grpc 1.9.1 → 1.10.0.pre1

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/{asn1/x_bignum.c → cipher_extra/internal.h}

@@ -54,100 +54,75 @@
  * copied and put under another distribution licence
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
 
-#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_CIPHER_EXTRA_INTERNAL_H
+#define OPENSSL_HEADER_CIPHER_EXTRA_INTERNAL_H
 
-#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/base.h>
 
-/*
- * Custom primitive type for BIGNUM handling. This reads in an ASN1_INTEGER
- * as a BIGNUM directly. Currently it ignores the sign which isn't a problem
- * since all BIGNUMs used are non negative and anything that looks negative
- * is normally due to an encoding error.
- */
+#include "../internal.h"
 
-#define BN_SENSITIVE    1
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+extern "C" {
+#endif
 
-static int bn_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
-static void bn_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
 
-static int bn_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype,
-                  const ASN1_ITEM *it);
-static int bn_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
-                  int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+// EVP_tls_cbc_get_padding determines the padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC
+// record in |in|. This decrypted record should not include any "decrypted"
+// explicit IV. If the record is publicly invalid, it returns zero. Otherwise,
+// it returns one and sets |*out_padding_ok| to all ones (0xfff..f) if the
+// padding is valid and zero otherwise. It then sets |*out_len| to the length
+// with the padding removed or |in_len| if invalid.
+//
+// If the function returns one, it runs in time independent of the contents of
+// |in|. It is also guaranteed that |*out_len| >= |mac_size|, satisfying
+// |EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac|'s precondition.
+int EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding(crypto_word_t *out_padding_ok, size_t *out_len,
+                               const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+                               size_t block_size, size_t mac_size);
 
-static const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS bignum_pf = {
-    NULL, 0,
-    bn_new,
-    bn_free,
-    0,
-    bn_c2i,
-    bn_i2c,
-    NULL /* prim_print */ ,
-};
+// EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of the first
+// |in_len| bytes of |in| to |out| in constant time (independent of the concrete
+// value of |in_len|, which may vary within a 256-byte window). |in| must point
+// to a buffer of |orig_len| bytes.
+//
+// On entry:
+//   orig_len >= in_len >= md_size
+//   md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+void EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac(uint8_t *out, size_t md_size, const uint8_t *in,
+                          size_t in_len, size_t orig_len);
 
-ASN1_ITEM_start(BIGNUM)
-        ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &bignum_pf, 0, "BIGNUM"
-ASN1_ITEM_end(BIGNUM)
+// EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |md| is a hash function
+// which EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record supports.
+int EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD *md);
 
-ASN1_ITEM_start(CBIGNUM)
-        ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE, V_ASN1_INTEGER, NULL, 0, &bignum_pf, BN_SENSITIVE, "BIGNUM"
-ASN1_ITEM_end(CBIGNUM)
+// EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record computes the MAC of a decrypted, padded TLS
+// record.
+//
+//   md: the hash function used in the HMAC.
+//     EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported must return true for this hash.
+//   md_out: the digest output. At most EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE bytes will be written.
+//   md_out_size: the number of output bytes is written here.
+//   header: the 13-byte, TLS record header.
+//   data: the record data itself
+//   data_plus_mac_size: the secret, reported length of the data and MAC
+//     once the padding has been removed.
+//   data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size: the public length of the whole
+//     record, including padding.
+//
+// On entry: by virtue of having been through one of the remove_padding
+// functions, above, we know that data_plus_mac_size is large enough to contain
+// a padding byte and MAC. (If the padding was invalid, it might contain the
+// padding too. )
+int EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t *md_out,
+                              size_t *md_out_size, const uint8_t header[13],
+                              const uint8_t *data, size_t data_plus_mac_size,
+                              size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
+                              const uint8_t *mac_secret,
+                              unsigned mac_secret_length);
 
-static int bn_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
-{
-    *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)BN_new();
-    if (*pval)
-        return 1;
-    else
-        return 0;
-}
 
