wearefair-grpc 1.3.1.pre.a

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c

@@ -0,0 +1,446 @@
+/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+ * project 2000.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../bytestring/internal.h"
+
+
+static int parse_integer_buggy(CBS *cbs, BIGNUM **out, int buggy) {
+  assert(*out == NULL);
+  *out = BN_new();
+  if (*out == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (buggy) {
+    return BN_parse_asn1_unsigned_buggy(cbs, *out);
+  }
+  return BN_parse_asn1_unsigned(cbs, *out);
+}
+
+static int parse_integer(CBS *cbs, BIGNUM **out) {
+  return parse_integer_buggy(cbs, out, 0 /* not buggy */);
+}
+
+static int marshal_integer(CBB *cbb, BIGNUM *bn) {
+  if (bn == NULL) {
+    /* An RSA object may be missing some components. */
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return BN_marshal_asn1(cbb, bn);
+}
+
+static RSA *parse_public_key(CBS *cbs, int buggy) {
+  RSA *ret = RSA_new();
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  CBS child;
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &child, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      !parse_integer_buggy(&child, &ret->n, buggy) ||
+      !parse_integer(&child, &ret->e) ||
+      CBS_len(&child) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_ENCODING);
+    RSA_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_is_odd(ret->e) ||
+      BN_num_bits(ret->e) < 2) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_RSA_PARAMETERS);
+    RSA_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+RSA *RSA_parse_public_key(CBS *cbs) {
+  return parse_public_key(cbs, 0 /* not buggy */);
+}
+
+RSA *RSA_parse_public_key_buggy(CBS *cbs) {
+  /* Estonian IDs issued between September 2014 to September 2015 are
+   * broken. See https://crbug.com/532048 and https://crbug.com/534766.
+   *
+   * TODO(davidben): Remove this code and callers in March 2016. */
+  return parse_public_key(cbs, 1 /* buggy */);
+}
+
+RSA *RSA_public_key_from_bytes(const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
+  CBS cbs;
+  CBS_init(&cbs, in, in_len);
+  RSA *ret = RSA_parse_public_key(&cbs);
+  if (ret == NULL || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_ENCODING);
+    RSA_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_marshal_public_key(CBB *cbb, const RSA *rsa) {
+  CBB child;
+  if (!CBB_add_asn1(cbb, &child, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      !marshal_integer(&child, rsa->n) ||
+      !marshal_integer(&child, rsa->e) ||
+      !CBB_flush(cbb)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_public_key_to_bytes(uint8_t **out_bytes, size_t *out_len,
+                            const RSA *rsa) {
+  CBB cbb;
+  CBB_zero(&cbb);
+  if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
+      !RSA_marshal_public_key(&cbb, rsa) ||
+      !CBB_finish(&cbb, out_bytes, out_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
+    CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+/* kVersionTwoPrime and kVersionMulti are the supported values of the version
+ * field of an RSAPrivateKey structure (RFC 3447). */
+static const uint64_t kVersionTwoPrime = 0;
+static const uint64_t kVersionMulti = 1;
+
+/* rsa_parse_additional_prime parses a DER-encoded OtherPrimeInfo from |cbs| and
+ * advances |cbs|. It returns a newly-allocated |RSA_additional_prime| on
+ * success or NULL on error. The |r| and |mont| fields of the result are set to
+ * NULL. */
+static RSA_additional_prime *rsa_parse_additional_prime(CBS *cbs) {
+  RSA_additional_prime *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA_additional_prime));
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  memset(ret, 0, sizeof(RSA_additional_prime));
+
+  CBS child;
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &child, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      !parse_integer(&child, &ret->prime) ||
+      !parse_integer(&child, &ret->exp) ||
+      !parse_integer(&child, &ret->coeff) ||
+      CBS_len(&child) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_ENCODING);
+    RSA_additional_prime_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+RSA *RSA_parse_private_key(CBS *cbs) {
+  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+  BIGNUM *product_of_primes_so_far = NULL;
+  RSA *ret = RSA_new();
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  CBS child;
+  uint64_t version;
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &child, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      !CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&child, &version)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_ENCODING);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (version != kVersionTwoPrime && version != kVersionMulti) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_VERSION);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!parse_integer(&child, &ret->n) ||
+      !parse_integer(&child, &ret->e) ||
+      !parse_integer(&child, &ret->d) ||
+      !parse_integer(&child, &ret->p) ||
+      !parse_integer(&child, &ret->q) ||
+      !parse_integer(&child, &ret->dmp1) ||
+      !parse_integer(&child, &ret->dmq1) ||
+      !parse_integer(&child, &ret->iqmp)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (version == kVersionMulti) {
