grpc 1.9.1 → 1.10.0.pre1

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/evp/p_ed25519_asn1.c

@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2017, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/curve25519.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../internal.h"
+
+
+static void ed25519_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+  OPENSSL_free(pkey->pkey.ptr);
+  pkey->pkey.ptr = NULL;
+}
+
+static int set_pubkey(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const uint8_t pubkey[32]) {
+  ED25519_KEY *key = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(ED25519_KEY));
+  if (key == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  key->has_private = 0;
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(key->key.pub.value, pubkey, 32);
+
+  ed25519_free(pkey);
+  pkey->pkey.ptr = key;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int set_privkey(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const uint8_t privkey[64]) {
+  ED25519_KEY *key = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(ED25519_KEY));
+  if (key == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  key->has_private = 1;
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(key->key.priv, privkey, 64);
+
+  ed25519_free(pkey);
+  pkey->pkey.ptr = key;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ed25519_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *out, CBS *params, CBS *key) {
+  // See draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-04, section 4.
+
+  // The parameters must be omitted. Public keys have length 32.
+  if (CBS_len(params) != 0 ||
+      CBS_len(key) != 32) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return set_pubkey(out, CBS_data(key));
+}
+
+static int ed25519_pub_encode(CBB *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+  const ED25519_KEY *key = pkey->pkey.ptr;
+
+  // See draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-04, section 4.
+  CBB spki, algorithm, oid, key_bitstring;
+  if (!CBB_add_asn1(out, &spki, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&spki, &algorithm, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&algorithm, &oid, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&oid, ed25519_asn1_meth.oid, ed25519_asn1_meth.oid_len) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&spki, &key_bitstring, CBS_ASN1_BITSTRING) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(&key_bitstring, 0 /* padding */) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&key_bitstring, key->key.pub.value, 32) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ed25519_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) {
+  const ED25519_KEY *a_key = a->pkey.ptr;
+  const ED25519_KEY *b_key = b->pkey.ptr;
+  return OPENSSL_memcmp(a_key->key.pub.value, b_key->key.pub.value, 32) == 0;
+}
+
+static int ed25519_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *out, CBS *params, CBS *key) {
+  // See draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-04, section 7.
+
+  // Parameters must be empty. The key is a 32-byte value wrapped in an extra
+  // OCTET STRING layer.
+  CBS inner;
+  if (CBS_len(params) != 0 ||
+      !CBS_get_asn1(key, &inner, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+      CBS_len(key) != 0 ||
+      CBS_len(&inner) != 32) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // The PKCS#8 encoding stores only the 32-byte seed, so we must recover the
+  // full representation which we use from it.
+  uint8_t pubkey[32], privkey[64];
+  ED25519_keypair_from_seed(pubkey, privkey, CBS_data(&inner));
+  return set_privkey(out, privkey);
+}
+
+static int ed25519_priv_encode(CBB *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+  ED25519_KEY *key = pkey->pkey.ptr;
+  if (!key->has_private) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_NOT_A_PRIVATE_KEY);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // See draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-04, section 7.
+  CBB pkcs8, algorithm, oid, private_key, inner;
+  if (!CBB_add_asn1(out, &pkcs8, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&pkcs8, 0 /* version */) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&pkcs8, &algorithm, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&algorithm, &oid, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&oid, ed25519_asn1_meth.oid, ed25519_asn1_meth.oid_len) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&pkcs8, &private_key, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&private_key, &inner, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+      // The PKCS#8 encoding stores only the 32-byte seed which is the first 32
+      // bytes of the private key.
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&inner, key->key.priv, 32) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int ed25519_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return 64; }
+
+static int ed25519_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return 256; }
+
+const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD ed25519_asn1_meth = {
+    EVP_PKEY_ED25519,
+    {0x2b, 0x65, 0x70},
+    3,
+    ed25519_pub_decode,
+    ed25519_pub_encode,
+    ed25519_pub_cmp,
+    ed25519_priv_decode,
+    ed25519_priv_encode,
+    NULL /* pkey_opaque */,
+    ed25519_size,
+    ed25519_bits,
+    NULL /* param_missing */,
+    NULL /* param_copy */,
+    NULL /* param_cmp */,
+    ed25519_free,
+};
+
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_ed25519_public(const uint8_t public_key[32]) {
+  EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_PKEY_new();
+  if (ret == NULL ||
+      !EVP_PKEY_set_type(ret, EVP_PKEY_ED25519) ||
+      !set_pubkey(ret, public_key)) {
+    EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_ed25519_private(const uint8_t private_key[64]) {
+  EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_PKEY_new();
+  if (ret == NULL ||
+      !EVP_PKEY_set_type(ret, EVP_PKEY_ED25519) ||
+      !set_privkey(ret, private_key)) {
+    EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/evp/p_rsa.c