-static void bn_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
-{
-    if (!*pval)
-        return;
-    if (it->size & BN_SENSITIVE)
-        BN_clear_free((BIGNUM *)*pval);
-    else
-        BN_free((BIGNUM *)*pval);
-    *pval = NULL;
-}
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+}  // extern C
+#endif
 
-static int bn_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype,
-                  const ASN1_ITEM *it)
-{
-    BIGNUM *bn;
-    int pad;
-    if (!*pval)
-        return -1;
-    bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
-    /* If MSB set in an octet we need a padding byte */
-    if (BN_num_bits(bn) & 0x7)
-        pad = 0;
-    else
-        pad = 1;
-    if (cont) {
-        if (pad)
-            *cont++ = 0;
-        BN_bn2bin(bn, cont);
-    }
-    return pad + BN_num_bytes(bn);
-}
-
-static int bn_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
-                  int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
-{
-    BIGNUM *bn;
-    if (!*pval) {
-        if (!bn_new(pval, it)) {
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
-    bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
-    if (!BN_bin2bn(cont, len, bn)) {
-        bn_free(pval, it);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    return 1;
-}
+#endif  // OPENSSL_HEADER_CIPHER_EXTRA_INTERNAL_H

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/cipher_extra/tls_cbc.c

@@ -0,0 +1,482 @@
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+#include "../internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../fipsmodule/cipher/internal.h"
+
+
+// MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES is the maximum number of bytes in the hash's length
+// field. (SHA-384/512 have 128-bit length.)
+#define MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES 16
+
+// MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE is the maximum hash block size that we'll support.
+// Currently SHA-384/512 has a 128-byte block size and that's the largest
+// supported by TLS.)
+#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128
+
+int EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding(crypto_word_t *out_padding_ok, size_t *out_len,
+                               const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+                               size_t block_size, size_t mac_size) {
+  const size_t overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
+
+  // These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant time.
+  if (overhead > in_len) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  size_t padding_length = in[in_len - 1];
+
+  crypto_word_t good = constant_time_ge_w(in_len, overhead + padding_length);
+  // The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and
+  // then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the
+  // length byte. Thus, with the length byte included, there are i+1
+  // bytes of padding.
+  //
+  // We can't check just |padding_length+1| bytes because that leaks
+  // decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the maximum
+  // amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record is
+  // public information so we can use it.)
+  size_t to_check = 256;  // maximum amount of padding, inc length byte.
+  if (to_check > in_len) {
+    to_check = in_len;
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < to_check; i++) {
+    uint8_t mask = constant_time_ge_8(padding_length, i);
+    uint8_t b = in[in_len - 1 - i];
+    // The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value
+    // |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero.
+    good &= ~(mask & (padding_length ^ b));
+  }
+
+  // If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value,
+  // one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared.
+  good = constant_time_eq_w(0xff, good & 0xff);
+
+  // Always treat |padding_length| as zero on error. If, assuming block size of
+  // 16, a padding of [<15 arbitrary bytes> 15] treated |padding_length| as 16
+  // and returned -1, distinguishing good MAC and bad padding from bad MAC and
+  // bad padding would give POODLE's padding oracle.
+  padding_length = good & (padding_length + 1);
+  *out_len = in_len - padding_length;
+  *out_padding_ok = good;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac(uint8_t *out, size_t md_size, const uint8_t *in,
+                          size_t in_len, size_t orig_len) {
+  uint8_t rotated_mac1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], rotated_mac2[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  uint8_t *rotated_mac = rotated_mac1;
+  uint8_t *rotated_mac_tmp = rotated_mac2;
+
+  // mac_end is the index of |in| just after the end of the MAC.
+  size_t mac_end = in_len;