+    /* Although otherPrimeInfos is written as OPTIONAL in RFC 3447, it later
+     * says "[otherPrimeInfos] shall be omitted if version is 0 and shall
+     * contain at least one instance of OtherPrimeInfo if version is 1." The
+     * OPTIONAL is just so both versions share a single definition. */
+    CBS other_prime_infos;
+    if (!CBS_get_asn1(&child, &other_prime_infos, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+        CBS_len(&other_prime_infos) == 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_ENCODING);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    ret->additional_primes = sk_RSA_additional_prime_new_null();
+    if (ret->additional_primes == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    product_of_primes_so_far = BN_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL ||
+        product_of_primes_so_far == NULL ||
+        !BN_mul(product_of_primes_so_far, ret->p, ret->q, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    while (CBS_len(&other_prime_infos) > 0) {
+      RSA_additional_prime *ap = rsa_parse_additional_prime(&other_prime_infos);
+      if (ap == NULL) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+      if (!sk_RSA_additional_prime_push(ret->additional_primes, ap)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        RSA_additional_prime_free(ap);
+        goto err;
+      }
+      ap->r = BN_dup(product_of_primes_so_far);
+      if (ap->r == NULL ||
+          !BN_mul(product_of_primes_so_far, product_of_primes_so_far,
+                  ap->prime, ctx)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (CBS_len(&child) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_ENCODING);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  BN_free(product_of_primes_so_far);
+  return ret;
+
+err:
+  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  BN_free(product_of_primes_so_far);
+  RSA_free(ret);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+RSA *RSA_private_key_from_bytes(const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
+  CBS cbs;
+  CBS_init(&cbs, in, in_len);
+  RSA *ret = RSA_parse_private_key(&cbs);
+  if (ret == NULL || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_ENCODING);
+    RSA_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_marshal_private_key(CBB *cbb, const RSA *rsa) {
+  const int is_multiprime =
+      sk_RSA_additional_prime_num(rsa->additional_primes) > 0;
+
+  CBB child;
+  if (!CBB_add_asn1(cbb, &child, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child,
+                           is_multiprime ? kVersionMulti : kVersionTwoPrime) ||
+      !marshal_integer(&child, rsa->n) ||
+      !marshal_integer(&child, rsa->e) ||
+      !marshal_integer(&child, rsa->d) ||
+      !marshal_integer(&child, rsa->p) ||
+      !marshal_integer(&child, rsa->q) ||
+      !marshal_integer(&child, rsa->dmp1) ||
+      !marshal_integer(&child, rsa->dmq1) ||
+      !marshal_integer(&child, rsa->iqmp)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  CBB other_prime_infos;
+  if (is_multiprime) {
+    if (!CBB_add_asn1(&child, &other_prime_infos, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_RSA_additional_prime_num(rsa->additional_primes);
+         i++) {
+      RSA_additional_prime *ap =
+          sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(rsa->additional_primes, i);
+      CBB other_prime_info;
+      if (!CBB_add_asn1(&other_prime_infos, &other_prime_info,
+                        CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+          !marshal_integer(&other_prime_info, ap->prime) ||
+          !marshal_integer(&other_prime_info, ap->exp) ||
+          !marshal_integer(&other_prime_info, ap->coeff) ||
+          !CBB_flush(&other_prime_infos)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_private_key_to_bytes(uint8_t **out_bytes, size_t *out_len,
+                             const RSA *rsa) {
+  CBB cbb;
+  CBB_zero(&cbb);
+  if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
+      !RSA_marshal_private_key(&cbb, rsa) ||
+      !CBB_finish(&cbb, out_bytes, out_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
+    CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+RSA *d2i_RSAPublicKey(RSA **out, const uint8_t **inp, long len) {
+  if (len < 0) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  CBS cbs;
+  CBS_init(&cbs, *inp, (size_t)len);
+  RSA *ret = RSA_parse_public_key(&cbs);
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  if (out != NULL) {
+    RSA_free(*out);
+    *out = ret;
+  }
+  *inp = CBS_data(&cbs);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int i2d_RSAPublicKey(const RSA *in, uint8_t **outp) {
+  CBB cbb;
+  if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
+      !RSA_marshal_public_key(&cbb, in)) {
+    CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return CBB_finish_i2d(&cbb, outp);
+}
+
+RSA *d2i_RSAPrivateKey(RSA **out, const uint8_t **inp, long len) {
+  if (len < 0) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  CBS cbs;
+  CBS_init(&cbs, *inp, (size_t)len);
+  RSA *ret = RSA_parse_private_key(&cbs);
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  if (out != NULL) {
+    RSA_free(*out);
+    *out = ret;
+  }
+  *inp = CBS_data(&cbs);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int i2d_RSAPrivateKey(const RSA *in, uint8_t **outp) {
