grpc 1.9.1 → 1.10.0.pre1

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8_x509.c

@@ -0,0 +1,789 @@
+/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+ * project 1999.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+
+#include <openssl/pkcs8.h>
+
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../bytestring/internal.h"
+#include "../internal.h"
+
+
+// Minor tweak to operation: zero private key data
+static int pkey_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                   void *exarg) {
+  // Since the structure must still be valid use ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE
+  if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) {
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *key = (PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *)*pval;
+    if (key->pkey && key->pkey->type == V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING &&
+        key->pkey->value.octet_string) {
+      OPENSSL_cleanse(key->pkey->value.octet_string->data,
+                      key->pkey->value.octet_string->length);
+    }
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkey_cb) = {
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkeyalg, X509_ALGOR),
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkey, ASN1_ANY),
+  ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, attributes, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 0)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO)
+
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKCS82PKEY(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) {
+  uint8_t *der = NULL;
+  int der_len = i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(p8, &der);
+  if (der_len < 0) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  CBS cbs;
+  CBS_init(&cbs, der, (size_t)der_len);
+  EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_parse_private_key(&cbs);
+  if (ret == NULL || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+    OPENSSL_free(der);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_free(der);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+  CBB cbb;
+  uint8_t *der = NULL;
+  size_t der_len;
+  if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
+      !EVP_marshal_private_key(&cbb, pkey) ||
+      !CBB_finish(&cbb, &der, &der_len) ||
+      der_len > LONG_MAX) {
+    CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  const uint8_t *p = der;
+  PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, (long)der_len);
+  if (p8 == NULL || p != der + der_len) {
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_free(der);
+  return p8;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(der);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *PKCS8_decrypt(X509_SIG *pkcs8, const char *pass,
+                                   int pass_len_in) {
+  size_t pass_len;
+  if (pass_len_in == -1 && pass != NULL) {
+    pass_len = strlen(pass);
+  } else {
+    pass_len = (size_t)pass_len_in;
+  }
+
+  PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *ret = NULL;
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+  uint8_t *in = NULL;
+
+  // Convert the legacy ASN.1 object to a byte string.
+  int in_len = i2d_X509_SIG(pkcs8, &in);
+  if (in_len < 0) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  CBS cbs;
+  CBS_init(&cbs, in, in_len);
+  pkey = PKCS8_parse_encrypted_private_key(&cbs, pass, pass_len);
+  if (pkey == NULL || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(pkey);
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(in);
+  EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+X509_SIG *PKCS8_encrypt(int pbe_nid, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const char *pass,
+                        int pass_len_in, const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len,
+                        int iterations, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf) {
+  size_t pass_len;
+  if (pass_len_in == -1 && pass != NULL) {
+    pass_len = strlen(pass);
+  } else {
+    pass_len = (size_t)pass_len_in;
+  }
+
+  // Parse out the private key.
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf);
+  if (pkey == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  X509_SIG *ret = NULL;
+  uint8_t *der = NULL;
+  size_t der_len;
+  CBB cbb;
+  if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 128) ||
+      !PKCS8_marshal_encrypted_private_key(&cbb, pbe_nid, cipher, pass,
+                                           pass_len, salt, salt_len, iterations,
+                                           pkey) ||
+      !CBB_finish(&cbb, &der, &der_len)) {
+    CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // Convert back to legacy ASN.1 objects.
+  const uint8_t *ptr = der;
+  ret = d2i_X509_SIG(NULL, &ptr, der_len);
+  if (ret == NULL || ptr != der + der_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    X509_SIG_free(ret);
+    ret = NULL;
+  }
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(der);
+  EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+struct pkcs12_context {
+  EVP_PKEY **out_key;
+  STACK_OF(X509) *out_certs;
+  const char *password;
+  size_t password_len;
+};
+
+// PKCS12_handle_sequence parses a BER-encoded SEQUENCE of elements in a PKCS#12
+// structure.
+static int PKCS12_handle_sequence(
+    CBS *sequence, struct pkcs12_context *ctx,
+    int (*handle_element)(CBS *cbs, struct pkcs12_context *ctx)) {
+  uint8_t *der_bytes = NULL;
+  size_t der_len;
+  CBS in;
+  int ret = 0;
+
+  // Although a BER->DER conversion is done at the beginning of |PKCS12_parse|,
+  // the ASN.1 data gets wrapped in OCTETSTRINGs and/or encrypted and the
+  // conversion cannot see through those wrappings. So each time we step
+  // through one we need to convert to DER again.
