grpc 1.15.0 → 1.30.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/cipher_extra/e_chacha20poly1305.c

@@ -0,0 +1,418 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <openssl/aead.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/chacha.h>
+#include <openssl/cipher.h>
+#include <openssl/cpu.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/poly1305.h>
+#include <openssl/type_check.h>
+
+#include "../fipsmodule/cipher/internal.h"
+#include "../internal.h"
+#include "../chacha/internal.h"
+
+
+#define POLY1305_TAG_LEN 16
+
+struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx {
+  uint8_t key[32];
+};
+
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
+                          sizeof(struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx),
+                      "AEAD state is too small");
+#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
+                          alignof(struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx),
+                      "AEAD state has insufficient alignment");
+#endif
+
+// For convenience (the x86_64 calling convention allows only six parameters in
+// registers), the final parameter for the assembly functions is both an input
+// and output parameter.
+union open_data {
+  struct {
+    alignas(16) uint8_t key[32];
+    uint32_t counter;
+    uint8_t nonce[12];
+  } in;
+  struct {
+    uint8_t tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
+  } out;
+};
+
+union seal_data {
+  struct {
+    alignas(16) uint8_t key[32];
+    uint32_t counter;
+    uint8_t nonce[12];
+    const uint8_t *extra_ciphertext;
+    size_t extra_ciphertext_len;
+  } in;
+  struct {
+    uint8_t tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
+  } out;
+};
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && \
+    !defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
+static int asm_capable(void) {
+  const int sse41_capable = (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << 19)) != 0;
+  return sse41_capable;
+}
+
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(union open_data) == 48, "wrong open_data size");
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(union seal_data) == 48 + 8 + 8,
+                      "wrong seal_data size");
+
+// chacha20_poly1305_open is defined in chacha20_poly1305_x86_64.pl. It decrypts
+// |plaintext_len| bytes from |ciphertext| and writes them to |out_plaintext|.
+// Additional input parameters are passed in |aead_data->in|. On exit, it will
+// write calculated tag value to |aead_data->out.tag|, which the caller must
+// check.
+extern void chacha20_poly1305_open(uint8_t *out_plaintext,
+                                   const uint8_t *ciphertext,
+                                   size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
+                                   size_t ad_len, union open_data *aead_data);
+
+// chacha20_poly1305_open is defined in chacha20_poly1305_x86_64.pl. It encrypts
+// |plaintext_len| bytes from |plaintext| and writes them to |out_ciphertext|.
+// Additional input parameters are passed in |aead_data->in|. The calculated tag
+// value is over the computed ciphertext concatenated with |extra_ciphertext|
+// and written to |aead_data->out.tag|.
+extern void chacha20_poly1305_seal(uint8_t *out_ciphertext,
+                                   const uint8_t *plaintext,
+                                   size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
+                                   size_t ad_len, union seal_data *aead_data);
+#else
+static int asm_capable(void) { return 0; }
+
+
+static void chacha20_poly1305_open(uint8_t *out_plaintext,
+                                   const uint8_t *ciphertext,
+                                   size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
+                                   size_t ad_len, union open_data *aead_data) {}
+
+static void chacha20_poly1305_seal(uint8_t *out_ciphertext,
+                                   const uint8_t *plaintext,
+                                   size_t plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ad,
+                                   size_t ad_len, union seal_data *aead_data) {}
+#endif
+
+static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
+                                       size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) {
+  struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx =
+      (struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *)&ctx->state;
+
+  if (tag_len == 0) {
+    tag_len = POLY1305_TAG_LEN;
+  }
+
+  if (tag_len > POLY1305_TAG_LEN) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (key_len != sizeof(c20_ctx->key)) {
+    return 0;  // internal error - EVP_AEAD_CTX_init should catch this.
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(c20_ctx->key, key, key_len);
+  ctx->tag_len = tag_len;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static void aead_chacha20_poly1305_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {}
+
+static void poly1305_update_length(poly1305_state *poly1305, size_t data_len) {
+  uint8_t length_bytes[8];
+
+  for (unsigned i = 0; i < sizeof(length_bytes); i++) {
+    length_bytes[i] = data_len;
+    data_len >>= 8;
+  }
+
+  CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, length_bytes, sizeof(length_bytes));
+}
+
+// calc_tag fills |tag| with the authentication tag for the given inputs.