+  CBB cbb;
+  if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
+      !RSA_marshal_private_key(&cbb, in)) {
+    CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return CBB_finish_i2d(&cbb, outp);
+}
+
+RSA *RSAPublicKey_dup(const RSA *rsa) {
+  uint8_t *der;
+  size_t der_len;
+  if (!RSA_public_key_to_bytes(&der, &der_len, rsa)) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  RSA *ret = RSA_public_key_from_bytes(der, der_len);
+  OPENSSL_free(der);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+RSA *RSAPrivateKey_dup(const RSA *rsa) {
+  uint8_t *der;
+  size_t der_len;
+  if (!RSA_private_key_to_bytes(&der, &der_len, rsa)) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  RSA *ret = RSA_private_key_from_bytes(der, der_len);
+  OPENSSL_free(der);
+  return ret;
+}

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_impl.c

@@ -0,0 +1,1139 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/thread.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../internal.h"
+
+
+static int check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes(const RSA *rsa) {
+  unsigned rsa_bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
+
+  if (rsa_bits > 16 * 1024) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* Mitigate DoS attacks by limiting the exponent size. 33 bits was chosen as
+   * the limit based on the recommendations in [1] and [2]. Windows CryptoAPI
+   * doesn't support values larger than 32 bits [3], so it is unlikely that
+   * exponents larger than 32 bits are being used for anything Windows commonly
+   * does.
+   *
+   * [1] https://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/03/16/rsae.html
+   * [2] https://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/03/17/rsados.html
+   * [3] https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa387685(VS.85).aspx */
+  static const unsigned kMaxExponentBits = 33;
+
+  if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > kMaxExponentBits) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* Verify |n > e|. Comparing |rsa_bits| to |kMaxExponentBits| is a small
+   * shortcut to comparing |n| and |e| directly. In reality, |kMaxExponentBits|
+   * is much smaller than the minimum RSA key size that any application should
+   * accept. */
+  if (rsa_bits <= kMaxExponentBits) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  assert(BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) > 0);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+size_t rsa_default_size(const RSA *rsa) {
+  return BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+}
+
+int rsa_default_encrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
+                        const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
+  const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
+  BIGNUM *f, *result;
+  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+  int i, ret = 0;
+
+  if (max_out < rsa_size) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes(rsa)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  result = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
+  if (!f || !result || !buf) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  switch (padding) {
+    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+      i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len);
+      break;
+    case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+      /* Use the default parameters: SHA-1 for both hashes and no label. */
+      i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len,
+                                          NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+      break;
+    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+      i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len);
+      break;
+    default:
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+      goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (i <= 0) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (BN_bin2bn(buf, rsa_size, f) == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+    /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx) ||
+      !BN_mod_exp_mont(result, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->mont_n)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
+   * modulus */
+  if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(out, rsa_size, result)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  *out_len = rsa_size;
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  if (ctx != NULL) {
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  }
+  if (buf != NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, rsa_size);
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/* MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA defines the maximum number of cached BN_BLINDINGs per
+ * RSA*. Then this limit is exceeded, BN_BLINDING objects will be created and
+ * destroyed as needed. */
+#define MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA 1024
+
+/* rsa_blinding_get returns a BN_BLINDING to use with |rsa|. It does this by
+ * allocating one of the cached BN_BLINDING objects in |rsa->blindings|. If
+ * none are free, the cache will be extended by a extra element and the new
+ * BN_BLINDING is returned.
