grpc 1.15.0 → 1.30.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/tls_method.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,317 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+static void tls_on_handshake_complete(SSL *ssl) {
+  // The handshake should have released its final message.
+  assert(!ssl->s3->has_message);
+
+  // During the handshake, |hs_buf| is retained. Release if it there is no
+  // excess in it. There should not be any excess because the handshake logic
+  // rejects unprocessed data after each Finished message. Note this means we do
+  // not allow a TLS 1.2 HelloRequest to be packed into the same record as
+  // Finished. (Schannel also rejects this.)
+  assert(!ssl->s3->hs_buf || ssl->s3->hs_buf->length == 0);
+  if (ssl->s3->hs_buf && ssl->s3->hs_buf->length == 0) {
+    ssl->s3->hs_buf.reset();
+  }
+}
+
+static bool tls_set_read_state(SSL *ssl, ssl_encryption_level_t level,
+                               UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> aead_ctx,
+                               Span<const uint8_t> secret_for_quic) {
+  // Cipher changes are forbidden if the current epoch has leftover data.
+  if (tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data(ssl)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESS_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->quic_method != nullptr) {
+    if (!ssl->quic_method->set_read_secret(ssl, level, aead_ctx->cipher(),
+                                           secret_for_quic.data(),
+                                           secret_for_quic.size())) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    // QUIC only uses |ssl| for handshake messages, which never use early data
+    // keys, so we return without installing anything. This avoids needing to
+    // have two secrets active at once in 0-RTT.
+    if (level == ssl_encryption_early_data) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_memset(ssl->s3->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(ssl->s3->read_sequence));
+  ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx = std::move(aead_ctx);
+  ssl->s3->read_level = level;
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool tls_set_write_state(SSL *ssl, ssl_encryption_level_t level,
+                                UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> aead_ctx,
+                                Span<const uint8_t> secret_for_quic) {
+  if (!tls_flush_pending_hs_data(ssl)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->quic_method != nullptr) {
+    if (!ssl->quic_method->set_write_secret(ssl, level, aead_ctx->cipher(),
+                                            secret_for_quic.data(),
+                                            secret_for_quic.size())) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    // QUIC only uses |ssl| for handshake messages, which never use early data
+    // keys, so we return without installing anything. This avoids needing to
+    // have two secrets active at once in 0-RTT.
+    if (level == ssl_encryption_early_data) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_memset(ssl->s3->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(ssl->s3->write_sequence));
+  ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx = std::move(aead_ctx);
+  ssl->s3->write_level = level;
+  return true;
+}
+
+static const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD kTLSProtocolMethod = {
+    false /* is_dtls */,
+    tls_new,
+    tls_free,
+    tls_get_message,
+    tls_next_message,
+    tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data,
+    tls_open_handshake,
+    tls_open_change_cipher_spec,
+    tls_open_app_data,
+    tls_write_app_data,
+    tls_dispatch_alert,
+    tls_init_message,
+    tls_finish_message,
+    tls_add_message,
+    tls_add_change_cipher_spec,
+    tls_flush_flight,
+    tls_on_handshake_complete,
+    tls_set_read_state,
+    tls_set_write_state,
+};
+
+static bool ssl_noop_x509_check_client_CA_names(
+    STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *names) {
+  return true;
+}
+
+static void ssl_noop_x509_clear(CERT *cert) {}
+static void ssl_noop_x509_free(CERT *cert) {}
+static void ssl_noop_x509_dup(CERT *new_cert, const CERT *cert) {}
+static void ssl_noop_x509_flush_cached_leaf(CERT *cert) {}
+static void ssl_noop_x509_flush_cached_chain(CERT *cert) {}
+static bool ssl_noop_x509_session_cache_objects(SSL_SESSION *sess) {
+  return true;
+}
+static bool ssl_noop_x509_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *new_session,
+                                      const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return true;
+}
+static void ssl_noop_x509_session_clear(SSL_SESSION *session) {}
+static bool ssl_noop_x509_session_verify_cert_chain(SSL_SESSION *session,
