wearefair-grpc 1.3.1.pre.a

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/cipher/internal.h

@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_CIPHER_INTERNAL_H
+#define OPENSSL_HEADER_CIPHER_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include <openssl/base.h>
+
+#include <openssl/aead.h>
+
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+
+/* EVP_CIPH_MODE_MASK contains the bits of |flags| that represent the mode. */
+#define EVP_CIPH_MODE_MASK 0x3f
+
+
+/* EVP_AEAD represents a specific AEAD algorithm. */
+struct evp_aead_st {
+  uint8_t key_len;
+  uint8_t nonce_len;
+  uint8_t overhead;
+  uint8_t max_tag_len;
+
+  /* init initialises an |EVP_AEAD_CTX|. If this call returns zero then
+   * |cleanup| will not be called for that context. */
+  int (*init)(EVP_AEAD_CTX *, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len,
+              size_t tag_len);
+  int (*init_with_direction)(EVP_AEAD_CTX *, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len,
+                             size_t tag_len, enum evp_aead_direction_t dir);
+  void (*cleanup)(EVP_AEAD_CTX *);
+
+  int (*seal)(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+              size_t max_out_len, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+              const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *ad,
+              size_t ad_len);
+
+  int (*open)(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+              size_t max_out_len, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+              const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *ad,
+              size_t ad_len);
+
+  int (*get_iv)(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t **out_iv,
+                size_t *out_len);
+};
+
+
+/* EVP_tls_cbc_get_padding determines the padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC
+ * record in |in|. This decrypted record should not include any "decrypted"
+ * explicit IV. If the record is publicly invalid, it returns zero. Otherwise,
+ * it returns one and sets |*out_padding_ok| to all ones (0xfff..f) if the
+ * padding is valid and zero otherwise. It then sets |*out_len| to the length
+ * with the padding removed or |in_len| if invalid.
+ *
+ * If the function returns one, it runs in time independent of the contents of
+ * |in|. It is also guaranteed that |*out_len| >= |mac_size|, satisfying
+ * |EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac|'s precondition. */
+int EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding(unsigned *out_padding_ok, unsigned *out_len,
+                               const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len,
+                               unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size);
+
+/* EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of the first
+ * |in_len| bytes of |in| to |out| in constant time (independent of the concrete
+ * value of |in_len|, which may vary within a 256-byte window). |in| must point
+ * to a buffer of |orig_len| bytes.
+ *
+ * On entry:
+ *   orig_len >= in_len >= md_size
+ *   md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE */
+void EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac(uint8_t *out, unsigned md_size,
+                          const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len,
+                          unsigned orig_len);
+
+/* EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |md| is a hash function
+ * which EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record supports. */
+int EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD *md);
+
+/* EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record computes the MAC of a decrypted, padded TLS
+ * record.
+ *
+ *   md: the hash function used in the HMAC.
+ *     EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported must return true for this hash.
+ *   md_out: the digest output. At most EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE bytes will be written.
+ *   md_out_size: the number of output bytes is written here.
+ *   header: the 13-byte, TLS record header.
+ *   data: the record data itself
+ *   data_plus_mac_size: the secret, reported length of the data and MAC
+ *     once the padding has been removed.
+ *   data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size: the public length of the whole
+ *     record, including padding.
+ *
+ * On entry: by virtue of having been through one of the remove_padding
+ * functions, above, we know that data_plus_mac_size is large enough to contain
+ * a padding byte and MAC. (If the padding was invalid, it might contain the
+ * padding too. ) */
+int EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t *md_out,
+                              size_t *md_out_size, const uint8_t header[13],
+                              const uint8_t *data, size_t data_plus_mac_size,
+                              size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
+                              const uint8_t *mac_secret,
+                              unsigned mac_secret_length);
+
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+} /* extern C */
+#endif
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HEADER_CIPHER_INTERNAL_H */

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/cipher/tls_cbc.c

@@ -0,0 +1,553 @@
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+#include "../internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+/* TODO(davidben): unsigned should be size_t. The various constant_time
+ * functions need to be switched to size_t. */
+
+/* MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES is the maximum number of bytes in the hash's length
+ * field. (SHA-384/512 have 128-bit length.) */
+#define MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES 16
+
+/* MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE is the maximum hash block size that we'll support.
