visaljs 0.0.2 → 0.0.4

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/rand.cc.inc

@@ -0,0 +1,486 @@
+// Copyright 2014 The BoringSSL Authors
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/chacha.h>
+#include <openssl/ctrdrbg.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+#include "../../bcm_support.h"
+#include "../../mem_internal.h"
+#include "../bcm_interface.h"
+#include "../delocate.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
+#include "../entropy/internal.h"
+#endif
+
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+// # Entropy design
+//
+// Each thread gets its own, thread-local DRBG. These are `rand_thread_state`
+// objects. In non-FIPS mode these are seeded from the operating system. It's
+// assumed that the operating system always has an unfailing source of entropy
+// which is accessed via `CRYPTO_sysrand`. (If the operating system entropy
+// source fails, it's up to `CRYPTO_sysrand` to abort the process—we don't try
+// to handle it.)
+//
+// If running in FIPS mode, a compliant entropy source must be used to seed the
+// thread-local DRBGs instead. That is either the BoringCrypto jitter source or,
+// on Android, a source provided by the OS which is accessed via a UNIX domain
+// socket. When seeding from these sources, OS entropy is still used via the
+// "additional data" input to the DRBG. But, from a compliance perspective,
+// this input is irrelevent.
+//
+// Since the jitter source takes some time to run, there is a single jitter
+// source per address space. It's used to seed a DRBG (`core_drbg`) which, in
+// turn, seeds the thread-local DRBGs. Android also uses this core DRBG design
+// in order to keep things more uniform across platforms.
+//
+// The core DRBG will be reseeded in accordance with NIST's reseeding
+// requirements. However, since our DRBG configuration allows for 2**48
+// generate calls before reseeding, it's unlikely that any process would
+// observe a reseed of that DRBG.
+//
+// The thread-local DRBGs mean that we have to worry about the process fork()ing
+// or the underlying VM getting cloned. Thus we try to mix entropy into each
+// generation from the thread-local DRBGs. The hardware may provide a
+// low-latency RNG. (Intel's rdrand instruction is the canonical example of
+// this.) If available, that'll be used for this additional data. Otherwise
+// we'll draw from the OS if it doesn't provide other fork-detection APIs.
+//
+// (We assume that the OS entropy is safe from fork()ing and VM duplication.
+// This might be a bit of a leap of faith, esp on Windows, but there's nothing
+// that we can do about it.)
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
+// This #if-block needs to be outside of the anonymous namespace:
+
+struct core_drbg {
+  CTR_DRBG_STATE drbg;
+  // calls is the number of generate calls made on `drbg` since it was last
+  // (re)seeded. This is bound by `kCoreReseedInterval`.
+  uint64_t calls = 0;
+};
+
+DEFINE_BSS_GET(struct core_drbg *, g_core_drbg, = nullptr)
+DEFINE_STATIC_MUTEX(g_core_drbg_lock)
+#endif  // FIPS
+
+namespace {
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
+
+// The number of times we'll generate from the core DRBG before reseeding.
+// This is within the permitted bounds but so high that this effectively means
+// that we'll never reseed it. See SP 800-90Ar1 table 3.
+constexpr uint64_t kCoreReseedInterval = (UINT64_C(1) << 48) - 1;
+constexpr size_t kCoreDRBGEntropySize = 48;
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_ANDROID)
+// Android seeds from a system daemon which is responsible for getting
+// entropy from a validated source.
+void core_drbg_get_entropy(uint8_t entropy[kCoreDRBGEntropySize]) {
+  uint8_t daemon_buffer[BSSL_ENTROPY_DAEMON_RESPONSE_LEN];
+  size_t daemon_buffer_len = sizeof(daemon_buffer);
+  if (!bssl_get_seed_from_daemon(daemon_buffer, &daemon_buffer_len)) {
+    // If the daemon isn't running then fallback to system entropy.
+    CRYPTO_sysrand(entropy, kCoreDRBGEntropySize);
+    return;
+  }
+  SHA384(daemon_buffer, daemon_buffer_len, entropy);
+}
+#else
+// Non-Android platforms use the jitter source.
+void core_drbg_get_entropy(uint8_t entropy[kCoreDRBGEntropySize]) {
+  // This runs the jitter source and takes some milliseconds.
+  for (unsigned i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
+    // The internal health checks of the jitter source may cause spurious
+    // failures, therefore we retry a number of times because failure
+    // to get entropy is fatal.
