visaljs 0.0.2 → 0.0.4

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/ec/util.cc.inc

@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+// Copyright 2015 The BoringSSL Authors
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/base.h>
+
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+// This function looks at 5+1 scalar bits (5 current, 1 adjacent less
+// significant bit), and recodes them into a signed digit for use in fast point
+// multiplication: the use of signed rather than unsigned digits means that
+// fewer points need to be precomputed, given that point inversion is easy (a
+// precomputed point dP makes -dP available as well).
+//
+// BACKGROUND:
+//
+// Signed digits for multiplication were introduced by Booth ("A signed binary
+// multiplication technique", Quart. Journ. Mech. and Applied Math., vol. IV,
+// pt. 2 (1951), pp. 236-240), in that case for multiplication of integers.
+// Booth's original encoding did not generally improve the density of nonzero
+// digits over the binary representation, and was merely meant to simplify the
+// handling of signed factors given in two's complement; but it has since been
+// shown to be the basis of various signed-digit representations that do have
+// further advantages, including the wNAF, using the following general
+// approach:
+//
+// (1) Given a binary representation
+//
+//       b_k  ...  b_2  b_1  b_0,
+//
+//     of a nonnegative integer (b_k in {0, 1}), rewrite it in digits 0, 1, -1
+//     by using bit-wise subtraction as follows:
+//
+//        b_k     b_(k-1)  ...  b_2  b_1  b_0
+//      -         b_k      ...  b_3  b_2  b_1  b_0
+//       -----------------------------------------
+//        s_(k+1) s_k      ...  s_3  s_2  s_1  s_0
+//
+//     A left-shift followed by subtraction of the original value yields a new
+//     representation of the same value, using signed bits s_i = b_(i-1) - b_i.
+//     This representation from Booth's paper has since appeared in the
+//     literature under a variety of different names including "reversed binary
+//     form", "alternating greedy expansion", "mutual opposite form", and
+//     "sign-alternating {+-1}-representation".
+//
+//     An interesting property is that among the nonzero bits, values 1 and -1
+//     strictly alternate.
+//
+// (2) Various window schemes can be applied to the Booth representation of
+//     integers: for example, right-to-left sliding windows yield the wNAF
+//     (a signed-digit encoding independently discovered by various researchers
+//     in the 1990s), and left-to-right sliding windows yield a left-to-right
+//     equivalent of the wNAF (independently discovered by various researchers
+//     around 2004).
+//
+// To prevent leaking information through side channels in point multiplication,
+// we need to recode the given integer into a regular pattern: sliding windows
+// as in wNAFs won't do, we need their fixed-window equivalent -- which is a few
+// decades older: we'll be using the so-called "modified Booth encoding" due to
+// MacSorley ("High-speed arithmetic in binary computers", Proc. IRE, vol. 49
+// (1961), pp. 67-91), in a radix-2^5 setting.  That is, we always combine five
+// signed bits into a signed digit:
+//
+//       s_(5j + 4) s_(5j + 3) s_(5j + 2) s_(5j + 1) s_(5j)
+//
+// The sign-alternating property implies that the resulting digit values are
+// integers from -16 to 16.
+//
+// Of course, we don't actually need to compute the signed digits s_i as an
+// intermediate step (that's just a nice way to see how this scheme relates
+// to the wNAF): a direct computation obtains the recoded digit from the
+// six bits b_(5j + 4) ... b_(5j - 1).
+//
+// This function takes those six bits as an integer (0 .. 63), writing the
+// recoded digit to *sign (0 for positive, 1 for negative) and *digit (absolute
+// value, in the range 0 .. 16).  Note that this integer essentially provides
+// the input bits "shifted to the left" by one position: for example, the input
+// to compute the least significant recoded digit, given that there's no bit
+// b_-1, has to be b_4 b_3 b_2 b_1 b_0 0.
+//
+// DOUBLING CASE:
+//
+// Point addition formulas for short Weierstrass curves are often incomplete.
+// Edge cases such as P + P or P + ∞ must be handled separately. This
+// complicates constant-time requirements. P + ∞ cannot be avoided (any window
+// may be zero) and is handled with constant-time selects. P + P (where P is not
+// ∞) usually is not. Instead, windowing strategies are chosen to avoid this
+// case. Whether this happens depends on the group order.
+//
+// Let w be the window width (in this function, w = 5). The non-trivial doubling
+// case in single-point scalar multiplication may occur if and only if the
+// 2^(w-1) bit of the group order is zero.
+//
+// Note the above only holds if the scalar is fully reduced and the group order
+// is a prime that is much larger than 2^w. It also only holds when windows
+// are applied from most significant to least significant, doubling between each
+// window. It does not apply to more complex table strategies such as
+// `EC_GFp_nistz256_method`.
