grpc 1.15.0 → 1.30.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/ssl_session.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,1333 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <utility>
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+// The address of this is a magic value, a pointer to which is returned by
+// SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr(). It allows a session callback to indicate
+// that it needs to asynchronously fetch session information.
+static const char g_pending_session_magic = 0;
+
+static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class =
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
+
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session);
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session);
+static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session, int lock);
+
+UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> ssl_session_new(const SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method) {
+  return MakeUnique<SSL_SESSION>(x509_method);
+}
+
+uint32_t ssl_hash_session_id(Span<const uint8_t> session_id) {
+  // Take the first four bytes of |session_id|. Session IDs are generated by the
+  // server randomly, so we can assume even using the first four bytes results
+  // in a good distribution.
+  uint8_t tmp_storage[sizeof(uint32_t)];
+  if (session_id.size() < sizeof(tmp_storage)) {
+    OPENSSL_memset(tmp_storage, 0, sizeof(tmp_storage));
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(tmp_storage, session_id.data(), session_id.size());
+    session_id = tmp_storage;
+  }
+
+  uint32_t hash =
+      ((uint32_t)session_id[0]) |
+      ((uint32_t)session_id[1] << 8) |
+      ((uint32_t)session_id[2] << 16) |
+      ((uint32_t)session_id[3] << 24);
+
+  return hash;
+}
+
+UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> SSL_SESSION_dup(SSL_SESSION *session, int dup_flags) {
+  UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> new_session = ssl_session_new(session->x509_method);
+  if (!new_session) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  new_session->is_server = session->is_server;
+  new_session->ssl_version = session->ssl_version;
+  new_session->is_quic = session->is_quic;
+  new_session->sid_ctx_length = session->sid_ctx_length;
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->sid_ctx, session->sid_ctx, session->sid_ctx_length);
+
+  // Copy the key material.
+  new_session->master_key_length = session->master_key_length;
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->master_key, session->master_key,
+         session->master_key_length);
+  new_session->cipher = session->cipher;
+
+  // Copy authentication state.
+  if (session->psk_identity != nullptr) {
+    new_session->psk_identity.reset(
+        OPENSSL_strdup(session->psk_identity.get()));
+    if (new_session->psk_identity == nullptr) {
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+  }
+  if (session->certs != nullptr) {
+    auto buf_up_ref = [](CRYPTO_BUFFER *buf) {
+      CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(buf);
+      return buf;
+    };
+    new_session->certs.reset(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_deep_copy(
+        session->certs.get(), buf_up_ref, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free));
+    if (new_session->certs == nullptr) {
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!session->x509_method->session_dup(new_session.get(), session)) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  new_session->verify_result = session->verify_result;
+
+  new_session->ocsp_response = UpRef(session->ocsp_response);
+  new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list =
+      UpRef(session->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
+
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->peer_sha256, session->peer_sha256,
+                 SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+  new_session->peer_sha256_valid = session->peer_sha256_valid;
+
+  new_session->peer_signature_algorithm = session->peer_signature_algorithm;
+
+  new_session->timeout = session->timeout;
+  new_session->auth_timeout = session->auth_timeout;
+  new_session->time = session->time;
+
+  // Copy non-authentication connection properties.
+  if (dup_flags & SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH) {
+    new_session->session_id_length = session->session_id_length;
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->session_id, session->session_id,
+                   session->session_id_length);
+
+    new_session->group_id = session->group_id;
+
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->original_handshake_hash,
+                   session->original_handshake_hash,
+                   session->original_handshake_hash_len);
+    new_session->original_handshake_hash_len =
+        session->original_handshake_hash_len;
+    new_session->ticket_lifetime_hint = session->ticket_lifetime_hint;
+    new_session->ticket_age_add = session->ticket_age_add;
+    new_session->ticket_max_early_data = session->ticket_max_early_data;
+    new_session->extended_master_secret = session->extended_master_secret;
+
+    if (!new_session->early_alpn.CopyFrom(session->early_alpn)) {
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+
+    if (!new_session->quic_early_data_hash.CopyFrom(
+            session->quic_early_data_hash)) {
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Copy the ticket.
