visaljs 0.0.2 → 0.0.4

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/service_indicator/internal.h

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+// Copyright Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_SERVICE_INDICATOR_INTERNAL_H
+#define OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_SERVICE_INDICATOR_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include <openssl/base.h>
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+// FIPS_service_indicator_before_call and `FIPS_service_indicator_after_call`
+// both currently return the same local thread counter which is slowly
+// incremented whenever approved services are called. The
+// `CALL_SERVICE_AND_CHECK_APPROVED` macro is strongly recommended over calling
+// these functions directly.
+//
+// `FIPS_service_indicator_before_call` is intended to be called immediately
+// before an approved service, while `FIPS_service_indicator_after_call` should
+// be called immediately after. If the values returned from these two functions
+// are not equal, this means that the service called in between is deemed to be
+// approved. If the values are still the same, this means the counter has not
+// been incremented, and the service called is not approved for FIPS.
+//
+// In non-FIPS builds, `FIPS_service_indicator_before_call` always returns zero
+// and `FIPS_service_indicator_after_call` always returns one. Thus calls always
+// appear to be approved. This is intended to simplify testing.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT uint64_t FIPS_service_indicator_before_call();
+OPENSSL_EXPORT uint64_t FIPS_service_indicator_after_call();
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
+
+// FIPS_service_indicator_update_state records that an approved service has been
+// invoked.
+void FIPS_service_indicator_update_state();
+
+// FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state and `FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state`
+// stop `FIPS_service_indicator_update_state` from actually updating the service
+// indicator. This is used when a primitive calls a potentially approved
+// primitive to avoid false positives. For example, just because a key
+// generation calls `BCM_rand_bytes` (and thus the approved DRBG) doesn't mean
+// that the key generation operation itself is approved.
+//
+// This lock nests: i.e. locking twice is fine so long as each lock is paired
+// with an unlock. If the (64-bit) counter overflows, the process aborts.
+void FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state();
+void FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state();
+
+// The following functions may call `FIPS_service_indicator_update_state` if
+// their parameter specifies an approved operation.
+
+void AEAD_GCM_verify_service_indicator(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx);
+void AEAD_CCM_verify_service_indicator(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx);
+void EC_KEY_keygen_verify_service_indicator(const EC_KEY *eckey);
+void ECDH_verify_service_indicator(const EC_KEY *ec_key);
+void EVP_Cipher_verify_service_indicator(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+void EVP_DigestSign_verify_service_indicator(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+void EVP_DigestVerify_verify_service_indicator(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+void HMAC_verify_service_indicator(const EVP_MD *evp_md);
+void TLSKDF_verify_service_indicator(const EVP_MD *dgst);
+
+#else
+
+// Service indicator functions are no-ops in non-FIPS builds.
+
+inline void FIPS_service_indicator_update_state() {}
+inline void FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state() {}
+inline void FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state() {}
+
+inline void AEAD_GCM_verify_service_indicator(
+    [[maybe_unused]] const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {}
+
+inline void AEAD_CCM_verify_service_indicator(
+    [[maybe_unused]] const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {}
+
+inline void EC_KEY_keygen_verify_service_indicator(
+    [[maybe_unused]] const EC_KEY *eckey) {}
+
+inline void ECDH_verify_service_indicator(
+    [[maybe_unused]] const EC_KEY *ec_key) {}
+
+inline void EVP_Cipher_verify_service_indicator(
+    [[maybe_unused]] const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) {}
+
+inline void EVP_DigestSign_verify_service_indicator(
+    [[maybe_unused]] const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {}
+
+inline void EVP_DigestVerify_verify_service_indicator(
+    [[maybe_unused]] const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {}
+
+inline void HMAC_verify_service_indicator(
+    [[maybe_unused]] const EVP_MD *evp_md) {}
+
+inline void TLSKDF_verify_service_indicator(
+    [[maybe_unused]] const EVP_MD *dgst) {}
+
+#endif  // BORINGSSL_FIPS
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+#endif  // OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_SERVICE_INDICATOR_INTERNAL_H

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/service_indicator/service_indicator.cc.inc

@@ -0,0 +1,330 @@
+// Copyright Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "../../evp/internal.h"
+#include "../../internal.h"
+#include "../../mem_internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
+
+#define STATE_UNLOCKED 0
+
+// fips_service_indicator_state is a thread-local structure that stores the
+// state of the FIPS service indicator.
