grpc 1.15.0 → 1.30.0

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/ctx.c

@@ -1,303 +0,0 @@
-/* Written by Ulf Moeller for the OpenSSL project. */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2004 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
-
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-
-#include "../../internal.h"
-
-
-// How many bignums are in each "pool item";
-#define BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE 16
-// The stack frame info is resizing, set a first-time expansion size;
-#define BN_CTX_START_FRAMES 32
-
-// A bundle of bignums that can be linked with other bundles
-typedef struct bignum_pool_item {
-  // The bignum values
-  BIGNUM vals[BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE];
-  // Linked-list admin
-  struct bignum_pool_item *prev, *next;
-} BN_POOL_ITEM;
-
-
-typedef struct bignum_pool {
-  // Linked-list admin
-  BN_POOL_ITEM *head, *current, *tail;
-  // Stack depth and allocation size
-  unsigned used, size;
-} BN_POOL;
-
-static void BN_POOL_init(BN_POOL *);
-static void BN_POOL_finish(BN_POOL *);
-static BIGNUM *BN_POOL_get(BN_POOL *);
-static void BN_POOL_release(BN_POOL *, unsigned int);
-
-
-// BN_STACK
-
-// A wrapper to manage the "stack frames"
-typedef struct bignum_ctx_stack {
-  // Array of indexes into the bignum stack
-  unsigned int *indexes;
-  // Number of stack frames, and the size of the allocated array
-  unsigned int depth, size;
-} BN_STACK;
-
-static void		BN_STACK_init(BN_STACK *);
-static void		BN_STACK_finish(BN_STACK *);
-static int		BN_STACK_push(BN_STACK *, unsigned int);
-static unsigned int	BN_STACK_pop(BN_STACK *);
-
-
-// BN_CTX
-
-// The opaque BN_CTX type
-struct bignum_ctx {
-  // The bignum bundles
-  BN_POOL pool;
-  // The "stack frames", if you will
-  BN_STACK stack;
-  // The number of bignums currently assigned
-  unsigned int used;
-  // Depth of stack overflow
-  int err_stack;
-  // Block "gets" until an "end" (compatibility behaviour)
-  int too_many;
-};
-
-BN_CTX *BN_CTX_new(void) {
-  BN_CTX *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BN_CTX));
-  if (!ret) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    return NULL;
-  }
-
-  // Initialise the structure
-  BN_POOL_init(&ret->pool);
-  BN_STACK_init(&ret->stack);
-  ret->used = 0;
-  ret->err_stack = 0;
-  ret->too_many = 0;
-  return ret;
-}
-
-void BN_CTX_free(BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  if (ctx == NULL) {
-    return;
-  }
-
-  BN_STACK_finish(&ctx->stack);
-  BN_POOL_finish(&ctx->pool);
-  OPENSSL_free(ctx);
-}
-
-void BN_CTX_start(BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  // If we're already overflowing ...
-  if (ctx->err_stack || ctx->too_many) {
-    ctx->err_stack++;
-  } else if (!BN_STACK_push(&ctx->stack, ctx->used)) {
-    // (Try to) get a new frame pointer
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_TOO_MANY_TEMPORARY_VARIABLES);
-    ctx->err_stack++;
-  }
-}
-
-BIGNUM *BN_CTX_get(BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  BIGNUM *ret;
-  if (ctx->err_stack || ctx->too_many) {
-    return NULL;
-  }
-
-  ret = BN_POOL_get(&ctx->pool);
-  if (ret == NULL) {
-    // Setting too_many prevents repeated "get" attempts from
-    // cluttering the error stack.
-    ctx->too_many = 1;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_TOO_MANY_TEMPORARY_VARIABLES);
-    return NULL;
-  }
-
-  // OK, make sure the returned bignum is "zero"
-  BN_zero(ret);
-  ctx->used++;
-  return ret;
-}
-
-void BN_CTX_end(BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  if (ctx->err_stack) {
-    ctx->err_stack--;
-  } else {
-    unsigned int fp = BN_STACK_pop(&ctx->stack);
-    // Does this stack frame have anything to release?