+  if (dup_flags & SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_TICKET &&
+      !new_session->ticket.CopyFrom(session->ticket)) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // The new_session does not get a copy of the ex_data.
+
+  new_session->not_resumable = true;
+  return new_session;
+}
+
+void ssl_session_rebase_time(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  struct OPENSSL_timeval now;
+  ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
+
+  // To avoid overflows and underflows, if we've gone back in time, update the
+  // time, but mark the session expired.
+  if (session->time > now.tv_sec) {
+    session->time = now.tv_sec;
+    session->timeout = 0;
+    session->auth_timeout = 0;
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Adjust the session time and timeouts. If the session has already expired,
+  // clamp the timeouts at zero.
+  uint64_t delta = now.tv_sec - session->time;
+  session->time = now.tv_sec;
+  if (session->timeout < delta) {
+    session->timeout = 0;
+  } else {
+    session->timeout -= delta;
+  }
+  if (session->auth_timeout < delta) {
+    session->auth_timeout = 0;
+  } else {
+    session->auth_timeout -= delta;
+  }
+}
+
+void ssl_session_renew_timeout(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session,
+                               uint32_t timeout) {
+  // Rebase the timestamp relative to the current time so |timeout| is measured
+  // correctly.
+  ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, session);
+
+  if (session->timeout > timeout) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  session->timeout = timeout;
+  if (session->timeout > session->auth_timeout) {
+    session->timeout = session->auth_timeout;
+  }
+}
+
+uint16_t ssl_session_protocol_version(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  uint16_t ret;
+  if (!ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(&ret, session->ssl_version)) {
+    // An |SSL_SESSION| will never have an invalid version. This is enforced by
+    // the parser.
+    assert(0);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *ssl_session_get_digest(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return ssl_get_handshake_digest(ssl_session_protocol_version(session),
+                                  session->cipher);
+}
+
+bool compute_quic_early_data_hash(const SSL_CONFIG *config,
+                                  uint8_t hash_out[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]) {
+  ScopedEVP_MD_CTX hash_ctx;
+  uint32_t transport_param_len = config->quic_transport_params.size();
+  uint32_t context_len = config->quic_early_data_context.size();
+  if (!EVP_DigestInit(hash_ctx.get(), EVP_sha256()) ||
+      !EVP_DigestUpdate(hash_ctx.get(), &transport_param_len,
+                        sizeof(transport_param_len)) ||
+      !EVP_DigestUpdate(hash_ctx.get(), config->quic_transport_params.data(),
+                        config->quic_transport_params.size()) ||
+      !EVP_DigestUpdate(hash_ctx.get(), &context_len, sizeof(context_len)) ||
+      !EVP_DigestUpdate(hash_ctx.get(), config->quic_early_data_context.data(),
+                        config->quic_early_data_context.size()) ||
+      !EVP_DigestFinal(hash_ctx.get(), hash_out, nullptr)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+int ssl_get_new_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, int is_server) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_SESSION_CREATION) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session = ssl_session_new(ssl->ctx->x509_method);
+  if (session == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  session->is_server = is_server;
+  session->ssl_version = ssl->version;
+  session->is_quic = ssl->quic_method != nullptr;
+  if (is_server && ssl->enable_early_data && session->is_quic) {
+    if (!session->quic_early_data_hash.Init(SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) ||
+        !compute_quic_early_data_hash(hs->config,
+                                      session->quic_early_data_hash.data())) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Fill in the time from the |SSL_CTX|'s clock.
+  struct OPENSSL_timeval now;
+  ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
+  session->time = now.tv_sec;
+
+  uint16_t version = ssl_protocol_version(ssl);
+  if (version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    // TLS 1.3 uses tickets as authenticators, so we are willing to use them for
+    // longer.
+    session->timeout = ssl->session_ctx->session_psk_dhe_timeout;
+    session->auth_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_AUTH_TIMEOUT;
+  } else {
+    // TLS 1.2 resumption does not incorporate new key material, so we use a
+    // much shorter timeout.
