grpc 1.9.1 → 1.10.0.pre1

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/rsa/padding.c

@@ -1,708 +0,0 @@
-/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
- * project 2005.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
-
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/digest.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-
-#include "internal.h"
-#include "../internal.h"
-
-/* TODO(fork): don't the check functions have to be constant time? */
-
-int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(uint8_t *to, unsigned to_len,
-                                 const uint8_t *from, unsigned from_len) {
-  unsigned j;
-
-  if (to_len < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (from_len > to_len - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  uint8_t *p = to;
-
-  *(p++) = 0;
-  *(p++) = 1; /* Private Key BT (Block Type) */
-
-  /* pad out with 0xff data */
-  j = to_len - 3 - from_len;
-  OPENSSL_memset(p, 0xff, j);
-  p += j;
-  *(p++) = 0;
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(p, from, from_len);
-  return 1;
-}
-
-int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(uint8_t *to, unsigned to_len,
-                                   const uint8_t *from, unsigned from_len) {
-  unsigned i, j;
-  const uint8_t *p;
-
-  if (from_len < 2) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  p = from;
-  if ((*(p++) != 0) || (*(p++) != 1)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  /* scan over padding data */
-  j = from_len - 2; /* one for leading 00, one for type. */
-  for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
-    /* should decrypt to 0xff */
-    if (*p != 0xff) {
-      if (*p == 0) {
-        p++;
-        break;
-      } else {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT);
-        return -1;
-      }
-    }
-    p++;
-  }
-
-  if (i == j) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  if (i < 8) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT);
-    return -1;
-  }
-  i++; /* Skip over the '\0' */
-  j -= i;
-  if (j > to_len) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
-    return -1;
-  }
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(to, p, j);
-
-  return j;
-}
-
-int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(uint8_t *to, unsigned to_len,
-                                 const uint8_t *from, unsigned from_len) {
-  unsigned i, j;
-
-  if (to_len < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (from_len > to_len - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  uint8_t *p = to;
-
-  *(p++) = 0;
-  *(p++) = 2; /* Public Key BT (Block Type) */
-
-  /* pad out with non-zero random data */
-  j = to_len - 3 - from_len;
-
-  if (!RAND_bytes(p, j)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
-    while (*p == 0) {
-      if (!RAND_bytes(p, 1)) {
-        return 0;
-      }
-    }
-    p++;
-  }
-
-  *(p++) = 0;
-
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(p, from, from_len);
-  return 1;
-}
-
-int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(uint8_t *to, unsigned to_len,
-                                   const uint8_t *from, unsigned from_len) {
-  if (from_len == 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_EMPTY_PUBLIC_KEY);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  /* PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. See "PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography
-   * Standard", section 7.2.2. */
-  if (from_len < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
-    /* |from| is zero-padded to the size of the RSA modulus, a public value, so
-     * this can be rejected in non-constant time. */
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  unsigned first_byte_is_zero = constant_time_eq(from[0], 0);
-  unsigned second_byte_is_two = constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
-
-  unsigned i, zero_index = 0, looking_for_index = ~0u;
-  for (i = 2; i < from_len; i++) {
-    unsigned equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
-    zero_index = constant_time_select(looking_for_index & equals0, (unsigned)i,
-                                      zero_index);
-    looking_for_index = constant_time_select(equals0, 0, looking_for_index);
-  }
-
-  /* The input must begin with 00 02. */
-  unsigned valid_index = first_byte_is_zero;
-  valid_index &= second_byte_is_two;
-
-  /* We must have found the end of PS. */
-  valid_index &= ~looking_for_index;
-
-  /* PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |from|. */
-  valid_index &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
-
-  /* Skip the zero byte. */
-  zero_index++;
-
-  /* NOTE: Although this logic attempts to be constant time, the API contracts
-   * of this function and |RSA_decrypt| with |RSA_PKCS1_PADDING| make it
-   * impossible to completely avoid Bleichenbacher's attack. Consumers should
-   * use |RSA_unpad_key_pkcs1|. */
-  if (!valid_index) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  const unsigned msg_len = from_len - zero_index;
-  if (msg_len > to_len) {
-    /* This shouldn't happen because this function is always called with
-     * |to_len| as the key size and |from_len| is bounded by the key size. */
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  if (msg_len > INT_MAX) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(to, &from[zero_index], msg_len);