+static void calc_tag(uint8_t tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN], const uint8_t *key,
+                     const uint8_t nonce[12], const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len,
+                     const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_len,
+                     const uint8_t *ciphertext_extra,
+                     size_t ciphertext_extra_len) {
+  alignas(16) uint8_t poly1305_key[32];
+  OPENSSL_memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key));
+  CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key, sizeof(poly1305_key), key, nonce,
+                   0);
+
+  static const uint8_t padding[16] = { 0 };  // Padding is all zeros.
+  poly1305_state ctx;
+  CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&ctx, poly1305_key);
+  CRYPTO_poly1305_update(&ctx, ad, ad_len);
+  if (ad_len % 16 != 0) {
+    CRYPTO_poly1305_update(&ctx, padding, sizeof(padding) - (ad_len % 16));
+  }
+  CRYPTO_poly1305_update(&ctx, ciphertext, ciphertext_len);
+  CRYPTO_poly1305_update(&ctx, ciphertext_extra, ciphertext_extra_len);
+  const size_t ciphertext_total = ciphertext_len + ciphertext_extra_len;
+  if (ciphertext_total % 16 != 0) {
+    CRYPTO_poly1305_update(&ctx, padding,
+                           sizeof(padding) - (ciphertext_total % 16));
+  }
+  poly1305_update_length(&ctx, ad_len);
+  poly1305_update_length(&ctx, ciphertext_total);
+  CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&ctx, tag);
+}
+
+static int chacha20_poly1305_seal_scatter(
+    const uint8_t *key, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag,
+    size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len, const uint8_t *nonce,
+    size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *extra_in,
+    size_t extra_in_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len, size_t tag_len) {
+  if (extra_in_len + tag_len < tag_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (max_out_tag_len < tag_len + extra_in_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (nonce_len != 12) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // |CRYPTO_chacha_20| uses a 32-bit block counter. Therefore we disallow
+  // individual operations that work on more than 256GB at a time.
+  // |in_len_64| is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only
+  // 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false.
+  // Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop
+  // the warning.
+  const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
+  if (in_len_64 >= (UINT64_C(1) << 32) * 64 - 64) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (max_out_tag_len < tag_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // The the extra input is given, it is expected to be very short and so is
+  // encrypted byte-by-byte first.
+  if (extra_in_len) {
+    static const size_t kChaChaBlockSize = 64;
+    uint32_t block_counter = 1 + (in_len / kChaChaBlockSize);
+    size_t offset = in_len % kChaChaBlockSize;
+    uint8_t block[64 /* kChaChaBlockSize */];
+
+    for (size_t done = 0; done < extra_in_len; block_counter++) {
+      memset(block, 0, sizeof(block));
+      CRYPTO_chacha_20(block, block, sizeof(block), key, nonce,
+                       block_counter);
+      for (size_t i = offset; i < sizeof(block) && done < extra_in_len;
+           i++, done++) {
+        out_tag[done] = extra_in[done] ^ block[i];
+      }
+      offset = 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  union seal_data data;
+  if (asm_capable()) {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(data.in.key, key, 32);
+    data.in.counter = 0;
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(data.in.nonce, nonce, 12);
+    data.in.extra_ciphertext = out_tag;
+    data.in.extra_ciphertext_len = extra_in_len;
+    chacha20_poly1305_seal(out, in, in_len, ad, ad_len, &data);
+  } else {
+    CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, in_len, key, nonce, 1);
+    calc_tag(data.out.tag, key, nonce, ad, ad_len, out, in_len, out_tag,
+             extra_in_len);
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_tag + extra_in_len, data.out.tag, tag_len);
+  *out_tag_len = extra_in_len + tag_len;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal_scatter(
+    const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag,
+    size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len, const uint8_t *nonce,
+    size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *extra_in,
+    size_t extra_in_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+  const struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx =
+      (struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *)&ctx->state;
+
+  return chacha20_poly1305_seal_scatter(
+      c20_ctx->key, out, out_tag, out_tag_len, max_out_tag_len, nonce,
+      nonce_len, in, in_len, extra_in, extra_in_len, ad, ad_len, ctx->tag_len);
+}
+
+static int aead_xchacha20_poly1305_seal_scatter(
+    const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag,
+    size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len, const uint8_t *nonce,
+    size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *extra_in,
+    size_t extra_in_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+  const struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx =
+      (struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *)&ctx->state;
+
+  if (nonce_len != 24) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  alignas(4) uint8_t derived_key[32];
+  alignas(4) uint8_t derived_nonce[12];
+  CRYPTO_hchacha20(derived_key, c20_ctx->key, nonce);
+  OPENSSL_memset(derived_nonce, 0, 4);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(&derived_nonce[4], &nonce[16], 8);
+
+  return chacha20_poly1305_seal_scatter(
+      derived_key, out, out_tag, out_tag_len, max_out_tag_len,
+      derived_nonce, sizeof(derived_nonce), in, in_len, extra_in, extra_in_len,
+      ad, ad_len, ctx->tag_len);
+}
+
+static int chacha20_poly1305_open_gather(
+    const uint8_t *key, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *nonce,
+    size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *in_tag,
+    size_t in_tag_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len, size_t tag_len) {
+  if (nonce_len != 12) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (in_tag_len != tag_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // |CRYPTO_chacha_20| uses a 32-bit block counter. Therefore we disallow
+  // individual operations that work on more than 256GB at a time.