+ * Currently SHA-384/512 has a 128-byte block size and that's the largest
+ * supported by TLS.) */
+#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128
+
+int EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding(unsigned *out_padding_ok, unsigned *out_len,
+                               const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len,
+                               unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size) {
+  unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;
+  const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
+
+  /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant time. */
+  if (overhead > in_len) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  padding_length = in[in_len - 1];
+
+  good = constant_time_ge(in_len, overhead + padding_length);
+  /* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and
+   * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the
+   * length byte. Thus, with the length byte included, there are i+1
+   * bytes of padding.
+   *
+   * We can't check just |padding_length+1| bytes because that leaks
+   * decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the maximum
+   * amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record is
+   * public information so we can use it.) */
+  to_check = 256; /* maximum amount of padding, inc length byte. */
+  if (to_check > in_len) {
+    to_check = in_len;
+  }
+
+  for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) {
+    uint8_t mask = constant_time_ge_8(padding_length, i);
+    uint8_t b = in[in_len - 1 - i];
+    /* The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value
+     * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */
+    good &= ~(mask & (padding_length ^ b));
+  }
+
+  /* If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value,
+   * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. */
+  good = constant_time_eq(0xff, good & 0xff);
+
+  /* Always treat |padding_length| as zero on error. If, assuming block size of
+   * 16, a padding of [<15 arbitrary bytes> 15] treated |padding_length| as 16
+   * and returned -1, distinguishing good MAC and bad padding from bad MAC and
+   * bad padding would give POODLE's padding oracle. */
+  padding_length = good & (padding_length + 1);
+  *out_len = in_len - padding_length;
+  *out_padding_ok = good;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac(uint8_t *out, unsigned md_size,
+                          const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len,
+                          unsigned orig_len) {
+  uint8_t rotated_mac1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], rotated_mac2[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  uint8_t *rotated_mac = rotated_mac1;
+  uint8_t *rotated_mac_tmp = rotated_mac2;
+
+  /* mac_end is the index of |in| just after the end of the MAC. */
+  unsigned mac_end = in_len;
+  unsigned mac_start = mac_end - md_size;
+  /* scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because
+   * the MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */
+  unsigned scan_start = 0;
+  unsigned i, j;
+  unsigned rotate_offset;
+
+  assert(orig_len >= in_len);
+  assert(in_len >= md_size);
+  assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+  /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */
+  if (orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1) {
+    scan_start = orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1);
+  }
+
+  /* Ideally the next statement would be:
+   *
+   *   rotate_offset = (mac_start - scan_start) % md_size;
+   *
+   * However, division is not a constant-time operation (at least on Intel
+   * chips). Thus we enumerate the possible values of md_size and handle each
+   * separately. The value of |md_size| is public information (it's determined
+   * by the cipher suite in the ServerHello) so our timing can vary based on
+   * its value. */
+
+  rotate_offset = mac_start - scan_start;
+  /* rotate_offset can be, at most, 255 (bytes of padding) + 1 (padding length)
+   * + md_size = 256 + 48 (since SHA-384 is the largest hash) = 304. */
+  assert(rotate_offset <= 304);
+
+  /* Below is an SMT-LIB2 verification that the Barrett reductions below are
+   * correct within this range:
+   *
+   * (define-fun barrett (
+   *     (x (_ BitVec 32))
+   *     (mul (_ BitVec 32))
+   *     (shift (_ BitVec 32))
+   *     (divisor (_ BitVec 32)) ) (_ BitVec 32)
+   *   (let ((q (bvsub x (bvmul divisor (bvlshr (bvmul x mul) shift))) ))
+   *     (ite (bvuge q divisor)
+   *       (bvsub q divisor)
+   *       q)))
+   *
+   * (declare-fun x () (_ BitVec 32))
+   *
+   * (assert (or
+   *   (let (
+   *     (divisor (_ bv20 32))
+   *     (mul (_ bv25 32))
+   *     (shift (_ bv9 32))
+   *     (limit (_ bv853 32)))
+   *
+   *     (and (bvule x limit) (not (= (bvurem x divisor)
+   *                                  (barrett x mul shift divisor)))))
+   *
+   *   (let (
+   *     (divisor (_ bv48 32))
+   *     (mul (_ bv10 32))
+   *     (shift (_ bv9 32))
+   *     (limit (_ bv768 32)))
+   *
+   *     (and (bvule x limit) (not (= (bvurem x divisor)
+   *                                  (barrett x mul shift divisor)))))
+   * ))
+   *
+   * (check-sat)
+   * (get-model)
+   */
+
+  if (md_size == 16) {
+    rotate_offset &= 15;
+  } else if (md_size == 20) {
+    /* 1/20 is approximated as 25/512 and then Barrett reduction is used.
