grpc 1.15.0 → 1.30.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/ssl_versions.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,394 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2017, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+bool ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(uint16_t *out, uint16_t version) {
+  switch (version) {
+    case TLS1_VERSION:
+    case TLS1_1_VERSION:
+    case TLS1_2_VERSION:
+    case TLS1_3_VERSION:
+      *out = version;
+      return true;
+
+    case DTLS1_VERSION:
+      // DTLS 1.0 is analogous to TLS 1.1, not TLS 1.0.
+      *out = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+      return true;
+
+    case DTLS1_2_VERSION:
+      *out = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+      return true;
+
+    default:
+      return false;
+  }
+}
+
+// The follow arrays are the supported versions for TLS and DTLS, in order of
+// decreasing preference.
+
+static const uint16_t kTLSVersions[] = {
+    TLS1_3_VERSION,
+    TLS1_2_VERSION,
+    TLS1_1_VERSION,
+    TLS1_VERSION,
+};
+
+static const uint16_t kDTLSVersions[] = {
+    DTLS1_2_VERSION,
+    DTLS1_VERSION,
+};
+
+static Span<const uint16_t> get_method_versions(
+    const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *method) {
+  return method->is_dtls ? Span<const uint16_t>(kDTLSVersions)
+                         : Span<const uint16_t>(kTLSVersions);
+}
+
+bool ssl_method_supports_version(const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *method,
+                                 uint16_t version) {
+  for (uint16_t supported : get_method_versions(method)) {
+    if (supported == version) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+// The following functions map between API versions and wire versions. The
+// public API works on wire versions.
+
+static const char *ssl_version_to_string(uint16_t version) {
+  switch (version) {
+    case TLS1_3_VERSION:
+      return "TLSv1.3";
+
+    case TLS1_2_VERSION:
+      return "TLSv1.2";
+
+    case TLS1_1_VERSION:
+      return "TLSv1.1";
+
+    case TLS1_VERSION:
+      return "TLSv1";
+
+    case DTLS1_VERSION:
+      return "DTLSv1";
+
+    case DTLS1_2_VERSION:
+      return "DTLSv1.2";
+
+    default:
+      return "unknown";
+  }
+}
+
+static uint16_t wire_version_to_api(uint16_t version) {
+  return version;
+}
+
+// api_version_to_wire maps |version| to some representative wire version.
+static bool api_version_to_wire(uint16_t *out, uint16_t version) {
+  // Check it is a real protocol version.
+  uint16_t unused;
+  if (!ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(&unused, version)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  *out = version;
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool set_version_bound(const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *method, uint16_t *out,
+                              uint16_t version) {
+  if (!api_version_to_wire(&version, version) ||
+      !ssl_method_supports_version(method, version)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  *out = version;
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool set_min_version(const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *method, uint16_t *out,
+                            uint16_t version) {
+  // Zero is interpreted as the default minimum version.
+  if (version == 0) {
+    *out = method->is_dtls ? DTLS1_VERSION : TLS1_VERSION;
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  return set_version_bound(method, out, version);
+}
+
+static bool set_max_version(const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *method, uint16_t *out,
+                            uint16_t version) {
+  // Zero is interpreted as the default maximum version.
+  if (version == 0) {
+    *out = method->is_dtls ? DTLS1_2_VERSION : TLS1_3_VERSION;
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  return set_version_bound(method, out, version);
+}
+
+const struct {
+  uint16_t version;
+  uint32_t flag;
+} kProtocolVersions[] = {
+    {TLS1_VERSION, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1},
+    {TLS1_1_VERSION, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1},
+    {TLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2},
+    {TLS1_3_VERSION, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3},
+};
+
+bool ssl_get_version_range(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t *out_min_version,
+                           uint16_t *out_max_version) {
+  // For historical reasons, |SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1| aliases |SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|, but
+  // DTLS 1.0 should be mapped to TLS 1.1.
+  uint32_t options = hs->ssl->options;
+  if (SSL_is_dtls(hs->ssl)) {
+    options &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
+    if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) {
+      options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
+    }
+  }
+
+  uint16_t min_version, max_version;
+  if (!ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(&min_version,
+                                      hs->config->conf_min_version) ||
+      !ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(&max_version,
+                                      hs->config->conf_max_version)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // QUIC requires TLS 1.3.