+  size_t mac_start = mac_end - md_size;
+
+  assert(orig_len >= in_len);
+  assert(in_len >= md_size);
+  assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+  // scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because
+  // the MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes.
+  size_t scan_start = 0;
+  // This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it.
+  if (orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1) {
+    scan_start = orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1);
+  }
+
+  size_t rotate_offset = 0;
+  uint8_t mac_started = 0;
+  OPENSSL_memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size);
+  for (size_t i = scan_start, j = 0; i < orig_len; i++, j++) {
+    if (j >= md_size) {
+      j -= md_size;
+    }
+    crypto_word_t is_mac_start = constant_time_eq_w(i, mac_start);
+    mac_started |= is_mac_start;
+    uint8_t mac_ended = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_end);
+    rotated_mac[j] |= in[i] & mac_started & ~mac_ended;
+    // Save the offset that |mac_start| is mapped to.
+    rotate_offset |= j & is_mac_start;
+  }
+
+  // Now rotate the MAC. We rotate in log(md_size) steps, one for each bit
+  // position.
+  for (size_t offset = 1; offset < md_size; offset <<= 1, rotate_offset >>= 1) {
+    // Rotate by |offset| iff the corresponding bit is set in
+    // |rotate_offset|, placing the result in |rotated_mac_tmp|.
+    const uint8_t skip_rotate = (rotate_offset & 1) - 1;
+    for (size_t i = 0, j = offset; i < md_size; i++, j++) {
+      if (j >= md_size) {
+        j -= md_size;
+      }
+      rotated_mac_tmp[i] =
+          constant_time_select_8(skip_rotate, rotated_mac[i], rotated_mac[j]);
+    }
+
+    // Swap pointers so |rotated_mac| contains the (possibly) rotated value.
+    // Note the number of iterations and thus the identity of these pointers is
+    // public information.
+    uint8_t *tmp = rotated_mac;
+    rotated_mac = rotated_mac_tmp;
+    rotated_mac_tmp = tmp;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(out, rotated_mac, md_size);
+}
+
+// u32toBE serialises an unsigned, 32-bit number (n) as four bytes at (p) in
+// big-endian order. The value of p is advanced by four.
+#define u32toBE(n, p)                \
+  do {                               \
+    *((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 24); \
+    *((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 16); \
+    *((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 8);  \
+    *((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n));       \
+  } while (0)
+
+// u64toBE serialises an unsigned, 64-bit number (n) as eight bytes at (p) in
+// big-endian order. The value of p is advanced by eight.
+#define u64toBE(n, p)                \
+  do {                               \
+    *((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 56); \
+    *((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 48); \
+    *((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 40); \
+    *((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 32); \
+    *((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 24); \
+    *((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 16); \
+    *((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 8);  \
+    *((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n));       \
+  } while (0)
+
+typedef union {
+  SHA_CTX sha1;
+  SHA256_CTX sha256;
+  SHA512_CTX sha512;
+} HASH_CTX;
+
+static void tls1_sha1_transform(HASH_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *block) {
+  SHA1_Transform(&ctx->sha1, block);
+}
+
+static void tls1_sha256_transform(HASH_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *block) {
+  SHA256_Transform(&ctx->sha256, block);
+}
+
+static void tls1_sha512_transform(HASH_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *block) {
+  SHA512_Transform(&ctx->sha512, block);
+}
+
+// These functions serialize the state of a hash and thus perform the standard
+// "final" operation without adding the padding and length that such a function
+// typically does.
+static void tls1_sha1_final_raw(HASH_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *md_out) {
+  SHA_CTX *sha1 = &ctx->sha1;
+  u32toBE(sha1->h[0], md_out);
+  u32toBE(sha1->h[1], md_out);
+  u32toBE(sha1->h[2], md_out);
+  u32toBE(sha1->h[3], md_out);
+  u32toBE(sha1->h[4], md_out);
+}
+
+static void tls1_sha256_final_raw(HASH_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *md_out) {
+  SHA256_CTX *sha256 = &ctx->sha256;
+  for (unsigned i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+    u32toBE(sha256->h[i], md_out);
+  }
+}
+
+static void tls1_sha512_final_raw(HASH_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *md_out) {
+  SHA512_CTX *sha512 = &ctx->sha512;