+  if (!CBS_asn1_ber_to_der(sequence, &der_bytes, &der_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (der_bytes != NULL) {
+    CBS_init(&in, der_bytes, der_len);
+  } else {
+    CBS_init(&in, CBS_data(sequence), CBS_len(sequence));
+  }
+
+  CBS child;
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(&in, &child, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      CBS_len(&in) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  while (CBS_len(&child) > 0) {
+    CBS element;
+    if (!CBS_get_asn1(&child, &element, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!handle_element(&element, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(der_bytes);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+// 1.2.840.113549.1.12.10.1.2
+static const uint8_t kPKCS8ShroudedKeyBag[] = {
+    0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0x01, 0x02};
+
+// 1.2.840.113549.1.12.10.1.3
+static const uint8_t kCertBag[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d,
+                                   0x01, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0x01, 0x03};
+
+// 1.2.840.113549.1.9.22.1
+static const uint8_t kX509Certificate[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
+                                           0x0d, 0x01, 0x09, 0x16, 0x01};
+
+// PKCS12_handle_safe_bag parses a single SafeBag element in a PKCS#12
+// structure.
+static int PKCS12_handle_safe_bag(CBS *safe_bag, struct pkcs12_context *ctx) {
+  CBS bag_id, wrapped_value;
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(safe_bag, &bag_id, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+      !CBS_get_asn1(safe_bag, &wrapped_value,
+                        CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0)
+      /* Ignore the bagAttributes field. */) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (CBS_mem_equal(&bag_id, kPKCS8ShroudedKeyBag,
+                    sizeof(kPKCS8ShroudedKeyBag))) {
+    // See RFC 7292, section 4.2.2.
+    if (*ctx->out_key) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_MULTIPLE_PRIVATE_KEYS_IN_PKCS12);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = PKCS8_parse_encrypted_private_key(
+        &wrapped_value, ctx->password, ctx->password_len);
+    if (pkey == NULL) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (CBS_len(&wrapped_value) != 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    *ctx->out_key = pkey;
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (CBS_mem_equal(&bag_id, kCertBag, sizeof(kCertBag))) {
+    // See RFC 7292, section 4.2.3.
+    CBS cert_bag, cert_type, wrapped_cert, cert;
+    if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_value, &cert_bag, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&cert_bag, &cert_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&cert_bag, &wrapped_cert,
+                      CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_cert, &cert, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    // Skip unknown certificate types.
+    if (!CBS_mem_equal(&cert_type, kX509Certificate,
+                       sizeof(kX509Certificate))) {
+      return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (CBS_len(&cert) > LONG_MAX) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    const uint8_t *inp = CBS_data(&cert);
+    X509 *x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &inp, (long)CBS_len(&cert));
+    if (!x509) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (inp != CBS_data(&cert) + CBS_len(&cert)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      X509_free(x509);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (0 == sk_X509_push(ctx->out_certs, x509)) {
+      X509_free(x509);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  // Unknown element type - ignore it.
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// 1.2.840.113549.1.7.1
+static const uint8_t kPKCS7Data[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
+                                     0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x01};
+
+// 1.2.840.113549.1.7.6
+static const uint8_t kPKCS7EncryptedData[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
+                                              0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x06};
+
+// PKCS12_handle_content_info parses a single PKCS#7 ContentInfo element in a
+// PKCS#12 structure.
+static int PKCS12_handle_content_info(CBS *content_info,
+                                      struct pkcs12_context *ctx) {
+  CBS content_type, wrapped_contents, contents;
+  int ret = 0;
+  uint8_t *storage = NULL;
+
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(content_info, &content_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+      !CBS_get_asn1(content_info, &wrapped_contents,
+                        CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0) ||
+      CBS_len(content_info) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (CBS_mem_equal(&content_type, kPKCS7EncryptedData,
+                    sizeof(kPKCS7EncryptedData))) {
+    // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-13.
+    //
+    // PKCS#7 encrypted data inside a PKCS#12 structure is generally an
+    // encrypted certificate bag and it's generally encrypted with 40-bit
+    // RC2-CBC.