+  if (hs->ssl->quic_method && min_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    min_version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
+  }
+
+  // OpenSSL's API for controlling versions entails blacklisting individual
+  // protocols. This has two problems. First, on the client, the protocol can
+  // only express a contiguous range of versions. Second, a library consumer
+  // trying to set a maximum version cannot disable protocol versions that get
+  // added in a future version of the library.
+  //
+  // To account for both of these, OpenSSL interprets the client-side bitmask
+  // as a min/max range by picking the lowest contiguous non-empty range of
+  // enabled protocols. Note that this means it is impossible to set a maximum
+  // version of the higest supported TLS version in a future-proof way.
+  bool any_enabled = false;
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kProtocolVersions); i++) {
+    // Only look at the versions already enabled.
+    if (min_version > kProtocolVersions[i].version) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (max_version < kProtocolVersions[i].version) {
+      break;
+    }
+
+    if (!(options & kProtocolVersions[i].flag)) {
+      // The minimum version is the first enabled version.
+      if (!any_enabled) {
+        any_enabled = true;
+        min_version = kProtocolVersions[i].version;
+      }
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // If there is a disabled version after the first enabled one, all versions
+    // after it are implicitly disabled.
+    if (any_enabled) {
+      max_version = kProtocolVersions[i-1].version;
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!any_enabled) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS_ENABLED);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  *out_min_version = min_version;
+  *out_max_version = max_version;
+  return true;
+}
+
+static uint16_t ssl_version(const SSL *ssl) {
+  // In early data, we report the predicted version.
+  if (SSL_in_early_data(ssl) && !ssl->server) {
+    return ssl->s3->hs->early_session->ssl_version;
+  }
+  return ssl->version;
+}
+
+uint16_t ssl_protocol_version(const SSL *ssl) {
+  assert(ssl->s3->have_version);
+  uint16_t version;
+  if (!ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(&version, ssl->version)) {
+    // |ssl->version| will always be set to a valid version.
+    assert(0);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return version;
+}
+
+bool ssl_supports_version(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t version) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  uint16_t protocol_version;
+  if (!ssl_method_supports_version(ssl->method, version) ||
+      !ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(&protocol_version, version) ||
+      hs->min_version > protocol_version ||
+      protocol_version > hs->max_version) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl_add_supported_versions(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *cbb) {
+  for (uint16_t version : get_method_versions(hs->ssl->method)) {
+    if (ssl_supports_version(hs, version) &&
+        !CBB_add_u16(cbb, version)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl_negotiate_version(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                           uint16_t *out_version, const CBS *peer_versions) {
+  for (uint16_t version : get_method_versions(hs->ssl->method)) {
+    if (!ssl_supports_version(hs, version)) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // JDK 11, prior to 11.0.2, has a buggy TLS 1.3 implementation which fails
+    // to send SNI when offering 1.3 sessions. Disable TLS 1.3 for such
+    // clients. We apply this logic here rather than |ssl_supports_version| so
+    // the downgrade signal continues to query the true capabilities. (The
+    // workaround is a limitation of the peer's capabilities rather than our
+    // own.)
+    //
+    // See https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8211806.
+    if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION && hs->apply_jdk11_workaround) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    CBS copy = *peer_versions;
+    while (CBS_len(&copy) != 0) {
+      uint16_t peer_version;
+      if (!CBS_get_u16(&copy, &peer_version)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+        *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+        return false;
+      }
+
+      if (peer_version == version) {
+        *out_version = version;
+        return true;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+  *out_alert = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+  return false;
+}
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t version) {
+  return set_min_version(ctx->method, &ctx->conf_min_version, version);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint16_t version) {
+  return set_max_version(ctx->method, &ctx->conf_max_version, version);
+}
+
+uint16_t SSL_CTX_get_min_proto_version(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->conf_min_version;
+}
+
+uint16_t SSL_CTX_get_max_proto_version(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->conf_max_version;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_min_proto_version(SSL *ssl, uint16_t version) {
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return set_min_version(ssl->method, &ssl->config->conf_min_version, version);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_max_proto_version(SSL *ssl, uint16_t version) {
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return set_max_version(ssl->method, &ssl->config->conf_max_version, version);
+}
+
+uint16_t SSL_get_min_proto_version(const SSL *ssl) {
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return ssl->config->conf_min_version;
+}
+
+uint16_t SSL_get_max_proto_version(const SSL *ssl) {
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return ssl->config->conf_max_version;
+}
+
+int SSL_version(const SSL *ssl) {
+  return wire_version_to_api(ssl_version(ssl));
+}
+
+const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *ssl) {
+  return ssl_version_to_string(ssl_version(ssl));
+}
+
+const char *SSL_SESSION_get_version(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return ssl_version_to_string(session->ssl_version);
+}
+
+uint16_t SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  return wire_version_to_api(session->ssl_version);
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(SSL_SESSION *session, uint16_t version) {
+  // This picks a representative TLS 1.3 version, but this API should only be
+  // used on unit test sessions anyway.