-    if (fp < ctx->used) {
-      BN_POOL_release(&ctx->pool, ctx->used - fp);
-    }
-
-    ctx->used = fp;
-    // Unjam "too_many" in case "get" had failed
-    ctx->too_many = 0;
-  }
-}
-
-
-// BN_STACK
-
-static void BN_STACK_init(BN_STACK *st) {
-  st->indexes = NULL;
-  st->depth = st->size = 0;
-}
-
-static void BN_STACK_finish(BN_STACK *st) {
-  OPENSSL_free(st->indexes);
-}
-
-static int BN_STACK_push(BN_STACK *st, unsigned int idx) {
-  if (st->depth == st->size) {
-    // Need to expand
-    unsigned int newsize =
-        (st->size ? (st->size * 3 / 2) : BN_CTX_START_FRAMES);
-    unsigned int *newitems = OPENSSL_malloc(newsize * sizeof(unsigned int));
-    if (!newitems) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-    if (st->depth) {
-      OPENSSL_memcpy(newitems, st->indexes, st->depth * sizeof(unsigned int));
-    }
-    OPENSSL_free(st->indexes);
-    st->indexes = newitems;
-    st->size = newsize;
-  }
-
-  st->indexes[(st->depth)++] = idx;
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static unsigned int BN_STACK_pop(BN_STACK *st) {
-  return st->indexes[--(st->depth)];
-}
-
-
-static void BN_POOL_init(BN_POOL *p) {
-  p->head = p->current = p->tail = NULL;
-  p->used = p->size = 0;
-}
-
-static void BN_POOL_finish(BN_POOL *p) {
-  while (p->head) {
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE; i++) {
-      BN_clear_free(&p->head->vals[i]);
-    }
-
-    p->current = p->head->next;
-    OPENSSL_free(p->head);
-    p->head = p->current;
-  }
-}
-
-static BIGNUM *BN_POOL_get(BN_POOL *p) {
-  if (p->used == p->size) {
-    BN_POOL_ITEM *item = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BN_POOL_ITEM));
-    if (!item) {
-      return NULL;
-    }
-
-    // Initialise the structure
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE; i++) {
-      BN_init(&item->vals[i]);
-    }
-
-    item->prev = p->tail;
-    item->next = NULL;
-    // Link it in
-    if (!p->head) {
-      p->head = p->current = p->tail = item;
-    } else {
-      p->tail->next = item;
-      p->tail = item;
-      p->current = item;
-    }
-
-    p->size += BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE;
-    p->used++;
-    // Return the first bignum from the new pool
-    return item->vals;
-  }
-
-  if (!p->used) {
-    p->current = p->head;
-  } else if ((p->used % BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE) == 0) {
-    p->current = p->current->next;
-  }
-
-  return p->current->vals + ((p->used++) % BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE);
-}
-
-static void BN_POOL_release(BN_POOL *p, unsigned int num) {
-  unsigned int offset = (p->used - 1) % BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE;
-  p->used -= num;
-
-  while (num--) {
-    if (!offset) {
-      offset = BN_CTX_POOL_SIZE - 1;
-      p->current = p->current->prev;
-    } else {
-      offset--;
-    }
-  }
-}

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/div.c

@@ -1,895 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-
-#include "internal.h"
-
-
-#if !defined(BN_ULLONG)
-// bn_div_words divides a double-width |h|,|l| by |d| and returns the result,
-// which must fit in a |BN_ULONG|.