+  // |in_len_64| is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only
+  // 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false.
+  // Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop
+  // the warning.
+  const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
+  if (in_len_64 >= (UINT64_C(1) << 32) * 64 - 64) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  union open_data data;
+  if (asm_capable()) {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(data.in.key, key, 32);
+    data.in.counter = 0;
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(data.in.nonce, nonce, 12);
+    chacha20_poly1305_open(out, in, in_len, ad, ad_len, &data);
+  } else {
+    calc_tag(data.out.tag, key, nonce, ad, ad_len, in, in_len, NULL, 0);
+    CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, in_len, key, nonce, 1);
+  }
+
+  if (CRYPTO_memcmp(data.out.tag, in_tag, tag_len) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_open_gather(
+    const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *nonce,
+    size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *in_tag,
+    size_t in_tag_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+  const struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx =
+      (struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *)&ctx->state;
+
+  return chacha20_poly1305_open_gather(c20_ctx->key, out, nonce, nonce_len, in,
+                                       in_len, in_tag, in_tag_len, ad, ad_len,
+                                       ctx->tag_len);
+}
+
+static int aead_xchacha20_poly1305_open_gather(
+    const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *nonce,
+    size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *in_tag,
+    size_t in_tag_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+  const struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx =
+      (struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *)&ctx->state;
+
+  if (nonce_len != 24) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  alignas(4) uint8_t derived_key[32];
+  alignas(4) uint8_t derived_nonce[12];
+  CRYPTO_hchacha20(derived_key, c20_ctx->key, nonce);
+  OPENSSL_memset(derived_nonce, 0, 4);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(&derived_nonce[4], &nonce[16], 8);
+
+  return chacha20_poly1305_open_gather(
+      derived_key, out, derived_nonce, sizeof(derived_nonce), in, in_len,
+      in_tag, in_tag_len, ad, ad_len, ctx->tag_len);
+}
+
+static const EVP_AEAD aead_chacha20_poly1305 = {
+    32,                // key len
+    12,                // nonce len
+    POLY1305_TAG_LEN,  // overhead
+    POLY1305_TAG_LEN,  // max tag length
+    1,                 // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in
+
+    aead_chacha20_poly1305_init,
+    NULL,  // init_with_direction
+    aead_chacha20_poly1305_cleanup,
+    NULL /* open */,
+    aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal_scatter,
+    aead_chacha20_poly1305_open_gather,
+    NULL,  // get_iv
+    NULL,  // tag_len
+};
+
+static const EVP_AEAD aead_xchacha20_poly1305 = {
+    32,                // key len
+    24,                // nonce len
+    POLY1305_TAG_LEN,  // overhead
+    POLY1305_TAG_LEN,  // max tag length
+    1,                 // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in
+
+    aead_chacha20_poly1305_init,
+    NULL,  // init_with_direction
+    aead_chacha20_poly1305_cleanup,
+    NULL /* open */,
+    aead_xchacha20_poly1305_seal_scatter,
+    aead_xchacha20_poly1305_open_gather,
+    NULL,  // get_iv
+    NULL,  // tag_len
+};
+
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305(void) {
+  return &aead_chacha20_poly1305;
+}
+
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_xchacha20_poly1305(void) {
+  return &aead_xchacha20_poly1305;
+}

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/cipher_extra/e_tls.c

@@ -0,0 +1,688 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/aead.h>
+#include <openssl/cipher.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/type_check.h>
+
+#include "../fipsmodule/cipher/internal.h"
+#include "../internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+typedef struct {
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX cipher_ctx;
+  HMAC_CTX hmac_ctx;
+  // mac_key is the portion of the key used for the MAC. It is retained
+  // separately for the constant-time CBC code.