+    if (entropy::GetSeed(entropy)) {
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+  fprintf(stderr, "Persistent jitter source failure.\n");
+  BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort();
+}
+#endif
+
+struct core_drbg *core_drbg_get_locked() {
+  struct core_drbg **core = g_core_drbg_bss_get();
+  if (*core != nullptr) {
+    return *core;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t entropy[kCoreDRBGEntropySize];
+  core_drbg_get_entropy(entropy);
+
+  *core = New<core_drbg>();
+  if (!*core) {
+    BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort();
+  }
+
+  uint8_t nonce[CTR_DRBG_NONCE_LEN] = {0};
+  static constexpr char kPersonalization[] = "BoringSSL";
+  if (!CTR_DRBG_init(&(*core)->drbg, /*df=*/1, entropy, sizeof(entropy), nonce,
+                     reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(kPersonalization),
+                     sizeof(kPersonalization))) {
+    BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort();
+  }
+
+  return *core;
+}
+
+// Draw a seed for a thread-local DRBG from the core DRBG.
+void core_drbg_draw_seed(uint8_t *out_seed, size_t len) {
+  MutexWriteLock lock(g_core_drbg_lock_bss_get());
+
+  struct core_drbg *const core = core_drbg_get_locked();
+  if (core->calls > kCoreReseedInterval) {
+    uint8_t reseed_entropy[kCoreDRBGEntropySize];
+    core_drbg_get_entropy(reseed_entropy);
+    if (!CTR_DRBG_reseed(&core->drbg, reseed_entropy,
+                         /*additional_data=*/nullptr, 0)) {
+      BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort();
+    }
+    core->calls = 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!CTR_DRBG_generate(&core->drbg, out_seed, len,
+                         /*additional_data=*/nullptr, 0)) {
+    BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort();
+  }
+  core->calls++;
+}
+
+#endif  // BORINGSSL_FIPS
+
+// kReseedInterval is the number of generate calls made to a thread-local
+// CTR-DRBG before reseeding.
+static const unsigned kReseedInterval = 4096;
+
+// rand_thread_state contains the per-thread state for the RNG.
+struct rand_thread_state {
+  CTR_DRBG_STATE drbg;
+  uint64_t fork_generation;
+  // calls is the number of generate calls made on `drbg` since it was last
+  // (re)seeded. This is bound by `kReseedInterval`.
+  unsigned calls;
+  // fork_unsafe_buffering is non-zero iff, when `drbg` was last (re)seeded,
+  // fork-unsafe buffering was enabled.
+  int fork_unsafe_buffering;
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
+  // next and prev form a nullptr-terminated, double-linked list of all states
+  // in a process.
+  struct rand_thread_state *next, *prev;
+  // clear_drbg_lock synchronizes between uses of `drbg` and
+  // `rand_thread_state_clear_all` clearing it. This lock should be uncontended
+  // in the common case, except on shutdown.
+  Mutex clear_drbg_lock;
+#endif
+};
+
+}  // namespace
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
+// thread_states_list is the head of a linked-list of all `rand_thread_state`
+// objects in the process, one per thread. This is needed because FIPS requires
+// the ability to zero them on demand (AS09.28). BoringSSL triggers this with a
+// destructor function.
+DEFINE_BSS_GET(struct rand_thread_state *, thread_states_list, = nullptr)
+DEFINE_STATIC_MUTEX(thread_states_list_lock)
+
+static void rand_thread_state_clear_all() __attribute__((destructor));
+static void rand_thread_state_clear_all() {
+  thread_states_list_lock_bss_get()->LockWrite();
+  for (struct rand_thread_state *cur = *thread_states_list_bss_get();
+       cur != nullptr; cur = cur->next) {
+    cur->clear_drbg_lock.LockWrite();
+    CTR_DRBG_clear(&cur->drbg);
+  }
+
+  g_core_drbg_lock_bss_get()->LockWrite();
+  struct core_drbg **core = g_core_drbg_bss_get();
+  if (*core) {
+    CTR_DRBG_clear(&(*core)->drbg);
+  }
+
+  // The locks are deliberately left locked so that any threads that are still
+  // running will hang if they try to call `BCM_rand_bytes`. It also ensures
+  // `rand_thread_state_free` cannot free any thread state while we've taken the
+  // lock.
+}
+#endif
+
+// rand_thread_state_free frees a `rand_thread_state`. This is called when a
+// thread exits.