-static BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d) {
-  BN_ULONG dh, dl, q, ret = 0, th, tl, t;
-  int i, count = 2;
-
-  if (d == 0) {
-    return BN_MASK2;
-  }
-
-  i = BN_num_bits_word(d);
-  assert((i == BN_BITS2) || (h <= (BN_ULONG)1 << i));
-
-  i = BN_BITS2 - i;
-  if (h >= d) {
-    h -= d;
-  }
-
-  if (i) {
-    d <<= i;
-    h = (h << i) | (l >> (BN_BITS2 - i));
-    l <<= i;
-  }
-  dh = (d & BN_MASK2h) >> BN_BITS4;
-  dl = (d & BN_MASK2l);
-  for (;;) {
-    if ((h >> BN_BITS4) == dh) {
-      q = BN_MASK2l;
-    } else {
-      q = h / dh;
-    }
-
-    th = q * dh;
-    tl = dl * q;
-    for (;;) {
-      t = h - th;
-      if ((t & BN_MASK2h) ||
-          ((tl) <= ((t << BN_BITS4) | ((l & BN_MASK2h) >> BN_BITS4)))) {
-        break;
-      }
-      q--;
-      th -= dh;
-      tl -= dl;
-    }
-    t = (tl >> BN_BITS4);
-    tl = (tl << BN_BITS4) & BN_MASK2h;
-    th += t;
-
-    if (l < tl) {
-      th++;
-    }
-    l -= tl;
-    if (h < th) {
-      h += d;
-      q--;
-    }
-    h -= th;
-
-    if (--count == 0) {
-      break;
-    }
-
-    ret = q << BN_BITS4;
-    h = (h << BN_BITS4) | (l >> BN_BITS4);
-    l = (l & BN_MASK2l) << BN_BITS4;
-  }
-
-  ret |= q;
-  return ret;
-}
-#endif  // !defined(BN_ULLONG)
-
-static inline void bn_div_rem_words(BN_ULONG *quotient_out, BN_ULONG *rem_out,
-                                    BN_ULONG n0, BN_ULONG n1, BN_ULONG d0) {
-  // GCC and Clang generate function calls to |__udivdi3| and |__umoddi3| when
-  // the |BN_ULLONG|-based C code is used.
-  //
-  // GCC bugs:
-  //   * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=14224
-  //   * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=43721
-  //   * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=54183
-  //   * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58897
-  //   * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=65668
-  //
-  // Clang bugs:
-  //   * https://llvm.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=6397
-  //   * https://llvm.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=12418
-  //
-  // These issues aren't specific to x86 and x86_64, so it might be worthwhile
-  // to add more assembly language implementations.
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86) && \
-    (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__))
-  __asm__ volatile("divl %4"
-                   : "=a"(*quotient_out), "=d"(*rem_out)
-                   : "a"(n1), "d"(n0), "rm"(d0)
-                   : "cc");
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && \
-    (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__))
-  __asm__ volatile("divq %4"
-                   : "=a"(*quotient_out), "=d"(*rem_out)
-                   : "a"(n1), "d"(n0), "rm"(d0)
-                   : "cc");
-#else
-#if defined(BN_ULLONG)
-  BN_ULLONG n = (((BN_ULLONG)n0) << BN_BITS2) | n1;
-  *quotient_out = (BN_ULONG)(n / d0);
-#else
-  *quotient_out = bn_div_words(n0, n1, d0);
-#endif
-  *rem_out = n1 - (*quotient_out * d0);
-#endif
-}
-
-// BN_div computes "quotient := numerator / divisor", rounding towards zero,
-// and sets up |rem| such that "quotient * divisor + rem = numerator" holds.
-//
-// Thus:
-//
-//     quotient->neg == numerator->neg ^ divisor->neg
-//        (unless the result is zero)
-//     rem->neg == numerator->neg
-//        (unless the remainder is zero)
-//
-// If |quotient| or |rem| is NULL, the respective value is not returned.
-//
-// This was specifically designed to contain fewer branches that may leak
-// sensitive information; see "New Branch Prediction Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL
-// and Necessary Software Countermeasures" by Onur Acıçmez, Shay Gueron, and
-// Jean-Pierre Seifert.
-int BN_div(BIGNUM *quotient, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *numerator,
-           const BIGNUM *divisor, BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  int norm_shift, loop;
-  BIGNUM wnum;
-  BN_ULONG *resp, *wnump;
-  BN_ULONG d0, d1;
-  int num_n, div_n;
-
-  // This function relies on the historical minimal-width |BIGNUM| invariant.
-  // It is already not constant-time (constant-time reductions should use
-  // Montgomery logic), so we shrink all inputs and intermediate values to
-  // retain the previous behavior.
-
-  // Invalid zero-padding would have particularly bad consequences.