@@ -68,30 +68,35 @@
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 
 #include "../internal.h"
-#include "../rsa/internal.h"
+#include "../fipsmodule/rsa/internal.h"
 #include "internal.h"
 
 
 typedef struct {
-  /* Key gen parameters */
+  // Key gen parameters
   int nbits;
   BIGNUM *pub_exp;
-  /* RSA padding mode */
+  // RSA padding mode
   int pad_mode;
-  /* message digest */
+  // message digest
   const EVP_MD *md;
-  /* message digest for MGF1 */
+  // message digest for MGF1
   const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
-  /* PSS salt length */
+  // PSS salt length
   int saltlen;
-  /* tbuf is a buffer which is either NULL, or is the size of the RSA modulus.
-   * It's used to store the output of RSA operations. */
+  // tbuf is a buffer which is either NULL, or is the size of the RSA modulus.
+  // It's used to store the output of RSA operations.
   uint8_t *tbuf;
-  /* OAEP label */
+  // OAEP label
   uint8_t *oaep_label;
   size_t oaep_labellen;
 } RSA_PKEY_CTX;
 
+typedef struct {
+  uint8_t *data;
+  size_t len;
+} RSA_OAEP_LABEL_PARAMS;
+
 static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
   RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx;
   rctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA_PKEY_CTX));
@@ -180,18 +185,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
   }
 
   if (rctx->md) {
-    unsigned int out_len;
-
-    if (tbslen != EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-      return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->md) == NID_mdc2) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_NO_MDC2_SUPPORT);
-      return 0;
-    }
-
+    unsigned out_len;
     switch (rctx->pad_mode) {
       case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
         if (!RSA_sign(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen, sig, &out_len, rsa)) {
@@ -201,14 +195,8 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
         return 1;
 
       case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
-        if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx) ||
-            !RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, rctx->tbuf, tbs, rctx->md,
-                                            rctx->mgf1md, rctx->saltlen) ||
-            !RSA_sign_raw(rsa, siglen, sig, *siglen, rctx->tbuf, key_len,
-                          RSA_NO_PADDING)) {
-          return 0;
-        }
-        return 1;
+        return RSA_sign_pss_mgf1(rsa, siglen, sig, *siglen, tbs, tbslen,
+                                 rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md, rctx->saltlen);
 
       default:
         return 0;
@@ -223,8 +211,6 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *sig,
                            size_t tbslen) {
   RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
   RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
-  size_t rslen;
-  const size_t key_len = EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey);
 
   if (rctx->md) {
     switch (rctx->pad_mode) {
@@ -232,25 +218,16 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *sig,
         return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, rsa);
 
       case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
-        if (tbslen != EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) {
-          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-          return 0;
-        }
-
-        if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx) ||
-            !RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &rslen, rctx->tbuf, key_len, sig, siglen,
-                            RSA_NO_PADDING) ||
-            !RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs, rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
-                                       rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen)) {
-          return 0;
-        }
-        return 1;
+        return RSA_verify_pss_mgf1(rsa, tbs, tbslen, rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
+                                   rctx->saltlen, sig, siglen);
 
       default:
         return 0;
     }
   }
 
+  size_t rslen;
+  const size_t key_len = EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey);
   if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx) ||
       !RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &rslen, rctx->tbuf, key_len, sig, siglen,
                       rctx->pad_mode) ||
@@ -279,31 +256,25 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
     return 0;
   }
 