+     * Analytically, this is correct for 0 <= rotate_offset <= 853. */
+    unsigned q = (rotate_offset * 25) >> 9;
+    rotate_offset -= q * 20;
+    rotate_offset -=
+        constant_time_select(constant_time_ge(rotate_offset, 20), 20, 0);
+  } else if (md_size == 32) {
+    rotate_offset &= 31;
+  } else if (md_size == 48) {
+    /* 1/48 is approximated as 10/512 and then Barrett reduction is used.
+     * Analytically, this is correct for 0 <= rotate_offset <= 768. */
+    unsigned q = (rotate_offset * 10) >> 9;
+    rotate_offset -= q * 48;
+    rotate_offset -=
+        constant_time_select(constant_time_ge(rotate_offset, 48), 48, 0);
+  } else {
+    /* This should be impossible therefore this path doesn't run in constant
+     * time. */
+    assert(0);
+    rotate_offset = rotate_offset % md_size;
+  }
+
+  memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size);
+  for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < orig_len; i++) {
+    uint8_t mac_started = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_start);
+    uint8_t mac_ended = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_end);
+    uint8_t b = in[i];
+    rotated_mac[j++] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended;
+    j &= constant_time_lt(j, md_size);
+  }
+
+  /* Now rotate the MAC. We rotate in log(md_size) steps, one for each bit
+   * position. */
+  for (unsigned offset = 1; offset < md_size;
+       offset <<= 1, rotate_offset >>= 1) {
+    /* Rotate by |offset| iff the corresponding bit is set in
+     * |rotate_offset|, placing the result in |rotated_mac_tmp|. */
+    const uint8_t skip_rotate = (rotate_offset & 1) - 1;
+    for (i = 0, j = offset; i < md_size; i++, j++) {
+      if (j >= md_size) {
+        j -= md_size;
+      }
+      rotated_mac_tmp[i] =
+          constant_time_select_8(skip_rotate, rotated_mac[i], rotated_mac[j]);
+    }
+
+    /* Swap pointers so |rotated_mac| contains the (possibly) rotated value.
+     * Note the number of iterations and thus the identity of these pointers is
+     * public information. */
+    uint8_t *tmp = rotated_mac;
+    rotated_mac = rotated_mac_tmp;
+    rotated_mac_tmp = tmp;
+  }
+
+  memcpy(out, rotated_mac, md_size);
+}
+
+/* u32toBE serialises an unsigned, 32-bit number (n) as four bytes at (p) in
+ * big-endian order. The value of p is advanced by four. */
+#define u32toBE(n, p) \
+  (*((p)++)=(uint8_t)(n>>24), \
+   *((p)++)=(uint8_t)(n>>16), \
+   *((p)++)=(uint8_t)(n>>8), \
+   *((p)++)=(uint8_t)(n))
+
+/* u64toBE serialises an unsigned, 64-bit number (n) as eight bytes at (p) in
+ * big-endian order. The value of p is advanced by eight. */
+#define u64toBE(n, p) \
+  (*((p)++)=(uint8_t)(n>>56), \
+   *((p)++)=(uint8_t)(n>>48), \
+   *((p)++)=(uint8_t)(n>>40), \
+   *((p)++)=(uint8_t)(n>>32), \
+   *((p)++)=(uint8_t)(n>>24), \
+   *((p)++)=(uint8_t)(n>>16), \
+   *((p)++)=(uint8_t)(n>>8), \
+   *((p)++)=(uint8_t)(n))
+
+/* These functions serialize the state of a hash and thus perform the standard
+ * "final" operation without adding the padding and length that such a function
+ * typically does. */
+static void tls1_sha1_final_raw(void *ctx, uint8_t *md_out) {
+  SHA_CTX *sha1 = ctx;
+  u32toBE(sha1->h[0], md_out);
+  u32toBE(sha1->h[1], md_out);
+  u32toBE(sha1->h[2], md_out);
+  u32toBE(sha1->h[3], md_out);
+  u32toBE(sha1->h[4], md_out);
+}
+#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA_CTX
+
+static void tls1_sha256_final_raw(void *ctx, uint8_t *md_out) {
+  SHA256_CTX *sha256 = ctx;
+  unsigned i;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+    u32toBE(sha256->h[i], md_out);
+  }
+}
+#undef  LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX
+#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA256_CTX
+