+static void rand_thread_state_free(void *state_in) {
+  struct rand_thread_state *state =
+      reinterpret_cast<rand_thread_state *>(state_in);
+
+  if (state_in == nullptr) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
+  thread_states_list_lock_bss_get()->LockWrite();
+
+  if (state->prev != nullptr) {
+    state->prev->next = state->next;
+  } else if (*thread_states_list_bss_get() == state) {
+    // `state->prev` may be nullptr either if it is the head of the list,
+    // or if `state` is freed before it was added to the list at all.
+    // Compare against the head of the list to distinguish these cases.
+    *thread_states_list_bss_get() = state->next;
+  }
+
+  if (state->next != nullptr) {
+    state->next->prev = state->prev;
+  }
+
+  thread_states_list_lock_bss_get()->UnlockWrite();
+
+  CTR_DRBG_clear(&state->drbg);
+#endif
+
+  Delete(state);
+}
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && \
+    !defined(FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION)
+// rdrand should only be called if either `have_rdrand` or `have_fast_rdrand`
+// returned true.
+static int rdrand(uint8_t *buf, const size_t len) {
+  const size_t len_multiple8 = len & ~7;
+  if (!CRYPTO_rdrand_multiple8_buf(buf, len_multiple8)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  const size_t remainder = len - len_multiple8;
+
+  if (remainder != 0) {
+    assert(remainder < 8);
+
+    uint8_t rand_buf[8];
+    if (!CRYPTO_rdrand(rand_buf)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(buf + len_multiple8, rand_buf, remainder);
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+#else
+
+static int rdrand(uint8_t *buf, size_t len) { return 0; }
+
+#endif
+
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_rand_bytes_hwrng(uint8_t *buf, const size_t len) {
+  if (!have_rdrand()) {
+    return bcm_status::failure;
+  }
+  if (rdrand(buf, len)) {
+    return bcm_status::not_approved;
+  }
+  return bcm_status::failure;
+}
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
+
+// rand_get_seed fills `seed` with entropy. Since, in FIPS mode, this entropy
+// comes from the jitter source / system daemon, `additional_input` will also be
+// filled with system entropy.
+static void rand_get_seed(struct rand_thread_state *state,
+                          uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN],
+                          uint8_t additional_input[CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN],
+                          size_t *out_additional_input_len) {
+  core_drbg_draw_seed(seed, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN);
+  CRYPTO_sysrand(additional_input, CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN);
+  *out_additional_input_len = CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN;
+}
+
+#else
+
+// rand_get_seed fills `seed` with system entropy in a non-FIPS build.
+static void rand_get_seed(struct rand_thread_state *state,
+                          uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN],
+                          uint8_t additional_input[CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN],
+                          size_t *out_additional_input_len) {
+  CRYPTO_sysrand(seed, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN);
+  *out_additional_input_len = 0;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+bcm_infallible bssl::BCM_rand_bytes_with_additional_data(
+    uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const uint8_t user_additional_data[32]) {
+  if (out_len == 0) {
+    return bcm_infallible::approved;
+  }
+
+  const uint64_t fork_generation = CRYPTO_get_fork_generation();
+  const int fork_unsafe_buffering = rand_fork_unsafe_buffering_enabled();
+
+  // Additional data is mixed into every CTR-DRBG call to protect, as best we
+  // can, against forks & VM clones. We do not over-read this information and
+  // don't reseed with it so, from the point of view of FIPS, this doesn't
+  // provide “prediction resistance”. But, in practice, it does.
+  uint8_t additional_data[32];
+  // Intel chips have fast RDRAND instructions while, in other cases, RDRAND can
+  // be _slower_ than a system call.
+  if (!have_fast_rdrand() ||
+      !rdrand(additional_data, sizeof(additional_data))) {
+    // Without a hardware RNG to save us from address-space duplication, the OS
+    // entropy is used. This can be expensive (one read per `RAND_bytes` call)
+    // and so is disabled when we have fork detection, or if the application has
+    // promised not to fork.
+    if (fork_generation != 0 || fork_unsafe_buffering) {
+      OPENSSL_memset(additional_data, 0, sizeof(additional_data));
+    } else {
+      CRYPTO_sysrand(additional_data, sizeof(additional_data));
+    }
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(additional_data); i++) {
+    additional_data[i] ^= user_additional_data[i];
+  }
+
+  struct rand_thread_state stack_state;
+  struct rand_thread_state *state = reinterpret_cast<rand_thread_state *>(
+      CRYPTO_get_thread_local(OPENSSL_THREAD_LOCAL_RAND));
+
+  if (state == nullptr) {
+    state = New<rand_thread_state>();
+    if (state == nullptr ||
+        !CRYPTO_set_thread_local(OPENSSL_THREAD_LOCAL_RAND, state,
+                                 rand_thread_state_free)) {
+      // If the system is out of memory, use an ephemeral state on the
+      // stack.
