wearefair-grpc 1.3.1.pre.a

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/ssl_rsa.c

@@ -0,0 +1,793 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/type_check.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x509);
+static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+static int is_key_type_supported(int key_type) {
+  return key_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA || key_type == EVP_PKEY_EC;
+}
+
+int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x) {
+  if (x == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return ssl_set_cert(ssl->cert, x);
+}
+
+int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *der, size_t der_len) {
+  if (der_len > LONG_MAX) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const uint8_t *p = der;
+  X509 *x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, (long)der_len);
+  if (x509 == NULL || p != der + der_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+    X509_free(x509);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int ret = SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x509);
+  X509_free(x509);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa) {
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+  int ret;
+
+  if (rsa == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+  if (pkey == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  RSA_up_ref(rsa);
+  EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+
+  ret = ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert, pkey);
+  EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *c, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+  if (!is_key_type_supported(pkey->type)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (c->x509 != NULL) {
+    /* Sanity-check that the private key and the certificate match, unless the
+     * key is opaque (in case of, say, a smartcard). */
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_is_opaque(pkey) &&
+        !X509_check_private_key(c->x509, pkey)) {
+      X509_free(c->x509);
+      c->x509 = NULL;
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  EVP_PKEY_free(c->privatekey);
+  EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pkey);
+  c->privatekey = pkey;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *der, size_t der_len) {
+  RSA *rsa = RSA_private_key_from_bytes(der, der_len);
+  if (rsa == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int ret = SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(ssl, rsa);
+  RSA_free(rsa);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+  int ret;
+
+  if (pkey == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ret = ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert, pkey);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type, SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *der,
+                            size_t der_len) {
+  if (der_len > LONG_MAX) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const uint8_t *p = der;
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey = d2i_PrivateKey(type, NULL, &p, (long)der_len);
+  if (pkey == NULL || p != der + der_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int ret = SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey);
+  EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) {
+  if (x == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return ssl_set_cert(ctx->cert, x);
+}
+
+static int ssl_set_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x) {
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+  if (pkey == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_X509_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!is_key_type_supported(pkey->type)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (c->privatekey != NULL) {
+    /* Sanity-check that the private key and the certificate match, unless the
+     * key is opaque (in case of, say, a smartcard). */
+    if (!EVP_PKEY_is_opaque(c->privatekey) &&
+        !X509_check_private_key(x, c->privatekey)) {
+      /* don't fail for a cert/key mismatch, just free current private key
+       * (when switching to a different cert & key, first this function should
+       * be used, then ssl_set_pkey */
+      EVP_PKEY_free(c->privatekey);
+      c->privatekey = NULL;
+      /* clear error queue */
+      ERR_clear_error();
+    }
+  }
+
+  EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+
+  X509_free(c->x509);
+  X509_up_ref(x);
+  c->x509 = x;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t der_len,
+                                 const uint8_t *der) {
+  if (der_len > LONG_MAX) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const uint8_t *p = der;
+  X509 *x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, (long)der_len);
+  if (x509 == NULL || p != der + der_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+    X509_free(x509);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x509);
+  X509_free(x509);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa) {
+  int ret;
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+
+  if (rsa == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+  if (pkey == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  RSA_up_ref(rsa);
+  EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+
+  ret = ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert, pkey);
+  EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *der,
+                                   size_t der_len) {
+  RSA *rsa = RSA_private_key_from_bytes(der, der_len);
+  if (rsa == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int ret = SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(ctx, rsa);
+  RSA_free(rsa);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+  if (pkey == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert, pkey);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type, SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *der,
+                                size_t der_len) {
+  if (der_len > LONG_MAX) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const uint8_t *p = der;
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey = d2i_PrivateKey(type, NULL, &p, (long)der_len);
+  if (pkey == NULL || p != der + der_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int ret = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pkey);
+  EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_private_key_method(SSL *ssl,
+                                const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *key_method) {
+  ssl->cert->key_method = key_method;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_private_key_method(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                    const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *key_method) {
+  ctx->cert->key_method = key_method;
+}
+
+static int set_signing_algorithm_prefs(CERT *cert, const uint16_t *prefs,
+                                       size_t num_prefs) {
+  cert->num_sigalgs = 0;
+  cert->sigalgs = BUF_memdup(prefs, num_prefs * sizeof(prefs[0]));
+  if (cert->sigalgs == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  cert->num_sigalgs = num_prefs;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_signing_algorithm_prefs(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint16_t *prefs,
+                                        size_t num_prefs) {
+  return set_signing_algorithm_prefs(ctx->cert, prefs, num_prefs);
+}
+
+
+int SSL_set_signing_algorithm_prefs(SSL *ssl, const uint16_t *prefs,
+                                    size_t num_prefs) {
+  return set_signing_algorithm_prefs(ssl->cert, prefs, num_prefs);
+}
+
+OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(int) >= 2 * sizeof(uint16_t),
+                       digest_list_conversion_cannot_overflow);
+
+int SSL_set_private_key_digest_prefs(SSL *ssl, const int *digest_nids,
+                                     size_t num_digests) {
+  OPENSSL_free(ssl->cert->sigalgs);
+
+  ssl->cert->num_sigalgs = 0;
+  ssl->cert->sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * 2 * num_digests);
+  if (ssl->cert->sigalgs == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* Convert the digest list to a signature algorithms list.
