wearefair-grpc 1.3.1.pre.a

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/ssl_buffer.c

@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2015, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/type_check.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(0xffff <= INT_MAX, uint16_fits_in_int);
+
+OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT((SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1)) == 0,
+                       align_to_a_power_of_two);
+
+/* setup_buffer initializes |buf| with capacity |cap|, aligned such that data
+ * written after |header_len| is aligned to a |SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD|-byte
+ * boundary. It returns one on success and zero on error. */
+static int setup_buffer(SSL3_BUFFER *buf, size_t header_len, size_t cap) {
+  if (buf->buf != NULL || cap > 0xffff) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* Add up to |SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD| - 1 bytes of slack for alignment. */
+  buf->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(cap + SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
+  if (buf->buf == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* Arrange the buffer such that the record body is aligned. */
+  buf->offset = (0 - header_len - (uintptr_t)buf->buf) &
+                (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
+  buf->len = 0;
+  buf->cap = cap;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static void consume_buffer(SSL3_BUFFER *buf, size_t len) {
+  if (len > buf->len) {
+    abort();
+  }
+  buf->offset += (uint16_t)len;
+  buf->len -= (uint16_t)len;
+  buf->cap -= (uint16_t)len;
+}
+
+static void clear_buffer(SSL3_BUFFER *buf) {
+  OPENSSL_free(buf->buf);
+  memset(buf, 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
+}
+
+OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH <=
+                           0xffff,
+                       maximum_read_buffer_too_large);
+
+/* setup_read_buffer initializes the read buffer if not already initialized. It
+ * returns one on success and zero on failure. */
+static int setup_read_buffer(SSL *ssl) {
+  SSL3_BUFFER *buf = &ssl->s3->read_buffer;
+
+  if (buf->buf != NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  size_t header_len = ssl_record_prefix_len(ssl);
+  size_t cap = SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
+  if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+    cap += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+  } else {
+    cap += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+  }
+
+  return setup_buffer(buf, header_len, cap);
+}
+
+uint8_t *ssl_read_buffer(SSL *ssl) {
+  return ssl->s3->read_buffer.buf + ssl->s3->read_buffer.offset;
+}
+
+size_t ssl_read_buffer_len(const SSL *ssl) {
+  return ssl->s3->read_buffer.len;
+}
+
+static int dtls_read_buffer_next_packet(SSL *ssl) {
+  SSL3_BUFFER *buf = &ssl->s3->read_buffer;
+
+  if (buf->len > 0) {
+    /* It is an error to call |dtls_read_buffer_extend| when the read buffer is
+     * not empty. */
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* Read a single packet from |ssl->rbio|. |buf->cap| must fit in an int. */
+  int ret = BIO_read(ssl->rbio, buf->buf + buf->offset, (int)buf->cap);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    ssl->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+    return ret;
+  }
+  /* |BIO_read| was bound by |buf->cap|, so this cannot overflow. */
+  buf->len = (uint16_t)ret;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int tls_read_buffer_extend_to(SSL *ssl, size_t len) {
+  SSL3_BUFFER *buf = &ssl->s3->read_buffer;
+
+  if (len > buf->cap) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* Read until the target length is reached. */
+  while (buf->len < len) {
+    /* The amount of data to read is bounded by |buf->cap|, which must fit in an
+     * int. */
+    int ret = BIO_read(ssl->rbio, buf->buf + buf->offset + buf->len,
+                       (int)(len - buf->len));
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+      ssl->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+      return ret;
+    }
+    /* |BIO_read| was bound by |buf->cap - buf->len|, so this cannot
+     * overflow. */
+    buf->len += (uint16_t)ret;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(SSL *ssl, size_t len) {
+  /* |ssl_read_buffer_extend_to| implicitly discards any consumed data. */
+  ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
+
+  if (!setup_read_buffer(ssl)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->rbio == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  int ret;
+  if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+    /* |len| is ignored for a datagram transport. */