+  uint8_t mac_key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  uint8_t mac_key_len;
+  // implicit_iv is one iff this is a pre-TLS-1.1 CBC cipher without an explicit
+  // IV.
+  char implicit_iv;
+} AEAD_TLS_CTX;
+
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE < 256,
+                      "mac_key_len does not fit in uint8_t");
+
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
+                          sizeof(AEAD_TLS_CTX),
+                      "AEAD state is too small");
+#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
+                          alignof(AEAD_TLS_CTX),
+                      "AEAD state has insufficient alignment");
+#endif
+
+static void aead_tls_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {
+  AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX *)&ctx->state;
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx);
+  HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx);
+}
+
+static int aead_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len,
+                         size_t tag_len, enum evp_aead_direction_t dir,
+                         const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md,
+                         char implicit_iv) {
+  if (tag_len != EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH &&
+      tag_len != EVP_MD_size(md)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_TAG_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (key_len != EVP_AEAD_key_length(ctx->aead)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_KEY_LENGTH);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  size_t mac_key_len = EVP_MD_size(md);
+  size_t enc_key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
+  assert(mac_key_len + enc_key_len +
+         (implicit_iv ? EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) : 0) == key_len);
+
+  AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX *)&ctx->state;
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx);
+  HMAC_CTX_init(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx);
+  assert(mac_key_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(tls_ctx->mac_key, key, mac_key_len);
+  tls_ctx->mac_key_len = (uint8_t)mac_key_len;
+  tls_ctx->implicit_iv = implicit_iv;
+
+  if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, &key[mac_key_len],
+                         implicit_iv ? &key[mac_key_len + enc_key_len] : NULL,
+                         dir == evp_aead_seal) ||
+      !HMAC_Init_ex(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, key, mac_key_len, md, NULL)) {
+    aead_tls_cleanup(ctx);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, 0);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static size_t aead_tls_tag_len(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const size_t in_len,
+                               const size_t extra_in_len) {
+  assert(extra_in_len == 0);
+  const AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX *)&ctx->state;
+
+  const size_t hmac_len = HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx);
+  if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+    // The NULL cipher.
+    return hmac_len;
+  }
+
+  const size_t block_size = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx);
+  // An overflow of |in_len + hmac_len| doesn't affect the result mod
+  // |block_size|, provided that |block_size| is a smaller power of two.
+  assert(block_size != 0 && (block_size & (block_size - 1)) == 0);
+  const size_t pad_len = block_size - (in_len + hmac_len) % block_size;
+  return hmac_len + pad_len;
+}
+
+static int aead_tls_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
+                                 uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len,
+                                 const size_t max_out_tag_len,
+                                 const uint8_t *nonce, const size_t nonce_len,
+                                 const uint8_t *in, const size_t in_len,
+                                 const uint8_t *extra_in,
+                                 const size_t extra_in_len, const uint8_t *ad,
+                                 const size_t ad_len) {
+  AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX *)&ctx->state;
+
+  if (!tls_ctx->cipher_ctx.encrypt) {
+    // Unlike a normal AEAD, a TLS AEAD may only be used in one direction.
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (in_len > INT_MAX) {
+    // EVP_CIPHER takes int as input.
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (max_out_tag_len < aead_tls_tag_len(ctx, in_len, extra_in_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(ctx->aead)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (ad_len != 13 - 2 /* length bytes */) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_AD_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // To allow for CBC mode which changes cipher length, |ad| doesn't include the
+  // length for legacy ciphers.
+  uint8_t ad_extra[2];
+  ad_extra[0] = (uint8_t)(in_len >> 8);
+  ad_extra[1] = (uint8_t)(in_len & 0xff);
+
+  // Compute the MAC. This must be first in case the operation is being done
+  // in-place.
+  uint8_t mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  unsigned mac_len;
+  if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) ||
+      !HMAC_Update(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, ad, ad_len) ||
+      !HMAC_Update(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, ad_extra, sizeof(ad_extra)) ||
+      !HMAC_Update(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, in, in_len) ||
+      !HMAC_Final(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, mac, &mac_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Configure the explicit IV.
+  if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+      !tls_ctx->implicit_iv &&
+      !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, nonce)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Encrypt the input.