+//
+// PROOF:
+//
+// Let n be the group order. Let l be the number of bits needed to represent n.
+// Assume there exists some 0 <= k < n such that signed w-bit windowed
+// multiplication hits the doubling case.
+//
+// Windowed multiplication consists of iterating over groups of s_i (defined
+// above based on k's binary representation) from most to least significant. At
+// iteration i (for i = ..., 3w, 2w, w, 0, starting from the most significant
+// window), we:
+//
+//  1. Double the accumulator A, w times. Let A_i be the value of A at this
+//     point.
+//
+//  2. Set A to T_i + A_i, where T_i is a precomputed multiple of P
+//     corresponding to the window s_(i+w-1) ... s_i.
+//
+// Let j be the index such that A_j = T_j ≠ ∞. Looking at A_i and T_i as
+// multiples of P, define a_i and t_i to be scalar coefficients of A_i and T_i.
+// Thus a_j = t_j ≠ 0 (mod n). Note a_i and t_i may not be reduced mod n. t_i is
+// the value of the w signed bits s_(i+w-1) ... s_i. a_i is computed as a_i =
+// 2^w * (a_(i+w) + t_(i+w)).
+//
+// t_i is bounded by -2^(w-1) <= t_i <= 2^(w-1). Additionally, we may write it
+// in terms of unsigned bits b_i. t_i consists of signed bits s_(i+w-1) ... s_i.
+// This is computed as:
+//
+//         b_(i+w-2) b_(i+w-3)  ...  b_i      b_(i-1)
+//      -  b_(i+w-1) b_(i+w-2)  ...  b_(i+1)  b_i
+//       --------------------------------------------
+//   t_i = s_(i+w-1) s_(i+w-2)  ...  s_(i+1)  s_i
+//
+// Observe that b_(i+w-2) through b_i occur in both terms. Let x be the integer
+// represented by that bit string, i.e. 2^(w-2)*b_(i+w-2) + ... + b_i.
+//
+//   t_i = (2*x + b_(i-1)) - (2^(w-1)*b_(i+w-1) + x)
+//       = x - 2^(w-1)*b_(i+w-1) + b_(i-1)
+//
+// Or, using C notation for bit operations:
+//
+//   t_i = (k>>i) & ((1<<(w-1)) - 1) - (k>>i) & (1<<(w-1)) + (k>>(i-1)) & 1
+//
+// Note b_(i-1) is added in left-shifted by one (or doubled) from its place.
+// This is compensated by t_(i-w)'s subtraction term. Thus, a_i may be computed
+// by adding b_l b_(l-1) ... b_(i+1) b_i and an extra copy of b_(i-1). In C
+// notation, this is:
+//
+//   a_i = (k>>(i+w)) << w + ((k>>(i+w-1)) & 1) << w
+//
+// Observe that, while t_i may be positive or negative, a_i is bounded by
+// 0 <= a_i < n + 2^w. Additionally, a_i can only be zero if b_(i+w-1) and up
+// are all zero. (Note this implies a non-trivial P + (-P) is unreachable for
+// all groups. That would imply the subsequent a_i is zero, which means all
+// terms thus far were zero.)
+//
+// Returning to our doubling position, we have a_j = t_j (mod n). We now
+// determine the value of a_j - t_j, which must be divisible by n. Our bounds on
+// a_j and t_j imply a_j - t_j is 0 or n. If it is 0, a_j = t_j. However, 2^w
+// divides a_j and -2^(w-1) <= t_j <= 2^(w-1), so this can only happen if
+// a_j = t_j = 0, which is a trivial doubling. Therefore, a_j - t_j = n.
+//
+// Now we determine j. Suppose j > 0. w divides j, so j >= w. Then,
+//
+//   n = a_j - t_j = (k>>(j+w)) << w + ((k>>(j+w-1)) & 1) << w - t_j
+//                <= k/2^j + 2^w - t_j
+//                 < n/2^w + 2^w + 2^(w-1)
+//
+// n is much larger than 2^w, so this is impossible. Thus, j = 0: only the final
+// addition may hit the doubling case.
+//
+// Finally, we consider bit patterns for n and k. Divide k into k_H + k_M + k_L
+// such that k_H is the contribution from b_(l-1) .. b_w, k_M is the
+// contribution from b_(w-1), and k_L is the contribution from b_(w-2) ... b_0.