+    ret = dtls_read_buffer_next_packet(ssl);
+  } else {
+    ret = tls_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, len);
+  }
+
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    /* If the buffer was empty originally and remained empty after attempting to
+     * extend it, release the buffer until the next attempt. */
+    ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+void ssl_read_buffer_consume(SSL *ssl, size_t len) {
+  SSL3_BUFFER *buf = &ssl->s3->read_buffer;
+
+  consume_buffer(buf, len);
+
+  /* The TLS stack never reads beyond the current record, so there will never be
+   * unconsumed data. If read-ahead is ever reimplemented,
+   * |ssl_read_buffer_discard| will require a |memcpy| to shift the excess back
+   * to the front of the buffer, to ensure there is enough space for the next
+   * record. */
+  assert(SSL_is_dtls(ssl) || len == 0 || buf->len == 0);
+}
+
+void ssl_read_buffer_discard(SSL *ssl) {
+  if (ssl->s3->read_buffer.len == 0) {
+    ssl_read_buffer_clear(ssl);
+  }
+}
+
+void ssl_read_buffer_clear(SSL *ssl) {
+  clear_buffer(&ssl->s3->read_buffer);
+}
+
+
+int ssl_write_buffer_is_pending(const SSL *ssl) {
+  return ssl->s3->write_buffer.len > 0;
+}
+
+OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH * 2 +
+                           SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD * 2 +
+                           SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH <= 0xffff,
+                       maximum_tls_write_buffer_too_large);
+
+OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH +
+                           SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD +
+                           SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH <= 0xffff,
+                       maximum_dtls_write_buffer_too_large);
+
+int ssl_write_buffer_init(SSL *ssl, uint8_t **out_ptr, size_t max_len) {
+  SSL3_BUFFER *buf = &ssl->s3->write_buffer;
+
+  if (buf->buf != NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  size_t header_len = ssl_seal_align_prefix_len(ssl);
+
+  /* TODO(davidben): This matches the original behavior in keeping the malloc
+   * size consistent. Does this matter? |cap| could just be |max_len|. */
+  size_t cap = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD;
+  if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+    cap += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+  } else {
+    cap += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+    if (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) {
+      cap += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (max_len > cap) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!setup_buffer(buf, header_len, cap)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  *out_ptr = buf->buf + buf->offset;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void ssl_write_buffer_set_len(SSL *ssl, size_t len) {
+  SSL3_BUFFER *buf = &ssl->s3->write_buffer;
+
+  if (len > buf->cap) {
+    abort();
+  }
+  buf->len = len;
+}
+
+static int tls_write_buffer_flush(SSL *ssl) {
+  SSL3_BUFFER *buf = &ssl->s3->write_buffer;
+
+  while (buf->len > 0) {
+    int ret = BIO_write(ssl->wbio, buf->buf + buf->offset, buf->len);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+      ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+      return ret;
+    }
+    consume_buffer(buf, (size_t)ret);
+  }
+  ssl_write_buffer_clear(ssl);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int dtls_write_buffer_flush(SSL *ssl) {
+  SSL3_BUFFER *buf = &ssl->s3->write_buffer;
+  if (buf->len == 0) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  int ret = BIO_write(ssl->wbio, buf->buf + buf->offset, buf->len);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+    /* If the write failed, drop the write buffer anyway. Datagram transports
+     * can't write half a packet, so the caller is expected to retry from the
+     * top. */
+    ssl_write_buffer_clear(ssl);
+    return ret;
+  }
+  ssl_write_buffer_clear(ssl);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_write_buffer_flush(SSL *ssl) {
+  if (ssl->wbio == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+    return dtls_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
+  } else {
+    return tls_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
+  }
+}
+
+void ssl_write_buffer_clear(SSL *ssl) {
+  clear_buffer(&ssl->s3->write_buffer);
+}

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c

@@ -0,0 +1,814 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void) {
+  /* The ex_data index to go from |X509_STORE_CTX| to |SSL| always uses the
+   * reserved app_data slot. Before ex_data was introduced, app_data was used.