+    session->timeout = ssl->session_ctx->session_timeout;
+    session->auth_timeout = ssl->session_ctx->session_timeout;
+  }
+
+  if (is_server) {
+    if (hs->ticket_expected || version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+      // Don't set session IDs for sessions resumed with tickets. This will keep
+      // them out of the session cache.
+      session->session_id_length = 0;
+    } else {
+      session->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+      if (!RAND_bytes(session->session_id, session->session_id_length)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+  } else {
+    session->session_id_length = 0;
+  }
+
+  if (hs->config->cert->sid_ctx_length > sizeof(session->sid_ctx)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(session->sid_ctx, hs->config->cert->sid_ctx,
+                 hs->config->cert->sid_ctx_length);
+  session->sid_ctx_length = hs->config->cert->sid_ctx_length;
+
+  // The session is marked not resumable until it is completely filled in.
+  session->not_resumable = true;
+  session->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
+
+  hs->new_session = std::move(session);
+  ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_ctx_rotate_ticket_encryption_key(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  OPENSSL_timeval now;
+  ssl_ctx_get_current_time(ctx, &now);
+  {
+    // Avoid acquiring a write lock in the common case (i.e. a non-default key
+    // is used or the default keys have not expired yet).
+    MutexReadLock lock(&ctx->lock);
+    if (ctx->ticket_key_current &&
+        (ctx->ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec == 0 ||
+         ctx->ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec > now.tv_sec) &&
+        (!ctx->ticket_key_prev ||
+         ctx->ticket_key_prev->next_rotation_tv_sec > now.tv_sec)) {
+      return 1;
+    }
+  }
+
+  MutexWriteLock lock(&ctx->lock);
+  if (!ctx->ticket_key_current ||
+      (ctx->ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec != 0 &&
+       ctx->ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec <= now.tv_sec)) {
+    // The current key has not been initialized or it is expired.
+    auto new_key = bssl::MakeUnique<TicketKey>();
+    if (!new_key) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    RAND_bytes(new_key->name, 16);
+    RAND_bytes(new_key->hmac_key, 16);
+    RAND_bytes(new_key->aes_key, 16);
+    new_key->next_rotation_tv_sec =
+        now.tv_sec + SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_KEY_ROTATION_INTERVAL;
+    if (ctx->ticket_key_current) {
+      // The current key expired. Rotate it to prev and bump up its rotation
+      // timestamp. Note that even with the new rotation time it may still be
+      // expired and get dropped below.
+      ctx->ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec +=
+          SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_KEY_ROTATION_INTERVAL;
+      ctx->ticket_key_prev = std::move(ctx->ticket_key_current);
+    }
+    ctx->ticket_key_current = std::move(new_key);
+  }
+
+  // Drop an expired prev key.
+  if (ctx->ticket_key_prev &&
+      ctx->ticket_key_prev->next_rotation_tv_sec <= now.tv_sec) {
+    ctx->ticket_key_prev.reset();
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_encrypt_ticket_with_cipher_ctx(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out,
+                                              const uint8_t *session_buf,
+                                              size_t session_len) {
+  ScopedEVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+  ScopedHMAC_CTX hctx;
+
+  // If the session is too long, emit a dummy value rather than abort the
+  // connection.
+  static const size_t kMaxTicketOverhead =
+      16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;
+  if (session_len > 0xffff - kMaxTicketOverhead) {
+    static const char kTicketPlaceholder[] = "TICKET TOO LARGE";
+    return CBB_add_bytes(out, (const uint8_t *)kTicketPlaceholder,
+                         strlen(kTicketPlaceholder));
+  }
+
+  // Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does all the
+  // work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
+  SSL_CTX *tctx = hs->ssl->session_ctx.get();
+  uint8_t iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+  uint8_t key_name[16];
+  if (tctx->ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
+    if (tctx->ticket_key_cb(hs->ssl, key_name, iv, ctx.get(), hctx.get(),
+                            1 /* encrypt */) < 0) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  } else {
+    // Rotate ticket key if necessary.