+struct fips_service_indicator_state {
+  // lock_state records the number of times the indicator has been locked.
+  // When it is zero (i.e. `STATE_UNLOCKED`) then the indicator can be updated.
+  uint64_t lock_state;
+  // counter is the indicator state. It is incremented when an approved service
+  // completes.
+  uint64_t counter;
+};
+
+// service_indicator_get returns a pointer to the `fips_service_indicator_state`
+// for the current thread. It returns nullptr on error.
+//
+// FIPS 140-3 requires that the module should provide the service indicator
+// for approved services irrespective of whether the user queries it or not.
+// Hence, it is lazily initialized in any call to an approved service.
+static struct fips_service_indicator_state *service_indicator_get() {
+  struct fips_service_indicator_state *indicator =
+      reinterpret_cast<fips_service_indicator_state *>(CRYPTO_get_thread_local(
+          OPENSSL_THREAD_LOCAL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_STATE));
+
+  if (indicator == nullptr) {
+    indicator = New<struct fips_service_indicator_state>();
+    if (indicator == nullptr) {
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+
+    indicator->lock_state = STATE_UNLOCKED;
+    indicator->counter = 0;
+
+    if (!CRYPTO_set_thread_local(
+            OPENSSL_THREAD_LOCAL_FIPS_SERVICE_INDICATOR_STATE, indicator,
+            OPENSSL_free)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CRYPTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return indicator;
+}
+
+static uint64_t service_indicator_get_counter() {
+  struct fips_service_indicator_state *indicator = service_indicator_get();
+  if (indicator == nullptr) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return indicator->counter;
+}
+
+uint64_t bssl::FIPS_service_indicator_before_call() {
+  return service_indicator_get_counter();
+}
+
+uint64_t bssl::FIPS_service_indicator_after_call() {
+  return service_indicator_get_counter();
+}
+
+void bssl::FIPS_service_indicator_update_state() {
+  struct fips_service_indicator_state *indicator = service_indicator_get();
+  if (indicator && indicator->lock_state == STATE_UNLOCKED) {
+    indicator->counter++;
+  }
+}
+
+void bssl::FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state() {
+  struct fips_service_indicator_state *indicator = service_indicator_get();
+  if (indicator == nullptr) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // `FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state` and
+  // `FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state` should not under/overflow in normal
+  // operation. They are still checked and errors added to facilitate testing in
+  // service_indicator_test.cc. This should only happen if lock/unlock are
+  // called in an incorrect order or multiple times in the same function.
+  const uint64_t new_state = indicator->lock_state + 1;
+  if (new_state < indicator->lock_state) {
+    // Overflow. This would imply that our call stack length has exceeded a
+    // `uint64_t` which impossible on a 64-bit system.
+    abort();
+  }
+
+  indicator->lock_state = new_state;
+}
+
+void bssl::FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state() {
+  struct fips_service_indicator_state *indicator = service_indicator_get();
+  if (indicator == nullptr) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (indicator->lock_state == 0) {
+    abort();
+  }
+
+  indicator->lock_state--;
+}
+
+void bssl::AEAD_GCM_verify_service_indicator(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {
+  const size_t key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(ctx->aead);
+  if (key_len == 16 || key_len == 32) {
+    FIPS_service_indicator_update_state();
+  }
+}
+
+void bssl::AEAD_CCM_verify_service_indicator(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (EVP_AEAD_key_length(ctx->aead) == 16 && ctx->tag_len == 4) {
+    FIPS_service_indicator_update_state();
+  }
+}
+
+// is_ec_fips_approved returns one if the curve corresponding to the given NID
+// is FIPS approved, and zero otherwise.
+static int is_ec_fips_approved(int curve_nid) {
+  switch (curve_nid) {
+    case NID_secp224r1:
+    case NID_X9_62_prime256v1:
+    case NID_secp384r1:
+    case NID_secp521r1:
+      return 1;
+    default:
+      return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+// is_md_fips_approved_for_signing returns one if the given message digest type
+// is FIPS approved for signing, and zero otherwise.
+static int is_md_fips_approved_for_signing(int md_type) {
+  switch (md_type) {
+    case NID_sha224:
+    case NID_sha256:
+    case NID_sha384:
+    case NID_sha512:
+    case NID_sha512_256:
+      return 1;
+    default:
+      return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+// is_md_fips_approved_for_verifying returns one if the given message digest
+// type is FIPS approved for verifying, and zero otherwise.