+ *
+ * On success, the index of the assigned BN_BLINDING is written to
+ * |*index_used| and must be passed to |rsa_blinding_release| when finished. */
+static BN_BLINDING *rsa_blinding_get(RSA *rsa, unsigned *index_used,
+                                     BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  assert(ctx != NULL);
+  assert(rsa->mont_n != NULL);
+
+  BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
+  BN_BLINDING **new_blindings;
+  uint8_t *new_blindings_inuse;
+  char overflow = 0;
+
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&rsa->lock);
+
+  unsigned i;
+  for (i = 0; i < rsa->num_blindings; i++) {
+    if (rsa->blindings_inuse[i] == 0) {
+      rsa->blindings_inuse[i] = 1;
+      ret = rsa->blindings[i];
+      *index_used = i;
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (ret != NULL) {
+    CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&rsa->lock);
+    return ret;
+  }
+
+  overflow = rsa->num_blindings >= MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA;
+
+  /* We didn't find a free BN_BLINDING to use so increase the length of
+   * the arrays by one and use the newly created element. */
+
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&rsa->lock);
+  ret = BN_BLINDING_new();
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  if (overflow) {
+    /* We cannot add any more cached BN_BLINDINGs so we use |ret|
+     * and mark it for destruction in |rsa_blinding_release|. */
+    *index_used = MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA;
+    return ret;
+  }
+
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&rsa->lock);
+
+  new_blindings =
+      OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BN_BLINDING *) * (rsa->num_blindings + 1));
+  if (new_blindings == NULL) {
+    goto err1;
+  }
+  memcpy(new_blindings, rsa->blindings,
+         sizeof(BN_BLINDING *) * rsa->num_blindings);
+  new_blindings[rsa->num_blindings] = ret;
+
+  new_blindings_inuse = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa->num_blindings + 1);
+  if (new_blindings_inuse == NULL) {
+    goto err2;
+  }
+  memcpy(new_blindings_inuse, rsa->blindings_inuse, rsa->num_blindings);
+  new_blindings_inuse[rsa->num_blindings] = 1;
+  *index_used = rsa->num_blindings;
+
+  OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings);
+  rsa->blindings = new_blindings;
+  OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings_inuse);
+  rsa->blindings_inuse = new_blindings_inuse;
+  rsa->num_blindings++;
+
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&rsa->lock);
+  return ret;
+
+err2:
+  OPENSSL_free(new_blindings);
+
+err1:
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&rsa->lock);
+  BN_BLINDING_free(ret);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+/* rsa_blinding_release marks the cached BN_BLINDING at the given index as free
+ * for other threads to use. */
+static void rsa_blinding_release(RSA *rsa, BN_BLINDING *blinding,
+                                 unsigned blinding_index) {
+  if (blinding_index == MAX_BLINDINGS_PER_RSA) {
+    /* This blinding wasn't cached. */
+    BN_BLINDING_free(blinding);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&rsa->lock);
+  rsa->blindings_inuse[blinding_index] = 0;
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&rsa->lock);
+}
+
+/* signing */
+int rsa_default_sign_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out,
+                         size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+                         int padding) {
+  const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
+  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+  int i, ret = 0;
+
+  if (max_out < rsa_size) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
+  if (buf == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  switch (padding) {
+    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+      i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len);
+      break;
+    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+      i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, rsa_size, in, in_len);
+      break;
+    default:
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+      goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (i <= 0) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!RSA_private_transform(rsa, out, buf, rsa_size)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  *out_len = rsa_size;
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  if (buf != NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, rsa_size);
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int rsa_default_decrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
+                        const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
+  const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
+  int r = -1;
+  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+  int ret = 0;
+
+  if (max_out < rsa_size) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
+    buf = out;
+  } else {
+    /* Allocate a temporary buffer to hold the padded plaintext. */
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
+    if (buf == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (in_len != rsa_size) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_LEN_NOT_EQUAL_TO_MOD_LEN);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!RSA_private_transform(rsa, buf, in, rsa_size)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  switch (padding) {
+    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+      r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(out, rsa_size, buf, rsa_size);
+      break;
+    case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+      /* Use the default parameters: SHA-1 for both hashes and no label. */
+      r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(out, rsa_size, buf, rsa_size,
+                                            NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+      break;
+    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+      r = rsa_size;
+      break;
+    default:
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+      goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (r < 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+  } else {
+    *out_len = r;
+    ret = 1;
+  }
+
+err:
+  if (padding != RSA_NO_PADDING && buf != NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, rsa_size);
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+int RSA_verify_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
+                   const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
+  if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
+  BIGNUM *f, *result;
+  int r = -1;
+
+  if (max_out < rsa_size) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (in_len != rsa_size) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_LEN_NOT_EQUAL_TO_MOD_LEN);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes(rsa)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int ret = 0;
+  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  result = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  if (f == NULL || result == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
+    buf = out;
+  } else {
+    /* Allocate a temporary buffer to hold the padded plaintext. */
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
+    if (buf == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (BN_bin2bn(in, in_len, f) == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx) ||
+      !BN_mod_exp_mont(result, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->mont_n)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(buf, rsa_size, result)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  switch (padding) {
+    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+      r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(out, rsa_size, buf, rsa_size);
+      break;
+    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+      r = rsa_size;
+      break;
+    default:
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+      goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (r < 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+  } else {
+    *out_len = r;
+    ret = 1;
+  }
+
+err:
+  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  if (buf != out) {
+    OPENSSL_free(buf);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int rsa_default_private_transform(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
+                                  size_t len) {
+  BIGNUM *f, *result;
+  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+  unsigned blinding_index = 0;
+  BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
+  int ret = 0;
+
+  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  result = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+  if (f == NULL || result == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (BN_bin2bn(in, len, f) == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+    /* Usually the padding functions would catch this. */
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* We cannot do blinding or verification without |e|, and continuing without
+   * those countermeasures is dangerous. However, the Java/Android RSA API
+   * requires support for keys where only |d| and |n| (and not |e|) are known.