-  int numerator_width = bn_minimal_width(numerator);
-  int divisor_width = bn_minimal_width(divisor);
-  if ((numerator_width > 0 && numerator->d[numerator_width - 1] == 0) ||
-      (divisor_width > 0 && divisor->d[divisor_width - 1] == 0)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (BN_is_zero(divisor)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *snum = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *sdiv = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *res = NULL;
-  if (quotient == NULL) {
-    res = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  } else {
-    res = quotient;
-  }
-  if (sdiv == NULL || res == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  // First we normalise the numbers
-  norm_shift = BN_BITS2 - (BN_num_bits(divisor) % BN_BITS2);
-  if (!BN_lshift(sdiv, divisor, norm_shift)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  bn_set_minimal_width(sdiv);
-  sdiv->neg = 0;
-  norm_shift += BN_BITS2;
-  if (!BN_lshift(snum, numerator, norm_shift)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  bn_set_minimal_width(snum);
-  snum->neg = 0;
-
-  // Since we don't want to have special-case logic for the case where snum is
-  // larger than sdiv, we pad snum with enough zeroes without changing its
-  // value.
-  if (snum->width <= sdiv->width + 1) {
-    if (!bn_wexpand(snum, sdiv->width + 2)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    for (int i = snum->width; i < sdiv->width + 2; i++) {
-      snum->d[i] = 0;
-    }
-    snum->width = sdiv->width + 2;
-  } else {
-    if (!bn_wexpand(snum, snum->width + 1)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    snum->d[snum->width] = 0;
-    snum->width++;
-  }
-
-  div_n = sdiv->width;
-  num_n = snum->width;
-  loop = num_n - div_n;
-  // Lets setup a 'window' into snum
-  // This is the part that corresponds to the current
-  // 'area' being divided
-  wnum.neg = 0;
-  wnum.d = &(snum->d[loop]);
-  wnum.width = div_n;
-  // only needed when BN_ucmp messes up the values between width and max
-  wnum.dmax = snum->dmax - loop;  // so we don't step out of bounds
-
-  // Get the top 2 words of sdiv
-  // div_n=sdiv->width;
-  d0 = sdiv->d[div_n - 1];
-  d1 = (div_n == 1) ? 0 : sdiv->d[div_n - 2];
-
-  // pointer to the 'top' of snum
-  wnump = &(snum->d[num_n - 1]);
-
-  // Setup to 'res'
-  res->neg = (numerator->neg ^ divisor->neg);
-  if (!bn_wexpand(res, loop + 1)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  res->width = loop - 1;
-  resp = &(res->d[loop - 1]);
-
-  // space for temp
-  if (!bn_wexpand(tmp, div_n + 1)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  // if res->width == 0 then clear the neg value otherwise decrease
-  // the resp pointer
-  if (res->width == 0) {
-    res->neg = 0;
-  } else {
-    resp--;
-  }
-
-  for (int i = 0; i < loop - 1; i++, wnump--, resp--) {
-    BN_ULONG q, l0;
-    // the first part of the loop uses the top two words of snum and sdiv to
-    // calculate a BN_ULONG q such that | wnum - sdiv * q | < sdiv
-    BN_ULONG n0, n1, rm = 0;
-
-    n0 = wnump[0];
-    n1 = wnump[-1];
-    if (n0 == d0) {
-      q = BN_MASK2;
-    } else {
-      // n0 < d0
-      bn_div_rem_words(&q, &rm, n0, n1, d0);
-
-#ifdef BN_ULLONG
-      BN_ULLONG t2 = (BN_ULLONG)d1 * q;
-      for (;;) {
-        if (t2 <= ((((BN_ULLONG)rm) << BN_BITS2) | wnump[-2])) {
-          break;
-        }
-        q--;
-        rm += d0;
-        if (rm < d0) {
-          break;  // don't let rm overflow
-        }
-        t2 -= d1;
-      }
-#else  // !BN_ULLONG
-      BN_ULONG t2l, t2h;
-      BN_UMULT_LOHI(t2l, t2h, d1, q);
-      for (;;) {
-        if (t2h < rm ||
-            (t2h == rm && t2l <= wnump[-2])) {
-          break;
-        }
-        q--;
-        rm += d0;
-        if (rm < d0) {
-          break;  // don't let rm overflow
-        }
-        if (t2l < d1) {
-          t2h--;
-        }
-        t2l -= d1;
-      }
-#endif  // !BN_ULLONG
-    }
-
-    l0 = bn_mul_words(tmp->d, sdiv->d, div_n, q);
-    tmp->d[div_n] = l0;
-    wnum.d--;
-    // ingore top values of the bignums just sub the two
-    // BN_ULONG arrays with bn_sub_words
-    if (bn_sub_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, tmp->d, div_n + 1)) {
-      // Note: As we have considered only the leading
-      // two BN_ULONGs in the calculation of q, sdiv * q
-      // might be greater than wnum (but then (q-1) * sdiv
-      // is less or equal than wnum)
-      q--;
-      if (bn_add_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, sdiv->d, div_n)) {
-        // we can't have an overflow here (assuming
-        // that q != 0, but if q == 0 then tmp is
-        // zero anyway)
-        (*wnump)++;
-      }
-    }
-    // store part of the result
-    *resp = q;
-  }
-
-  bn_set_minimal_width(snum);
-
-  if (rem != NULL) {
-    // Keep a copy of the neg flag in numerator because if |rem| == |numerator|
-    // |BN_rshift| will overwrite it.