+   * Avoid breaking any software which assumes |X509_STORE_CTX_get_app_data|
+   * works. */
+  return 0;
+}
+
+CERT *ssl_cert_new(void) {
+  CERT *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) {
+  CERT *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
+
+  if (cert->x509 != NULL) {
+    X509_up_ref(cert->x509);
+    ret->x509 = cert->x509;
+  }
+
+  if (cert->privatekey != NULL) {
+    EVP_PKEY_up_ref(cert->privatekey);
+    ret->privatekey = cert->privatekey;
+  }
+
+  if (cert->chain) {
+    ret->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(cert->chain);
+    if (!ret->chain) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  ret->key_method = cert->key_method;
+
+  ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k;
+  ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a;
+
+  if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) {
+    ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
+    if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+  ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
+
+  if (cert->sigalgs != NULL) {
+    ret->sigalgs =
+        BUF_memdup(cert->sigalgs, cert->num_sigalgs * sizeof(cert->sigalgs[0]));
+    if (ret->sigalgs == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+  ret->num_sigalgs = cert->num_sigalgs;
+
+  ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb;
+  ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg;
+
+  if (cert->verify_store != NULL) {
+    X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->verify_store);
+    ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store;
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+
+err:
+  ssl_cert_free(ret);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */
+void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *cert) {
+  if (cert == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  X509_free(cert->x509);
+  cert->x509 = NULL;
+  EVP_PKEY_free(cert->privatekey);
+  cert->privatekey = NULL;
+  sk_X509_pop_free(cert->chain, X509_free);
+  cert->chain = NULL;
+  cert->key_method = NULL;
+}
+
+void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c) {
+  if (c == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  DH_free(c->dh_tmp);
+
+  ssl_cert_clear_certs(c);
+  OPENSSL_free(c->sigalgs);
+  X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store);
+
+  OPENSSL_free(c);
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_set0_chain(CERT *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
+  sk_X509_pop_free(cert->chain, X509_free);
+  cert->chain = chain;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_set1_chain(CERT *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
+  STACK_OF(X509) *dchain;
+  if (chain == NULL) {
+    return ssl_cert_set0_chain(cert, NULL);
+  }
+
+  dchain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain);
+  if (dchain == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(cert, dchain)) {
+    sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(CERT *cert, X509 *x509) {
+  if (cert->chain == NULL) {
+    cert->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
+  }
+  if (cert->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(cert->chain, x509)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(CERT *cert, X509 *x509) {
+  if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(cert, x509)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  X509_up_ref(x509);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) {
+  c->cert_cb = cb;
+  c->cert_cb_arg = arg;
+}
+
+int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *ssl, long *out_verify_result,
+                          STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain) {
+  if (cert_chain == NULL || sk_X509_num(cert_chain) == 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  X509_STORE *verify_store = ssl->ctx->cert_store;
+  if (ssl->cert->verify_store != NULL) {
+    verify_store = ssl->cert->verify_store;
+  }
+
+  X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(cert_chain, 0);
+  int ret = 0;
+  X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
+  if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, verify_store, leaf, cert_chain)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(),
+                                  ssl)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by the
+   * context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates or vice
+   * versa. */
+  X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, ssl->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
+
+  /* Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the ctx. */
+  X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), ssl->param);
+
+  if (ssl->verify_callback) {
+    X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, ssl->verify_callback);
+  }
+
+  int verify_ret;
+  if (ssl->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL) {
+    verify_ret = ssl->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, ssl->ctx->app_verify_arg);
+  } else {
+    verify_ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
+  }
+
+  *out_verify_result = ctx.error;
+
+  /* If |SSL_VERIFY_NONE|, the error is non-fatal, but we keep the result. */
+  if (verify_ret <= 0 && ssl->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) {
+    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, ssl_verify_alarm_type(ctx.error));
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ERR_clear_error();
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,
+                               STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) {
+  sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free);
+  *ca_list = name_list;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list) {
+  STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(list); i++) {
+      X509_NAME *name = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(list, i));