+static int is_md_fips_approved_for_verifying(int md_type) {
+  switch (md_type) {
+    case NID_sha224:
+    case NID_sha256:
+    case NID_sha384:
+    case NID_sha512:
+    case NID_sha512_256:
+      return 1;
+    default:
+      return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+static void evp_md_ctx_verify_service_indicator(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
+                                                int (*md_ok)(int md_type)) {
+  if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(ctx) == nullptr) {
+    // Signature schemes without a prehash are currently never FIPS approved.
+    return;
+  }
+
+  EVP_PKEY_CTX *const pctx = ctx->pctx;
+  const EVP_PKEY *const pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx);
+  const int pkey_type = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
+  const int md_type = EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx);
+
+  // EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS SPKIs aren't supported.
+  if (pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+    // Message digest used in the private key should be of the same type
+    // as the given one, so we extract the MD type from the `EVP_PKEY`
+    // and compare it with the type in `ctx`.
+    const EVP_MD *pctx_md;
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(pctx, &pctx_md)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (EVP_MD_type(pctx_md) != md_type) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    int padding;
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pctx, &padding)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (padding == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+      int salt_len;
+      const EVP_MD *mgf1_md;
+      if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, &salt_len) ||
+          !EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(pctx, &mgf1_md) ||
+          (salt_len != RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST &&
+           salt_len != (int)EVP_MD_size(pctx_md)) ||
+          EVP_MD_type(mgf1_md) != md_type) {
+        // Only PSS where saltLen == hashLen is tested with ACVP. Cases with
+        // non-standard padding functions are also excluded.
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+
+    // The approved RSA key sizes for signing are 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits.
+    // Note: `EVP_PKEY_size` returns the size in bytes.
+    size_t pkey_size = EVP_PKEY_size(FromOpaque(ctx->pctx)->pkey.get());
+
+    // Check if the MD type and the RSA key size are approved.
+    if (md_ok(md_type) &&
+        (pkey_size == 256 || pkey_size == 384 || pkey_size == 512)) {
+      FIPS_service_indicator_update_state();
+    }
+  } else if (pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+    // Check if the MD type and the elliptic curve are approved.
+    if (md_ok(md_type) &&
+        is_ec_fips_approved(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(
+            EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(FromOpaque(ctx->pctx)->pkey.get()))))) {
+      FIPS_service_indicator_update_state();
+    }
+  }
+
+err:
+  // Ensure that junk errors aren't left on the queue.
+  ERR_clear_error();
+}
+
+void bssl::EC_KEY_keygen_verify_service_indicator(const EC_KEY *eckey) {
+  if (is_ec_fips_approved(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)))) {
+    FIPS_service_indicator_update_state();
+  }
+}
+
+void bssl::ECDH_verify_service_indicator(const EC_KEY *ec_key) {
+  if (is_ec_fips_approved(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key)))) {
+    FIPS_service_indicator_update_state();
+  }
+}
+
+void bssl::EVP_Cipher_verify_service_indicator(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) {
+  switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(ctx)) {
+    case NID_aes_128_ecb:
+    case NID_aes_192_ecb:
+    case NID_aes_256_ecb:
+
+    case NID_aes_128_cbc:
+    case NID_aes_192_cbc:
+    case NID_aes_256_cbc:
+
+    case NID_aes_128_ctr:
+    case NID_aes_192_ctr:
+    case NID_aes_256_ctr:
+      FIPS_service_indicator_update_state();
+  }
+}
+
+void bssl::EVP_DigestVerify_verify_service_indicator(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {
+  return evp_md_ctx_verify_service_indicator(ctx,
+                                             is_md_fips_approved_for_verifying);
+}
+
+void bssl::EVP_DigestSign_verify_service_indicator(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) {
+  return evp_md_ctx_verify_service_indicator(ctx,
+                                             is_md_fips_approved_for_signing);
+}
+
+void bssl::HMAC_verify_service_indicator(const EVP_MD *evp_md) {
+  switch (EVP_MD_type(evp_md)) {
+    case NID_sha1:
+    case NID_sha224:
+    case NID_sha256:
+    case NID_sha384:
+    case NID_sha512:
+    case NID_sha512_256:
+      FIPS_service_indicator_update_state();
+      break;
+  }
+}
+
+void bssl::TLSKDF_verify_service_indicator(const EVP_MD *md) {
+  // HMAC-SHA{256, 384, 512} are approved for use in the KDF in TLS 1.2. These
+  // Key Derivation functions are to be used in the context of the TLS protocol.