+                                                    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                                    uint8_t *out_alert) {
+  return false;
+}
+
+static void ssl_noop_x509_hs_flush_cached_ca_names(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {}
+static bool ssl_noop_x509_ssl_new(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { return true; }
+static void ssl_noop_x509_ssl_config_free(SSL_CONFIG *cfg) {}
+static void ssl_noop_x509_ssl_flush_cached_client_CA(SSL_CONFIG *cfg) {}
+static bool ssl_noop_x509_ssl_auto_chain_if_needed(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  return true;
+}
+static bool ssl_noop_x509_ssl_ctx_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return true; }
+static void ssl_noop_x509_ssl_ctx_free(SSL_CTX *ctx) {}
+static void ssl_noop_x509_ssl_ctx_flush_cached_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx) {}
+
+const SSL_X509_METHOD ssl_noop_x509_method = {
+  ssl_noop_x509_check_client_CA_names,
+  ssl_noop_x509_clear,
+  ssl_noop_x509_free,
+  ssl_noop_x509_dup,
+  ssl_noop_x509_flush_cached_chain,
+  ssl_noop_x509_flush_cached_leaf,
+  ssl_noop_x509_session_cache_objects,
+  ssl_noop_x509_session_dup,
+  ssl_noop_x509_session_clear,
+  ssl_noop_x509_session_verify_cert_chain,
+  ssl_noop_x509_hs_flush_cached_ca_names,
+  ssl_noop_x509_ssl_new,
+  ssl_noop_x509_ssl_config_free,
+  ssl_noop_x509_ssl_flush_cached_client_CA,
+  ssl_noop_x509_ssl_auto_chain_if_needed,
+  ssl_noop_x509_ssl_ctx_new,
+  ssl_noop_x509_ssl_ctx_free,
+  ssl_noop_x509_ssl_ctx_flush_cached_client_CA,
+};
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLS_method(void) {
+  static const SSL_METHOD kMethod = {
+      0,
+      &kTLSProtocolMethod,
+      &ssl_crypto_x509_method,
+  };
+  return &kMethod;
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_method(void) {
+  return TLS_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLS_with_buffers_method(void) {
+  static const SSL_METHOD kMethod = {
+      0,
+      &kTLSProtocolMethod,
+      &ssl_noop_x509_method,
+  };
+  return &kMethod;
+}
+
+// Legacy version-locked methods.
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_method(void) {
+  static const SSL_METHOD kMethod = {
+      TLS1_2_VERSION,
+      &kTLSProtocolMethod,
+      &ssl_crypto_x509_method,
+  };
+  return &kMethod;
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_method(void) {
+  static const SSL_METHOD kMethod = {
+      TLS1_1_VERSION,
+      &kTLSProtocolMethod,
+      &ssl_crypto_x509_method,
+  };
+  return &kMethod;
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void) {
+  static const SSL_METHOD kMethod = {
+      TLS1_VERSION,
+      &kTLSProtocolMethod,
+      &ssl_crypto_x509_method,
+  };
+  return &kMethod;
+}
+
+// Legacy side-specific methods.
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_server_method(void) {
+  return TLSv1_2_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_server_method(void) {
+  return TLSv1_1_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void) {
+  return TLSv1_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_client_method(void) {
+  return TLSv1_2_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_client_method(void) {
+  return TLSv1_1_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_client_method(void) {
+  return TLSv1_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_server_method(void) {
+  return SSLv23_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_client_method(void) {
+  return SSLv23_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLS_server_method(void) {
+  return TLS_method();
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *TLS_client_method(void) {
+  return TLS_method();
+}

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/tls_record.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,703 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+// kMaxEmptyRecords is the number of consecutive, empty records that will be
+// processed. Without this limit an attacker could send empty records at a
+// faster rate than we can process and cause record processing to loop
+// forever.
+static const uint8_t kMaxEmptyRecords = 32;
+
+// kMaxEarlyDataSkipped is the maximum number of rejected early data bytes that
+// will be skipped. Without this limit an attacker could send records at a
+// faster rate than we can process and cause trial decryption to loop forever.
+// This value should be slightly above kMaxEarlyDataAccepted, which is measured
+// in plaintext.
+static const size_t kMaxEarlyDataSkipped = 16384;
+
+// kMaxWarningAlerts is the number of consecutive warning alerts that will be
+// processed.
+static const uint8_t kMaxWarningAlerts = 4;
+
+// ssl_needs_record_splitting returns one if |ssl|'s current outgoing cipher
+// state needs record-splitting and zero otherwise.