+    if (!ssl_ctx_rotate_ticket_encryption_key(tctx)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    MutexReadLock lock(&tctx->lock);
+    if (!RAND_bytes(iv, 16) ||
+        !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+                            tctx->ticket_key_current->aes_key, iv) ||
+        !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx.get(), tctx->ticket_key_current->hmac_key, 16,
+                      tlsext_tick_md(), NULL)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(key_name, tctx->ticket_key_current->name, 16);
+  }
+
+  uint8_t *ptr;
+  if (!CBB_add_bytes(out, key_name, 16) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(out, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx.get())) ||
+      !CBB_reserve(out, &ptr, session_len + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  size_t total = 0;
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(ptr, session_buf, session_len);
+  total = session_len;
+#else
+  int len;
+  if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx.get(), ptr + total, &len, session_buf, session_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  total += len;
+  if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx.get(), ptr + total, &len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  total += len;
+#endif
+  if (!CBB_did_write(out, total)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  unsigned hlen;
+  if (!HMAC_Update(hctx.get(), CBB_data(out), CBB_len(out)) ||
+      !CBB_reserve(out, &ptr, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) ||
+      !HMAC_Final(hctx.get(), ptr, &hlen) ||
+      !CBB_did_write(out, hlen)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_encrypt_ticket_with_method(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out,
+                                          const uint8_t *session_buf,
+                                          size_t session_len) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  const SSL_TICKET_AEAD_METHOD *method = ssl->session_ctx->ticket_aead_method;
+  const size_t max_overhead = method->max_overhead(ssl);
+  const size_t max_out = session_len + max_overhead;
+  if (max_out < max_overhead) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t *ptr;
+  if (!CBB_reserve(out, &ptr, max_out)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  size_t out_len;
+  if (!method->seal(ssl, ptr, &out_len, max_out, session_buf,
+                    session_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TICKET_ENCRYPTION_FAILED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBB_did_write(out, out_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_encrypt_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out,
+                       const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  // Serialize the SSL_SESSION to be encoded into the ticket.
+  uint8_t *session_buf = NULL;
+  size_t session_len;
+  if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(session, &session_buf, &session_len)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  int ret = 0;
+  if (hs->ssl->session_ctx->ticket_aead_method) {
+    ret = ssl_encrypt_ticket_with_method(hs, out, session_buf, session_len);
+  } else {
+    ret = ssl_encrypt_ticket_with_cipher_ctx(hs, out, session_buf, session_len);
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_free(session_buf);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int ssl_session_is_context_valid(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                 const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  if (session == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return session->sid_ctx_length == hs->config->cert->sid_ctx_length &&
+         OPENSSL_memcmp(session->sid_ctx, hs->config->cert->sid_ctx,
+                        hs->config->cert->sid_ctx_length) == 0;
+}
+
+int ssl_session_is_time_valid(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  if (session == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  struct OPENSSL_timeval now;
+  ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
+
+  // Reject tickets from the future to avoid underflow.
+  if (now.tv_sec < session->time) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return session->timeout > now.tv_sec - session->time;
+}
+
+int ssl_session_is_resumable(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                             const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  const SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  return ssl_session_is_context_valid(hs, session) &&
+         // The session must have been created by the same type of end point as
+         // we're now using it with.
+         ssl->server == session->is_server &&
+         // The session must not be expired.
+         ssl_session_is_time_valid(ssl, session) &&
+         // Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
+         // version.
+         ssl->version == session->ssl_version &&
+         // Only resume if the session's cipher matches the negotiated one. This
+         // is stricter than necessary for TLS 1.3, which allows cross-cipher
+         // resumption if the PRF hashes match. We require an exact match for
+         // simplicity. If loosening this, the 0-RTT accept logic must be
+         // updated to check the cipher.
+         hs->new_cipher == session->cipher &&
+         // If the session contains a client certificate (either the full
+         // certificate or just the hash) then require that the form of the
+         // certificate matches the current configuration.