+      Delete(state);
+      state = &stack_state;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN];
+    uint8_t personalization[CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN] = {0};
+    size_t personalization_len = 0;
+    rand_get_seed(state, seed, personalization, &personalization_len);
+
+    if (!CTR_DRBG_init(&state->drbg, /*df=*/true, seed,
+                       sizeof(seed) - CTR_DRBG_NONCE_LEN,
+                       seed + sizeof(seed) - CTR_DRBG_NONCE_LEN,
+                       personalization, personalization_len)) {
+      abort();
+    }
+    state->calls = 0;
+    state->fork_generation = fork_generation;
+    state->fork_unsafe_buffering = fork_unsafe_buffering;
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
+    if (state != &stack_state) {
+      MutexWriteLock lock(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get());
+      struct rand_thread_state **states_list = thread_states_list_bss_get();
+      state->next = *states_list;
+      if (state->next != nullptr) {
+        state->next->prev = state;
+      }
+      state->prev = nullptr;
+      *states_list = state;
+    }
+#endif
+  }
+
+  if (state->calls >= kReseedInterval ||
+      // If we've forked since `state` was last seeded, reseed.
+      state->fork_generation != fork_generation ||
+      // If `state` was seeded from a state with different fork-safety
+      // preferences, reseed. Suppose `state` was fork-safe, then forked into
+      // two children, but each of the children never fork and disable fork
+      // safety. The children must reseed to avoid working from the same PRNG
+      // state.
+      state->fork_unsafe_buffering != fork_unsafe_buffering) {
+    uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN];
+    uint8_t reseed_additional_data[CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN] = {0};
+    size_t reseed_additional_data_len = 0;
+    rand_get_seed(state, seed, reseed_additional_data,
+                  &reseed_additional_data_len);
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
+    // Take a read lock around accesses to `state->drbg`. This is needed to
+    // avoid returning bad entropy if we race with
+    // `rand_thread_state_clear_all`.
+    state->clear_drbg_lock.LockRead();
+#endif
+    if (!CTR_DRBG_reseed_ex(&state->drbg, seed, sizeof(seed),
+                            reseed_additional_data,
+                            reseed_additional_data_len)) {
+      abort();
+    }
+    state->calls = 0;
+    state->fork_generation = fork_generation;
+    state->fork_unsafe_buffering = fork_unsafe_buffering;
+  } else {
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
+    state->clear_drbg_lock.LockRead();
+#endif
+  }
+
+  int first_call = 1;
+  while (out_len > 0) {
+    size_t todo = out_len;
+    if (todo > CTR_DRBG_MAX_GENERATE_LENGTH) {
+      todo = CTR_DRBG_MAX_GENERATE_LENGTH;
+    }
+
+    if (!CTR_DRBG_generate(&state->drbg, out, todo, additional_data,
+                           first_call ? sizeof(additional_data) : 0)) {
+      abort();
+    }
+
+    out += todo;
+    out_len -= todo;
+    // Though we only check before entering the loop, this cannot add enough to
+    // overflow a `size_t`.
+    state->calls++;
+    first_call = 0;
+  }
+
+  if (state == &stack_state) {
+    CTR_DRBG_clear(&state->drbg);
+  }
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
+  state->clear_drbg_lock.UnlockRead();
+#endif
+  return bcm_infallible::approved;
+}
+
+bcm_infallible bssl::BCM_rand_bytes(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) {
+  static const uint8_t kZeroAdditionalData[32] = {0};
+  BCM_rand_bytes_with_additional_data(out, out_len, kZeroAdditionalData);
+  return bcm_infallible::approved;
+}

package/runtime/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/rsa/internal.h

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+// Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_RSA_INTERNAL_H
+#define OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_RSA_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include <openssl/base.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#include "../../internal.h"
+#include "../../mem_internal.h"
+
+
+DECLARE_OPAQUE_STRUCT(rsa_st, RSAImpl)
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+// TODO(crbug.com/42290480): Raise this limit. 512-bit RSA was factored in 1999.
+#define OPENSSL_RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 512
+
+// TODO(davidben): This is inside BCM because `RSA` is inside BCM, but BCM never
+// uses this. Split the RSA type in two.
+enum rsa_pss_params_t {
+  // No parameters.
+  // TODO(davidben): Remove this and use std::optional where appropriate.
+  rsa_pss_none = 0,
+  // RSA-PSS using SHA-256, MGF1 with SHA-256, salt length 32.