-    int neg = numerator->neg;
-    if (!BN_rshift(rem, snum, norm_shift)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    if (!BN_is_zero(rem)) {
-      rem->neg = neg;
-    }
-  }
-
-  bn_set_minimal_width(res);
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return 1;
-
-err:
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return 0;
-}
-
-int BN_nnmod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  if (!(BN_mod(r, m, d, ctx))) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  if (!r->neg) {
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  // now -|d| < r < 0, so we have to set r := r + |d|.
-  return (d->neg ? BN_sub : BN_add)(r, r, d);
-}
-
-// bn_mod_sub_words sets |r| to |a| - |b| (mod |m|), using |tmp| as scratch
-// space. Each array is |num| words long. |a| and |b| must be < |m|. Any pair of
-// |r|, |a|, and |b| may alias.
-static void bn_mod_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
-                             const BN_ULONG *m, BN_ULONG *tmp, size_t num) {
-  // r = a - b
-  BN_ULONG borrow = bn_sub_words(r, a, b, num);
-  // tmp = a - b + m
-  bn_add_words(tmp, r, m, num);
-  bn_select_words(r, 0 - borrow, tmp /* r < 0 */, r /* r >= 0 */, num);
-}
-
-// bn_mod_add_words sets |r| to |a| + |b| (mod |m|), using |tmp| as scratch
-// space. Each array is |num| words long. |a| and |b| must be < |m|. Any pair of
-// |r|, |a|, and |b| may alias.
-static void bn_mod_add_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
-                             const BN_ULONG *m, BN_ULONG *tmp, size_t num) {
-  // tmp = a + b. Note the result fits in |num|+1 words. We store the extra word
-  // in |carry|.
-  BN_ULONG carry = bn_add_words(tmp, a, b, num);
-  // r = a + b - m. We use |bn_sub_words| to perform the bulk of the
-  // subtraction, and then apply the borrow to |carry|.
-  carry -= bn_sub_words(r, tmp, m, num);
-  // |a| and |b| were both fully-reduced, so we know:
-  //
-  //   0 + 0 - m <= r < m + m - m
-  //          -m <= r < m
-  //
-  // If 0 <= |r| < |m|, |r| fits in |num| words and |carry| is zero. We then
-  // wish to select |r| as the answer. Otherwise -m <= r < 0 and we wish to
-  // return |r| + |m|, or |tmp|. |carry| must then be -1 or all ones. In both
-  // cases, |carry| is a suitable input to |bn_select_words|.
-  //
-  // Although |carry| may be one if |bn_add_words| returns one and
-  // |bn_sub_words| returns zero, this would give |r| > |m|, which violates are
-  // input assumptions.
-  assert(carry == 0 || carry == (BN_ULONG)-1);
-  bn_select_words(r, carry, tmp /* r < 0 */, r /* r >= 0 */, num);
-}
-
-int bn_div_consttime(BIGNUM *quotient, BIGNUM *remainder,
-                     const BIGNUM *numerator, const BIGNUM *divisor,
-                     BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  if (BN_is_negative(numerator) || BN_is_negative(divisor)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NEGATIVE_NUMBER);
-    return 0;
-  }
-  if (BN_is_zero(divisor)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // This function implements long division in binary. It is not very efficient,
-  // but it is simple, easy to make constant-time, and performant enough for RSA
-  // key generation.