+         ((sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(session->certs.get()) == 0 &&
+           !session->peer_sha256_valid) ||
+          session->peer_sha256_valid ==
+              hs->config->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) &&
+         // Only resume if the underlying transport protocol hasn't changed.
+         // This is to prevent cross-protocol resumption between QUIC and TCP.
+         (hs->ssl->quic_method != nullptr) == session->is_quic;
+}
+
+// ssl_lookup_session looks up |session_id| in the session cache and sets
+// |*out_session| to an |SSL_SESSION| object if found.
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_lookup_session(
+    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> *out_session,
+    Span<const uint8_t> session_id) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  out_session->reset();
+
+  if (session_id.empty() || session_id.size() > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session;
+  // Try the internal cache, if it exists.
+  if (!(ssl->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
+        SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) {
+    uint32_t hash = ssl_hash_session_id(session_id);
+    auto cmp = [](const void *key, const SSL_SESSION *sess) -> int {
+      Span<const uint8_t> key_id =
+          *reinterpret_cast<const Span<const uint8_t> *>(key);
+      Span<const uint8_t> sess_id =
+          MakeConstSpan(sess->session_id, sess->session_id_length);
+      return key_id == sess_id ? 0 : 1;
+    };
+    MutexReadLock lock(&ssl->session_ctx->lock);
+    // |lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve_key| returns a non-owning pointer.
+    session = UpRef(lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve_key(ssl->session_ctx->sessions,
+                                                &session_id, hash, cmp));
+    // TODO(davidben): This should probably move it to the front of the list.
+  }
+
+  // Fall back to the external cache, if it exists.
+  if (!session && ssl->session_ctx->get_session_cb != nullptr) {
+    int copy = 1;
+    session.reset(ssl->session_ctx->get_session_cb(ssl, session_id.data(),
+                                                   session_id.size(), &copy));
+    if (!session) {
+      return ssl_hs_ok;
+    }
+
+    if (session.get() == SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr()) {
+      session.release();  // This pointer is not actually owned.
+      return ssl_hs_pending_session;
+    }
+
+    // Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us to do so
+    // (note that if the session structures returned by the callback are shared
+    // between threads, it must handle the reference count itself [i.e. copy ==
+    // 0], or things won't be thread-safe).
+    if (copy) {
+      SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session.get());
+    }
+
+    // Add the externally cached session to the internal cache if necessary.
+    if (!(ssl->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
+          SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) {
+      SSL_CTX_add_session(ssl->session_ctx.get(), session.get());
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (session && !ssl_session_is_time_valid(ssl, session.get())) {
+    // The session was from the cache, so remove it.
+    SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssl->session_ctx.get(), session.get());
+    session.reset();
+  }
+
+  *out_session = std::move(session);
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_get_prev_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                        UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> *out_session,
+                                        bool *out_tickets_supported,
+                                        bool *out_renew_ticket,
+                                        const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello) {
+  // This is used only by servers.
+  assert(hs->ssl->server);
+  UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session;
+  bool renew_ticket = false;
+
+  // If tickets are disabled, always behave as if no tickets are present.
+  CBS ticket;
+  const bool tickets_supported =
+      !(SSL_get_options(hs->ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) &&
+      ssl_client_hello_get_extension(client_hello, &ticket,
+                                     TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
+  if (tickets_supported && CBS_len(&ticket) != 0) {
+    switch (ssl_process_ticket(hs, &session, &renew_ticket, ticket,
+                               MakeConstSpan(client_hello->session_id,
+                                             client_hello->session_id_len))) {
+      case ssl_ticket_aead_success:
+        break;
+      case ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket:
+        assert(!session);
+        break;
+      case ssl_ticket_aead_error:
+        return ssl_hs_error;
+      case ssl_ticket_aead_retry:
+        return ssl_hs_pending_ticket;
+    }
+  } else {
+    // The client didn't send a ticket, so the session ID is a real ID.