+  return api_version_to_wire(&session->ssl_version, version);
+}

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/ssl_x509.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,1358 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+// check_ssl_x509_method asserts that |ssl| has the X509-based method
+// installed. Calling an X509-based method on an |ssl| with a different method
+// will likely misbehave and possibly crash or leak memory.
+static void check_ssl_x509_method(const SSL *ssl) {
+  assert(ssl == NULL || ssl->ctx->x509_method == &ssl_crypto_x509_method);
+}
+
+// check_ssl_ctx_x509_method acts like |check_ssl_x509_method|, but for an
+// |SSL_CTX|.
+static void check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  assert(ctx == NULL || ctx->x509_method == &ssl_crypto_x509_method);
+}
+
+// x509_to_buffer returns a |CRYPTO_BUFFER| that contains the serialised
+// contents of |x509|.
+static UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> x509_to_buffer(X509 *x509) {
+  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+  int cert_len = i2d_X509(x509, &buf);
+  if (cert_len <= 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buffer(CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(buf, cert_len, NULL));
+  OPENSSL_free(buf);
+
+  return buffer;
+}
+
+// new_leafless_chain returns a fresh stack of buffers set to {NULL}.
+static UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> new_leafless_chain(void) {
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> chain(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null());
+  if (!chain ||
+      !sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(chain.get(), nullptr)) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  return chain;
+}
+
+// ssl_cert_set_chain sets elements 1.. of |cert->chain| to the serialised
+// forms of elements of |chain|. It returns one on success or zero on error, in
+// which case no change to |cert->chain| is made. It preverses the existing
+// leaf from |cert->chain|, if any.
+static bool ssl_cert_set_chain(CERT *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> new_chain;
+
+  if (cert->chain != nullptr) {
+    new_chain.reset(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null());
+    if (!new_chain) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    // |leaf| might be NULL if it's a “leafless” chain.
+    CRYPTO_BUFFER *leaf = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain.get(), 0);
+    if (!PushToStack(new_chain.get(), UpRef(leaf))) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  for (X509 *x509 : chain) {
+    if (!new_chain) {
+      new_chain = new_leafless_chain();
+      if (!new_chain) {
+        return false;
+      }
+    }
+
+    UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buffer = x509_to_buffer(x509);
+    if (!buffer ||
+        !PushToStack(new_chain.get(), std::move(buffer))) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  cert->chain = std::move(new_chain);
+  return true;
+}
+
+static void ssl_crypto_x509_cert_flush_cached_leaf(CERT *cert) {
+  X509_free(cert->x509_leaf);
+  cert->x509_leaf = nullptr;
+}
+
+static void ssl_crypto_x509_cert_flush_cached_chain(CERT *cert) {
+  sk_X509_pop_free(cert->x509_chain, X509_free);
+  cert->x509_chain = nullptr;
+}
+
+static bool ssl_crypto_x509_check_client_CA_list(
+    STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *names) {
+  for (const CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer : names) {
+    const uint8_t *inp = CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buffer);
+    UniquePtr<X509_NAME> name(
+        d2i_X509_NAME(nullptr, &inp, CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buffer)));
+    if (name == nullptr ||
+        inp != CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buffer) + CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buffer)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static void ssl_crypto_x509_cert_clear(CERT *cert) {
+  ssl_crypto_x509_cert_flush_cached_leaf(cert);
+  ssl_crypto_x509_cert_flush_cached_chain(cert);
+
+  X509_free(cert->x509_stash);
+  cert->x509_stash = nullptr;
+}
+
+static void ssl_crypto_x509_cert_free(CERT *cert) {
+  ssl_crypto_x509_cert_clear(cert);
+  X509_STORE_free(cert->verify_store);
+}
+
+static void ssl_crypto_x509_cert_dup(CERT *new_cert, const CERT *cert) {
+  if (cert->verify_store != nullptr) {
+    X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->verify_store);
+    new_cert->verify_store = cert->verify_store;
+  }
+}
+
+static bool ssl_crypto_x509_session_cache_objects(SSL_SESSION *sess) {
+  bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509)> chain, chain_without_leaf;
+  if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(sess->certs.get()) > 0) {
+    chain.reset(sk_X509_new_null());
+    if (!chain) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return false;
+    }
+    if (sess->is_server) {
+      // chain_without_leaf is only needed for server sessions. See
+      // |SSL_get_peer_cert_chain|.