+  for (unsigned i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+    u64toBE(sha512->h[i], md_out);
+  }
+}
+
+int EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD *md) {
+  switch (EVP_MD_type(md)) {
+    case NID_sha1:
+    case NID_sha256:
+    case NID_sha384:
+      return 1;
+
+    default:
+      return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+int EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t *md_out,
+                              size_t *md_out_size, const uint8_t header[13],
+                              const uint8_t *data, size_t data_plus_mac_size,
+                              size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
+                              const uint8_t *mac_secret,
+                              unsigned mac_secret_length) {
+  HASH_CTX md_state;
+  void (*md_final_raw)(HASH_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *md_out);
+  void (*md_transform)(HASH_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *block);
+  unsigned md_size, md_block_size = 64;
+  // md_length_size is the number of bytes in the length field that terminates
+  // the hash.
+  unsigned md_length_size = 8;
+
+  // Bound the acceptable input so we can forget about many possible overflows
+  // later in this function. This is redundant with the record size limits in
+  // TLS.
+  if (data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size >= 1024 * 1024) {
+    assert(0);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  switch (EVP_MD_type(md)) {
+    case NID_sha1:
+      SHA1_Init(&md_state.sha1);
+      md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw;
+      md_transform = tls1_sha1_transform;
+      md_size = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+      break;
+
+    case NID_sha256:
+      SHA256_Init(&md_state.sha256);
+      md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
+      md_transform = tls1_sha256_transform;
+      md_size = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+      break;
+
+    case NID_sha384:
+      SHA384_Init(&md_state.sha512);
+      md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
+      md_transform = tls1_sha512_transform;
+      md_size = SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+      md_block_size = 128;
+      md_length_size = 16;
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      // EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been called first to
+      // check that the hash function is supported.
+      assert(0);
+      *md_out_size = 0;
+      return 0;
+  }
+
+  assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES);
+  assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
+  assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+  static const size_t kHeaderLength = 13;
+
+  // kVarianceBlocks is the number of blocks of the hash that we have to
+  // calculate in constant time because they could be altered by the
+  // padding value.
+  //
+  // TLSv1 has MACs up to 48 bytes long (SHA-384) and the padding is not
+  // required to be minimal. Therefore we say that the final six blocks
+  // can vary based on the padding.
+  static const size_t kVarianceBlocks = 6;
+
+  // From now on we're dealing with the MAC, which conceptually has 13
+  // bytes of `header' before the start of the data.
+  size_t len = data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + kHeaderLength;
+  // max_mac_bytes contains the maximum bytes of bytes in the MAC, including
+  // |header|, assuming that there's no padding.
+  size_t max_mac_bytes = len - md_size - 1;
+  // num_blocks is the maximum number of hash blocks.
+  size_t num_blocks =
+      (max_mac_bytes + 1 + md_length_size + md_block_size - 1) / md_block_size;
+  // In order to calculate the MAC in constant time we have to handle
+  // the final blocks specially because the padding value could cause the
+  // end to appear somewhere in the final |kVarianceBlocks| blocks and we
+  // can't leak where. However, |num_starting_blocks| worth of data can
+  // be hashed right away because no padding value can affect whether
+  // they are plaintext.
+  size_t num_starting_blocks = 0;
+  // k is the starting byte offset into the conceptual header||data where
+  // we start processing.
+  size_t k = 0;
+  // mac_end_offset is the index just past the end of the data to be
+  // MACed.
+  size_t mac_end_offset = data_plus_mac_size + kHeaderLength - md_size;
+  // c is the index of the 0x80 byte in the final hash block that
+  // contains application data.
+  size_t c = mac_end_offset % md_block_size;
+  // index_a is the hash block number that contains the 0x80 terminating
+  // value.
+  size_t index_a = mac_end_offset / md_block_size;
+  // index_b is the hash block number that contains the 64-bit hash