+   * The callers that require that bad behavior set |RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING|. */
+  int disable_security = (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING) && rsa->e == NULL;
+
+  if (!disable_security) {
+    /* Keys without public exponents must have blinding explicitly disabled to
+     * be used. */
+    if (rsa->e == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    blinding = rsa_blinding_get(rsa, &blinding_index, ctx);
+    if (blinding == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(f, blinding, rsa->e, rsa->mont_n, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (rsa->p != NULL && rsa->q != NULL && rsa->e != NULL && rsa->dmp1 != NULL &&
+      rsa->dmq1 != NULL && rsa->iqmp != NULL) {
+    if (!mod_exp(result, f, rsa, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  } else {
+    BIGNUM local_d;
+    BIGNUM *d = NULL;
+
+    BN_init(&local_d);
+    d = &local_d;
+    BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+    if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(result, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->mont_n)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Verify the result to protect against fault attacks as described in the
+   * 1997 paper "On the Importance of Checking Cryptographic Protocols for
+   * Faults" by Dan Boneh, Richard A. DeMillo, and Richard J. Lipton. Some
+   * implementations do this only when the CRT is used, but we do it in all
+   * cases. Section 6 of the aforementioned paper describes an attack that
+   * works when the CRT isn't used. That attack is much less likely to succeed
+   * than the CRT attack, but there have likely been improvements since 1997.
+   *
+   * This check is cheap assuming |e| is small; it almost always is. */
+  if (!disable_security) {
+    BIGNUM *vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (vrfy == NULL ||
+        !BN_mod_exp_mont(vrfy, result, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->mont_n) ||
+        !BN_equal_consttime(vrfy, f)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(result, blinding, rsa->mont_n, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(out, len, result)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  if (ctx != NULL) {
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  }
+  if (blinding != NULL) {
+    rsa_blinding_release(rsa, blinding, blinding_index);
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  assert(ctx != NULL);
+
+  assert(rsa->n != NULL);
+  assert(rsa->e != NULL);
+  assert(rsa->d != NULL);
+  assert(rsa->p != NULL);
+  assert(rsa->q != NULL);
+  assert(rsa->dmp1 != NULL);
+  assert(rsa->dmq1 != NULL);
+  assert(rsa->iqmp != NULL);
+
+  BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy;
+  BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1, local_c, local_r1;
+  BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1;
+  int ret = 0;
+  size_t i, num_additional_primes = 0;
+
+  if (rsa->additional_primes != NULL) {
+    num_additional_primes = sk_RSA_additional_prime_num(rsa->additional_primes);
+  }
+
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  if (r1 == NULL ||
+      m1 == NULL ||
+      vrfy == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  {
+    BIGNUM local_p, local_q;
+    BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
+
+    /* Make sure BN_mod in Montgomery initialization uses BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. */
+    BN_init(&local_p);
+    p = &local_p;
+    BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+    BN_init(&local_q);
+    q = &local_q;
+    BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+    if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_p, &rsa->lock, p, ctx) ||
+        !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_q, &rsa->lock, q, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->mont_n, &rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* compute I mod q */
+  c = &local_c;
+  BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+  if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
+  dmq1 = &local_dmq1;
+  BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+  if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, rsa->mont_q)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* compute I mod p */
+  c = &local_c;
+  BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+  if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
+  dmp1 = &local_dmp1;
+  BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+  if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, rsa->mont_p)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
+   * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
+  if (BN_is_negative(r0)) {
+    if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
+  pr1 = &local_r1;
+  BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+  if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
+   * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
+   * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
+   * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
+   * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