+    enum ssl_hs_wait_t lookup_ret = ssl_lookup_session(
+        hs, &session,
+        MakeConstSpan(client_hello->session_id, client_hello->session_id_len));
+    if (lookup_ret != ssl_hs_ok) {
+      return lookup_ret;
+    }
+  }
+
+  *out_session = std::move(session);
+  *out_tickets_supported = tickets_supported;
+  *out_renew_ticket = renew_ticket;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session, int lock) {
+  int ret = 0;
+
+  if (session != NULL && session->session_id_length != 0) {
+    if (lock) {
+      CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock);
+    }
+    SSL_SESSION *found_session = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions,
+                                                         session);
+    if (found_session == session) {
+      ret = 1;
+      found_session = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, session);
+      SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, session);
+    }
+
+    if (lock) {
+      CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ctx->lock);
+    }
+
+    if (ret) {
+      if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) {
+        ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx, found_session);
+      }
+      SSL_SESSION_free(found_session);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+void ssl_set_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  if (ssl->session.get() == session) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  ssl->session = UpRef(session);
+}
+
+// locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  if (session->next == NULL || session->prev == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (session->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_tail) {
+    // last element in list
+    if (session->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_head) {
+      // only one element in list
+      ctx->session_cache_head = NULL;
+      ctx->session_cache_tail = NULL;
+    } else {
+      ctx->session_cache_tail = session->prev;
+      session->prev->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
+    }
+  } else {
+    if (session->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_head) {
+      // first element in list
+      ctx->session_cache_head = session->next;
+      session->next->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+    } else {  // middle of list
+      session->next->prev = session->prev;
+      session->prev->next = session->next;
+    }
+  }
+  session->prev = session->next = NULL;
+}
+
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  if (session->next != NULL && session->prev != NULL) {
+    SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, session);
+  }
+
+  if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) {
+    ctx->session_cache_head = session;
+    ctx->session_cache_tail = session;
+    session->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+    session->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
+  } else {
+    session->next = ctx->session_cache_head;
+    session->next->prev = session;
+    session->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+    ctx->session_cache_head = session;
+  }
+}
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+ssl_session_st::ssl_session_st(const SSL_X509_METHOD *method)
+    : x509_method(method),
+      extended_master_secret(false),
+      peer_sha256_valid(false),
+      not_resumable(false),
+      ticket_age_add_valid(false),
+      is_server(false),
+      is_quic(false) {
+  CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ex_data);
+  time = ::time(nullptr);
+}
+
+ssl_session_st::~ssl_session_st() {
+  CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, this, &ex_data);
+  x509_method->session_clear(this);
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ssl_session_new(ctx->x509_method).release();
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_up_ref(SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&session->references);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  if (session == NULL ||
+      !CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&session->references)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  session->~ssl_session_st();
+  OPENSSL_free(session);
+}
+
+const uint8_t *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *session,
+                                  unsigned *out_len) {
+  if (out_len != NULL) {
+    *out_len = session->session_id_length;
+  }
+  return session->session_id;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set1_id(SSL_SESSION *session, const uint8_t *sid,
+                        size_t sid_len) {
+  if (sid_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Use memmove in case someone passes in the output of |SSL_SESSION_get_id|.
+  OPENSSL_memmove(session->session_id, sid, sid_len);
+  session->session_id_length = sid_len;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return session->timeout;
+}
+
+uint64_t SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  if (session == NULL) {
+    // NULL should crash, but silently accept it here for compatibility.
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return session->time;
+}
+
+X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return session->x509_peer;
+}
+
+const STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *
+    SSL_SESSION_get0_peer_certificates(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return session->certs.get();
+}
+
+void SSL_SESSION_get0_signed_cert_timestamp_list(const SSL_SESSION *session,
+                                                 const uint8_t **out,
+                                                 size_t *out_len) {
+  if (session->signed_cert_timestamp_list) {
+    *out = CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(session->signed_cert_timestamp_list.get());
+    *out_len = CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(session->signed_cert_timestamp_list.get());
+  } else {
+    *out = nullptr;
+    *out_len = 0;
+  }
+}
+
+void SSL_SESSION_get0_ocsp_response(const SSL_SESSION *session,
+                                    const uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len) {
+  if (session->ocsp_response) {
+    *out = CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(session->ocsp_response.get());
+    *out_len = CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(session->ocsp_response.get());
+  } else {
+    *out = nullptr;
+    *out_len = 0;
+  }
+}
+
+size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(const SSL_SESSION *session, uint8_t *out,
+                                  size_t max_out) {
+  // TODO(davidben): Fix master_key_length's type and remove these casts.
