wearefair-grpc 1.3.1.pre.a

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/s3_both.c

@@ -0,0 +1,745 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+SSL_HANDSHAKE *ssl_handshake_new(enum ssl_hs_wait_t (*do_handshake)(SSL *ssl)) {
+  SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_HANDSHAKE));
+  if (hs == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  memset(hs, 0, sizeof(SSL_HANDSHAKE));
+  hs->do_handshake = do_handshake;
+  hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+  return hs;
+}
+
+void ssl_handshake_free(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  if (hs == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(hs->secret, sizeof(hs->secret));
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(hs->traffic_secret_0, sizeof(hs->traffic_secret_0));
+  SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(&hs->ecdh_ctx);
+  OPENSSL_free(hs->key_share_bytes);
+  OPENSSL_free(hs->public_key);
+  OPENSSL_free(hs->peer_sigalgs);
+  OPENSSL_free(hs->peer_psk_identity_hint);
+  OPENSSL_free(hs);
+}
+
+/* ssl3_do_write sends |ssl->init_buf| in records of type 'type'
+ * (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC). It returns 1 on success
+ * and <= 0 on error. */
+static int ssl3_do_write(SSL *ssl, int type, const uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
+  int ret = ssl3_write_bytes(ssl, type, data, len);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+
+  /* ssl3_write_bytes writes the data in its entirety. */
+  assert((size_t)ret == len);
+  ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, type, data, len);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_init_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type) {
+  CBB_zero(cbb);
+  if (ssl->s3->pending_message != NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* Pick a modest size hint to save most of the |realloc| calls. */
+  if (!CBB_init(cbb, 64) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(cbb, type) ||
+      !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, body)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_finish_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) {
+  if (ssl->s3->pending_message != NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t *msg = NULL;
+  size_t len;
+  if (!CBB_finish(cbb, &msg, &len) ||
+      len > 0xffffffffu) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    OPENSSL_free(msg);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ssl3_update_handshake_hash(ssl, msg, len);
+
+  ssl->s3->pending_message = msg;
+  ssl->s3->pending_message_len = (uint32_t)len;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_write_message(SSL *ssl) {
+  if (ssl->s3->pending_message == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int ret = ssl3_do_write(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, ssl->s3->pending_message,
+                          ssl->s3->pending_message_len);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->pending_message);
+  ssl->s3->pending_message = NULL;
+  ssl->s3->pending_message_len = 0;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *ssl, int a, int b) {
+  if (ssl->state == b) {
+    return ssl->method->write_message(ssl);
+  }
+
+  int n = ssl->s3->enc_method->final_finish_mac(ssl, ssl->server,
+                                                ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md);
+  if (n == 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = n;
+
+  /* Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. */
+  if (!ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_RANDOM",
+                      SSL_get_session(ssl)->master_key,
+                      SSL_get_session(ssl)->master_key_length)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */
+  if (ssl->server) {
+    assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+    memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
+    ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = n;
+  } else {
+    assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+    memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
+    ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = n;
+  }
+
+  CBB cbb, body;
+  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&body, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md,
+                     ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) ||
+      !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  ssl->state = b;
+  return ssl->method->write_message(ssl);
+}
+
+/* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
+ * so far. */
+static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *ssl) {
+  /* If no new cipher setup then return immediately: other functions will set
+   * the appropriate error. */
+  if (ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = ssl->s3->enc_method->final_finish_mac(
+      ssl, !ssl->server, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *ssl) {
+  int al;
+  int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_FINISHED,
+                                         ssl_dont_hash_message);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+
+  /* Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message. */
+  ssl3_take_mac(ssl);
+  if (!ssl->method->hash_current_message(ssl)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  size_t finished_len = ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
+
+  int finished_ok = ssl->init_num == finished_len &&
+                    CRYPTO_memcmp(ssl->init_msg, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
+                                  finished_len) == 0;
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+  finished_ok = 1;
+#endif
+  if (!finished_ok) {
+    al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
+    goto f_err;
+  }
+
+  /* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */
+  if (ssl->server) {
+    assert(finished_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+    memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
+           finished_len);
+    ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len;
+  } else {
+    assert(finished_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+    memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
+           finished_len);
+    ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+
+f_err:
+  ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+err:
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) {
+  static const uint8_t kChangeCipherSpec[1] = {SSL3_MT_CCS};
+
+  return ssl3_do_write(ssl, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, kChangeCipherSpec,
+                       sizeof(kChangeCipherSpec));
+}
+
+int ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *ssl) {
+  CBB cbb, body;
+  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) ||
+      !ssl_add_cert_chain(ssl, &body) ||