+// That is:
+//
+// - 2^w divides k_H
+// - k_M is 0 or 2^(w-1)
+// - 0 <= k_L < 2^(w-1)
+//
+// Divide n into n_H + n_M + n_L similarly. We thus have:
+//
+//   t_0 = (k>>0) & ((1<<(w-1)) - 1) - (k>>0) & (1<<(w-1)) + (k>>(0-1)) & 1
+//       = k & ((1<<(w-1)) - 1) - k & (1<<(w-1))
+//       = k_L - k_M
+//
+//   a_0 = (k>>(0+w)) << w + ((k>>(0+w-1)) & 1) << w
+//       = (k>>w) << w + ((k>>(w-1)) & 1) << w
+//       = k_H + 2*k_M
+//
+//                 n = a_0 - t_0
+//   n_H + n_M + n_L = (k_H + 2*k_M) - (k_L - k_M)
+//                   = k_H + 3*k_M - k_L
+//
+// k_H - k_L < k and k < n, so k_H - k_L ≠ n. Therefore k_M is not 0 and must be
+// 2^(w-1). Now we consider k_H and n_H. We know k_H <= n_H. Suppose k_H = n_H.
+// Then,
+//
+//   n_M + n_L = 3*(2^(w-1)) - k_L
+//             > 3*(2^(w-1)) - 2^(w-1)
+//             = 2^w
+//
+// Contradiction (n_M + n_L is the bottom w bits of n). Thus k_H < n_H. Suppose
+// k_H < n_H - 2*2^w. Then,
+//
+//   n_H + n_M + n_L = k_H + 3*(2^(w-1)) - k_L
+//                   < n_H - 2*2^w + 3*(2^(w-1)) - k_L
+//         n_M + n_L < -2^(w-1) - k_L
+//
+// Contradiction. Thus, k_H = n_H - 2^w. (Note 2^w divides n_H and k_H.) Thus,
+//
+//   n_H + n_M + n_L = k_H + 3*(2^(w-1)) - k_L
+//                   = n_H - 2^w + 3*(2^(w-1)) - k_L
+//         n_M + n_L = 2^(w-1) - k_L
+//                  <= 2^(w-1)
+//
+// Equality would mean 2^(w-1) divides n, which is impossible if n is prime.
+// Thus n_M + n_L < 2^(w-1), so n_M is zero, proving our condition.
+//
+// This proof constructs k, so, to show the converse, let k_H = n_H - 2^w,
+// k_M = 2^(w-1), k_L = 2^(w-1) - n_L. This will result in a non-trivial point
+// doubling in the final addition and is the only such scalar.
+//
+// COMMON CURVES:
+//
+// The group orders for common curves end in the following bit patterns:
+//
+//   P-521: ...00001001; w = 4 is okay
+//   P-384: ...01110011; w = 2, 5, 6, 7 are okay
+//   P-256: ...01010001; w = 5, 7 are okay
+//   P-224: ...00111101; w = 3, 4, 5, 6 are okay
+void bssl::ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(crypto_word_t *sign,
+                                           crypto_word_t *digit,
+                                           crypto_word_t in) {
+  crypto_word_t s, d;
+
+  s = ~((in >> 5) - 1); /* sets all bits to MSB(in), 'in' seen as
+                          * 6-bit value */
+  d = (1 << 6) - in - 1;
+  d = (d & s) | (in & ~s);
+  d = (d >> 1) + (d & 1);
+
+  *sign = s & 1;
+  *digit = d;
+}

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/ec/wnaf.cc.inc

@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+// Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+// Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <iterator>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+
+#include "../../internal.h"
+#include "../bn/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+// This file implements the wNAF-based interleaving multi-exponentiation method
+// at:
+//   http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F3-540-45537-X_13
+//   http://www.bmoeller.de/pdf/TI-01-08.multiexp.pdf
+
+void bssl::ec_compute_wNAF(const EC_GROUP *group, int8_t *out,
+                           const EC_SCALAR *scalar, size_t bits, int w) {
+  // 'int8_t' can represent integers with absolute values less than 2^7.
+  assert(0 < w && w <= 7);
+  assert(bits != 0);
+  int bit = 1 << w;         // 2^w, at most 128
+  int next_bit = bit << 1;  // 2^(w+1), at most 256
+  int mask = next_bit - 1;  // at most 255
+
+  int window_val = scalar->words[0] & mask;
+  for (size_t j = 0; j < bits + 1; j++) {
+    assert(0 <= window_val && window_val <= next_bit);
+    int digit = 0;
+    if (window_val & 1) {
+      assert(0 < window_val && window_val < next_bit);
+      if (window_val & bit) {
+        digit = window_val - next_bit;
+        // We know -next_bit < digit < 0 and window_val - digit = next_bit.