+    if (name == NULL || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) {
+      X509_NAME_free(name);
+      sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
+      return NULL;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) {
+  set_client_CA_list(&ssl->client_CA, name_list);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) {
+  set_client_CA_list(&ctx->client_CA, name_list);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->client_CA;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *ssl) {
+  /* For historical reasons, this function is used both to query configuration
+   * state on a server as well as handshake state on a client. However, whether
+   * |ssl| is a client or server is not known until explicitly configured with
+   * |SSL_set_connect_state|. If |handshake_func| is NULL, |ssl| is in an
+   * indeterminate mode and |ssl->server| is unset. */
+  if (ssl->handshake_func != NULL && !ssl->server) {
+    return ssl->s3->tmp.ca_names;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->client_CA != NULL) {
+    return ssl->client_CA;
+  }
+  return ssl->ctx->client_CA;
+}
+
+static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk, X509 *x509) {
+  X509_NAME *name;
+
+  if (x509 == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (*sk == NULL) {
+    *sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+    if (*sk == NULL) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  name = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x509));
+  if (name == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk, name)) {
+    X509_NAME_free(name);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509) {
+  return add_client_CA(&ssl->client_CA, x509);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) {
+  return add_client_CA(&ctx->client_CA, x509);
+}
+
+int ssl_has_certificate(const SSL *ssl) {
+  return ssl->cert->x509 != NULL && ssl_has_private_key(ssl);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *ssl_parse_cert_chain(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                     uint8_t *out_leaf_sha256, CBS *cbs) {
+  STACK_OF(X509) *ret = sk_X509_new_null();
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  X509 *x = NULL;
+  CBS certificate_list;
+  if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(cbs, &certificate_list)) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) {
+    CBS certificate;
+    if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate)) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* Retain the hash of the leaf certificate if requested. */
+    if (sk_X509_num(ret) == 0 && out_leaf_sha256 != NULL) {
+      SHA256(CBS_data(&certificate), CBS_len(&certificate), out_leaf_sha256);
+    }
+
+    /* A u24 length cannot overflow a long. */
+    const uint8_t *data = CBS_data(&certificate);
+    x = d2i_X509(NULL, &data, (long)CBS_len(&certificate));
+    if (x == NULL || data != CBS_data(&certificate) + CBS_len(&certificate)) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (!sk_X509_push(ret, x)) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    x = NULL;
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+
+err:
+  X509_free(x);
+  sk_X509_pop_free(ret, X509_free);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+int ssl_add_cert_to_cbb(CBB *cbb, X509 *x509) {
+  int len = i2d_X509(x509, NULL);
+  if (len < 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  uint8_t *buf;
+  if (!CBB_add_space(cbb, &buf, len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (buf != NULL && i2d_X509(x509, &buf) < 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_add_cert_with_length(CBB *cbb, X509 *x509) {
+  CBB child;
+  return CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, &child) &&
+         ssl_add_cert_to_cbb(&child, x509) &&
+         CBB_flush(cbb);
+}
+
+int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) {
+  if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
+    return CBB_add_u24(cbb, 0);
+  }
+
+  CERT *cert = ssl->cert;
+  X509 *x = cert->x509;
+
+  CBB child;
+  if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, &child)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int no_chain = 0;
+  STACK_OF(X509) *chain = cert->chain;
+  if ((ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || chain != NULL) {
+    no_chain = 1;
+  }
+
+  if (no_chain) {
+    if (!ssl_add_cert_with_length(&child, x)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+      x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+      if (!ssl_add_cert_with_length(&child, x)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+  } else {
+    X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
+
+    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, ssl->ctx->cert_store, x, NULL)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
+    /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
+    ERR_clear_error();
+
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) {
+      x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
+      if (!ssl_add_cert_with_length(&child, x)) {
+        X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+  }
+
+  return CBB_flush(cbb);
+}
+
+static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b) {
+  return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *
+    ssl_parse_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *cbs) {
+  STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
+  X509_NAME *name = NULL;
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  CBS child;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &child)) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  while (CBS_len(&child) > 0) {
+    CBS distinguished_name;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&child, &distinguished_name)) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    const uint8_t *ptr = CBS_data(&distinguished_name);
+    /* A u16 length cannot overflow a long. */