+   * they ensure p > q [steve] */
+  if (BN_is_negative(r0)) {
+    if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+  if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  for (i = 0; i < num_additional_primes; i++) {
+    /* multi-prime RSA. */
+    BIGNUM local_exp, local_prime;
+    BIGNUM *exp = &local_exp, *prime = &local_prime;
+    RSA_additional_prime *ap =
+        sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(rsa->additional_primes, i);
+
+    BN_with_flags(exp, ap->exp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+    BN_with_flags(prime, ap->prime, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+    /* c will already point to a BIGNUM with the correct flags. */
+    if (!BN_mod(r1, c, prime, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&ap->mont, &rsa->lock, prime, ctx) ||
+        !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(m1, r1, exp, prime, ctx, ap->mont)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    BN_set_flags(m1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+    if (!BN_sub(m1, m1, r0) ||
+        !BN_mul(m1, m1, ap->coeff, ctx) ||
+        !BN_mod(m1, m1, prime, ctx) ||
+        (BN_is_negative(m1) && !BN_add(m1, m1, prime)) ||
+        !BN_mul(m1, m1, ap->r, ctx) ||
+        !BN_add(r0, r0, m1)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int rsa_default_multi_prime_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int num_primes,
+                                   BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) {
+  BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *r3 = NULL, *tmp;
+  BIGNUM local_r0, local_d, local_p;
+  BIGNUM *pr0, *d, *p;
+  int prime_bits, ok = -1, n = 0, i, j;
+  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+  STACK_OF(RSA_additional_prime) *additional_primes = NULL;
+
+  if (num_primes < 2) {
+    ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_MUST_HAVE_AT_LEAST_TWO_PRIMES);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  if (r0 == NULL || r1 == NULL || r2 == NULL || r3 == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (num_primes > 2) {
+    additional_primes = sk_RSA_additional_prime_new_null();
+    if (additional_primes == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  for (i = 2; i < num_primes; i++) {
+    RSA_additional_prime *ap = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA_additional_prime));
+    if (ap == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    memset(ap, 0, sizeof(RSA_additional_prime));
+    ap->prime = BN_new();
+    ap->exp = BN_new();
+    ap->coeff = BN_new();
+    ap->r = BN_new();
+    if (ap->prime == NULL ||
+        ap->exp == NULL ||
+        ap->coeff == NULL ||
+        ap->r == NULL ||
+        !sk_RSA_additional_prime_push(additional_primes, ap)) {
+      RSA_additional_prime_free(ap);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* We need the RSA components non-NULL */
+  if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!rsa->d && ((rsa->d = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!rsa->e && ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!rsa->p && ((rsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!rsa->q && ((rsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1 = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1 = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* generate p and q */
+  prime_bits = (bits + (num_primes - 1)) / num_primes;
+  for (;;) {
+    if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, prime_bits, 0, NULL, NULL, cb) ||
+        !BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one()) ||
+        !BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (BN_is_one(r1)) {
+      break;
+    }
+    if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+  if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  prime_bits = ((bits - prime_bits) + (num_primes - 2)) / (num_primes - 1);
+  for (;;) {
+    /* When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
+     * continually regenerating the same prime values. Check for
+     * this and bail if it happens 3 times. */
+    unsigned int degenerate = 0;
+    do {
+      if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, prime_bits, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+    } while ((BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0) && (++degenerate < 3));
+    if (degenerate == 3) {
+      ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()) ||
+        !BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (BN_is_one(r1)) {
+      break;
+    }
+    if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1) ||
+      !BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  for (i = 2; i < num_primes; i++) {
+    RSA_additional_prime *ap =
+        sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(additional_primes, i - 2);
+    prime_bits = ((bits - BN_num_bits(rsa->n)) + (num_primes - (i + 1))) /
+                 (num_primes - i);
+
+    for (;;) {
+      if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(ap->prime, prime_bits, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+      if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, ap->prime) == 0 ||