-  if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
   if (rctx->md == NULL) {
-    const int ret = RSA_public_decrypt(sig_len, sig, rctx->tbuf,
-                                       ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
-    if (ret < 0) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-    *out_len = ret;
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(out, rctx->tbuf, *out_len);
-    return 1;
+    return RSA_verify_raw(rsa, out_len, out, *out_len, sig, sig_len,
+                          rctx->pad_mode);
   }
 
   if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
     return 0;
   }
 
+  // Assemble the encoded hash, using a placeholder hash value.
+  static const uint8_t kDummyHash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
+  const size_t hash_len = EVP_MD_size(rctx->md);
   uint8_t *asn1_prefix;
   size_t asn1_prefix_len;
   int asn1_prefix_allocated;
-  if (!RSA_add_pkcs1_prefix(&asn1_prefix, &asn1_prefix_len,
-                            &asn1_prefix_allocated, EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), NULL,
-                            0)) {
+  if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx) ||
+      !RSA_add_pkcs1_prefix(&asn1_prefix, &asn1_prefix_len,
+                            &asn1_prefix_allocated, EVP_MD_type(rctx->md),
+                            kDummyHash, hash_len)) {
     return 0;
   }
 
@@ -311,8 +282,9 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
   int ok = 1;
   if (!RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &rslen, rctx->tbuf, key_len, sig, sig_len,
                       RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) ||
-      rslen < asn1_prefix_len ||
-      CRYPTO_memcmp(rctx->tbuf, asn1_prefix, asn1_prefix_len) != 0) {
+      rslen != asn1_prefix_len ||
+      // Compare all but the hash suffix.
+      CRYPTO_memcmp(rctx->tbuf, asn1_prefix, asn1_prefix_len - hash_len) != 0) {
     ok = 0;
   }
 
@@ -324,15 +296,10 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
     return 0;
   }
 
-  const size_t result_len = rslen - asn1_prefix_len;
-  if (result_len != EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
   if (out != NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(out, rctx->tbuf + asn1_prefix_len, result_len);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(out, rctx->tbuf + rslen - hash_len, hash_len);
   }
-  *out_len = result_len;
+  *out_len = hash_len;
 
   return 1;
 }
@@ -386,22 +353,15 @@ static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
   }
 
   if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
-    size_t plaintext_len;
-    int message_len;
-
+    size_t padded_len;
     if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx) ||
-        !RSA_decrypt(rsa, &plaintext_len, rctx->tbuf, key_len, in, inlen,
-                     RSA_NO_PADDING)) {
+        !RSA_decrypt(rsa, &padded_len, rctx->tbuf, key_len, in, inlen,
+                     RSA_NO_PADDING) ||
+        !RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(
+            out, outlen, key_len, rctx->tbuf, padded_len, rctx->oaep_label,
+            rctx->oaep_labellen, rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md)) {
       return 0;
     }
-
-    message_len = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(
-        out, key_len, rctx->tbuf, plaintext_len, rctx->oaep_label,
-        rctx->oaep_labellen, rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md);
-    if (message_len < 0) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-    *outlen = message_len;
     return 1;
   }
 
@@ -530,20 +490,17 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) {
       }
       return 1;
 
-    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL: {
       if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
         OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
         return 0;
       }
       OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
-      if (p2 && p1 > 0) {
-        rctx->oaep_label = p2;
-        rctx->oaep_labellen = p1;
-      } else {
-        rctx->oaep_label = NULL;
-        rctx->oaep_labellen = 0;
-      }
+      RSA_OAEP_LABEL_PARAMS *params = p2;
+      rctx->oaep_label = params->data;
+      rctx->oaep_labellen = params->len;
       return 1;
+    }
 
     case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
       if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
@@ -590,7 +547,9 @@ const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pkey_meth = {
     pkey_rsa_cleanup,
     pkey_rsa_keygen,
     pkey_rsa_sign,
+    NULL /* sign_message */,
     pkey_rsa_verify,
+    NULL /* verify_message */,
     pkey_rsa_verify_recover,
     pkey_rsa_encrypt,
     pkey_rsa_decrypt,
@@ -654,13 +613,9 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **out_md) {
 
 int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *label,
                                      size_t label_len) {
-  if (label_len > INT_MAX) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
+  RSA_OAEP_LABEL_PARAMS params = {label, label_len};
   return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
-                           EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, (int)label_len,
-                           (void *)label);
+                           EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, 0, &params);
 }
 
 int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,