+  // length, in bits.
+  size_t index_b = (mac_end_offset + md_length_size) / md_block_size;
+
+  if (num_blocks > kVarianceBlocks) {
+    num_starting_blocks = num_blocks - kVarianceBlocks;
+    k = md_block_size * num_starting_blocks;
+  }
+
+  // bits is the hash-length in bits. It includes the additional hash
+  // block for the masked HMAC key.
+  size_t bits = 8 * mac_end_offset;  // at most 18 bits to represent
+
+  // Compute the initial HMAC block.
+  bits += 8 * md_block_size;
+  // hmac_pad is the masked HMAC key.
+  uint8_t hmac_pad[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+  OPENSSL_memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size);
+  assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad));
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++) {
+    hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36;
+  }
+
+  md_transform(&md_state, hmac_pad);
+
+  // The length check means |bits| fits in four bytes.
+  uint8_t length_bytes[MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES];
+  OPENSSL_memset(length_bytes, 0, md_length_size - 4);
+  length_bytes[md_length_size - 4] = (uint8_t)(bits >> 24);
+  length_bytes[md_length_size - 3] = (uint8_t)(bits >> 16);
+  length_bytes[md_length_size - 2] = (uint8_t)(bits >> 8);
+  length_bytes[md_length_size - 1] = (uint8_t)bits;
+
+  if (k > 0) {
+    // k is a multiple of md_block_size.
+    uint8_t first_block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(first_block, header, 13);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(first_block + 13, data, md_block_size - 13);
+    md_transform(&md_state, first_block);
+    for (size_t i = 1; i < k / md_block_size; i++) {
+      md_transform(&md_state, data + md_block_size * i - 13);
+    }
+  }
+
+  uint8_t mac_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  OPENSSL_memset(mac_out, 0, sizeof(mac_out));
+
+  // We now process the final hash blocks. For each block, we construct
+  // it in constant time. If the |i==index_a| then we'll include the 0x80
+  // bytes and zero pad etc. For each block we selectively copy it, in
+  // constant time, to |mac_out|.
+  for (size_t i = num_starting_blocks;
+       i <= num_starting_blocks + kVarianceBlocks; i++) {
+    uint8_t block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    uint8_t is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_a);
+    uint8_t is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_b);
+    for (size_t j = 0; j < md_block_size; j++) {
+      uint8_t b = 0;
+      if (k < kHeaderLength) {
+        b = header[k];
+      } else if (k < data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + kHeaderLength) {
+        b = data[k - kHeaderLength];
+      }
+      k++;
+
+      uint8_t is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c);
+      uint8_t is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c + 1);
+      // If this is the block containing the end of the
+      // application data, and we are at the offset for the
+      // 0x80 value, then overwrite b with 0x80.
+      b = constant_time_select_8(is_past_c, 0x80, b);
+      // If this the the block containing the end of the
+      // application data and we're past the 0x80 value then
+      // just write zero.
+      b = b & ~is_past_cp1;
+      // If this is index_b (the final block), but not
+      // index_a (the end of the data), then the 64-bit
+      // length didn't fit into index_a and we're having to
+      // add an extra block of zeros.
+      b &= ~is_block_b | is_block_a;
+
+      // The final bytes of one of the blocks contains the
+      // length.
+      if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size) {
+        // If this is index_b, write a length byte.
+        b = constant_time_select_8(
+            is_block_b, length_bytes[j - (md_block_size - md_length_size)], b);
+      }
+      block[j] = b;
+    }
+
+    md_transform(&md_state, block);
+    md_final_raw(&md_state, block);
+    // If this is index_b, copy the hash value to |mac_out|.
+    for (size_t j = 0; j < md_size; j++) {
+      mac_out[j] |= block[j] & is_block_b;
+    }
+  }
+
+  EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+  if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL /* engine */)) {
+    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Complete the HMAC in the standard manner.
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++) {
+    hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a;
+  }
+
+  EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size);
+  EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);
+  unsigned md_out_size_u;
+  EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u);
+  *md_out_size = md_out_size_u;
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+
+  return 1;
+}