+      chain_without_leaf.reset(sk_X509_new_null());
+      if (!chain_without_leaf) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return false;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf;
+  for (CRYPTO_BUFFER *cert : sess->certs.get()) {
+    UniquePtr<X509> x509(X509_parse_from_buffer(cert));
+    if (!x509) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      return false;
+    }
+    if (leaf == nullptr) {
+      leaf = UpRef(x509);
+    } else if (chain_without_leaf &&
+               !PushToStack(chain_without_leaf.get(), UpRef(x509))) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return false;
+    }
+    if (!PushToStack(chain.get(), std::move(x509))) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  sk_X509_pop_free(sess->x509_chain, X509_free);
+  sess->x509_chain = chain.release();
+
+  sk_X509_pop_free(sess->x509_chain_without_leaf, X509_free);
+  sess->x509_chain_without_leaf = chain_without_leaf.release();
+
+  X509_free(sess->x509_peer);
+  sess->x509_peer = leaf.release();
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ssl_crypto_x509_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *new_session,
+                                        const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  new_session->x509_peer = UpRef(session->x509_peer).release();
+  if (session->x509_chain != nullptr) {
+    new_session->x509_chain = X509_chain_up_ref(session->x509_chain);
+    if (new_session->x509_chain == nullptr) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  if (session->x509_chain_without_leaf != nullptr) {
+    new_session->x509_chain_without_leaf =
+        X509_chain_up_ref(session->x509_chain_without_leaf);
+    if (new_session->x509_chain_without_leaf == nullptr) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static void ssl_crypto_x509_session_clear(SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  X509_free(session->x509_peer);
+  session->x509_peer = nullptr;
+  sk_X509_pop_free(session->x509_chain, X509_free);
+  session->x509_chain = nullptr;
+  sk_X509_pop_free(session->x509_chain_without_leaf, X509_free);
+  session->x509_chain_without_leaf = nullptr;
+}
+
+static bool ssl_crypto_x509_session_verify_cert_chain(SSL_SESSION *session,
+                                                      SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                                      uint8_t *out_alert) {
+  *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+  STACK_OF(X509) *const cert_chain = session->x509_chain;
+  if (cert_chain == nullptr || sk_X509_num(cert_chain) == 0) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = hs->ssl->ctx.get();
+  X509_STORE *verify_store = ssl_ctx->cert_store;
+  if (hs->config->cert->verify_store != nullptr) {
+    verify_store = hs->config->cert->verify_store;
+  }
+
+  X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(cert_chain, 0);
+  ScopedX509_STORE_CTX ctx;
+  if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx.get(), verify_store, leaf, cert_chain) ||
+      !X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(
+          ctx.get(), SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), hs->ssl) ||
+      // We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by
+      // the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates or
+      // vice versa.
+      !X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(
+          ctx.get(), hs->ssl->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server") ||
+      // Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the ctx.
+      !X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx.get()),
+                              hs->config->param)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (hs->config->verify_callback) {
+    X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx.get(), hs->config->verify_callback);
+  }
+
+  int verify_ret;
+  if (ssl_ctx->app_verify_callback != nullptr) {
+    verify_ret =
+        ssl_ctx->app_verify_callback(ctx.get(), ssl_ctx->app_verify_arg);
+  } else {
+    verify_ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx.get());
+  }
+
+  session->verify_result = ctx->error;
+
+  // If |SSL_VERIFY_NONE|, the error is non-fatal, but we keep the result.
+  if (verify_ret <= 0 && hs->config->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_alert_from_verify_result(ctx->error);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  ERR_clear_error();
+  return true;
+}
+
+static void ssl_crypto_x509_hs_flush_cached_ca_names(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(hs->cached_x509_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
+  hs->cached_x509_ca_names = nullptr;
+}
+
+static bool ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_new(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  hs->config->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+  if (hs->config->param == nullptr) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(hs->config->param, hs->ssl->ctx->param);
+  return true;
+}
+
+static void ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_flush_cached_client_CA(SSL_CONFIG *cfg) {
+  sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(cfg->cached_x509_client_CA, X509_NAME_free);
+  cfg->cached_x509_client_CA = nullptr;
+}
+
+static void ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_config_free(SSL_CONFIG *cfg) {
+  sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(cfg->cached_x509_client_CA, X509_NAME_free);
+  cfg->cached_x509_client_CA = nullptr;
+  X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(cfg->param);
+}
+
+static bool ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_auto_chain_if_needed(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  // Only build a chain if there are no intermediates configured and the feature
+  // isn't disabled.