-
-  int ret = 0;
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *q = quotient, *r = remainder;
-  if (quotient == NULL || quotient == numerator || quotient == divisor) {
-    q = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  }
-  if (remainder == NULL || remainder == numerator || remainder == divisor) {
-    r = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  }
-  BIGNUM *tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  if (q == NULL || r == NULL || tmp == NULL ||
-      !bn_wexpand(q, numerator->width) ||
-      !bn_wexpand(r, divisor->width) ||
-      !bn_wexpand(tmp, divisor->width)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  OPENSSL_memset(q->d, 0, numerator->width * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
-  q->width = numerator->width;
-  q->neg = 0;
-
-  OPENSSL_memset(r->d, 0, divisor->width * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
-  r->width = divisor->width;
-  r->neg = 0;
-
-  // Incorporate |numerator| into |r|, one bit at a time, reducing after each
-  // step. At the start of each loop iteration, |r| < |divisor|
-  for (int i = numerator->width - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-    for (int bit = BN_BITS2 - 1; bit >= 0; bit--) {
-      // Incorporate the next bit of the numerator, by computing
-      // r = 2*r or 2*r + 1. Note the result fits in one more word. We store the
-      // extra word in |carry|.
-      BN_ULONG carry = bn_add_words(r->d, r->d, r->d, divisor->width);
-      r->d[0] |= (numerator->d[i] >> bit) & 1;
-      // tmp = r - divisor. We use |bn_sub_words| to perform the bulk of the
-      // subtraction, and then apply the borrow to |carry|.
-      carry -= bn_sub_words(tmp->d, r->d, divisor->d, divisor->width);
-      // |r| was previously fully-reduced, so we know:
-      //
-      //    2*0 - divisor <= tmp <= 2*(divisor-1) + 1 - divisor
-      //         -divisor <= tmp < divisor
-      //
-      // If 0 <= |tmp| < |divisor|, |tmp| fits in |divisor->width| and |carry|
-      // is zero. We then wish to select |tmp|. Otherwise,
-      // -|divisor| <= |tmp| < 0 and we wish to select |tmp| + |divisor|, which
-      // is |r|. |carry| must then be -1 (all ones). In both cases, |carry| is a
-      // suitable input to |bn_select_words|.
-      //
-      // Although |carry| may be one if |bn_add_words| returns one and
-      // |bn_sub_words| returns zero, this would give |r| > |d|, which violates
-      // the loop invariant.
-      bn_select_words(r->d, carry, r->d /* tmp < 0 */, tmp->d /* tmp >= 0 */,
-                      divisor->width);
-      // The corresponding bit of the quotient is set iff we needed to subtract.
-      q->d[i] |= (~carry & 1) << bit;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if ((quotient != NULL && !BN_copy(quotient, q)) ||
-      (remainder != NULL && !BN_copy(remainder, r))) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-static BIGNUM *bn_scratch_space_from_ctx(size_t width, BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  BIGNUM *ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  if (ret == NULL ||
-      !bn_wexpand(ret, width)) {
-    return NULL;
-  }
-  ret->neg = 0;
-  ret->width = width;
-  return ret;
-}
-
-// bn_resized_from_ctx returns |bn| with width at least |width| or NULL on
-// error. This is so it may be used with low-level "words" functions. If
-// necessary, it allocates a new |BIGNUM| with a lifetime of the current scope
-// in |ctx|, so the caller does not need to explicitly free it. |bn| must fit in
-// |width| words.
-static const BIGNUM *bn_resized_from_ctx(const BIGNUM *bn, size_t width,
-                                         BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  if ((size_t)bn->width >= width) {
-    // Any excess words must be zero.