+    name = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &ptr, (long)CBS_len(&distinguished_name));
+    if (name == NULL ||
+        ptr != CBS_data(&distinguished_name) + CBS_len(&distinguished_name)) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    name = NULL;
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+
+err:
+  X509_NAME_free(name);
+  sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+int ssl_add_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) {
+  CBB child, name_cbb;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &child)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl);
+  if (sk == NULL) {
+    return CBB_flush(cbb);
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
+    X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
+    int len = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
+    if (len < 0) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    uint8_t *ptr;
+    if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&child, &name_cbb) ||
+        !CBB_add_space(&name_cbb, &ptr, (size_t)len) ||
+        (len > 0 && i2d_X509_NAME(name, &ptr) < 0)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return CBB_flush(cbb);
+}
+
+int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, int *out_should_retry) {
+  if (ssl_has_certificate(ssl) || ssl->ctx->client_cert_cb == NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  X509 *x509 = NULL;
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+  int ret = ssl->ctx->client_cert_cb(ssl, &x509, &pkey);
+  if (ret < 0) {
+    *out_should_retry = 1;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (ret != 0) {
+    if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x509) ||
+        !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey)) {
+      ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      *out_should_retry = 0;
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  X509_free(x509);
+  EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int set_cert_store(X509_STORE **store_ptr, X509_STORE *new_store, int take_ref) {
+  X509_STORE_free(*store_ptr);
+  *store_ptr = new_store;
+
+  if (new_store != NULL && take_ref) {
+    X509_STORE_up_ref(new_store);
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set0_verify_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) {
+  return set_cert_store(&ctx->cert->verify_store, store, 0);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) {
+  return set_cert_store(&ctx->cert->verify_store, store, 1);
+}
+
+int SSL_set0_verify_cert_store(SSL *ssl, X509_STORE *store) {
+  return set_cert_store(&ssl->cert->verify_store, store, 0);
+}
+
+int SSL_set1_verify_cert_store(SSL *ssl, X509_STORE *store) {
+  return set_cert_store(&ssl->cert->verify_store, store, 1);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set0_chain(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
+  return ssl_cert_set0_chain(ctx->cert, chain);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_chain(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
+  return ssl_cert_set1_chain(ctx->cert, chain);
+}
+
+int SSL_set0_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
+  return ssl_cert_set0_chain(ssl->cert, chain);
+}
+
+int SSL_set1_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
+  return ssl_cert_set1_chain(ssl->cert, chain);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) {
+  return ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(ctx->cert, x509);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) {
+  return ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(ctx->cert, x509);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) {
+  return SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(ctx, x509);
+}
+
+int SSL_add0_chain_cert(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509) {
+  return ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(ssl->cert, x509);
+}
+
+int SSL_add1_chain_cert(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509) {
+  return ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(ssl->cert, x509);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  return SSL_CTX_set0_chain(ctx, NULL);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  return SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(ctx);
+}
+
+int SSL_clear_chain_certs(SSL *ssl) {
+  return SSL_set0_chain(ssl, NULL);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs(const SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) **out_chain) {
+  *out_chain = ctx->cert->chain;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs(const SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                  STACK_OF(X509) **out_chain) {
+  return SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs(ctx, out_chain);
+}
+
+int SSL_get0_chain_certs(const SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) **out_chain) {
+  *out_chain = ssl->cert->chain;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_check_leaf_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *leaf) {
+  int ret = 0;
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(leaf);
+  if (pkey == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* Check the certificate's type matches the cipher. */
+  const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+  int expected_type = ssl_cipher_get_key_type(cipher);
+  assert(expected_type != EVP_PKEY_NONE);
+  if (pkey->type != expected_type) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) {
+    /* TODO(davidben): This behavior is preserved from upstream. Should key
+     * usages be checked in other cases as well? */
+    /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */
+    X509_check_purpose(leaf, -1, 0);
+    if ((leaf->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
+        !(leaf->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!tls1_check_ec_cert(ssl, leaf)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+  return ret;
+}