+  rsa_pss_sha256,
+  // RSA-PSS using SHA-384, MGF1 with SHA-384, salt length 48.
+  rsa_pss_sha384,
+  // RSA-PSS using SHA-512, MGF1 with SHA-512, salt length 64.
+  rsa_pss_sha512,
+};
+
+class RSAImpl : public rsa_st, public RefCounted<RSAImpl> {
+ public:
+  explicit RSAImpl(const ENGINE *engine);
+
+  RSA_METHOD *meth = nullptr;
+
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> n;
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> e;
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> d;
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> p;
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> q;
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> dmp1;
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> dmq1;
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> iqmp;
+
+  // be careful using this if the RSA structure is shared
+  CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data = {};
+  int flags = 0;
+
+  Mutex lock;
+
+  // Used to cache montgomery values. The creation of these values is protected
+  // by `lock`.
+  UniquePtr<BN_MONT_CTX> mont_n;
+  UniquePtr<BN_MONT_CTX> mont_p;
+  UniquePtr<BN_MONT_CTX> mont_q;
+
+  // The following fields are copies of `d`, `dmp1`, and `dmq1`, respectively,
+  // but with the correct widths to prevent side channels. These must use
+  // separate copies due to threading concerns caused by OpenSSL's API
+  // mistakes. See https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/5158 and
+  // the `freeze_private_key` implementation.
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> d_fixed, dmp1_fixed, dmq1_fixed;
+
+  // iqmp_mont is q^-1 mod p in Montgomery form, using `mont_p`.
+  UniquePtr<BIGNUM> iqmp_mont;
+
+  // pss_params is the RSA-PSS parameters associated with the key. This is not
+  // used by the low-level RSA implementation, just the EVP layer.
+  bssl::rsa_pss_params_t pss_params = bssl::rsa_pss_none;
+
+  // private_key_frozen is one if the key has been used for a private key
+  // operation and may no longer be mutated.
+  unsigned private_key_frozen = 0;
+
+ private:
+  friend RefCounted;
+  ~RSAImpl();
+};
+
+#define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE 11
+
+// Default implementations of RSA operations.
+
+const RSA_METHOD *RSA_default_method();
+
+int rsa_default_sign_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out,
+                         size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+                         int padding);
+int rsa_default_private_transform(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
+                                  size_t len);
+
+
+int PKCS1_MGF1(uint8_t *out, size_t len, const uint8_t *seed, size_t seed_len,
+               const EVP_MD *md);
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(uint8_t *to, size_t to_len,
+                                 const uint8_t *from, size_t from_len);
+int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+                                   size_t max_out, const uint8_t *from,
+                                   size_t from_len);
+int RSA_padding_add_none(uint8_t *to, size_t to_len, const uint8_t *from,
+                         size_t from_len);
+
+// rsa_check_public_key checks that `rsa`'s public modulus and exponent are
+// within DoS bounds.
+int rsa_check_public_key(const RSA *rsa);
+
+// rsa_private_transform_no_self_test calls either the method-specific
+// `private_transform` function (if given) or the generic one. See the comment
+// for `private_transform` in `rsa_meth_st`.
+int rsa_private_transform_no_self_test(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out,
+                                       const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
+
+// rsa_private_transform acts the same as `rsa_private_transform_no_self_test`
+// but, in FIPS mode, performs an RSA self test before calling the default RSA
+// implementation.
+int rsa_private_transform(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
+                          size_t len);
+
+// rsa_invalidate_key is called after `rsa` has been mutated, to invalidate
+// fields derived from the original structure. This function assumes exclusive
+// access to `rsa`. In particular, no other thread may be concurrently signing,
+// etc., with `rsa`.
+void rsa_invalidate_key(RSA *rsa);
+
+
+// Functions that avoid self-tests.
+//
+// Self-tests need to call functions that don't try and ensure that the
+// self-tests have passed. These functions, in turn, need to limit themselves
+// to such functions too.
+//
+// These functions are the same as their public versions, but skip the self-test
+// check.
+
+int rsa_verify_no_self_test(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *digest,
+                            size_t digest_len, const uint8_t *sig,
+                            size_t sig_len, RSA *rsa);
+
+int rsa_verify_raw_no_self_test(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out,
+                                size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in,
+                                size_t in_len, int padding);
+
+int rsa_sign_no_self_test(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *digest,
+                          size_t digest_len, uint8_t *out, unsigned *out_len,
+                          RSA *rsa);
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+#endif  // OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_FIPSMODULE_RSA_INTERNAL_H