+      !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+size_t ssl_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *ssl) {
+  /* kMaxMessageLen is the default maximum message size for handshakes which do
+   * not accept peer certificate chains. */
+  static const size_t kMaxMessageLen = 16384;
+
+  if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
+    if ((!ssl->server || (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) &&
+        kMaxMessageLen < ssl->max_cert_list) {
+      return ssl->max_cert_list;
+    }
+    return kMaxMessageLen;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    /* In TLS 1.2 and below, the largest acceptable post-handshake message is
+     * a HelloRequest. */
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->server) {
+    /* The largest acceptable post-handshake message for a server is a
+     * KeyUpdate. We will never initiate post-handshake auth. */
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* Clients must accept NewSessionTicket and CertificateRequest, so allow the
+   * default size. */
+  return kMaxMessageLen;
+}
+
+static int extend_handshake_buffer(SSL *ssl, size_t length) {
+  if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->init_buf, length)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  while (ssl->init_buf->length < length) {
+    int ret = ssl3_read_handshake_bytes(
+        ssl, (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data + ssl->init_buf->length,
+        length - ssl->init_buf->length);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+      return ret;
+    }
+    ssl->init_buf->length += (size_t)ret;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int read_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl, int *out_is_v2_client_hello) {
+  /* Read the first 5 bytes, the size of the TLS record header. This is
+   * sufficient to detect a V2ClientHello and ensures that we never read beyond
+   * the first record. */
+  int ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+  const uint8_t *p = ssl_read_buffer(ssl);
+
+  /* Some dedicated error codes for protocol mixups should the application wish
+   * to interpret them differently. (These do not overlap with ClientHello or
+   * V2ClientHello.) */
+  if (strncmp("GET ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0 ||
+      strncmp("POST ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 ||
+      strncmp("HEAD ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 ||
+      strncmp("PUT ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  if (strncmp("CONNE", (const char *)p, 5) == 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if ((p[0] & 0x80) == 0 || p[2] != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO ||
+      p[3] != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+    /* Not a V2ClientHello. */
+    *out_is_v2_client_hello = 0;
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  /* Determine the length of the V2ClientHello. */
+  size_t msg_length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1];
+  if (msg_length > (1024 * 4)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  if (msg_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 2) {
+    /* Reject lengths that are too short early. We have already read
+     * |SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH| bytes, so we should not attempt to process an
+     * (invalid) V2ClientHello which would be shorter than that. */
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* Read the remainder of the V2ClientHello. */
+  ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, 2 + msg_length);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+
+  CBS v2_client_hello;
+  CBS_init(&v2_client_hello, ssl_read_buffer(ssl) + 2, msg_length);
+
+  /* The V2ClientHello without the length is incorporated into the handshake
+   * hash. */
+  if (!ssl3_update_handshake_hash(ssl, CBS_data(&v2_client_hello),
+                                  CBS_len(&v2_client_hello))) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, 0 /* V2ClientHello */,
+                      CBS_data(&v2_client_hello), CBS_len(&v2_client_hello));
+
+  uint8_t msg_type;
+  uint16_t version, cipher_spec_length, session_id_length, challenge_length;
+  CBS cipher_specs, session_id, challenge;
+  if (!CBS_get_u8(&v2_client_hello, &msg_type) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &version) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_spec_length) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &session_id_length) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &challenge_length) ||
+      !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_specs, cipher_spec_length) ||
+      !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &session_id, session_id_length) ||
+      !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &challenge, challenge_length) ||
+      CBS_len(&v2_client_hello) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* msg_type has already been checked. */
+  assert(msg_type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO);
+
+  /* The client_random is the V2ClientHello challenge. Truncate or
+   * left-pad with zeros as needed. */
+  size_t rand_len = CBS_len(&challenge);
+  if (rand_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) {
+    rand_len = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+  }
+  uint8_t random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
+  memset(random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+  memcpy(random + (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - rand_len), CBS_data(&challenge),
+         rand_len);
+
+  /* Write out an equivalent SSLv3 ClientHello. */
+  size_t max_v3_client_hello = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 /* version */ +
+                               SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 /* session ID length */ +
+                               2 /* cipher list length */ +
+                               CBS_len(&cipher_specs) / 3 * 2 +
+                               1 /* compression length */ + 1 /* compression */;
+  CBB client_hello, hello_body, cipher_suites;
+  CBB_zero(&client_hello);
+  if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->init_buf, max_v3_client_hello) ||
+      !CBB_init_fixed(&client_hello, (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data,
+                      ssl->init_buf->max) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(&client_hello, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
+      !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &hello_body) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&hello_body, version) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&hello_body, random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+      /* No session id. */
+      !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&hello_body, &cipher_suites)) {