-  return (int)msg_len;
-}
-
-int RSA_padding_add_none(uint8_t *to, unsigned to_len, const uint8_t *from,
-                         unsigned from_len) {
-  if (from_len > to_len) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (from_len < to_len) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(to, from, from_len);
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int PKCS1_MGF1(uint8_t *out, size_t len, const uint8_t *seed,
-                      size_t seed_len, const EVP_MD *md) {
-  int ret = 0;
-  EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-
-  size_t md_len = EVP_MD_size(md);
-
-  for (uint32_t i = 0; len > 0; i++) {
-    uint8_t counter[4];
-    counter[0] = (uint8_t)(i >> 24);
-    counter[1] = (uint8_t)(i >> 16);
-    counter[2] = (uint8_t)(i >> 8);
-    counter[3] = (uint8_t)i;
-    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md, NULL) ||
-        !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, seed, seed_len) ||
-        !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, counter, sizeof(counter))) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    if (md_len <= len) {
-      if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, NULL)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-      out += md_len;
-      len -= md_len;
-    } else {
-      uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-      if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, digest, NULL)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-      OPENSSL_memcpy(out, digest, len);
-      len = 0;
-    }
-  }
-
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(uint8_t *to, unsigned to_len,
-                                    const uint8_t *from, unsigned from_len,
-                                    const uint8_t *param, unsigned param_len,
-                                    const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md) {
-  unsigned i, emlen, mdlen;
-  uint8_t *db, *seed;
-  uint8_t *dbmask = NULL, seedmask[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-  int ret = 0;
-
-  if (md == NULL) {
-    md = EVP_sha1();
-  }
-  if (mgf1md == NULL) {
-    mgf1md = md;
-  }
-
-  mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
-
-  if (to_len < 2 * mdlen + 2) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  emlen = to_len - 1;
-  if (from_len > emlen - 2 * mdlen - 1) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (emlen < 2 * mdlen + 1) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  to[0] = 0;
-  seed = to + 1;
-  db = to + mdlen + 1;
-
-  if (!EVP_Digest(param, param_len, db, NULL, md, NULL)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  OPENSSL_memset(db + mdlen, 0, emlen - from_len - 2 * mdlen - 1);
-  db[emlen - from_len - mdlen - 1] = 0x01;
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(db + emlen - from_len - mdlen, from, from_len);
-  if (!RAND_bytes(seed, mdlen)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(emlen - mdlen);
-  if (dbmask == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (!PKCS1_MGF1(dbmask, emlen - mdlen, seed, mdlen, mgf1md)) {
-    goto out;
-  }
-  for (i = 0; i < emlen - mdlen; i++) {
-    db[i] ^= dbmask[i];
-  }
-
-  if (!PKCS1_MGF1(seedmask, mdlen, db, emlen - mdlen, mgf1md)) {
-    goto out;
-  }
-  for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++) {
-    seed[i] ^= seedmask[i];
-  }
-  ret = 1;
-
-out:
-  OPENSSL_free(dbmask);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(uint8_t *to, unsigned to_len,
-                                      const uint8_t *from, unsigned from_len,
-                                      const uint8_t *param, unsigned param_len,
-                                      const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md) {
-  unsigned i, dblen, mlen = -1, mdlen, bad, looking_for_one_byte, one_index = 0;
-  const uint8_t *maskeddb, *maskedseed;
-  uint8_t *db = NULL, seed[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], phash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-
-  if (md == NULL) {
-    md = EVP_sha1();
-  }
-  if (mgf1md == NULL) {
-    mgf1md = md;
-  }
-
-  mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
-
-  /* The encoded message is one byte smaller than the modulus to ensure that it
-   * doesn't end up greater than the modulus. Thus there's an extra "+1" here
-   * compared to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2437#section-9.1.1.2. */
-  if (from_len < 1 + 2*mdlen + 1) {
-    /* 'from_len' is the length of the modulus, i.e. does not depend on the
-     * particular ciphertext. */
-    goto decoding_err;
-  }
-
-  dblen = from_len - mdlen - 1;
-  db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen);
-  if (db == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  maskedseed = from + 1;
-  maskeddb = from + 1 + mdlen;
-
-  if (!PKCS1_MGF1(seed, mdlen, maskeddb, dblen, mgf1md)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  for (i = 0; i < mdlen; i++) {
-    seed[i] ^= maskedseed[i];
-  }
-
-  if (!PKCS1_MGF1(db, dblen, seed, mdlen, mgf1md)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++) {
-    db[i] ^= maskeddb[i];
-  }
-
-  if (!EVP_Digest(param, param_len, phash, NULL, md, NULL)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  bad = ~constant_time_is_zero(CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, mdlen));