+
+        // modified wNAF
+        if (j + w + 1 >= bits) {
+          // special case for generating modified wNAFs:
+          // no new bits will be added into window_val,
+          // so using a positive digit here will decrease
+          // the total length of the representation
+
+          digit = window_val & (mask >> 1);
+          // We know 0 < digit < bit and window_val - digit = bit.
+        }
+      } else {
+        digit = window_val;
+        // We know 0 < digit < bit and window_val - digit = 0.
+      }
+
+      window_val -= digit;
+
+      // Now window_val is 0 or 2^(w+1) in standard wNAF generation.
+      // For modified window NAFs, it may also be 2^w.
+      //
+      // See the comments above for the derivation of each of these bounds.
+      assert(window_val == 0 || window_val == next_bit || window_val == bit);
+      assert(-bit < digit && digit < bit);
+
+      // window_val was odd, so digit is also odd.
+      assert(digit & 1);
+    }
+
+    out[j] = digit;
+
+    // Incorporate the next bit. Previously, `window_val` <= `next_bit`, so if
+    // we shift and add at most one copy of `bit`, this will continue to hold
+    // afterwards.
+    window_val >>= 1;
+    window_val += bit * bn_is_bit_set_words(scalar->words, group->order.N.width,
+                                            j + w + 1);
+    assert(window_val <= next_bit);
+  }
+
+  // bits + 1 entries should be sufficient to consume all bits.
+  assert(window_val == 0);
+}
+
+// compute_precomp sets `out[i]` to (2*i+1)*p, for i from 0 to `len`.
+static void compute_precomp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_JACOBIAN *out,
+                            const EC_JACOBIAN *p, size_t len) {
+  ec_GFp_simple_point_copy(&out[0], p);
+  EC_JACOBIAN two_p;
+  ec_GFp_mont_dbl(group, &two_p, p);
+  for (size_t i = 1; i < len; i++) {
+    ec_GFp_mont_add(group, &out[i], &out[i - 1], &two_p);
+  }
+}
+
+static void lookup_precomp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_JACOBIAN *out,
+                           const EC_JACOBIAN *precomp, int digit) {
+  if (digit < 0) {
+    digit = -digit;
+    ec_GFp_simple_point_copy(out, &precomp[digit >> 1]);
+    ec_GFp_simple_invert(group, out);
+  } else {
+    ec_GFp_simple_point_copy(out, &precomp[digit >> 1]);
+  }
+}
+
+// EC_WNAF_WINDOW_BITS is the window size to use for `ec_GFp_mont_mul_public`.
+#define EC_WNAF_WINDOW_BITS 4
+
+// EC_WNAF_TABLE_SIZE is the table size to use for `ec_GFp_mont_mul_public`.
+#define EC_WNAF_TABLE_SIZE (1 << (EC_WNAF_WINDOW_BITS - 1))
+
+// EC_WNAF_STACK is the number of points worth of data to stack-allocate and
+// avoid a malloc.
+#define EC_WNAF_STACK 3
+
+int bssl::ec_GFp_mont_mul_public_batch(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_JACOBIAN *r,
+                                       const EC_SCALAR *g_scalar,
+                                       const EC_JACOBIAN *points,
+                                       const EC_SCALAR *scalars, size_t num) {
+  size_t bits = EC_GROUP_order_bits(group);
+  size_t wNAF_len = bits + 1;
+
+  // Stack-allocated space, which will be used if the task is small enough.
+  int8_t wNAF_stack[EC_WNAF_STACK][EC_MAX_BYTES * 8 + 1];
+  EC_JACOBIAN precomp_stack[EC_WNAF_STACK][EC_WNAF_TABLE_SIZE];
+
+  // Allocated pointers, which will remain NULL unless needed.
+  EC_JACOBIAN(*precomp_alloc)[EC_WNAF_TABLE_SIZE] = nullptr;
+  int8_t (*wNAF_alloc)[EC_MAX_BYTES * 8 + 1] = nullptr;
+
+  // These fields point either to the stack or heap buffers of the same name.
