2048_q(BN_new());
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> ffdhe2048_g(BN_new());
+  UniquePtr<DH> dh(DH_new());
+  if (!ffdhe2048_p || !ffdhe2048_q || !ffdhe2048_g || !dh) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  bn_set_static_words(ffdhe2048_p.get(), kFFDHE2048Data,
+                      std::size(kFFDHE2048Data));
+
+  if (!BN_rshift1(ffdhe2048_q.get(), ffdhe2048_p.get()) ||
+      !BN_set_word(ffdhe2048_g.get(), 2) ||
+      !DH_set0_pqg(dh.get(), ffdhe2048_p.get(), ffdhe2048_q.get(),
+                   ffdhe2048_g.get())) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  // `DH_set0_pqg` takes ownership on success.
+  ffdhe2048_p.release();
+  ffdhe2048_q.release();
+  ffdhe2048_g.release();
+
+  return dh.release();
+}

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/dh/internal.h

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+// Copyright 2022 The BoringSSL Authors
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_DH_INTERNAL_H
+#define OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_DH_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include <openssl/base.h>
+
+#include "../../internal.h"
+#include "../../mem_internal.h"
+
+
+DECLARE_OPAQUE_STRUCT(dh_st, DHImpl)
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+class DHImpl : public dh_st, public RefCounted<DHImpl> {
+ public:
+  DHImpl() : RefCounted(CheckSubClass()) {}
+
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> p;
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> g;
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> q;
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> pub_key;   // gˣ mod p
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> priv_key;  // x
+
+  // priv_length contains the length, in bits, of the private value. If zero,
+  // the private value will be the same length as `p`.
+  unsigned priv_length = 0;
+
+  mutable Mutex method_mont_p_lock;
+  mutable UniquePtr<BN_MONT_CTX> method_mont_p;
+
+ private:
+  friend RefCounted;
+  ~DHImpl() = default;
+};
+
+// dh_check_params_fast checks basic invariants on `dh`'s domain parameters. It
+// does not check that `dh` forms a valid group, only that the sizes are within
+// DoS bounds.
+int dh_check_params_fast(const DH *dh);
+
+// dh_compute_key_padded_no_self_test does the same as `DH_compute_key_padded`,
+// but doesn't try to run the self-test first. This is for use in the self tests
+// themselves, to prevent an infinite loop.
+int dh_compute_key_padded_no_self_test(unsigned char *out,
+                                       const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh);
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+#endif  // OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_DH_INTERNAL_H

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/digest/digest.cc.inc

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+// Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+
+#include "../../internal.h"
+#include "../../mem_internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+int EVP_MD_type(const EVP_MD *md) { return md->type; }
+
+int EVP_MD_nid(const EVP_MD *md) { return EVP_MD_type(md); }
+
+uint32_t EVP_MD_flags(const EVP_MD *md) { return md->flags; }
+
+size_t EVP_MD_size(const EVP_MD *md) { return md->md_size; }
+
+size_t EVP_MD_block_size(const EVP_MD *md) { return md->block_size; }
+
+
+void EVP_MD_CTX_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {
+  ctx->digest = nullptr;
+  ctx->pctx = nullptr;
+  ctx->pctx_ops = nullptr;
+}
+
+EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new() {
+  EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = New<EVP_MD_CTX>();
+
+  if (ctx) {
+    EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx);
+  }
+
+  return ctx;
+}
+
+EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_create() { return EVP_MD_CTX_new(); }
+
+int EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {
+  assert(ctx->pctx == nullptr || ctx->pctx_ops != nullptr);
+  if (ctx->pctx_ops) {
+    ctx->pctx_ops->free(ctx->pctx);
+  }
+
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void EVP_MD_CTX_cleanse(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->md_data, sizeof(ctx->md_data));
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+}
+
+void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (!ctx) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+  Delete(ctx);
+}
+
+void EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); }
+
+int EVP_DigestFinalXOF(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t len) {
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DIGEST, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+uint32_t EVP_MD_meth_get_flags(const EVP_MD *md) { return EVP_MD_flags(md); }
+
+void EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int flags) {}
+
+int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in) {
+  // `in->digest` may be NULL if this is a signing `EVP_MD_CTX` for, e.g.,
+  // Ed25519 which does not hash with `EVP_MD_CTX`.
+  if (in == nullptr || (in->pctx == nullptr && in->digest == nullptr)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DIGEST, DIGEST_R_INPUT_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (out == in) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DIGEST, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = nullptr;
+  assert(in->pctx == nullptr || in->pctx_ops != nullptr);
+  if (in->pctx) {
+    pctx = in->pctx_ops->dup(in->pctx);
+    if (!pctx) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(out);
+
+  out->digest = in->digest;
+  if (in->digest != nullptr) {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(out->md_data, in->md_data, in->digest->ctx_size);
+  }
+  out->pctx = pctx;
+  out->pctx_ops = in->pctx_ops;
+  assert(out->pctx == nullptr || out->pctx_ops != nullptr);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void EVP_MD_CTX_move(EVP_MD_CTX *out, EVP_MD_CTX *in) {
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(out);
+  // While not guaranteed, `EVP_MD_CTX` is currently safe to move with `memcpy`.
+  // bssl-crypto currently relies on this, however, so if we change this, we
+  // need to box the `HMAC_CTX`. (Relying on this is only fine because we assume
+  // BoringSSL and bssl-crypto will always be updated atomically. We do not
+  // allow any version skew between the two.)
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out, in, sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX));
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(in);
+}
+
+int EVP_MD_CTX_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in) {
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(out);
+  return EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(out, in);
+}
+
+int EVP_MD_CTX_reset(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *engine) {
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+
+  assert(ctx->pctx == nullptr);
+  assert(type->ctx_size != 0);
+  assert(type->ctx_size <= sizeof(ctx->md_data));
+  ctx->digest = type;
+  ctx->digest->init(ctx);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_DigestInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type) {
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx);
+  return EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, type, nullptr);
+}
+
+int EVP_DigestUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t len) {
+  ctx->digest->update(ctx, data, len);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_DigestFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *md_out, unsigned int *size) {
+  assert(ctx->digest->md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+  ctx->digest->final(ctx, md_out);
+  if (size != nullptr) {
+    *size = ctx->digest->md_size;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->md_data, ctx->digest->ctx_size);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_DigestFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *md, unsigned int *size) {
+  (void)EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, md, size);
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_Digest(const void *data, size_t count, uint8_t *out_md,
+               unsigned int *out_size, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl) {
+  ScopedEVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+  return EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx.get(), type, impl) &&
+         EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), data, count) &&
+         EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx.get(), out_md, out_size);
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (ctx == nullptr) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  return ctx->digest;
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *EVP_MD_CTX_md(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {
+  return EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(ctx);
+}
+
+size_t EVP_MD_CTX_size(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {
+  return EVP_MD_size(EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(ctx));
+}
+
+size_t EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {
+  return EVP_MD_block_size(EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(ctx));
+}
+
+int EVP_MD_CTX_type(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {
+  return EVP_MD_type(EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(ctx));
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->pctx; }
+
+int EVP_add_digest(const EVP_MD *digest) { return 1; }