+  int len;
+  if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out, &len, in, (int)in_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  unsigned block_size = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx);
+
+  // Feed the MAC into the cipher in two steps. First complete the final partial
+  // block from encrypting the input and split the result between |out| and
+  // |out_tag|. Then feed the rest.
+
+  const size_t early_mac_len = (block_size - (in_len % block_size)) % block_size;
+  if (early_mac_len != 0) {
+    assert(len + block_size - early_mac_len == in_len);
+    uint8_t buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+    int buf_len;
+    if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, buf, &buf_len, mac,
+                           (int)early_mac_len)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    assert(buf_len == (int)block_size);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(out + len, buf, block_size - early_mac_len);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(out_tag, buf + block_size - early_mac_len, early_mac_len);
+  }
+  size_t tag_len = early_mac_len;
+
+  if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out_tag + tag_len, &len,
+                         mac + tag_len, mac_len - tag_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  tag_len += len;
+
+  if (block_size > 1) {
+    assert(block_size <= 256);
+    assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE);
+
+    // Compute padding and feed that into the cipher.
+    uint8_t padding[256];
+    unsigned padding_len = block_size - ((in_len + mac_len) % block_size);
+    OPENSSL_memset(padding, padding_len - 1, padding_len);
+    if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out_tag + tag_len, &len,
+                           padding, (int)padding_len)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    tag_len += len;
+  }
+
+  if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out_tag + tag_len, &len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  assert(len == 0);  // Padding is explicit.
+  assert(tag_len == aead_tls_tag_len(ctx, in_len, extra_in_len));
+
+  *out_tag_len = tag_len;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int aead_tls_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+                         size_t max_out_len, const uint8_t *nonce,
+                         size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+                         const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+  AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX *)&ctx->state;
+
+  if (tls_ctx->cipher_ctx.encrypt) {
+    // Unlike a normal AEAD, a TLS AEAD may only be used in one direction.
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (in_len < HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (max_out_len < in_len) {
+    // This requires that the caller provide space for the MAC, even though it
+    // will always be removed on return.
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(ctx->aead)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (ad_len != 13 - 2 /* length bytes */) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_AD_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (in_len > INT_MAX) {
+    // EVP_CIPHER takes int as input.
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Configure the explicit IV.
+  if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+      !tls_ctx->implicit_iv &&
+      !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, nonce)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Decrypt to get the plaintext + MAC + padding.
+  size_t total = 0;
+  int len;
+  if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out, &len, in, (int)in_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  total += len;
+  if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx, out + total, &len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  total += len;
+  assert(total == in_len);
+
+  CONSTTIME_SECRET(out, total);
+
+  // Remove CBC padding. Code from here on is timing-sensitive with respect to
+  // |padding_ok| and |data_plus_mac_len| for CBC ciphers.
+  size_t data_plus_mac_len;
+  crypto_word_t padding_ok;
+  if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+    if (!EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding(
+            &padding_ok, &data_plus_mac_len, out, total,
+            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx),
+            HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx))) {
+      // Publicly invalid. This can be rejected in non-constant time.
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  } else {
+    padding_ok = CONSTTIME_TRUE_W;
+    data_plus_mac_len = total;
+    // |data_plus_mac_len| = |total| = |in_len| at this point. |in_len| has
+    // already been checked against the MAC size at the top of the function.
+    assert(data_plus_mac_len >= HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx));
+  }
+  size_t data_len = data_plus_mac_len - HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx);
+
+  // At this point, if the padding is valid, the first |data_plus_mac_len| bytes
+  // after |out| are the plaintext and MAC. Otherwise, |data_plus_mac_len| is
+  // still large enough to extract a MAC, but it will be irrelevant.
+
+  // To allow for CBC mode which changes cipher length, |ad| doesn't include the
+  // length for legacy ciphers.
+  uint8_t ad_fixed[13];
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(ad_fixed, ad, 11);
+  ad_fixed[11] = (uint8_t)(data_len >> 8);
+  ad_fixed[12] = (uint8_t)(data_len & 0xff);
+  ad_len += 2;
+
+  // Compute the MAC and extract the one in the record.