+static bool ssl_needs_record_splitting(const SSL *ssl) {
+#if !defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+  return !ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->is_null_cipher() &&
+         ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->ProtocolVersion() < TLS1_1_VERSION &&
+         (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) != 0 &&
+         SSL_CIPHER_is_block_cipher(ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->cipher());
+#else
+  return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+bool ssl_record_sequence_update(uint8_t *seq, size_t seq_len) {
+  for (size_t i = seq_len - 1; i < seq_len; i--) {
+    ++seq[i];
+    if (seq[i] != 0) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+  return false;
+}
+
+size_t ssl_record_prefix_len(const SSL *ssl) {
+  size_t header_len;
+  if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+    header_len = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+  } else {
+    header_len = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+  }
+
+  return header_len + ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->ExplicitNonceLen();
+}
+
+size_t ssl_seal_align_prefix_len(const SSL *ssl) {
+  if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+    return DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->ExplicitNonceLen();
+  }
+
+  size_t ret =
+      SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->ExplicitNonceLen();
+  if (ssl_needs_record_splitting(ssl)) {
+    ret += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+    ret += ssl_cipher_get_record_split_len(ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->cipher());
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static ssl_open_record_t skip_early_data(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                         size_t consumed) {
+  ssl->s3->early_data_skipped += consumed;
+  if (ssl->s3->early_data_skipped < consumed) {
+    ssl->s3->early_data_skipped = kMaxEarlyDataSkipped + 1;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->s3->early_data_skipped > kMaxEarlyDataSkipped) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_SKIPPED_EARLY_DATA);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  return ssl_open_record_discard;
+}
+
+ssl_open_record_t tls_open_record(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_type,
+                                  Span<uint8_t> *out, size_t *out_consumed,
+                                  uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in) {
+  *out_consumed = 0;
+  if (ssl->s3->read_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_close_notify) {
+    return ssl_open_record_close_notify;
+  }
+
+  // If there is an unprocessed handshake message or we are already buffering
+  // too much, stop before decrypting another handshake record.
+  if (!tls_can_accept_handshake_data(ssl, out_alert)) {
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  CBS cbs = CBS(in);
+
+  // Decode the record header.
+  uint8_t type;
+  uint16_t version, ciphertext_len;
+  if (!CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &type) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &version) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &ciphertext_len)) {
+    *out_consumed = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+    return ssl_open_record_partial;
+  }
+
+  bool version_ok;
+  if (ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher()) {
+    // Only check the first byte. Enforcing beyond that can prevent decoding
+    // version negotiation failure alerts.
+    version_ok = (version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR;
+  } else {
+    version_ok = version == ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->RecordVersion();
+  }
+
+  if (!version_ok) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  // Check the ciphertext length.
+  if (ciphertext_len > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  // Extract the body.
+  CBS body;
+  if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &body, ciphertext_len)) {
+    *out_consumed = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + (size_t)ciphertext_len;
+    return ssl_open_record_partial;
+  }
+
+  Span<const uint8_t> header = in.subspan(0, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
+  ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_HEADER, header);
+
+  *out_consumed = in.size() - CBS_len(&cbs);
+
+  if (ssl->s3->have_version &&
+      ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION &&
+      SSL_in_init(ssl) &&
+      type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC &&
+      ciphertext_len == 1 &&
+      CBS_data(&body)[0] == 1) {
+    ssl->s3->empty_record_count++;
+    if (ssl->s3->empty_record_count > kMaxEmptyRecords) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+      return ssl_open_record_error;
+    }
+    return ssl_open_record_discard;
+  }
+
+  // Skip early data received when expecting a second ClientHello if we rejected
+  // 0RTT.
+  if (ssl->s3->skip_early_data &&
+      ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher() &&
+      type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+    return skip_early_data(ssl, out_alert, *out_consumed);
+  }
+
+  // Decrypt the body in-place.
+  if (!ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->Open(
+          out, type, version, ssl->s3->read_sequence, header,
+          MakeSpan(const_cast<uint8_t *>(CBS_data(&body)), CBS_len(&body)))) {
+    if (ssl->s3->skip_early_data && !ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher()) {
+      ERR_clear_error();
+      return skip_early_data(ssl, out_alert, *out_consumed);
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  ssl->s3->skip_early_data = false;
+
+  if (!ssl_record_sequence_update(ssl->s3->read_sequence, 8)) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  // TLS 1.3 hides the record type inside the encrypted data.