+  if ((hs->ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) ||
+      !ssl_has_certificate(hs) || hs->config->cert->chain == NULL ||
+      sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->config->cert->chain.get()) > 1) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<X509> leaf(X509_parse_from_buffer(
+      sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(hs->config->cert->chain.get(), 0)));
+  if (!leaf) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  ScopedX509_STORE_CTX ctx;
+  if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx.get(), hs->ssl->ctx->cert_store, leaf.get(),
+                           NULL)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Attempt to build a chain, ignoring the result.
+  X509_verify_cert(ctx.get());
+  ERR_clear_error();
+
+  // Remove the leaf from the generated chain.
+  X509_free(sk_X509_shift(ctx->chain));
+
+  if (!ssl_cert_set_chain(hs->config->cert.get(), ctx->chain)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  ssl_crypto_x509_cert_flush_cached_chain(hs->config->cert.get());
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static void ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_ctx_flush_cached_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ctx->cached_x509_client_CA, X509_NAME_free);
+  ctx->cached_x509_client_CA = nullptr;
+}
+
+static bool ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_ctx_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  ctx->cert_store = X509_STORE_new();
+  ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+  return (ctx->cert_store != nullptr && ctx->param != nullptr);
+}
+
+static void ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_ctx_free(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_ctx_flush_cached_client_CA(ctx);
+  X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+  X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store);
+}
+
+const SSL_X509_METHOD ssl_crypto_x509_method = {
+  ssl_crypto_x509_check_client_CA_list,
+  ssl_crypto_x509_cert_clear,
+  ssl_crypto_x509_cert_free,
+  ssl_crypto_x509_cert_dup,
+  ssl_crypto_x509_cert_flush_cached_chain,
+  ssl_crypto_x509_cert_flush_cached_leaf,
+  ssl_crypto_x509_session_cache_objects,
+  ssl_crypto_x509_session_dup,
+  ssl_crypto_x509_session_clear,
+  ssl_crypto_x509_session_verify_cert_chain,
+  ssl_crypto_x509_hs_flush_cached_ca_names,
+  ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_new,
+  ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_config_free,
+  ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_flush_cached_client_CA,
+  ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_auto_chain_if_needed,
+  ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_ctx_new,
+  ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_ctx_free,
+  ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_ctx_flush_cached_client_CA,
+};
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *ssl) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  if (ssl == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+  if (session == NULL || session->x509_peer == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  X509_up_ref(session->x509_peer);
+  return session->x509_peer;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *ssl) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  if (ssl == nullptr) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+  if (session == nullptr) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // OpenSSL historically didn't include the leaf certificate in the returned
+  // certificate chain, but only for servers.
+  return ssl->server ? session->x509_chain_without_leaf : session->x509_chain;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_full_cert_chain(const SSL *ssl) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+  if (session == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  return session->x509_chain;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *ctx, int purpose) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(ctx->param, purpose);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *ssl, int purpose) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(ssl->config->param, purpose);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *ctx, int trust) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(ctx->param, trust);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_trust(SSL *ssl, int trust) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(ssl->config->param, trust);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, param);
+}
+
+int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->config->param, param);
+}
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_CTX_get0_param(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  return ctx->param;
+}
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_get0_param(SSL *ssl) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    assert(ssl->config);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return ssl->config->param;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *ssl) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    assert(ssl->config);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ssl->config->param);
+}
+
+int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *ssl))(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    assert(ssl->config);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return ssl->config->verify_callback;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  return ctx->verify_mode;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param);
+}
+
+int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(
+    int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  return ctx->default_verify_callback;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_verify(SSL *ssl, int mode,
+                    int (*callback)(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx)) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    return;
+  }
+  ssl->config->verify_mode = mode;
+  if (callback != NULL) {
+    ssl->config->verify_callback = callback;
+  }
+}
+
+void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *ssl, int depth) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    return;
+  }
+  X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ssl->config->param, depth);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                      int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx,
+                                                void *arg),
+                                      void *arg) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  ctx->app_verify_callback = cb;
+  ctx->app_verify_arg = arg;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode,
+                        int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  ctx->verify_mode = mode;
+  ctx->default_verify_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  return X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *ca_file,
+                                  const char *ca_dir) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  return X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store, ca_file, ca_dir);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long result) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  if (result != X509_V_OK) {
+    abort();
+  }
+}
+
+long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+  if (session == NULL) {
+    return X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
+  }
+  return session->verify_result;
+}
+
+X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  return ctx->cert_store;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store);
+  ctx->cert_store = store;
+}
+
+static int ssl_use_certificate(CERT *cert, X509 *x) {
+  if (x == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buffer = x509_to_buffer(x);
+  if (!buffer) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return ssl_set_cert(cert, std::move(buffer));
+}
+
+int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return ssl_use_certificate(ssl->config->cert.get(), x);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  return ssl_use_certificate(ctx->cert.get(), x);
+}
+
+// ssl_cert_cache_leaf_cert sets |cert->x509_leaf|, if currently NULL, from the
+// first element of |cert->chain|.