+  int8_t(*wNAF)[EC_MAX_BYTES * 8 + 1];
+  EC_JACOBIAN(*precomp)[EC_WNAF_TABLE_SIZE];
+
+  if (num <= EC_WNAF_STACK) {
+    wNAF = wNAF_stack;
+    precomp = precomp_stack;
+  } else {
+    wNAF_alloc = reinterpret_cast<decltype(wNAF_alloc)>(
+        OPENSSL_calloc(num, sizeof(wNAF_alloc[0])));
+    if (wNAF_alloc == nullptr) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    precomp_alloc = reinterpret_cast<decltype(precomp_alloc)>(
+        OPENSSL_calloc(num, sizeof(precomp_alloc[0])));
+    if (precomp_alloc == nullptr) {
+      OPENSSL_free(wNAF_alloc);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    wNAF = wNAF_alloc;
+    precomp = precomp_alloc;
+  }
+
+  int8_t g_wNAF[EC_MAX_BYTES * 8 + 1];
+  EC_JACOBIAN g_precomp[EC_WNAF_TABLE_SIZE];
+  assert(wNAF_len <= std::size(g_wNAF));
+  const EC_JACOBIAN *g = &group->generator.raw;
+  if (g_scalar != nullptr) {
+    ec_compute_wNAF(group, g_wNAF, g_scalar, bits, EC_WNAF_WINDOW_BITS);
+    compute_precomp(group, g_precomp, g, EC_WNAF_TABLE_SIZE);
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+    assert(wNAF_len <= std::size(wNAF[i]));
+    ec_compute_wNAF(group, wNAF[i], &scalars[i], bits, EC_WNAF_WINDOW_BITS);
+    compute_precomp(group, precomp[i], &points[i], EC_WNAF_TABLE_SIZE);
+  }
+
+  EC_JACOBIAN tmp;
+  int r_is_at_infinity = 1;
+  for (size_t k = wNAF_len - 1; k < wNAF_len; k--) {
+    if (!r_is_at_infinity) {
+      ec_GFp_mont_dbl(group, r, r);
+    }
+
+    if (g_scalar != nullptr && g_wNAF[k] != 0) {
+      lookup_precomp(group, &tmp, g_precomp, g_wNAF[k]);
+      if (r_is_at_infinity) {
+        ec_GFp_simple_point_copy(r, &tmp);
+        r_is_at_infinity = 0;
+      } else {
+        ec_GFp_mont_add(group, r, r, &tmp);
+      }
+    }
+
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+      if (wNAF[i][k] != 0) {
+        lookup_precomp(group, &tmp, precomp[i], wNAF[i][k]);
+        if (r_is_at_infinity) {
+          ec_GFp_simple_point_copy(r, &tmp);
+          r_is_at_infinity = 0;
+        } else {
+          ec_GFp_mont_add(group, r, r, &tmp);
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (r_is_at_infinity) {
+    ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity(group, r);
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_free(wNAF_alloc);
+  OPENSSL_free(precomp_alloc);
+  return 1;
+}

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/ecdh/ecdh.cc.inc

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+// Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+// Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+
+#include "../../internal.h"
+#include "../bcm_interface.h"
+#include "../ec/internal.h"
+#include "../service_indicator/internal.h"
+
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+int ECDH_compute_key_fips(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const EC_POINT *pub_key,
+                          const EC_KEY *priv_key) {
+  boringssl_ensure_ecc_self_test();
+
+  if (FromOpaque(priv_key)->priv_key == nullptr) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDH, ECDH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  const EC_SCALAR *const priv = &FromOpaque(priv_key)->priv_key->scalar;
+  const EC_GROUP *const group = EC_KEY_get0_group(priv_key);
+  if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, pub_key->group, nullptr) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EC_JACOBIAN shared_point;
+  uint8_t buf[EC_MAX_BYTES];
+  size_t buflen;
+  if (!ec_point_mul_scalar(group, &shared_point, &pub_key->raw, priv) ||
+      !ec_get_x_coordinate_as_bytes(group, buf, &buflen, sizeof(buf),
+                                    &shared_point)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDH, ECDH_R_POINT_ARITHMETIC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state();
+  SHA256_CTX ctx;
+  SHA512_CTX ctx_512;
+  switch (out_len) {
+    case SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH:
+      BCM_sha224_init(&ctx);
+      BCM_sha224_update(&ctx, buf, buflen);
+      BCM_sha224_final(out, &ctx);
+      break;
+    case SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH:
+      BCM_sha256_init(&ctx);
+      BCM_sha256_update(&ctx, buf, buflen);
+      BCM_sha256_final(out, &ctx);
+      break;
+    case SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH:
+      BCM_sha384_init(&ctx_512);
+      BCM_sha384_update(&ctx_512, buf, buflen);
+      BCM_sha384_final(out, &ctx_512);
+      break;
+    case SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH:
+      BCM_sha512_init(&ctx_512);
+      BCM_sha512_update(&ctx_512, buf, buflen);
+      BCM_sha512_final(out, &ctx_512);
+      break;
+    default:
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDH, ECDH_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+      FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state();
+      return 0;
+  }
+  FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state();
+
+  ECDH_verify_service_indicator(priv_key);
+  return 1;
+}