+    CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* Copy the cipher suites. */
+  while (CBS_len(&cipher_specs) > 0) {
+    uint32_t cipher_spec;
+    if (!CBS_get_u24(&cipher_specs, &cipher_spec)) {
+      CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Skip SSLv2 ciphers. */
+    if ((cipher_spec & 0xff0000) != 0) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (!CBB_add_u16(&cipher_suites, cipher_spec)) {
+      CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return -1;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Add the null compression scheme and finish. */
+  if (!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 1) || !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
+      !CBB_finish(&client_hello, NULL, &ssl->init_buf->length)) {
+    CBB_cleanup(&client_hello);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* Consume and discard the V2ClientHello. */
+  ssl_read_buffer_consume(ssl, 2 + msg_length);
+  ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
+
+  *out_is_v2_client_hello = 1;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_message(SSL *ssl, int msg_type,
+                     enum ssl_hash_message_t hash_message) {
+again:
+  /* Re-create the handshake buffer if needed. */
+  if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) {
+    ssl->init_buf = BUF_MEM_new();
+    if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) {
+      return -1;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->server && !ssl->s3->v2_hello_done) {
+    /* Bypass the record layer for the first message to handle V2ClientHello. */
+    assert(hash_message == ssl_hash_message);
+    int is_v2_client_hello = 0;
+    int ret = read_v2_client_hello(ssl, &is_v2_client_hello);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+      return ret;
+    }
+    if (is_v2_client_hello) {
+      /* V2ClientHello is hashed separately. */
+      hash_message = ssl_dont_hash_message;
+    }
+    ssl->s3->v2_hello_done = 1;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message) {
+    /* A ssl_dont_hash_message call cannot be combined with reuse_message; the
+     * ssl_dont_hash_message would have to have been applied to the previous
+     * call. */
+    assert(hash_message == ssl_hash_message);
+    assert(ssl->init_msg != NULL);
+
+    ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0;
+    hash_message = ssl_dont_hash_message;
+  } else {
+    ssl3_release_current_message(ssl, 0 /* don't free buffer */);
+  }
+
+  /* Read the message header, if we haven't yet. */
+  int ret = extend_handshake_buffer(ssl, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+
+  /* Parse out the length. Cap it so the peer cannot force us to buffer up to
+   * 2^24 bytes. */
+  const uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data;
+  size_t msg_len = (((uint32_t)p[1]) << 16) | (((uint32_t)p[2]) << 8) | p[3];
+  if (msg_len > ssl_max_handshake_message_len(ssl)) {
+    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* Read the message body, if we haven't yet. */
+  ret = extend_handshake_buffer(ssl, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + msg_len);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+
+  /* We have now received a complete message. */
+  ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, ssl->init_buf->data,
+                      ssl->init_buf->length);
+
+  ssl->s3->tmp.message_type = ((const uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data)[0];
+  ssl->init_msg = (uint8_t*)ssl->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+  ssl->init_num = ssl->init_buf->length - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+  /* Ignore stray HelloRequest messages in the handshake before TLS 1.3. Per RFC
+   * 5246, section 7.4.1.1, the server may send HelloRequest at any time. */
+  if (!ssl->server && SSL_in_init(ssl) &&
+      (!ssl->s3->have_version || ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) &&
+      ssl->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST &&
+      ssl->init_num == 0) {
+    goto again;
+  }
+
+  if (msg_type >= 0 && ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != msg_type) {
+    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
+  if (hash_message == ssl_hash_message && !ssl3_hash_current_message(ssl)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_hash_current_message(SSL *ssl) {
+  return ssl3_update_handshake_hash(ssl, (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data,
+                                    ssl->init_buf->length);
+}
+
+void ssl3_release_current_message(SSL *ssl, int free_buffer) {
+  if (ssl->init_msg != NULL) {
+    /* |init_buf| never contains data beyond the current message. */
+    assert(SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + ssl->init_num == ssl->init_buf->length);
+
+    /* Clear the current message. */
+    ssl->init_msg = NULL;
+    ssl->init_num = 0;
+    ssl->init_buf->length = 0;
+  }
+
+  if (free_buffer) {
+    BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf);
+    ssl->init_buf = NULL;
+  }
+}
+
+int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) {
+  int al;
+
+  switch (type) {
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
+      al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
+      break;
+
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
+    case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
+    case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
+    case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
+      al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+      break;
+
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+      al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+      break;
+
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
+      al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
+      break;
+
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
+      al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
+      break;
+
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
+    case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
+    case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
+    case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
+      al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+      break;
+
+    case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+    case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
+    case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
+    case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
+      al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
+      break;
+
+    case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
+      al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+      break;
+
+    case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
+      al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
+      break;
+  }
+
+  return al;
+}