+  bool has_padding =
+      !ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher() &&
+      ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->ProtocolVersion() >= TLS1_3_VERSION;
+
+  // If there is padding, the plaintext limit includes the padding, but includes
+  // extra room for the inner content type.
+  size_t plaintext_limit =
+      has_padding ? SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + 1 : SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+  if (out->size() > plaintext_limit) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  if (has_padding) {
+    // The outer record type is always application_data.
+    if (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_OUTER_RECORD_TYPE);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      return ssl_open_record_error;
+    }
+
+    do {
+      if (out->empty()) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+        *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+        return ssl_open_record_error;
+      }
+      type = out->back();
+      *out = out->subspan(0, out->size() - 1);
+    } while (type == 0);
+  }
+
+  // Limit the number of consecutive empty records.
+  if (out->empty()) {
+    ssl->s3->empty_record_count++;
+    if (ssl->s3->empty_record_count > kMaxEmptyRecords) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+      return ssl_open_record_error;
+    }
+    // Apart from the limit, empty records are returned up to the caller. This
+    // allows the caller to reject records of the wrong type.
+  } else {
+    ssl->s3->empty_record_count = 0;
+  }
+
+  if (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+    return ssl_process_alert(ssl, out_alert, *out);
+  }
+
+  // Handshake messages may not interleave with any other record type.
+  if (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
+      tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data(ssl)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  ssl->s3->warning_alert_count = 0;
+
+  *out_type = type;
+  return ssl_open_record_success;
+}
+
+static bool do_seal_record(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_prefix, uint8_t *out,
+                           uint8_t *out_suffix, uint8_t type, const uint8_t *in,
+                           const size_t in_len) {
+  SSLAEADContext *aead = ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx.get();
+  uint8_t *extra_in = NULL;
+  size_t extra_in_len = 0;
+  if (!aead->is_null_cipher() &&
+      aead->ProtocolVersion() >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    // TLS 1.3 hides the actual record type inside the encrypted data.
+    extra_in = &type;
+    extra_in_len = 1;
+  }
+
+  size_t suffix_len, ciphertext_len;
+  if (!aead->SuffixLen(&suffix_len, in_len, extra_in_len) ||
+      !aead->CiphertextLen(&ciphertext_len, in_len, extra_in_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  assert(in == out || !buffers_alias(in, in_len, out, in_len));
+  assert(!buffers_alias(in, in_len, out_prefix, ssl_record_prefix_len(ssl)));
+  assert(!buffers_alias(in, in_len, out_suffix, suffix_len));
+
+  if (extra_in_len) {
+    out_prefix[0] = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
+  } else {
+    out_prefix[0] = type;
+  }
+
+  uint16_t record_version = aead->RecordVersion();
+
+  out_prefix[1] = record_version >> 8;
+  out_prefix[2] = record_version & 0xff;
+  out_prefix[3] = ciphertext_len >> 8;
+  out_prefix[4] = ciphertext_len & 0xff;
+  Span<const uint8_t> header = MakeSpan(out_prefix, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+  if (!aead->SealScatter(out_prefix + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, out, out_suffix,
+                         out_prefix[0], record_version, ssl->s3->write_sequence,
+                         header, in, in_len, extra_in, extra_in_len) ||
+      !ssl_record_sequence_update(ssl->s3->write_sequence, 8)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_HEADER, header);
+  return true;
+}
+
+static size_t tls_seal_scatter_prefix_len(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t type,
+                                          size_t in_len) {
+  size_t ret = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+  if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && in_len > 1 &&
+      ssl_needs_record_splitting(ssl)) {
+    // In the case of record splitting, the 1-byte record (of the 1/n-1 split)
+    // will be placed in the prefix, as will four of the five bytes of the
+    // record header for the main record. The final byte will replace the first
+    // byte of the plaintext that was used in the small record.