+static void tls1_sha512_final_raw(void *ctx, uint8_t *md_out) {
+  SHA512_CTX *sha512 = ctx;
+  unsigned i;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+    u64toBE(sha512->h[i], md_out);
+  }
+}
+#undef  LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX
+#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA512_CTX
+
+int EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD *md) {
+  switch (EVP_MD_type(md)) {
+    case NID_sha1:
+    case NID_sha256:
+    case NID_sha384:
+      return 1;
+
+    default:
+      return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+int EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t *md_out,
+                              size_t *md_out_size, const uint8_t header[13],
+                              const uint8_t *data, size_t data_plus_mac_size,
+                              size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
+                              const uint8_t *mac_secret,
+                              unsigned mac_secret_length) {
+  union {
+    double align;
+    uint8_t c[sizeof(LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX)];
+  } md_state;
+  void (*md_final_raw)(void *ctx, uint8_t *md_out);
+  void (*md_transform)(void *ctx, const uint8_t *block);
+  unsigned md_size, md_block_size = 64;
+  unsigned len, max_mac_bytes, num_blocks, num_starting_blocks, k,
+           mac_end_offset, c, index_a, index_b;
+  unsigned int bits; /* at most 18 bits */
+  uint8_t length_bytes[MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES];
+  /* hmac_pad is the masked HMAC key. */
+  uint8_t hmac_pad[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+  uint8_t first_block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+  uint8_t mac_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  unsigned i, j, md_out_size_u;
+  EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+  /* mdLengthSize is the number of bytes in the length field that terminates
+  * the hash. */
+  unsigned md_length_size = 8;
+
+  /* This is a, hopefully redundant, check that allows us to forget about
+   * many possible overflows later in this function. */
+  assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024 * 1024);
+
+  switch (EVP_MD_type(md)) {
+    case NID_sha1:
+      SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX *)md_state.c);
+      md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw;
+      md_transform =
+          (void (*)(void *ctx, const uint8_t *block))SHA1_Transform;
+      md_size = 20;
+      break;
+
+    case NID_sha256:
+      SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c);
+      md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
+      md_transform =
+          (void (*)(void *ctx, const uint8_t *block))SHA256_Transform;
+      md_size = 32;
+      break;
+
+    case NID_sha384:
+      SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c);
+      md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
+      md_transform =
+          (void (*)(void *ctx, const uint8_t *block))SHA512_Transform;
+      md_size = 384 / 8;
+      md_block_size = 128;
+      md_length_size = 16;
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      /* EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been called first to
+       * check that the hash function is supported. */
+      assert(0);
+      *md_out_size = 0;
+      return 0;
+  }
+
+  assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES);
+  assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
+  assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+  static const unsigned kHeaderLength = 13;
+
+  /* kVarianceBlocks is the number of blocks of the hash that we have to
+   * calculate in constant time because they could be altered by the
+   * padding value.