+  uint8_t mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  size_t mac_len;
+  uint8_t record_mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  uint8_t *record_mac;
+  if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+      EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported(tls_ctx->hmac_ctx.md)) {
+    if (!EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record(tls_ctx->hmac_ctx.md, mac, &mac_len,
+                                   ad_fixed, out, data_plus_mac_len, total,
+                                   tls_ctx->mac_key, tls_ctx->mac_key_len)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    assert(mac_len == HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx));
+
+    record_mac = record_mac_tmp;
+    EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac(record_mac, mac_len, out, data_plus_mac_len, total);
+  } else {
+    // We should support the constant-time path for all CBC-mode ciphers
+    // implemented.
+    assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE);
+
+    unsigned mac_len_u;
+    if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) ||
+        !HMAC_Update(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, ad_fixed, ad_len) ||
+        !HMAC_Update(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, out, data_len) ||
+        !HMAC_Final(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, mac, &mac_len_u)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    mac_len = mac_len_u;
+
+    assert(mac_len == HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx));
+    record_mac = &out[data_len];
+  }
+
+  // Perform the MAC check and the padding check in constant-time. It should be
+  // safe to simply perform the padding check first, but it would not be under a
+  // different choice of MAC location on padding failure. See
+  // EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding.
+  crypto_word_t good =
+      constant_time_eq_int(CRYPTO_memcmp(record_mac, mac, mac_len), 0);
+  good &= padding_ok;
+  CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(&good, sizeof(good));
+  if (!good) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(&data_len, sizeof(data_len));
+  CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(out, data_len);
+
+  // End of timing-sensitive code.
+
+  *out_len = data_len;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
+                                          size_t key_len, size_t tag_len,
+                                          enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
+  return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_aes_128_cbc(),
+                       EVP_sha1(), 0);
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init(
+    EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, size_t tag_len,
+    enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
+  return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_aes_128_cbc(),
+                       EVP_sha1(), 1);
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
+                                            const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len,
+                                            size_t tag_len,
+                                            enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
+  return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_aes_128_cbc(),
+                       EVP_sha256(), 0);
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
+                                          size_t key_len, size_t tag_len,
+                                          enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
+  return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_aes_256_cbc(),
+                       EVP_sha1(), 0);
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init(
+    EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, size_t tag_len,
+    enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
+  return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_aes_256_cbc(),
+                       EVP_sha1(), 1);
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
+                                            const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len,
+                                            size_t tag_len,
+                                            enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
+  return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_aes_256_cbc(),
+                       EVP_sha256(), 0);
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
+                                            const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len,
+                                            size_t tag_len,
+                                            enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
+  return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_aes_256_cbc(),
+                       EVP_sha384(), 0);
+}
+
+static int aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
+                                           const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len,
+                                           size_t tag_len,
+                                           enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
+  return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(),
+                       EVP_sha1(), 0);
+}
+
+static int aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init(
+    EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, size_t tag_len,
+    enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
+  return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(),
+                       EVP_sha1(), 1);
+}
+
+static int aead_tls_get_iv(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t **out_iv,
+                           size_t *out_iv_len) {
+  const AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX *)&ctx->state;
+  const size_t iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx);
+  if (iv_len <= 1) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  *out_iv = tls_ctx->cipher_ctx.iv;
+  *out_iv_len = iv_len;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int aead_null_sha1_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
+                                   size_t key_len, size_t tag_len,
+                                   enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
+  return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_enc_null(),
+                       EVP_sha1(), 1 /* implicit iv */);
+}
+
+static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls = {
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16,  // key len (SHA1 + AES128)
+    16,                      // nonce len (IV)
+    16 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,  // overhead (padding + SHA1)
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,       // max tag length
+    0,                       // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in
+
+    NULL,  // init
+    aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_init,
+    aead_tls_cleanup,
+    aead_tls_open,
+    aead_tls_seal_scatter,
+    NULL,  // open_gather
+    NULL,  // get_iv
+    aead_tls_tag_len,
+};
+
+static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv = {
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16 + 16,  // key len (SHA1 + AES128 + IV)
+    0,                            // nonce len