+static int ssl_cert_cache_leaf_cert(CERT *cert) {
+  assert(cert->x509_method);
+
+  if (cert->x509_leaf != NULL ||
+      cert->chain == NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  CRYPTO_BUFFER *leaf = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain.get(), 0);
+  if (!leaf) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  cert->x509_leaf = X509_parse_from_buffer(leaf);
+  return cert->x509_leaf != NULL;
+}
+
+static X509 *ssl_cert_get0_leaf(CERT *cert) {
+  if (cert->x509_leaf == NULL &&
+      !ssl_cert_cache_leaf_cert(cert)) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  return cert->x509_leaf;
+}
+
+X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *ssl) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    assert(ssl->config);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return ssl_cert_get0_leaf(ssl->config->cert.get());
+}
+
+X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  MutexWriteLock lock(const_cast<CRYPTO_MUTEX*>(&ctx->lock));
+  return ssl_cert_get0_leaf(ctx->cert.get());
+}
+
+static int ssl_cert_set0_chain(CERT *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
+  if (!ssl_cert_set_chain(cert, chain)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
+  ssl_crypto_x509_cert_flush_cached_chain(cert);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_cert_set1_chain(CERT *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
+  if (!ssl_cert_set_chain(cert, chain)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ssl_crypto_x509_cert_flush_cached_chain(cert);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_cert_append_cert(CERT *cert, X509 *x509) {
+  assert(cert->x509_method);
+
+  UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buffer = x509_to_buffer(x509);
+  if (!buffer) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (cert->chain != NULL) {
+    return PushToStack(cert->chain.get(), std::move(buffer));
+  }
+
+  cert->chain = new_leafless_chain();
+  if (!cert->chain ||
+      !PushToStack(cert->chain.get(), std::move(buffer))) {
+    cert->chain.reset();
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(CERT *cert, X509 *x509) {
+  if (!ssl_cert_append_cert(cert, x509)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  X509_free(cert->x509_stash);
+  cert->x509_stash = x509;
+  ssl_crypto_x509_cert_flush_cached_chain(cert);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(CERT *cert, X509 *x509) {
+  if (!ssl_cert_append_cert(cert, x509)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ssl_crypto_x509_cert_flush_cached_chain(cert);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set0_chain(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  return ssl_cert_set0_chain(ctx->cert.get(), chain);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_chain(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  return ssl_cert_set1_chain(ctx->cert.get(), chain);
+}
+
+int SSL_set0_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return ssl_cert_set0_chain(ssl->config->cert.get(), chain);
+}
+
+int SSL_set1_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return ssl_cert_set1_chain(ssl->config->cert.get(), chain);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  return ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(ctx->cert.get(), x509);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  return ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(ctx->cert.get(), x509);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  return SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(ctx, x509);
+}
+
+int SSL_add0_chain_cert(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(ssl->config->cert.get(), x509);
+}
+
+int SSL_add1_chain_cert(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(ssl->config->cert.get(), x509);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  return SSL_CTX_set0_chain(ctx, NULL);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  return SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(ctx);
+}
+
+int SSL_clear_chain_certs(SSL *ssl) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  return SSL_set0_chain(ssl, NULL);
+}
+
+// ssl_cert_cache_chain_certs fills in |cert->x509_chain| from elements 1.. of
+// |cert->chain|.