+  switch (EVP_MD_type(md)) {
+    case NID_sha256:
+    case NID_sha384:
+    case NID_sha512:
+      FIPS_service_indicator_update_state();
+      break;
+  }
+}
+
+#else
+
+uint64_t bssl::FIPS_service_indicator_before_call() { return 0; }
+
+uint64_t bssl::FIPS_service_indicator_after_call() {
+  // One is returned so that the return value is always greater than zero, the
+  // return value of `FIPS_service_indicator_before_call`. This makes everything
+  // report as "approved" in non-FIPS builds.
+  return 1;
+}
+
+#endif  // BORINGSSL_FIPS

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/sha/internal.h

@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+// Copyright 2018 The BoringSSL Authors
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_SHA_INTERNAL_H
+#define OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_SHA_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include <openssl/base.h>
+
+#include "../../internal.h"
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+// Define SHA{n}[_{variant}]_ASM if sha{n}_block_data_order[_{variant}] is
+// defined in assembly.
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_ARM)
+
+#define SHA1_ASM_NOHW
+#define SHA256_ASM_NOHW
+#define SHA512_ASM_NOHW
+
+#define SHA1_ASM_HW
+inline int sha1_hw_capable() { return CRYPTO_is_ARMv8_SHA1_capable(); }
+
+#define SHA1_ASM_NEON
+extern "C" void sha1_block_data_order_neon(uint32_t state[5],
+                                           const uint8_t *data, size_t num);
+
+#define SHA256_ASM_HW
+inline int sha256_hw_capable() { return CRYPTO_is_ARMv8_SHA256_capable(); }
+
+#define SHA256_ASM_NEON
+extern "C" void sha256_block_data_order_neon(uint32_t state[8],
+                                             const uint8_t *data, size_t num);
+
+// Armv8.2 SHA-512 instructions are not available in 32-bit.
+#define SHA512_ASM_NEON
+extern "C" void sha512_block_data_order_neon(uint64_t state[8],
+                                             const uint8_t *data, size_t num);
+
+#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)
+
+#define SHA1_ASM_NOHW
+#define SHA256_ASM_NOHW
+#define SHA512_ASM_NOHW
+
+#define SHA1_ASM_HW
+inline int sha1_hw_capable() { return CRYPTO_is_ARMv8_SHA1_capable(); }
+
+#define SHA256_ASM_HW
+inline int sha256_hw_capable() { return CRYPTO_is_ARMv8_SHA256_capable(); }
+
+#define SHA512_ASM_HW
+inline int sha512_hw_capable() { return CRYPTO_is_ARMv8_SHA512_capable(); }
+
+#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86)
+
+#define SHA1_ASM_NOHW
+#define SHA256_ASM_NOHW
+#define SHA512_ASM_NOHW
+
+#define SHA1_ASM_SSSE3
+inline int sha1_ssse3_capable() { return CRYPTO_is_SSSE3_capable(); }
+extern "C" void sha1_block_data_order_ssse3(uint32_t state[5],
+                                            const uint8_t *data, size_t num);
+
+#define SHA1_ASM_AVX
+inline int sha1_avx_capable() {
+  // AMD CPUs have slow SHLD/SHRD. See also the discussion in sha1-586.pl.
+  //
+  // TODO(crbug.com/42290564): Should we enable SHAEXT on 32-bit x86?
+  return CRYPTO_is_AVX_capable() && CRYPTO_is_intel_cpu();
+}
+extern "C" void sha1_block_data_order_avx(uint32_t state[5],
+                                          const uint8_t *data, size_t num);
+
+#define SHA256_ASM_SSSE3
+inline int sha256_ssse3_capable() { return CRYPTO_is_SSSE3_capable(); }
+extern "C" void sha256_block_data_order_ssse3(uint32_t state[8],
+                                              const uint8_t *data, size_t num);
+
+#define SHA256_ASM_AVX
+inline int sha256_avx_capable() {
+  // AMD CPUs have slow SHLD/SHRD. See also the discussion in sha1-586.pl.
+  //
+  // TODO(crbug.com/42290564): Should we enable SHAEXT on 32-bit x86?