+    CBS version_bytes, eci, contents_type, ai, encrypted_contents;
+    uint8_t *out;
+    size_t out_len;
+
+    if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_contents, &contents, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&contents, &version_bytes, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
+        // EncryptedContentInfo, see
+        // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-10.1
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&contents, &eci, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&eci, &contents_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+        // AlgorithmIdentifier, see
+        // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.1.1.2
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&eci, &ai, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1_implicit_string(
+            &eci, &encrypted_contents, &storage,
+            CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!CBS_mem_equal(&contents_type, kPKCS7Data, sizeof(kPKCS7Data))) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!pkcs8_pbe_decrypt(&out, &out_len, &ai, ctx->password,
+                           ctx->password_len, CBS_data(&encrypted_contents),
+                           CBS_len(&encrypted_contents))) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    CBS safe_contents;
+    CBS_init(&safe_contents, out, out_len);
+    ret = PKCS12_handle_sequence(&safe_contents, ctx, PKCS12_handle_safe_bag);
+    OPENSSL_free(out);
+  } else if (CBS_mem_equal(&content_type, kPKCS7Data, sizeof(kPKCS7Data))) {
+    CBS octet_string_contents;
+
+    if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_contents, &octet_string_contents,
+                      CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = PKCS12_handle_sequence(&octet_string_contents, ctx,
+                                 PKCS12_handle_safe_bag);
+  } else {
+    // Unknown element type - ignore it.
+    ret = 1;
+  }
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(storage);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int PKCS12_get_key_and_certs(EVP_PKEY **out_key, STACK_OF(X509) *out_certs,
+                             CBS *ber_in, const char *password) {
+  uint8_t *der_bytes = NULL;
+  size_t der_len;
+  CBS in, pfx, mac_data, authsafe, content_type, wrapped_authsafes, authsafes;
+  uint64_t version;
+  int ret = 0;
+  struct pkcs12_context ctx;
+  const size_t original_out_certs_len = sk_X509_num(out_certs);
+
+  // The input may be in BER format.
+  if (!CBS_asn1_ber_to_der(ber_in, &der_bytes, &der_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (der_bytes != NULL) {
+    CBS_init(&in, der_bytes, der_len);
+  } else {
+    CBS_init(&in, CBS_data(ber_in), CBS_len(ber_in));
+  }
+
+  *out_key = NULL;
+  OPENSSL_memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+
+  // See ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-12/pkcs-12v1.pdf, section
+  // four.
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(&in, &pfx, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      CBS_len(&in) != 0 ||
+      !CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&pfx, &version)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (version < 3) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_VERSION);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(&pfx, &authsafe, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (CBS_len(&pfx) == 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_MISSING_MAC);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(&pfx, &mac_data, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // authsafe is a PKCS#7 ContentInfo. See
+  // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-7.
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(&authsafe, &content_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+      !CBS_get_asn1(&authsafe, &wrapped_authsafes,
+                        CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // The content type can either be data or signedData. The latter indicates
+  // that it's signed by a public key, which isn't supported.
+  if (!CBS_mem_equal(&content_type, kPKCS7Data, sizeof(kPKCS7Data))) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_PKCS12_PUBLIC_KEY_INTEGRITY_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_authsafes, &authsafes, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ctx.out_key = out_key;
+  ctx.out_certs = out_certs;
+  ctx.password = password;
+  ctx.password_len = password != NULL ? strlen(password) : 0;
+
+  // Verify the MAC.
+  {
+    CBS mac, salt, expected_mac;
+    if (!CBS_get_asn1(&mac_data, &mac, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    const EVP_MD *md = EVP_parse_digest_algorithm(&mac);
+    if (md == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!CBS_get_asn1(&mac, &expected_mac, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&mac_data, &salt, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    // The iteration count is optional and the default is one.
+    uint64_t iterations = 1;
+    if (CBS_len(&mac_data) > 0) {
+      if (!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&mac_data, &iterations) ||
+          iterations > UINT_MAX) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+
+    uint8_t hmac_key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    if (!pkcs12_key_gen(ctx.password, ctx.password_len, CBS_data(&salt),
+                        CBS_len(&salt), PKCS12_MAC_ID, iterations,
+                        EVP_MD_size(md), hmac_key, md)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned hmac_len;
+    if (NULL == HMAC(md, hmac_key, EVP_MD_size(md), CBS_data(&authsafes),
+                     CBS_len(&authsafes), hmac, &hmac_len)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!CBS_mem_equal(&expected_mac, hmac, hmac_len)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_INCORRECT_PASSWORD);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // authsafes contains a series of PKCS#7 ContentInfos.