-    assert(bn_fits_in_words(bn, width));
-    return bn;
-  }
-  BIGNUM *ret = bn_scratch_space_from_ctx(width, ctx);
-  if (ret == NULL ||
-      !BN_copy(ret, bn) ||
-      !bn_resize_words(ret, width)) {
-    return NULL;
-  }
-  return ret;
-}
-
-int BN_mod_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
-               BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  if (!BN_add(r, a, b)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx);
-}
-
-int BN_mod_add_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
-                     const BIGNUM *m) {
-  BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-  int ok = ctx != NULL &&
-           bn_mod_add_consttime(r, a, b, m, ctx);
-  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-  return ok;
-}
-
-int bn_mod_add_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
-                         const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  a = bn_resized_from_ctx(a, m->width, ctx);
-  b = bn_resized_from_ctx(b, m->width, ctx);
-  BIGNUM *tmp = bn_scratch_space_from_ctx(m->width, ctx);
-  int ok = a != NULL && b != NULL && tmp != NULL &&
-           bn_wexpand(r, m->width);
-  if (ok) {
-    bn_mod_add_words(r->d, a->d, b->d, m->d, tmp->d, m->width);
-    r->width = m->width;
-  }
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return ok;
-}
-
-int BN_mod_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
-               BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  if (!BN_sub(r, a, b)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx);
-}
-
-int bn_mod_sub_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
-                         const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  a = bn_resized_from_ctx(a, m->width, ctx);
-  b = bn_resized_from_ctx(b, m->width, ctx);
-  BIGNUM *tmp = bn_scratch_space_from_ctx(m->width, ctx);
-  int ok = a != NULL && b != NULL && tmp != NULL &&
-           bn_wexpand(r, m->width);
-  if (ok) {
-    bn_mod_sub_words(r->d, a->d, b->d, m->d, tmp->d, m->width);
-    r->width = m->width;
-  }
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return ok;
-}
-
-int BN_mod_sub_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
-                     const BIGNUM *m) {
-  BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-  int ok = ctx != NULL &&
-           bn_mod_sub_consttime(r, a, b, m, ctx);
-  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-  return ok;
-}
-
-int BN_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
-               BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  BIGNUM *t;
-  int ret = 0;
-
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  if (t == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (a == b) {
-    if (!BN_sqr(t, a, ctx)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-  } else {
-    if (!BN_mul(t, a, b, ctx)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (!BN_nnmod(r, t, m, ctx)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-int BN_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  if (!BN_sqr(r, a, ctx)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // r->neg == 0,  thus we don't need BN_nnmod
-  return BN_mod(r, r, m, ctx);
-}
-
-int BN_mod_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m,
-                  BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  BIGNUM *abs_m = NULL;
-  int ret;
-
-  if (!BN_nnmod(r, a, m, ctx)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (m->neg) {
-    abs_m = BN_dup(m);
-    if (abs_m == NULL) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-    abs_m->neg = 0;
-  }
-
-  ret = bn_mod_lshift_consttime(r, r, n, (abs_m ? abs_m : m), ctx);
-
-  BN_free(abs_m);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-int bn_mod_lshift_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m,
-                            BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  if (!BN_copy(r, a)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) {
-    if (!bn_mod_lshift1_consttime(r, r, m, ctx)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-  }
-  return 1;
-}
-
-int BN_mod_lshift_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n, const BIGNUM *m) {
-  BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-  int ok = ctx != NULL &&
-           bn_mod_lshift_consttime(r, a, n, m, ctx);
-  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-  return ok;
-}
-
-int BN_mod_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  if (!BN_lshift1(r, a)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  return BN_nnmod(r, r, m, ctx);
-}
-
-int bn_mod_lshift1_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m,
-                             BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  return bn_mod_add_consttime(r, a, a, m, ctx);
-}
-
-int BN_mod_lshift1_quick(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m) {
-  BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-  int ok = ctx != NULL &&
-           bn_mod_lshift1_consttime(r, a, m, ctx);
-  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-  return ok;
-}
-
-BN_ULONG BN_div_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w) {
-  BN_ULONG ret = 0;
-  int i, j;
-
-  if (!w) {
-    // actually this an error (division by zero)
-    return (BN_ULONG) - 1;
-  }
-
-  if (a->width == 0) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // normalize input for |bn_div_rem_words|.