+   *
+   * TLSv1 has MACs up to 48 bytes long (SHA-384) and the padding is not
+   * required to be minimal. Therefore we say that the final six blocks
+   * can vary based on the padding. */
+  static const unsigned kVarianceBlocks = 6;
+
+  /* From now on we're dealing with the MAC, which conceptually has 13
+   * bytes of `header' before the start of the data. */
+  len = data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + kHeaderLength;
+  /* max_mac_bytes contains the maximum bytes of bytes in the MAC, including
+  * |header|, assuming that there's no padding. */
+  max_mac_bytes = len - md_size - 1;
+  /* num_blocks is the maximum number of hash blocks. */
+  num_blocks =
+      (max_mac_bytes + 1 + md_length_size + md_block_size - 1) / md_block_size;
+  /* In order to calculate the MAC in constant time we have to handle
+   * the final blocks specially because the padding value could cause the
+   * end to appear somewhere in the final |kVarianceBlocks| blocks and we
+   * can't leak where. However, |num_starting_blocks| worth of data can
+   * be hashed right away because no padding value can affect whether
+   * they are plaintext. */
+  num_starting_blocks = 0;
+  /* k is the starting byte offset into the conceptual header||data where
+   * we start processing. */
+  k = 0;
+  /* mac_end_offset is the index just past the end of the data to be
+   * MACed. */
+  mac_end_offset = data_plus_mac_size + kHeaderLength - md_size;
+  /* c is the index of the 0x80 byte in the final hash block that
+   * contains application data. */
+  c = mac_end_offset % md_block_size;
+  /* index_a is the hash block number that contains the 0x80 terminating
+   * value. */
+  index_a = mac_end_offset / md_block_size;
+  /* index_b is the hash block number that contains the 64-bit hash
+   * length, in bits. */
+  index_b = (mac_end_offset + md_length_size) / md_block_size;
+  /* bits is the hash-length in bits. It includes the additional hash
+   * block for the masked HMAC key. */
+
+  if (num_blocks > kVarianceBlocks) {
+    num_starting_blocks = num_blocks - kVarianceBlocks;
+    k = md_block_size * num_starting_blocks;
+  }
+
+  bits = 8 * mac_end_offset;
+
+  /* Compute the initial HMAC block. */
+  bits += 8 * md_block_size;
+  memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size);
+  assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad));
+  memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
+  for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++) {
+    hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36;
+  }
+
+  md_transform(md_state.c, hmac_pad);
+
+  memset(length_bytes, 0, md_length_size - 4);
+  length_bytes[md_length_size - 4] = (uint8_t)(bits >> 24);
+  length_bytes[md_length_size - 3] = (uint8_t)(bits >> 16);
+  length_bytes[md_length_size - 2] = (uint8_t)(bits >> 8);
+  length_bytes[md_length_size - 1] = (uint8_t)bits;
+
+  if (k > 0) {
+    /* k is a multiple of md_block_size. */
+    memcpy(first_block, header, 13);
+    memcpy(first_block + 13, data, md_block_size - 13);
+    md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
+    for (i = 1; i < k / md_block_size; i++) {
+      md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size * i - 13);
+    }
+  }
+
+  memset(mac_out, 0, sizeof(mac_out));
+
+  /* We now process the final hash blocks. For each block, we construct
+   * it in constant time. If the |i==index_a| then we'll include the 0x80
+   * bytes and zero pad etc. For each block we selectively copy it, in
+   * constant time, to |mac_out|. */
+  for (i = num_starting_blocks; i <= num_starting_blocks + kVarianceBlocks;
+       i++) {
+    uint8_t block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    uint8_t is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_a);
+    uint8_t is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_b);
+    for (j = 0; j < md_block_size; j++) {
+      uint8_t b = 0, is_past_c, is_past_cp1;
+      if (k < kHeaderLength) {
+        b = header[k];
+      } else if (k < data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + kHeaderLength) {
+        b = data[k - kHeaderLength];
+      }
+      k++;
+
+      is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c);
+      is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c + 1);
+      /* If this is the block containing the end of the
+       * application data, and we are at the offset for the
+       * 0x80 value, then overwrite b with 0x80. */
+      b = constant_time_select_8(is_past_c, 0x80, b);
+      /* If this the the block containing the end of the
+       * application data and we're past the 0x80 value then
+       * just write zero. */
+      b = b & ~is_past_cp1;
+      /* If this is index_b (the final block), but not
+       * index_a (the end of the data), then the 64-bit
+       * length didn't fit into index_a and we're having to
+       * add an extra block of zeros. */
+      b &= ~is_block_b | is_block_a;
+
+      /* The final bytes of one of the blocks contains the
+       * length. */
+      if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size) {
+        /* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */
+        b = constant_time_select_8(
+            is_block_b, length_bytes[j - (md_block_size - md_length_size)], b);
+      }
+      block[j] = b;
+    }
+
+    md_transform(md_state.c, block);
+    md_final_raw(md_state.c, block);
+    /* If this is index_b, copy the hash value to |mac_out|. */
+    for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++) {
+      mac_out[j] |= block[j] & is_block_b;
+    }
+  }
+
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+  if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL /* engine */)) {
+    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */
+  for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++) {
+    hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a;
+  }
+
+  EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size);
+  EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);
+  EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u);
+  *md_out_size = md_out_size_u;
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+
+  return 1;
+}