+          BN_cmp(rsa->q, ap->prime) == 0) {
+        continue;
+      }
+
+      for (j = 0; j < i - 2; j++) {
+        if (BN_cmp(sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(additional_primes, j)->prime,
+                   ap->prime) == 0) {
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+      if (j != i - 2) {
+        continue;
+      }
+
+      if (!BN_sub(r2, ap->prime, BN_value_one()) ||
+          !BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      if (!BN_is_one(r1)) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      if (i != num_primes - 1) {
+        break;
+      }
+
+      /* For the last prime we'll check that it makes n large enough. In the
+       * two prime case this isn't a problem because we generate primes with
+       * the top two bits set and so the product is always of the expected
+       * size. In the multi prime case, this doesn't follow. */
+      if (!BN_mul(r1, rsa->n, ap->prime, ctx)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+      if (BN_num_bits(r1) == (unsigned) bits) {
+        break;
+      }
+
+      if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+
+    /* ap->r is is the product of all the primes prior to the current one
+     * (including p and q). */
+    if (!BN_copy(ap->r, rsa->n)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (i == num_primes - 1) {
+      /* In the case of the last prime, we calculated n as |r1| in the loop
+       * above. */
+      if (!BN_copy(rsa->n, r1)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+    } else if (!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->n, ap->prime, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
+    tmp = rsa->p;
+    rsa->p = rsa->q;
+    rsa->q = tmp;
+  }
+
+  /* calculate d */
+  if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one())) {
+    goto err; /* p-1 */
+  }
+  if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one())) {
+    goto err; /* q-1 */
+  }
+  if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx)) {
+    goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */
+  }
+  for (i = 2; i < num_primes; i++) {
+    RSA_additional_prime *ap =
+        sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(additional_primes, i - 2);
+    if (!BN_sub(r3, ap->prime, BN_value_one()) ||
+        !BN_mul(r0, r0, r3, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+  pr0 = &local_r0;
+  BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+  if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx)) {
+    goto err; /* d */
+  }
+
+  /* set up d for correct BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */
+  d = &local_d;
+  BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+  /* calculate d mod (p-1) */
+  if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* calculate d mod (q-1) */
+  if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* calculate inverse of q mod p */
+  p = &local_p;
+  BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+  if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, p, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  for (i = 2; i < num_primes; i++) {
+    RSA_additional_prime *ap =
+        sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(additional_primes, i - 2);
+    if (!BN_sub(ap->exp, ap->prime, BN_value_one()) ||
+        !BN_mod(ap->exp, rsa->d, ap->exp, ctx) ||
+        !BN_mod_inverse(ap->coeff, ap->r, ap->prime, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  ok = 1;
+  rsa->additional_primes = additional_primes;
+  additional_primes = NULL;
+
+err:
+  if (ok == -1) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
+    ok = 0;
+  }
+  if (ctx != NULL) {
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  }
+  sk_RSA_additional_prime_pop_free(additional_primes,
+                                   RSA_additional_prime_free);
+  return ok;
+}
+
+int rsa_default_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) {
+  return rsa_default_multi_prime_keygen(rsa, bits, 2 /* num primes */, e_value,
+                                        cb);
+}
+
+/* All of the methods are NULL to make it easier for the compiler/linker to drop
+ * unused functions. The wrapper functions will select the appropriate
+ * |rsa_default_*| implementation. */
+const RSA_METHOD RSA_default_method = {
+  {
+    0 /* references */,
+    1 /* is_static */,
+  },
+  NULL /* app_data */,
+
+  NULL /* init */,
+  NULL /* finish (defaults to rsa_default_finish) */,
+
+  NULL /* size (defaults to rsa_default_size) */,
+
+  NULL /* sign */,
+  NULL /* verify */,
+
+  NULL /* encrypt (defaults to rsa_default_encrypt) */,
+  NULL /* sign_raw (defaults to rsa_default_sign_raw) */,
+  NULL /* decrypt (defaults to rsa_default_decrypt) */,
+  NULL /* verify_raw (defaults to rsa_default_verify_raw) */,
+
+  NULL /* private_transform (defaults to rsa_default_private_transform) */,
+
+  NULL /* mod_exp (ignored) */,
+  NULL /* bn_mod_exp (ignored) */,
+
+  RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE,
+
+  NULL /* keygen (defaults to rsa_default_keygen) */,
+  NULL /* multi_prime_keygen (defaults to rsa_default_multi_prime_keygen) */,
+
+  NULL /* supports_digest */,
+};