+  if (!PKCS12_handle_sequence(&authsafes, &ctx, PKCS12_handle_content_info)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(der_bytes);
+  if (!ret) {
+    EVP_PKEY_free(*out_key);
+    *out_key = NULL;
+    while (sk_X509_num(out_certs) > original_out_certs_len) {
+      X509 *x509 = sk_X509_pop(out_certs);
+      X509_free(x509);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+void PKCS12_PBE_add(void) {}
+
+struct pkcs12_st {
+  uint8_t *ber_bytes;
+  size_t ber_len;
+};
+
+PKCS12 *d2i_PKCS12(PKCS12 **out_p12, const uint8_t **ber_bytes,
+                   size_t ber_len) {
+  PKCS12 *p12;
+
+  p12 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(PKCS12));
+  if (!p12) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  p12->ber_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(ber_len);
+  if (!p12->ber_bytes) {
+    OPENSSL_free(p12);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(p12->ber_bytes, *ber_bytes, ber_len);
+  p12->ber_len = ber_len;
+  *ber_bytes += ber_len;
+
+  if (out_p12) {
+    PKCS12_free(*out_p12);
+
+    *out_p12 = p12;
+  }
+
+  return p12;
+}
+
+PKCS12* d2i_PKCS12_bio(BIO *bio, PKCS12 **out_p12) {
+  size_t used = 0;
+  BUF_MEM *buf;
+  const uint8_t *dummy;
+  static const size_t kMaxSize = 256 * 1024;
+  PKCS12 *ret = NULL;
+
+  buf = BUF_MEM_new();
+  if (buf == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  if (BUF_MEM_grow(buf, 8192) == 0) {
+    goto out;
+  }
+
+  for (;;) {
+    int n = BIO_read(bio, &buf->data[used], buf->length - used);
+    if (n < 0) {
+      if (used == 0) {
+        goto out;
+      }
+      // Workaround a bug in node.js. It uses a memory BIO for this in the wrong
+      // mode.
+      n = 0;
+    }
+
+    if (n == 0) {
+      break;
+    }
+    used += n;
+
+    if (used < buf->length) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    if (buf->length > kMaxSize ||
+        BUF_MEM_grow(buf, buf->length * 2) == 0) {
+      goto out;
+    }
+  }
+
+  dummy = (uint8_t*) buf->data;
+  ret = d2i_PKCS12(out_p12, &dummy, used);
+
+out:
+  BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+PKCS12* d2i_PKCS12_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS12 **out_p12) {
+  BIO *bio;
+  PKCS12 *ret;
+
+  bio = BIO_new_fp(fp, 0 /* don't take ownership */);
+  if (!bio) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  ret = d2i_PKCS12_bio(bio, out_p12);
+  BIO_free(bio);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int PKCS12_parse(const PKCS12 *p12, const char *password, EVP_PKEY **out_pkey,
+                 X509 **out_cert, STACK_OF(X509) **out_ca_certs) {
+  CBS ber_bytes;
+  STACK_OF(X509) *ca_certs = NULL;
+  char ca_certs_alloced = 0;
+
+  if (out_ca_certs != NULL && *out_ca_certs != NULL) {
+    ca_certs = *out_ca_certs;
+  }
+
+  if (!ca_certs) {
+    ca_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
+    if (ca_certs == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    ca_certs_alloced = 1;
+  }
+
+  CBS_init(&ber_bytes, p12->ber_bytes, p12->ber_len);
+  if (!PKCS12_get_key_and_certs(out_pkey, ca_certs, &ber_bytes, password)) {
+    if (ca_certs_alloced) {
+      sk_X509_free(ca_certs);
+    }
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  *out_cert = NULL;
+  if (sk_X509_num(ca_certs) > 0) {
+    *out_cert = sk_X509_shift(ca_certs);
+  }
+
+  if (out_ca_certs) {
+    *out_ca_certs = ca_certs;
+  } else {
+    sk_X509_pop_free(ca_certs, X509_free);
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int PKCS12_verify_mac(const PKCS12 *p12, const char *password,
+                      int password_len) {
+  if (password == NULL) {
+    if (password_len != 0) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  } else if (password_len != -1 &&
+             (password[password_len] != 0 ||
+              OPENSSL_memchr(password, 0, password_len) != NULL)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+  X509 *cert = NULL;
+  if (!PKCS12_parse(p12, password, &pkey, &cert, NULL)) {
+    ERR_clear_error();
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+  X509_free(cert);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void PKCS12_free(PKCS12 *p12) {
+  if (p12 == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_free(p12->ber_bytes);
+  OPENSSL_free(p12);
+}