+  if (max_out == 0) {
+    return (size_t)session->master_key_length;
+  }
+  if (max_out > (size_t)session->master_key_length) {
+    max_out = (size_t)session->master_key_length;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out, session->master_key, max_out);
+  return max_out;
+}
+
+uint64_t SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *session, uint64_t time) {
+  if (session == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  session->time = time;
+  return time;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *session, uint32_t timeout) {
+  if (session == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  session->timeout = timeout;
+  session->auth_timeout = timeout;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+const uint8_t *SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context(const SSL_SESSION *session,
+                                           unsigned *out_len) {
+  if (out_len != NULL) {
+    *out_len = session->sid_ctx_length;
+  }
+  return session->sid_ctx;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *session, const uint8_t *sid_ctx,
+                                size_t sid_ctx_len) {
+  if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof(session->sid_ctx)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  static_assert(sizeof(session->sid_ctx) < 256, "sid_ctx_len does not fit");
+  session->sid_ctx_length = (uint8_t)sid_ctx_len;
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(session->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_should_be_single_use(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return ssl_session_protocol_version(session) >= TLS1_3_VERSION;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return !session->not_resumable;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_has_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return !session->ticket.empty();
+}
+
+void SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *session,
+                             const uint8_t **out_ticket, size_t *out_len) {
+  if (out_ticket != nullptr) {
+    *out_ticket = session->ticket.data();
+  }
+  *out_len = session->ticket.size();
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set_ticket(SSL_SESSION *session, const uint8_t *ticket,
+                           size_t ticket_len) {
+  return session->ticket.CopyFrom(MakeConstSpan(ticket, ticket_len));
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return session->ticket_lifetime_hint;
+}
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return session->cipher;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_has_peer_sha256(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return session->peer_sha256_valid;
+}
+
+void SSL_SESSION_get0_peer_sha256(const SSL_SESSION *session,
+                                  const uint8_t **out_ptr, size_t *out_len) {
+  if (session->peer_sha256_valid) {
+    *out_ptr = session->peer_sha256;
+    *out_len = sizeof(session->peer_sha256);
+  } else {
+    *out_ptr = nullptr;
+    *out_len = 0;
+  }
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_early_data_capable(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return ssl_session_protocol_version(session) >= TLS1_3_VERSION &&
+         session->ticket_max_early_data != 0;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_copy_without_early_data(SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  if (!SSL_SESSION_early_data_capable(session)) {
+    return UpRef(session).release();
+  }
+
+  bssl::UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> copy =
+      SSL_SESSION_dup(session, SSL_SESSION_DUP_ALL);
+  if (!copy) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  copy->ticket_max_early_data = 0;
+  // Copied sessions are non-resumable until they're completely filled in.
+  copy->not_resumable = session->not_resumable;
+  assert(!SSL_SESSION_early_data_capable(copy.get()));
+  return copy.release();
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr(void) {
+  return (SSL_SESSION *)&g_pending_session_magic;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl) {
+  // Once the handshake completes we return the established session. Otherwise
+  // we return the intermediate session, either |session| (for resumption) or
+  // |new_session| if doing a full handshake.