-  j = BN_BITS2 - BN_num_bits_word(w);
-  w <<= j;
-  if (!BN_lshift(a, a, j)) {
-    return (BN_ULONG) - 1;
-  }
-
-  for (i = a->width - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-    BN_ULONG l = a->d[i];
-    BN_ULONG d;
-    BN_ULONG unused_rem;
-    bn_div_rem_words(&d, &unused_rem, ret, l, w);
-    ret = l - (d * w);
-    a->d[i] = d;
-  }
-
-  bn_set_minimal_width(a);
-  ret >>= j;
-  return ret;
-}
-
-BN_ULONG BN_mod_word(const BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w) {
-#ifndef BN_CAN_DIVIDE_ULLONG
-  BN_ULONG ret = 0;
-#else
-  BN_ULLONG ret = 0;
-#endif
-  int i;
-
-  if (w == 0) {
-    return (BN_ULONG) -1;
-  }
-
-#ifndef BN_CAN_DIVIDE_ULLONG
-  // If |w| is too long and we don't have |BN_ULLONG| division then we need to
-  // fall back to using |BN_div_word|.
-  if (w > ((BN_ULONG)1 << BN_BITS4)) {
-    BIGNUM *tmp = BN_dup(a);
-    if (tmp == NULL) {
-      return (BN_ULONG)-1;
-    }
-    ret = BN_div_word(tmp, w);
-    BN_free(tmp);
-    return ret;
-  }
-#endif
-
-  for (i = a->width - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-#ifndef BN_CAN_DIVIDE_ULLONG
-    ret = ((ret << BN_BITS4) | ((a->d[i] >> BN_BITS4) & BN_MASK2l)) % w;
-    ret = ((ret << BN_BITS4) | (a->d[i] & BN_MASK2l)) % w;
-#else
-    ret = (BN_ULLONG)(((ret << (BN_ULLONG)BN_BITS2) | a->d[i]) % (BN_ULLONG)w);
-#endif
-  }
-  return (BN_ULONG)ret;
-}
-
-int BN_mod_pow2(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, size_t e) {
-  if (e == 0 || a->width == 0) {
-    BN_zero(r);
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  size_t num_words = 1 + ((e - 1) / BN_BITS2);
-
-  // If |a| definitely has less than |e| bits, just BN_copy.
-  if ((size_t) a->width < num_words) {
-    return BN_copy(r, a) != NULL;
-  }
-
-  // Otherwise, first make sure we have enough space in |r|.
-  // Note that this will fail if num_words > INT_MAX.
-  if (!bn_wexpand(r, num_words)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // Copy the content of |a| into |r|.
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(r->d, a->d, num_words * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
-
-  // If |e| isn't word-aligned, we have to mask off some of our bits.
-  size_t top_word_exponent = e % (sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 8);
-  if (top_word_exponent != 0) {
-    r->d[num_words - 1] &= (((BN_ULONG) 1) << top_word_exponent) - 1;
-  }
-
-  // Fill in the remaining fields of |r|.
-  r->neg = a->neg;
-  r->width = (int) num_words;
-  bn_set_minimal_width(r);
-  return 1;
-}
-
-int BN_nnmod_pow2(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, size_t e) {
-  if (!BN_mod_pow2(r, a, e)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // If the returned value was non-negative, we're done.
-  if (BN_is_zero(r) || !r->neg) {
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  size_t num_words = 1 + (e - 1) / BN_BITS2;
-
-  // Expand |r| to the size of our modulus.
-  if (!bn_wexpand(r, num_words)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // Clear the upper words of |r|.
-  OPENSSL_memset(&r->d[r->width], 0, (num_words - r->width) * BN_BYTES);
-
-  // Set parameters of |r|.
-  r->neg = 0;
-  r->width = (int) num_words;
-
-  // Now, invert every word. The idea here is that we want to compute 2^e-|x|,
-  // which is actually equivalent to the twos-complement representation of |x|
-  // in |e| bits, which is -x = ~x + 1.
-  for (int i = 0; i < r->width; i++) {
-    r->d[i] = ~r->d[i];
-  }
-
-  // If our exponent doesn't span the top word, we have to mask the rest.
-  size_t top_word_exponent = e % BN_BITS2;
-  if (top_word_exponent != 0) {
-    r->d[r->width - 1] &= (((BN_ULONG) 1) << top_word_exponent) - 1;
-  }
-
-  // Keep the minimal-width invariant for |BIGNUM|.
-  bn_set_minimal_width(r);
-
-  // Finally, add one, for the reason described above.
-  return BN_add(r, r, BN_value_one());
-}