wearefair-grpc 1.3.1.pre.a

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/cipher/e_tls.c

@@ -0,0 +1,602 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/aead.h>
+#include <openssl/cipher.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/type_check.h>
+
+#include "../internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+typedef struct {
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX cipher_ctx;
+  HMAC_CTX hmac_ctx;
+  /* mac_key is the portion of the key used for the MAC. It is retained
+   * separately for the constant-time CBC code. */
+  uint8_t mac_key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  uint8_t mac_key_len;
+  /* implicit_iv is one iff this is a pre-TLS-1.1 CBC cipher without an explicit
+   * IV. */
+  char implicit_iv;
+} AEAD_TLS_CTX;
+
+OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE < 256, mac_key_len_fits_in_uint8_t);
+
+static void aead_tls_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {
+  AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX *)ctx->aead_state;
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx);
+  HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx);
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(&tls_ctx->mac_key, sizeof(tls_ctx->mac_key));
+  OPENSSL_free(tls_ctx);
+  ctx->aead_state = NULL;
+}
+
+static int aead_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len,
+                         size_t tag_len, enum evp_aead_direction_t dir,
+                         const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md,
+                         char implicit_iv) {
+  if (tag_len != EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH &&
+      tag_len != EVP_MD_size(md)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_TAG_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (key_len != EVP_AEAD_key_length(ctx->aead)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_KEY_LENGTH);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  size_t mac_key_len = EVP_MD_size(md);
+  size_t enc_key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
+  assert(mac_key_len + enc_key_len +
+         (implicit_iv ? EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) : 0) == key_len);
+
+  AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(AEAD_TLS_CTX));
+  if (tls_ctx == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx);
+  HMAC_CTX_init(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx);
+  assert(mac_key_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+  memcpy(tls_ctx->mac_key, key, mac_key_len);
+  tls_ctx->mac_key_len = (uint8_t)mac_key_len;
+  tls_ctx->implicit_iv = implicit_iv;
+
+  ctx->aead_state = tls_ctx;
+  if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, &key[mac_key_len],
+                         implicit_iv ? &key[mac_key_len + enc_key_len] : NULL,
+                         dir == evp_aead_seal) ||
+      !HMAC_Init_ex(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, key, mac_key_len, md, NULL)) {
+    aead_tls_cleanup(ctx);
+    ctx->aead_state = NULL;
+    return 0;
+  }
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, 0);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int aead_tls_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
+                         size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
+                         const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+                         const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+                         const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+  AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX *)ctx->aead_state;
+  size_t total = 0;
+
+  if (!tls_ctx->cipher_ctx.encrypt) {
+    /* Unlike a normal AEAD, a TLS AEAD may only be used in one direction. */
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (in_len + EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(ctx->aead) < in_len ||
+      in_len > INT_MAX) {
+    /* EVP_CIPHER takes int as input. */
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (max_out_len < in_len + EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(ctx->aead)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(ctx->aead)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (ad_len != 13 - 2 /* length bytes */) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_AD_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* To allow for CBC mode which changes cipher length, |ad| doesn't include the
+   * length for legacy ciphers. */
+  uint8_t ad_extra[2];
+  ad_extra[0] = (uint8_t)(in_len >> 8);
+  ad_extra[1] = (uint8_t)(in_len & 0xff);
+
+  /* Compute the MAC. This must be first in case the operation is being done
+   * in-place. */
+  uint8_t mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  unsigned mac_len;
+  if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) ||
+      !HMAC_Update(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, ad, ad_len) ||
+      !HMAC_Update(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, ad_extra, sizeof(ad_extra)) ||
+      !HMAC_Update(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, in, in_len) ||
+      !HMAC_Final(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, mac, &mac_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* Configure the explicit IV. */
+  if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+      !tls_ctx->implicit_iv &&
+      !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, nonce)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* Encrypt the input. */
+  int len;
+  if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out, &len, in,
+                         (int)in_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  total = len;
+
+  /* Feed the MAC into the cipher. */
+  if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out + total, &len, mac,
+                         (int)mac_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  total += len;
+
+  unsigned block_size = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx);
+  if (block_size > 1) {
+    assert(block_size <= 256);
+    assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE);
+
+    /* Compute padding and feed that into the cipher. */
+    uint8_t padding[256];
+    unsigned padding_len = block_size - ((in_len + mac_len) % block_size);
+    memset(padding, padding_len - 1, padding_len);
+    if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out + total, &len, padding,
+                           (int)padding_len)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    total += len;
+  }
+
+  if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out + total, &len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  total += len;
+
+  *out_len = total;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int aead_tls_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
+                         size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
+                         const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+                         const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+                         const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+  AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX *)ctx->aead_state;
+
+  if (tls_ctx->cipher_ctx.encrypt) {
+    /* Unlike a normal AEAD, a TLS AEAD may only be used in one direction. */
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (in_len < HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (max_out_len < in_len) {
+    /* This requires that the caller provide space for the MAC, even though it
+     * will always be removed on return. */
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(ctx->aead)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (ad_len != 13 - 2 /* length bytes */) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_AD_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (in_len > INT_MAX) {