+   *
+   * TODO(davidben): Replace this API with one that can express RSA-PSS, etc. */
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < num_digests; i++) {
+    switch (digest_nids[i]) {
+      case NID_sha1:
+        ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs] = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1;
+        ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs + 1] = SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1;
+        ssl->cert->num_sigalgs += 2;
+        break;
+      case NID_sha256:
+        ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs] = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256;
+        ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs + 1] =
+            SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256;
+        ssl->cert->num_sigalgs += 2;
+        break;
+      case NID_sha384:
+        ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs] = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384;
+        ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs + 1] =
+            SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384;
+        ssl->cert->num_sigalgs += 2;
+        break;
+      case NID_sha512:
+        ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs] = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512;
+        ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs + 1] =
+            SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512;
+        ssl->cert->num_sigalgs += 2;
+        break;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_has_private_key(const SSL *ssl) {
+  return ssl->cert->privatekey != NULL || ssl->cert->key_method != NULL;
+}
+
+int ssl_is_ecdsa_key_type(int type) {
+  switch (type) {
+    /* TODO(davidben): Remove support for |EVP_PKEY_EC| key types. */
+    case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+    case NID_X9_62_prime256v1:
+    case NID_secp384r1:
+    case NID_secp521r1:
+      return 1;
+    default:
+      return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+int ssl_private_key_type(SSL *ssl) {
+  if (ssl->cert->key_method != NULL) {
+    return ssl->cert->key_method->type(ssl);
+  }
+  switch (EVP_PKEY_id(ssl->cert->privatekey)) {
+    case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+      return NID_rsaEncryption;
+    case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+      return EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(
+          EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ssl->cert->privatekey)));
+    default:
+      return NID_undef;
+  }
+}
+
+size_t ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(SSL *ssl) {
+  if (ssl->cert->key_method != NULL) {
+    return ssl->cert->key_method->max_signature_len(ssl);
+  }
+  return EVP_PKEY_size(ssl->cert->privatekey);
+}
+
+/* TODO(davidben): Forbid RSA-PKCS1 in TLS 1.3. For now we allow it because NSS
+ * has yet to start doing RSA-PSS, so enforcing it would complicate interop
+ * testing. */
+static int is_rsa_pkcs1(const EVP_MD **out_md, uint16_t sigalg) {
+  switch (sigalg) {
+    case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1:
+      *out_md = EVP_md5_sha1();
+      return 1;
+    case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1:
+      *out_md = EVP_sha1();
+      return 1;
+    case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256:
+      *out_md = EVP_sha256();
+      return 1;
+    case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384:
+      *out_md = EVP_sha384();
+      return 1;
+    case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512:
+      *out_md = EVP_sha512();
+      return 1;
+    default:
+      return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+static int ssl_sign_rsa_pkcs1(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+                              size_t max_out, const EVP_MD *md,
+                              const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
+  EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+  *out_len = max_out;
+  int ret = EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, ssl->cert->privatekey) &&
+            EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, in, in_len) &&
+            EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, out_len);
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int ssl_verify_rsa_pkcs1(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *signature,
+                                size_t signature_len, const EVP_MD *md,
+                                EVP_PKEY *pkey, const uint8_t *in,
+                                size_t in_len) {
+  if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+  int ret = EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&md_ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) &&
+            EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, in, in_len) &&
+            EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&md_ctx, signature, signature_len);
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int is_ecdsa(int *out_curve, const EVP_MD **out_md, uint16_t sigalg) {
+  switch (sigalg) {
+    case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1:
+      *out_curve = NID_undef;
+      *out_md = EVP_sha1();
+      return 1;