+  if (!SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
+    return ssl->s3->established_session.get();
+  }
+  SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs.get();
+  if (hs->early_session) {
+    return hs->early_session.get();
+  }
+  if (hs->new_session) {
+    return hs->new_session.get();
+  }
+  return ssl->session.get();
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl) {
+  SSL_SESSION *ret = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+  if (ret != NULL) {
+    SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret);
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
+                                 CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
+                                 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused,
+                                 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
+  int index;
+  if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
+                               free_func)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return index;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *session, int idx, void *arg) {
+  return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&session->ex_data, idx, arg);
+}
+
+void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *session, int idx) {
+  return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&session->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  // Although |session| is inserted into two structures (a doubly-linked list
+  // and the hash table), |ctx| only takes one reference.
+  UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> owned_session = UpRef(session);
+
+  SSL_SESSION *old_session;
+  MutexWriteLock lock(&ctx->lock);
+  if (!lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, &old_session, session)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  // |ctx->sessions| took ownership of |session| and gave us back a reference to
+  // |old_session|. (|old_session| may be the same as |session|, in which case
+  // we traded identical references with |ctx->sessions|.)
+  owned_session.release();
+  owned_session.reset(old_session);
+
+  if (old_session != NULL) {
+    if (old_session == session) {
+      // |session| was already in the cache. There are no linked list pointers
+      // to update.
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    // There was a session ID collision. |old_session| was replaced with
+    // |session| in the hash table, so |old_session| must be removed from the
+    // linked list to match.
+    SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, old_session);
+  }
+
+  SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, session);
+
+  // Enforce any cache size limits.
+  if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) {
+    while (lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions) >
+           SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) {
+      if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail, 0)) {
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return remove_session_lock(ctx, session, 1);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  // SSL_set_session may only be called before the handshake has started.
+  if (ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ||
+      ssl->s3->hs == NULL ||
+      ssl->s3->hs->state != 0) {
+    abort();
+  }
+
+  ssl_set_session(ssl, session);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t timeout) {
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Historically, zero was treated as |SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT|.
+  if (timeout == 0) {
+    timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
+  }
+
+  uint32_t old_timeout = ctx->session_timeout;
+  ctx->session_timeout = timeout;
+  return old_timeout;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return ctx->session_timeout;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_session_psk_dhe_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t timeout) {
+  ctx->session_psk_dhe_timeout = timeout;
+}
+
+typedef struct timeout_param_st {
+  SSL_CTX *ctx;
+  uint64_t time;
+  LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *cache;
+} TIMEOUT_PARAM;
+
+static void timeout_doall_arg(SSL_SESSION *session, void *void_param) {
+  TIMEOUT_PARAM *param = reinterpret_cast<TIMEOUT_PARAM *>(void_param);
+
+  if (param->time == 0 ||
+      session->time + session->timeout < session->time ||
+      param->time > (session->time + session->timeout)) {
+    // The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to
+    // save on locking overhead
+    (void) lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(param->cache, session);
+    SSL_SESSION_list_remove(param->ctx, session);
+    if (param->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) {
+      param->ctx->remove_session_cb(param->ctx, session);
+    }
+    SSL_SESSION_free(session);
+  }
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint64_t time) {
+  TIMEOUT_PARAM tp;
+
+  tp.ctx = ctx;
+  tp.cache = ctx->sessions;
+  if (tp.cache == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+  tp.time = time;
+  MutexWriteLock lock(&ctx->lock);
+  lh_SSL_SESSION_doall_arg(tp.cache, timeout_doall_arg, &tp);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                             int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)) {
+  ctx->new_session_cb = cb;
+}
+
+int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return ctx->new_session_cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(
+    SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session)) {
+  ctx->remove_session_cb = cb;
+}
+
+void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                                 SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return ctx->remove_session_cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                             SSL_SESSION *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *id,
+                                                int id_len, int *out_copy)) {
+  ctx->get_session_cb = cb;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl,
+                                                      const uint8_t *id,
+                                                      int id_len,
+                                                      int *out_copy) {
+  return ctx->get_session_cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(
+    SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value)) {
+  ctx->info_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl, int type,
+                                                int value) {
+  return ctx->info_callback;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                               void (*cb)(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey)) {
+  ctx->channel_id_cb = cb;
+}
+
+void (*SSL_CTX_get_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey) {
+  return ctx->channel_id_cb;
+}