+    /* EVP_CIPHER takes int as input. */
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* Configure the explicit IV. */
+  if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+      !tls_ctx->implicit_iv &&
+      !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, nonce)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* Decrypt to get the plaintext + MAC + padding. */
+  size_t total = 0;
+  int len;
+  if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out, &len, in, (int)in_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  total += len;
+  if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out + total, &len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  total += len;
+  assert(total == in_len);
+
+  /* Remove CBC padding. Code from here on is timing-sensitive with respect to
+   * |padding_ok| and |data_plus_mac_len| for CBC ciphers. */
+  unsigned padding_ok, data_plus_mac_len, data_len;
+  if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+    if (!EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding(
+            &padding_ok, &data_plus_mac_len, out, total,
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx),
+            (unsigned)HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx))) {
+      /* Publicly invalid. This can be rejected in non-constant time. */
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  } else {
+    padding_ok = ~0u;
+    data_plus_mac_len = total;
+    /* |data_plus_mac_len| = |total| = |in_len| at this point. |in_len| has
+     * already been checked against the MAC size at the top of the function. */
+    assert(data_plus_mac_len >= HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx));
+  }
+  data_len = data_plus_mac_len - HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx);
+
+  /* At this point, if the padding is valid, the first |data_plus_mac_len| bytes
+   * after |out| are the plaintext and MAC. Otherwise, |data_plus_mac_len| is
+   * still large enough to extract a MAC, but it will be irrelevant. */
+
+  /* To allow for CBC mode which changes cipher length, |ad| doesn't include the
+   * length for legacy ciphers. */
+  uint8_t ad_fixed[13];
+  memcpy(ad_fixed, ad, 11);
+  ad_fixed[11] = (uint8_t)(data_len >> 8);
+  ad_fixed[12] = (uint8_t)(data_len & 0xff);
+  ad_len += 2;
+
+  /* Compute the MAC and extract the one in the record. */
+  uint8_t mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  size_t mac_len;
+  uint8_t record_mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  uint8_t *record_mac;
+  if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+      EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported(tls_ctx->hmac_ctx.md)) {
+    if (!EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record(tls_ctx->hmac_ctx.md, mac, &mac_len,
+                                   ad_fixed, out, data_plus_mac_len, total,
+                                   tls_ctx->mac_key, tls_ctx->mac_key_len)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    assert(mac_len == HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx));
+
+    record_mac = record_mac_tmp;
+    EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac(record_mac, mac_len, out, data_plus_mac_len, total);
+  } else {
+    /* We should support the constant-time path for all CBC-mode ciphers
+     * implemented. */
+    assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE);
+
+    unsigned mac_len_u;
+    if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) ||
+        !HMAC_Update(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, ad_fixed, ad_len) ||
+        !HMAC_Update(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, out, data_len) ||
+        !HMAC_Final(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, mac, &mac_len_u)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    mac_len = mac_len_u;
+
+    assert(mac_len == HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx));
+    record_mac = &out[data_len];
+  }
+
+  /* Perform the MAC check and the padding check in constant-time. It should be
+   * safe to simply perform the padding check first, but it would not be under a
+   * different choice of MAC location on padding failure. See
+   * EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding. */
+  unsigned good = constant_time_eq_int(CRYPTO_memcmp(record_mac, mac, mac_len),
+                                       0);
+  good &= padding_ok;
+  if (!good) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /* End of timing-sensitive code. */
+
+  *out_len = data_len;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
+                                          size_t key_len, size_t tag_len,
+                                          enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
+  return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_aes_128_cbc(),
+                       EVP_sha1(), 0);
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init(
+    EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, size_t tag_len,
+    enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
+  return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_aes_128_cbc(),
+                       EVP_sha1(), 1);
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
+                                            const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len,
+                                            size_t tag_len,
+                                            enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
+  return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_aes_128_cbc(),
+                       EVP_sha256(), 0);
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
+                                          size_t key_len, size_t tag_len,
+                                          enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
+  return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_aes_256_cbc(),
+                       EVP_sha1(), 0);
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init(
+    EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, size_t tag_len,
+    enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
+  return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_aes_256_cbc(),
+                       EVP_sha1(), 1);
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
+                                            const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len,
+                                            size_t tag_len,
+                                            enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
+  return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_aes_256_cbc(),
+                       EVP_sha256(), 0);
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
+                                            const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len,
+                                            size_t tag_len,
+                                            enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
+  return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_aes_256_cbc(),
+                       EVP_sha384(), 0);
+}
+
+static int aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
+                                           const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len,
+                                           size_t tag_len,
+                                           enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
+  return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(),
+                       EVP_sha1(), 0);
+}
+
+static int aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init(
+    EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, size_t tag_len,
+    enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
+  return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(),