+    case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256:
+      *out_curve = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+      *out_md = EVP_sha256();
+      return 1;
+    case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384:
+      *out_curve = NID_secp384r1;
+      *out_md = EVP_sha384();
+      return 1;
+    case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512:
+      *out_curve = NID_secp521r1;
+      *out_md = EVP_sha512();
+      return 1;
+    default:
+      return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+static int ssl_sign_ecdsa(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+                          size_t max_out, int curve, const EVP_MD *md,
+                          const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
+  EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ssl->cert->privatekey);
+  if (ec_key == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* In TLS 1.3, the curve is also specified by the signature algorithm. */
+  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION &&
+      (curve == NID_undef ||
+       EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key)) != curve)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+  *out_len = max_out;
+  int ret = EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, ssl->cert->privatekey) &&
+            EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, in, in_len) &&
+            EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, out_len);
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int ssl_verify_ecdsa(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *signature,
+                            size_t signature_len, int curve, const EVP_MD *md,
+                            EVP_PKEY *pkey, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
+  EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
+  if (ec_key == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* In TLS 1.3, the curve is also specified by the signature algorithm. */
+  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION &&
+      (curve == NID_undef ||
+       EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key)) != curve)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+  int ret = EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&md_ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) &&
+            EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, in, in_len) &&
+            EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&md_ctx, signature, signature_len);
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int is_rsa_pss(const EVP_MD **out_md, uint16_t sigalg) {
+  switch (sigalg) {
+    case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA256:
+      *out_md = EVP_sha256();
+      return 1;
+    case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA384:
+      *out_md = EVP_sha384();
+      return 1;
+    case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA512:
+      *out_md = EVP_sha512();
+      return 1;
+    default:
+      return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+static int ssl_sign_rsa_pss(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+                              size_t max_out, const EVP_MD *md,
+                              const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
+  EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+  *out_len = max_out;
+  EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+  int ret =
+      EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, ssl->cert->privatekey) &&
+      EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) &&
+      EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1 /* salt len = hash len */) &&
+      EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, in, in_len) &&
+      EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, out_len);
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int ssl_verify_rsa_pss(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *signature,
+                                size_t signature_len, const EVP_MD *md,
+                                EVP_PKEY *pkey, const uint8_t *in,
+                                size_t in_len) {
+  if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+  EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+  int ret =
+      EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) &&
+      EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) &&
+      EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1 /* salt len = hash len */) &&
+      EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, in, in_len) &&
+      EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&md_ctx, signature, signature_len);
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+enum ssl_private_key_result_t ssl_private_key_sign(
+    SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out,
+    uint16_t signature_algorithm, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
+  if (ssl->cert->key_method != NULL) {
+    if (ssl->cert->key_method->sign != NULL) {
+      return ssl->cert->key_method->sign(ssl, out, out_len, max_out,
+                                         signature_algorithm, in, in_len);
+    }
+
+    /* TODO(davidben): Remove support for |sign_digest|-only