+  return CRYPTO_is_AVX_capable() && CRYPTO_is_intel_cpu();
+}
+extern "C" void sha256_block_data_order_avx(uint32_t state[8],
+                                            const uint8_t *data, size_t num);
+
+#define SHA512_ASM_SSSE3
+inline int sha512_ssse3_capable() { return CRYPTO_is_SSSE3_capable(); }
+extern "C" void sha512_block_data_order_ssse3(uint64_t state[8],
+                                              const uint8_t *data, size_t num);
+
+#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
+
+#define SHA1_ASM_NOHW
+#define SHA256_ASM_NOHW
+#define SHA512_ASM_NOHW
+
+#define SHA1_ASM_HW
+inline int sha1_hw_capable() {
+  return CRYPTO_is_x86_SHA_capable() && CRYPTO_is_SSSE3_capable();
+}
+
+#define SHA1_ASM_AVX2
+inline int sha1_avx2_capable() {
+  return CRYPTO_is_AVX2_capable() && CRYPTO_is_BMI2_capable() &&
+         CRYPTO_is_BMI1_capable();
+}
+extern "C" void sha1_block_data_order_avx2(uint32_t state[5],
+                                           const uint8_t *data, size_t num);
+
+#define SHA1_ASM_AVX
+inline int sha1_avx_capable() {
+  // AMD CPUs have slow SHLD/SHRD. See also the discussion in sha1-586.pl. Zen
+  // added the SHA extension, so this is moot on newer AMD CPUs.
+  return CRYPTO_is_AVX_capable() && CRYPTO_is_intel_cpu();
+}
+extern "C" void sha1_block_data_order_avx(uint32_t state[5],
+                                          const uint8_t *data, size_t num);
+
+#define SHA1_ASM_SSSE3
+inline int sha1_ssse3_capable() { return CRYPTO_is_SSSE3_capable(); }
+extern "C" void sha1_block_data_order_ssse3(uint32_t state[5],
+                                            const uint8_t *data, size_t num);
+
+#define SHA256_ASM_HW
+inline int sha256_hw_capable() {
+  // Note that the original assembly did not check SSSE3.
+  return CRYPTO_is_x86_SHA_capable() && CRYPTO_is_SSSE3_capable();
+}
+
+#define SHA256_ASM_AVX
+inline int sha256_avx_capable() {
+  // AMD CPUs have slow SHLD/SHRD. See also the discussion in sha1-586.pl. Zen
+  // added the SHA extension, so this is moot on newer AMD CPUs.
+  return CRYPTO_is_AVX_capable() && CRYPTO_is_intel_cpu();
+}
+extern "C" void sha256_block_data_order_avx(uint32_t state[8],
+                                            const uint8_t *data, size_t num);
+
+#define SHA256_ASM_SSSE3
+inline int sha256_ssse3_capable() { return CRYPTO_is_SSSE3_capable(); }
+extern "C" void sha256_block_data_order_ssse3(uint32_t state[8],
+                                              const uint8_t *data, size_t num);
+
+#define SHA512_ASM_AVX
+inline int sha512_avx_capable() {
+  // AMD CPUs have slow SHLD/SHRD. See also the discussion in sha1-586.pl.
+  //
+  // TODO(crbug.com/42290564): Fixing and enabling the AVX2 implementation would
+  // mitigate this on newer AMD CPUs.
+  return CRYPTO_is_AVX_capable() && CRYPTO_is_intel_cpu();
+}
+extern "C" void sha512_block_data_order_avx(uint64_t state[8],
+                                            const uint8_t *data, size_t num);
+
+#endif
+
+#if defined(SHA1_ASM_HW)
+extern "C" void sha1_block_data_order_hw(uint32_t state[5], const uint8_t *data,
+                                         size_t num);
+#endif
+#if defined(SHA1_ASM_NOHW)
+extern "C" void sha1_block_data_order_nohw(uint32_t state[5],
+                                           const uint8_t *data, size_t num);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(SHA256_ASM_HW)
+extern "C" void sha256_block_data_order_hw(uint32_t state[8],
+                                           const uint8_t *data, size_t num);
+#endif
+#if defined(SHA256_ASM_NOHW)
+extern "C" void sha256_block_data_order_nohw(uint32_t state[8],
+                                             const uint8_t *data, size_t num);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(SHA512_ASM_HW)
+extern "C" void sha512_block_data_order_hw(uint64_t state[8],
+                                           const uint8_t *data, size_t num);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(SHA512_ASM_NOHW)
+extern "C" void sha512_block_data_order_nohw(uint64_t state[8],
+                                             const uint8_t *data, size_t num);
+#endif
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+#endif  // OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_SHA_INTERNAL_H