+    ret += ssl_cipher_get_record_split_len(ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->cipher());
+    ret += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 1;
+  } else {
+    ret += ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->ExplicitNonceLen();
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static bool tls_seal_scatter_suffix_len(const SSL *ssl, size_t *out_suffix_len,
+                                        uint8_t type, size_t in_len) {
+  size_t extra_in_len = 0;
+  if (!ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->is_null_cipher() &&
+      ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->ProtocolVersion() >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    // TLS 1.3 adds an extra byte for encrypted record type.
+    extra_in_len = 1;
+  }
+  if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&  // clang-format off
+      in_len > 1 &&
+      ssl_needs_record_splitting(ssl)) {
+    // With record splitting enabled, the first byte gets sealed into a separate
+    // record which is written into the prefix.
+    in_len -= 1;
+  }
+  return ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->SuffixLen(out_suffix_len, in_len, extra_in_len);
+}
+
+// tls_seal_scatter_record seals a new record of type |type| and body |in| and
+// splits it between |out_prefix|, |out|, and |out_suffix|. Exactly
+// |tls_seal_scatter_prefix_len| bytes are written to |out_prefix|, |in_len|
+// bytes to |out|, and |tls_seal_scatter_suffix_len| bytes to |out_suffix|. It
+// returns one on success and zero on error. If enabled,
+// |tls_seal_scatter_record| implements TLS 1.0 CBC 1/n-1 record splitting and
+// may write two records concatenated.
+static bool tls_seal_scatter_record(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_prefix, uint8_t *out,
+                                   uint8_t *out_suffix, uint8_t type,
+                                   const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
+  if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && in_len > 1 &&
+      ssl_needs_record_splitting(ssl)) {
+    assert(ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->ExplicitNonceLen() == 0);
+    const size_t prefix_len = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+    // Write the 1-byte fragment into |out_prefix|.
+    uint8_t *split_body = out_prefix + prefix_len;
+    uint8_t *split_suffix = split_body + 1;
+
+    if (!do_seal_record(ssl, out_prefix, split_body, split_suffix, type, in,
+                        1)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    size_t split_record_suffix_len;
+    if (!ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->SuffixLen(&split_record_suffix_len, 1, 0)) {
+      assert(false);
+      return false;
+    }
+    const size_t split_record_len = prefix_len + 1 + split_record_suffix_len;
+    assert(SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + ssl_cipher_get_record_split_len(
+                                       ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->cipher()) ==
+           split_record_len);
+
+    // Write the n-1-byte fragment. The header gets split between |out_prefix|
+    // (header[:-1]) and |out| (header[-1:]).
+    uint8_t tmp_prefix[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH];
+    if (!do_seal_record(ssl, tmp_prefix, out + 1, out_suffix, type, in + 1,
+                        in_len - 1)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    assert(tls_seal_scatter_prefix_len(ssl, type, in_len) ==
+           split_record_len + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 1);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(out_prefix + split_record_len, tmp_prefix,
+                   SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 1);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(out, tmp_prefix + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 1, 1);
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  return do_seal_record(ssl, out_prefix, out, out_suffix, type, in, in_len);
+}
+
+bool tls_seal_record(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+                     size_t max_out_len, uint8_t type, const uint8_t *in,
+                     size_t in_len) {
+  if (buffers_alias(in, in_len, out, max_out_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  const size_t prefix_len = tls_seal_scatter_prefix_len(ssl, type, in_len);
+  size_t suffix_len;
+  if (!tls_seal_scatter_suffix_len(ssl, &suffix_len, type, in_len)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (in_len + prefix_len < in_len ||
+      prefix_len + in_len + suffix_len < prefix_len + in_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (max_out_len < in_len + prefix_len + suffix_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t *prefix = out;
+  uint8_t *body = out + prefix_len;
+  uint8_t *suffix = body + in_len;
+  if (!tls_seal_scatter_record(ssl, prefix, body, suffix, type, in, in_len)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  *out_len = prefix_len + in_len + suffix_len;
+  return true;
+}
+
+enum ssl_open_record_t ssl_process_alert(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                         Span<const uint8_t> in) {
+  // Alerts records may not contain fragmented or multiple alerts.