+    16 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,       // overhead (padding + SHA1)
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,            // max tag length
+    0,                            // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in
+
+    NULL,  // init
+    aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init,
+    aead_tls_cleanup,
+    aead_tls_open,
+    aead_tls_seal_scatter,
+    NULL,             // open_gather
+    aead_tls_get_iv,  // get_iv
+    aead_tls_tag_len,
+};
+
+static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls = {
+    SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16,  // key len (SHA256 + AES128)
+    16,                         // nonce len (IV)
+    16 + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,  // overhead (padding + SHA256)
+    SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,       // max tag length
+    0,                          // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in
+
+    NULL,  // init
+    aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls_init,
+    aead_tls_cleanup,
+    aead_tls_open,
+    aead_tls_seal_scatter,
+    NULL,  // open_gather
+    NULL,  // get_iv
+    aead_tls_tag_len,
+};
+
+static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls = {
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32,  // key len (SHA1 + AES256)
+    16,                      // nonce len (IV)
+    16 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,  // overhead (padding + SHA1)
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,       // max tag length
+    0,                       // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in
+
+    NULL,  // init
+    aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_init,
+    aead_tls_cleanup,
+    aead_tls_open,
+    aead_tls_seal_scatter,
+    NULL,  // open_gather
+    NULL,  // get_iv
+    aead_tls_tag_len,
+};
+
+static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv = {
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32 + 16,  // key len (SHA1 + AES256 + IV)
+    0,                            // nonce len
+    16 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,       // overhead (padding + SHA1)
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,            // max tag length
+    0,                            // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in
+
+    NULL,  // init
+    aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init,
+    aead_tls_cleanup,
+    aead_tls_open,
+    aead_tls_seal_scatter,
+    NULL,             // open_gather
+    aead_tls_get_iv,  // get_iv
+    aead_tls_tag_len,
+};
+
+static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls = {
+    SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32,  // key len (SHA256 + AES256)
+    16,                         // nonce len (IV)
+    16 + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,  // overhead (padding + SHA256)
+    SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,       // max tag length
+    0,                          // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in
+
+    NULL,  // init
+    aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls_init,
+    aead_tls_cleanup,
+    aead_tls_open,
+    aead_tls_seal_scatter,
+    NULL,  // open_gather
+    NULL,  // get_iv
+    aead_tls_tag_len,
+};
+
+static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls = {
+    SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32,  // key len (SHA384 + AES256)
+    16,                         // nonce len (IV)
+    16 + SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,  // overhead (padding + SHA384)
+    SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,       // max tag length
+    0,                          // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in
+
+    NULL,  // init
+    aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls_init,
+    aead_tls_cleanup,
+    aead_tls_open,
+    aead_tls_seal_scatter,
+    NULL,  // open_gather
+    NULL,  // get_iv
+    aead_tls_tag_len,
+};
+
+static const EVP_AEAD aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls = {
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 24,  // key len (SHA1 + 3DES)
+    8,                       // nonce len (IV)
+    8 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,   // overhead (padding + SHA1)
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,       // max tag length
+    0,                       // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in
+
+    NULL,  // init
+    aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_init,
+    aead_tls_cleanup,
+    aead_tls_open,
+    aead_tls_seal_scatter,
+    NULL,  // open_gather
+    NULL,  // get_iv
+    aead_tls_tag_len,
+};
+
+static const EVP_AEAD aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv = {
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 24 + 8,  // key len (SHA1 + 3DES + IV)
+    0,                           // nonce len
+    8 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,       // overhead (padding + SHA1)
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,           // max tag length
+    0,                           // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in
+
+    NULL,  // init
+    aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init,
+    aead_tls_cleanup,
+    aead_tls_open,
+    aead_tls_seal_scatter,
+    NULL,             // open_gather
+    aead_tls_get_iv,  // get_iv
+    aead_tls_tag_len,
+};
+
+static const EVP_AEAD aead_null_sha1_tls = {
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,  // key len
+    0,                  // nonce len
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,  // overhead (SHA1)
+    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,  // max tag length
+    0,                  // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in
+
+    NULL,  // init
+    aead_null_sha1_tls_init,
+    aead_tls_cleanup,
+    aead_tls_open,
+    aead_tls_seal_scatter,
+    NULL,  // open_gather
+    NULL,  // get_iv
+    aead_tls_tag_len,
+};
+
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls(void) {
+  return &aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls;
+}
+
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv(void) {
+  return &aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv;
+}
+
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls(void) {
+  return &aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls;
+}
+
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls(void) {
+  return &aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls;
+}
+
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv(void) {
+  return &aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv;
+}
+
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls(void) {
+  return &aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls;
+}
+
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls(void) {
+  return &aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls;
+}
+
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls(void) {
+  return &aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls;
+}
+
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv(void) {
+  return &aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv;
+}
+
+const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_null_sha1_tls(void) { return &aead_null_sha1_tls; }