+static int ssl_cert_cache_chain_certs(CERT *cert) {
+  assert(cert->x509_method);
+
+  if (cert->x509_chain != nullptr ||
+      cert->chain == nullptr ||
+      sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(cert->chain.get()) < 2) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509)> chain(sk_X509_new_null());
+  if (!chain) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 1; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(cert->chain.get()); i++) {
+    CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain.get(), i);
+    UniquePtr<X509> x509(X509_parse_from_buffer(buffer));
+    if (!x509 ||
+        !PushToStack(chain.get(), std::move(x509))) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  cert->x509_chain = chain.release();
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs(const SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) **out_chain) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  MutexWriteLock lock(const_cast<CRYPTO_MUTEX*>(&ctx->lock));
+  if (!ssl_cert_cache_chain_certs(ctx->cert.get())) {
+    *out_chain = NULL;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  *out_chain = ctx->cert->x509_chain;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs(const SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                  STACK_OF(X509) **out_chain) {
+  return SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs(ctx, out_chain);
+}
+
+int SSL_get0_chain_certs(const SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) **out_chain) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    assert(ssl->config);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (!ssl_cert_cache_chain_certs(ssl->config->cert.get())) {
+    *out_chain = NULL;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  *out_chain = ssl->config->cert->x509_chain;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION_bio(BIO *bio, SSL_SESSION **out) {
+  uint8_t *data;
+  size_t len;
+  if (!BIO_read_asn1(bio, &data, &len, 1024 * 1024)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_data(data);
+  const uint8_t *ptr = data;
+  return d2i_SSL_SESSION(out, &ptr, static_cast<long>(len));
+}
+
+int i2d_SSL_SESSION_bio(BIO *bio, const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  uint8_t *data;
+  size_t len;
+  if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes(session, &data, &len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_data(data);
+  return BIO_write_all(bio, data, len);
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION, PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
+
+SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const uint8_t **pp, long length) {
+  if (length < 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  CBS cbs;
+  CBS_init(&cbs, *pp, length);
+
+  UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> ret = SSL_SESSION_parse(&cbs, &ssl_crypto_x509_method,
+                                                 NULL /* no buffer pool */);
+  if (!ret) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  if (a) {
+    SSL_SESSION_free(*a);
+    *a = ret.get();
+  }
+  *pp = CBS_data(&cbs);
+  return ret.release();
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list) {
+  return sk_X509_NAME_deep_copy(list, X509_NAME_dup, X509_NAME_free);
+}
+
+static void set_client_CA_list(UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> *ca_list,
+                               const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list,
+                               CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *pool) {
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> buffers(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null());
+  if (!buffers) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  for (X509_NAME *name : name_list) {
+    uint8_t *outp = NULL;
+    int len = i2d_X509_NAME(name, &outp);
+    if (len < 0) {
+      return;
+    }
+
+    UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buffer(CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(outp, len, pool));
+    OPENSSL_free(outp);
+    if (!buffer ||
+        !PushToStack(buffers.get(), std::move(buffer))) {
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+
+  *ca_list = std::move(buffers);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    return;
+  }
+  ssl->ctx->x509_method->ssl_flush_cached_client_CA(ssl->config.get());
+  set_client_CA_list(&ssl->config->client_CA, name_list, ssl->ctx->pool);
+  sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(name_list, X509_NAME_free);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  ctx->x509_method->ssl_ctx_flush_cached_client_CA(ctx);
+  set_client_CA_list(&ctx->client_CA, name_list, ctx->pool);
+  sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(name_list, X509_NAME_free);
+}
+
+static STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *
+    buffer_names_to_x509(const STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *names,
+                         STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **cached) {
+  if (names == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  if (*cached != NULL) {
+    return *cached;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509_NAME)> new_cache(sk_X509_NAME_new_null());
+  if (!new_cache) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  for (const CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer : names) {
+    const uint8_t *inp = CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buffer);
+    UniquePtr<X509_NAME> name(
+        d2i_X509_NAME(nullptr, &inp, CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buffer)));
+    if (!name ||
+        inp != CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buffer) + CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buffer) ||
+        !PushToStack(new_cache.get(), std::move(name))) {
+      return NULL;
+    }
+  }
+
+  *cached = new_cache.release();
+  return *cached;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *ssl) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    assert(ssl->config);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  // For historical reasons, this function is used both to query configuration
+  // state on a server as well as handshake state on a client. However, whether
+  // |ssl| is a client or server is not known until explicitly configured with
+  // |SSL_set_connect_state|. If |do_handshake| is NULL, |ssl| is in an
+  // indeterminate mode and |ssl->server| is unset.