+     * |SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD|s. */
+    const EVP_MD *md;
+    int curve;
+    if (!is_rsa_pkcs1(&md, signature_algorithm) &&
+        !is_ecdsa(&curve, &md, signature_algorithm)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_FOR_CUSTOM_KEY);
+      return ssl_private_key_failure;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned hash_len;
+    if (!EVP_Digest(in, in_len, hash, &hash_len, md, NULL)) {
+      return ssl_private_key_failure;
+    }
+
+    return ssl->cert->key_method->sign_digest(ssl, out, out_len, max_out, md,
+                                              hash, hash_len);
+  }
+
+  const EVP_MD *md;
+  if (is_rsa_pkcs1(&md, signature_algorithm) &&
+      ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return ssl_sign_rsa_pkcs1(ssl, out, out_len, max_out, md, in, in_len)
+               ? ssl_private_key_success
+               : ssl_private_key_failure;
+  }
+
+  int curve;
+  if (is_ecdsa(&curve, &md, signature_algorithm)) {
+    return ssl_sign_ecdsa(ssl, out, out_len, max_out, curve, md, in, in_len)
+               ? ssl_private_key_success
+               : ssl_private_key_failure;
+  }
+
+  if (is_rsa_pss(&md, signature_algorithm)) {
+    return ssl_sign_rsa_pss(ssl, out, out_len, max_out, md, in, in_len)
+               ? ssl_private_key_success
+               : ssl_private_key_failure;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+  return ssl_private_key_failure;
+}
+
+int ssl_public_key_verify(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *signature,
+                          size_t signature_len, uint16_t signature_algorithm,
+                          EVP_PKEY *pkey, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
+  const EVP_MD *md;
+  if (is_rsa_pkcs1(&md, signature_algorithm) &&
+      ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return ssl_verify_rsa_pkcs1(ssl, signature, signature_len, md, pkey, in,
+                                in_len);
+  }
+
+  int curve;
+  if (is_ecdsa(&curve, &md, signature_algorithm)) {
+    return ssl_verify_ecdsa(ssl, signature, signature_len, curve, md, pkey, in,
+                            in_len);
+  }
+
+  if (is_rsa_pss(&md, signature_algorithm)) {
+    return ssl_verify_rsa_pss(ssl, signature, signature_len, md, pkey, in,
+                              in_len);
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+enum ssl_private_key_result_t ssl_private_key_decrypt(
+    SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out,
+    const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
+  if (ssl->cert->key_method != NULL) {
+    return ssl->cert->key_method->decrypt(ssl, out, out_len, max_out, in,
+                                          in_len);
+  }
+
+  RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ssl->cert->privatekey);
+  if (rsa == NULL) {
+    /* Decrypt operations are only supported for RSA keys. */
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return ssl_private_key_failure;
+  }
+
+  /* Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part
+   * of the timing-sensitive code by the caller. */
+  if (!RSA_decrypt(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, RSA_NO_PADDING)) {
+    return ssl_private_key_failure;
+  }
+  return ssl_private_key_success;
+}
+
+enum ssl_private_key_result_t ssl_private_key_complete(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out,
+                                                       size_t *out_len,
+                                                       size_t max_out) {
+  /* Only custom keys may be asynchronous. */
+  return ssl->cert->key_method->complete(ssl, out, out_len, max_out);
+}
+
+int ssl_private_key_supports_signature_algorithm(SSL *ssl,
+                                                 uint16_t signature_algorithm) {
+  const EVP_MD *md;
+  if (is_rsa_pkcs1(&md, signature_algorithm) &&
+      ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    return ssl_private_key_type(ssl) == NID_rsaEncryption;
+  }
+
+  int curve;
+  if (is_ecdsa(&curve, &md, signature_algorithm)) {
+    int type = ssl_private_key_type(ssl);
+    if (!ssl_is_ecdsa_key_type(type)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Prior to TLS 1.3, ECDSA curves did not match the signature algorithm. */
+    if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+      return 1;
+    }
+
+    return curve != NID_undef && type == curve;
+  }
+
+  if (is_rsa_pss(&md, signature_algorithm)) {
+    if (ssl_private_key_type(ssl) != NID_rsaEncryption) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Ensure the RSA key is large enough for the hash. RSASSA-PSS requires that
+     * emLen be at least hLen + sLen + 2. Both hLen and sLen are the size of the
+     * hash in TLS. Reasonable RSA key sizes are large enough for the largest
+     * defined RSASSA-PSS algorithm, but 1024-bit RSA is slightly too large for
+     * SHA-512. 1024-bit RSA is sometimes used for test credentials, so check
+     * the size to fall back to another algorithm. */
+    if (ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(ssl) < 2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* RSA-PSS is only supported by message-based private keys. */
+    if (ssl->cert->key_method != NULL && ssl->cert->key_method->sign == NULL) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  return 0;
+}