+  if (in.size() != 2) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ALERT);
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_ALERT, in);
+
+  const uint8_t alert_level = in[0];
+  const uint8_t alert_descr = in[1];
+
+  uint16_t alert = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
+  ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, alert);
+
+  if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
+    if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
+      ssl->s3->read_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
+      return ssl_open_record_close_notify;
+    }
+
+    // Warning alerts do not exist in TLS 1.3, but RFC 8446 section 6.1
+    // continues to define user_canceled as a signal to cancel the handshake,
+    // without specifying how to handle it. JDK11 misuses it to signal
+    // full-duplex connection close after the handshake. As a workaround, skip
+    // user_canceled as in TLS 1.2. This matches NSS and OpenSSL.
+    if (ssl->s3->have_version &&
+        ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION &&
+        alert_descr != SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ALERT);
+      return ssl_open_record_error;
+    }
+
+    ssl->s3->warning_alert_count++;
+    if (ssl->s3->warning_alert_count > kMaxWarningAlerts) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARNING_ALERTS);
+      return ssl_open_record_error;
+    }
+    return ssl_open_record_discard;
+  }
+
+  if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
+    ERR_add_error_dataf("SSL alert number %d", alert_descr);
+    *out_alert = 0;  // No alert to send back to the peer.
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
+  return ssl_open_record_error;
+}
+
+OpenRecordResult OpenRecord(SSL *ssl, Span<uint8_t> *out,
+                            size_t *out_record_len, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                            const Span<uint8_t> in) {
+  // This API is a work in progress and currently only works for TLS 1.2 servers
+  // and below.
+  if (SSL_in_init(ssl) ||
+      SSL_is_dtls(ssl) ||
+      ssl_protocol_version(ssl) > TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+    assert(false);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    return OpenRecordResult::kError;
+  }
+
+  Span<uint8_t> plaintext;
+  uint8_t type = 0;
+  const ssl_open_record_t result = tls_open_record(
+      ssl, &type, &plaintext, out_record_len, out_alert, in);
+
+  switch (result) {
+    case ssl_open_record_success:
+      if (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+        *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+        return OpenRecordResult::kError;
+      }
+      *out = plaintext;
+      return OpenRecordResult::kOK;
+    case ssl_open_record_discard:
+      return OpenRecordResult::kDiscard;
+    case ssl_open_record_partial:
+      return OpenRecordResult::kIncompleteRecord;
+    case ssl_open_record_close_notify:
+      return OpenRecordResult::kAlertCloseNotify;
+    case ssl_open_record_error:
+      return OpenRecordResult::kError;
+  }
+  assert(false);
+  return OpenRecordResult::kError;
+}
+
+size_t SealRecordPrefixLen(const SSL *ssl, const size_t record_len) {
+  return tls_seal_scatter_prefix_len(ssl, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, record_len);
+}
+
+size_t SealRecordSuffixLen(const SSL *ssl, const size_t plaintext_len) {
+  assert(plaintext_len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
+  size_t suffix_len;
+  if (!tls_seal_scatter_suffix_len(ssl, &suffix_len, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,
+                                   plaintext_len)) {
+    assert(false);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  assert(suffix_len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD);
+  return suffix_len;
+}
+
+bool SealRecord(SSL *ssl, const Span<uint8_t> out_prefix,
+                const Span<uint8_t> out, Span<uint8_t> out_suffix,
+                const Span<const uint8_t> in) {
+  // This API is a work in progress and currently only works for TLS 1.2 servers
+  // and below.
+  if (SSL_in_init(ssl) ||
+      SSL_is_dtls(ssl) ||
+      ssl_protocol_version(ssl) > TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+    assert(false);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (out_prefix.size() != SealRecordPrefixLen(ssl, in.size()) ||
+      out.size() != in.size() ||
+      out_suffix.size() != SealRecordSuffixLen(ssl, in.size())) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return false;
+  }
+  return tls_seal_scatter_record(ssl, out_prefix.data(), out.data(),
+                                 out_suffix.data(), SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,
+                                 in.data(), in.size());
+}
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+size_t SSL_max_seal_overhead(const SSL *ssl) {
+  if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+    return dtls_max_seal_overhead(ssl, dtls1_use_current_epoch);
+  }
+
+  size_t ret = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+  ret += ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->MaxOverhead();
+  // TLS 1.3 needs an extra byte for the encrypted record type.
+  if (!ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->is_null_cipher() &&
+      ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->ProtocolVersion() >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    ret += 1;
+  }
+  if (ssl_needs_record_splitting(ssl)) {
+    ret *= 2;
+  }
+  return ret;
+}