+                       EVP_sha1(), 1);
+}
+
+static int aead_tls_get_iv(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t **out_iv,
+                           size_t *out_iv_len) {
+  const AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX*) ctx->aead_state;
+  const size_t iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx);
+  if (iv_len <= 1) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  *out_iv = tls_ctx->cipher_ctx.iv;
+  *out_iv_len = iv_len;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int aead_null_sha1_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
+                                   size_t key_len, size_t tag_len,
+                                   enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
+  return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_enc_null(),
+                       EVP_sha1(), 1 /* implicit iv */);
+}
+
+static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls = {
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16, /* key len (SHA1 + AES128) */
+    16,                     /* nonce len (IV) */
+    16 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA1) */
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,      /* max tag length */
+    NULL, /* init */
+    aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_init,
+    aead_tls_cleanup,
+    aead_tls_seal,
+    aead_tls_open,
+    NULL,                   /* get_iv */
+};
+
+static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv = {
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16 + 16, /* key len (SHA1 + AES128 + IV) */
+    0,                           /* nonce len */
+    16 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,      /* overhead (padding + SHA1) */
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,           /* max tag length */
+    NULL, /* init */
+    aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init,
+    aead_tls_cleanup,
+    aead_tls_seal,
+    aead_tls_open,
+    aead_tls_get_iv,             /* get_iv */
+};
+
+static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls = {
+    SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16, /* key len (SHA256 + AES128) */
+    16,                        /* nonce len (IV) */
+    16 + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA256) */
+    SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,      /* max tag length */
+    NULL, /* init */
+    aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls_init,
+    aead_tls_cleanup,
+    aead_tls_seal,
+    aead_tls_open,
+    NULL,                      /* get_iv */
+};
+
+static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls = {
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32, /* key len (SHA1 + AES256) */
+    16,                     /* nonce len (IV) */
+    16 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA1) */
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,      /* max tag length */
+    NULL, /* init */
+    aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_init,
+    aead_tls_cleanup,
+    aead_tls_seal,
+    aead_tls_open,
+    NULL,                   /* get_iv */
+};
+
+static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv = {
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32 + 16, /* key len (SHA1 + AES256 + IV) */
+    0,                           /* nonce len */
+    16 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,      /* overhead (padding + SHA1) */
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,           /* max tag length */
+    NULL, /* init */
+    aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init,
+    aead_tls_cleanup,
+    aead_tls_seal,
+    aead_tls_open,
+    aead_tls_get_iv,             /* get_iv */
+};
+
+static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls = {
+    SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32, /* key len (SHA256 + AES256) */
+    16,                        /* nonce len (IV) */
+    16 + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA256) */
+    SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,      /* max tag length */
+    NULL, /* init */
+    aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls_init,
+    aead_tls_cleanup,
+    aead_tls_seal,
+    aead_tls_open,
+    NULL,                      /* get_iv */
+};
+
+static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls = {
+    SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32, /* key len (SHA384 + AES256) */
+    16,                        /* nonce len (IV) */
+    16 + SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA384) */
+    SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,      /* max tag length */
+    NULL, /* init */
+    aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls_init,
+    aead_tls_cleanup,
+    aead_tls_seal,
+    aead_tls_open,
+    NULL,                      /* get_iv */
+};
+
+static const EVP_AEAD aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls = {
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 24, /* key len (SHA1 + 3DES) */
+    8,                      /* nonce len (IV) */
+    8 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,  /* overhead (padding + SHA1) */
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,      /* max tag length */
+    NULL, /* init */
+    aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_init,
+    aead_tls_cleanup,
+    aead_tls_seal,
+    aead_tls_open,
+    NULL,                   /* get_iv */
+};
+
+static const EVP_AEAD aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv = {
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 24 + 8, /* key len (SHA1 + 3DES + IV) */
+    0,                          /* nonce len */
+    8 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,      /* overhead (padding + SHA1) */
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,          /* max tag length */
+    NULL, /* init */
+    aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init,
+    aead_tls_cleanup,
+    aead_tls_seal,
+    aead_tls_open,
+    aead_tls_get_iv,            /* get_iv */
+};
+
+static const EVP_AEAD aead_null_sha1_tls = {
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,          /* key len */
+    0,                          /* nonce len */
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,          /* overhead (SHA1) */
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,          /* max tag length */
+    NULL,                       /* init */
+    aead_null_sha1_tls_init,
+    aead_tls_cleanup,
+    aead_tls_seal,
+    aead_tls_open,
+    NULL,                       /* get_iv */
+};
+
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls(void) {
+  return &aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls;
+}
+
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv(void) {
+  return &aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv;
+}
+
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls(void) {
+  return &aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls;
+}
+
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls(void) {
+  return &aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls;
+}
+
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv(void) {
+  return &aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv;
+}
+
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls(void) {
+  return &aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls;
+}
+
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls(void) {
+  return &aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls;
+}
+
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls(void) {
+  return &aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls;
+}
+
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv(void) {
+  return &aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv;
+}
+
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_null_sha1_tls(void) { return &aead_null_sha1_tls; }