+  if (ssl->do_handshake != NULL && !ssl->server) {
+    if (ssl->s3->hs != NULL) {
+      return buffer_names_to_x509(ssl->s3->hs->ca_names.get(),
+                                  &ssl->s3->hs->cached_x509_ca_names);
+    }
+
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->config->client_CA != NULL) {
+    return buffer_names_to_x509(
+        ssl->config->client_CA.get(),
+        (STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **)&ssl->config->cached_x509_client_CA);
+  }
+  return SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(ssl->ctx.get());
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  // This is a logically const operation that may be called on multiple threads,
+  // so it needs to lock around updating |cached_x509_client_CA|.
+  MutexWriteLock lock(const_cast<CRYPTO_MUTEX *>(&ctx->lock));
+  return buffer_names_to_x509(
+      ctx->client_CA.get(),
+      const_cast<STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **>(&ctx->cached_x509_client_CA));
+}
+
+static int add_client_CA(UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> *names, X509 *x509,
+                         CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *pool) {
+  if (x509 == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t *outp = NULL;
+  int len = i2d_X509_NAME(X509_get_subject_name(x509), &outp);
+  if (len < 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buffer(CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(outp, len, pool));
+  OPENSSL_free(outp);
+  if (!buffer) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int alloced = 0;
+  if (*names == nullptr) {
+    names->reset(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null());
+    alloced = 1;
+
+    if (*names == NULL) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!PushToStack(names->get(), std::move(buffer))) {
+    if (alloced) {
+      names->reset();
+    }
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (!add_client_CA(&ssl->config->client_CA, x509, ssl->ctx->pool)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_flush_cached_client_CA(ssl->config.get());
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  if (!add_client_CA(&ctx->client_CA, x509, ctx->pool)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ssl_crypto_x509_ssl_ctx_flush_cached_client_CA(ctx);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int do_client_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, void *arg) {
+  // Should only be called during handshake, but check to be sure.
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    assert(ssl->config);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl_has_certificate(ssl->s3->hs.get()) ||
+      ssl->ctx->client_cert_cb == NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  X509 *x509 = NULL;
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+  int ret = ssl->ctx->client_cert_cb(ssl, &x509, &pkey);
+  if (ret < 0) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  UniquePtr<X509> free_x509(x509);
+  UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> free_pkey(pkey);
+
+  if (ret != 0) {
+    if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x509) ||
+        !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl,
+                                                        X509 **out_x509,
+                                                        EVP_PKEY **out_pkey)) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  // Emulate the old client certificate callback with the new one.
+  SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(ctx, do_client_cert_cb, NULL);
+  ctx->client_cert_cb = cb;
+}
+
+static int set_cert_store(X509_STORE **store_ptr, X509_STORE *new_store,
+                          int take_ref) {
+  X509_STORE_free(*store_ptr);
+  *store_ptr = new_store;
+
+  if (new_store != NULL && take_ref) {
+    X509_STORE_up_ref(new_store);
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void) {
+  // The ex_data index to go from |X509_STORE_CTX| to |SSL| always uses the
+  // reserved app_data slot. Before ex_data was introduced, app_data was used.
+  // Avoid breaking any software which assumes |X509_STORE_CTX_get_app_data|
+  // works.
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set0_verify_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  return set_cert_store(&ctx->cert->verify_store, store, 0);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) {
+  check_ssl_ctx_x509_method(ctx);
+  return set_cert_store(&ctx->cert->verify_store, store, 1);
+}
+
+int SSL_set0_verify_cert_store(SSL *ssl, X509_STORE *store) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return set_cert_store(&ssl->config->cert->verify_store, store, 0);
+}
+
+int SSL_set1_verify_cert_store(SSL *ssl, X509_STORE *store) {
+  check_ssl_x509_method(ssl);
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return set_cert_store(&ssl->config->cert->verify_store, store, 1);
+}
+
+int SSL_alert_from_verify_result(long result) {
+  switch (result) {
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
+    case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+    case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
+    case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
+    case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
+      return SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
+
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
+    case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
+    case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
+    case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
+      return SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+      return SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
+    case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
+      return SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
+
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
+      return SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
+
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
+    case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
+    case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
+    case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
+      return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+    case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
+      return SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+
+    case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
+      return SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
+
+    default:
+      return SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
+  }
+}