-  bad |= ~constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
-
-  looking_for_one_byte = ~0u;
-  for (i = mdlen; i < dblen; i++) {
-    unsigned equals1 = constant_time_eq(db[i], 1);
-    unsigned equals0 = constant_time_eq(db[i], 0);
-    one_index = constant_time_select(looking_for_one_byte & equals1, i,
-                                     one_index);
-    looking_for_one_byte =
-        constant_time_select(equals1, 0, looking_for_one_byte);
-    bad |= looking_for_one_byte & ~equals0;
-  }
-
-  bad |= looking_for_one_byte;
-
-  if (bad) {
-    goto decoding_err;
-  }
-
-  one_index++;
-  mlen = dblen - one_index;
-  if (to_len < mlen) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
-    mlen = -1;
-  } else {
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(to, db + one_index, mlen);
-  }
-
-  OPENSSL_free(db);
-  return mlen;
-
-decoding_err:
-  /* to avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not reveal
-   * which kind of decoding error happened */
-  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
- err:
-  OPENSSL_free(db);
-  return -1;
-}
-
-static const unsigned char zeroes[] = {0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0};
-
-int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const uint8_t *mHash,
-                              const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash,
-                              const uint8_t *EM, int sLen) {
-  int i;
-  int ret = 0;
-  int maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen;
-  size_t hLen;
-  const uint8_t *H;
-  uint8_t *DB = NULL;
-  EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-  uint8_t H_[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-
-  if (mgf1Hash == NULL) {
-    mgf1Hash = Hash;
-  }
-
-  hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
-
-  /* Negative sLen has special meanings:
-   *	-1	sLen == hLen
-   *	-2	salt length is autorecovered from signature
-   *	-N	reserved */
-  if (sLen == -1) {
-    sLen = hLen;
-  } else if (sLen == -2) {
-    sLen = -2;
-  } else if (sLen < -2) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  MSBits = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) - 1) & 0x7;
-  emLen = RSA_size(rsa);
-  if (EM[0] & (0xFF << MSBits)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID);
-    goto err;
-  }
-  if (MSBits == 0) {
-    EM++;
-    emLen--;
-  }
-  if (emLen < ((int)hLen + sLen + 2)) {
-    /* sLen can be small negative */
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
-    goto err;
-  }
-  if (EM[emLen - 1] != 0xbc) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID);
-    goto err;
-  }
-  maskedDBLen = emLen - hLen - 1;
-  H = EM + maskedDBLen;
-  DB = OPENSSL_malloc(maskedDBLen);
-  if (!DB) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    goto err;
-  }
-  if (!PKCS1_MGF1(DB, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, mgf1Hash)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  for (i = 0; i < maskedDBLen; i++) {
-    DB[i] ^= EM[i];
-  }
-  if (MSBits) {
-    DB[0] &= 0xFF >> (8 - MSBits);
-  }
-  for (i = 0; DB[i] == 0 && i < (maskedDBLen - 1); i++) {
-    ;
-  }
-  if (DB[i++] != 0x1) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED);
-    goto err;
-  }
-  if (sLen >= 0 && (maskedDBLen - i) != sLen) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
-    goto err;
-  }
-  if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, Hash, NULL) ||
-      !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, zeroes, sizeof zeroes) ||
-      !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, mHash, hLen)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  if (maskedDBLen - i) {
-    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, DB + i, maskedDBLen - i)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-  }
-  if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, H_, NULL)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  if (OPENSSL_memcmp(H_, H, hLen)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-    ret = 0;
-  } else {
-    ret = 1;
-  }
-
-err:
-  OPENSSL_free(DB);
-  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
-  return ret;
-}
-
-int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
-                                   const unsigned char *mHash,
-                                   const EVP_MD *Hash, const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash,
-                                   int sLenRequested) {
-  int ret = 0;
-  size_t maskedDBLen, MSBits, emLen;
-  size_t hLen;
-  unsigned char *H, *salt = NULL, *p;
-  EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-
-  if (mgf1Hash == NULL) {
-    mgf1Hash = Hash;
-  }
-
-  hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
-
-  if (BN_is_zero(rsa->n)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_EMPTY_PUBLIC_KEY);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  MSBits = (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) - 1) & 0x7;
-  emLen = RSA_size(rsa);
-  if (MSBits == 0) {
-    assert(emLen >= 1);
-    *EM++ = 0;
-    emLen--;
-  }
-
-  if (emLen < hLen + 2) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  /* Negative sLenRequested has special meanings:
-   *   -1  sLen == hLen
-   *   -2  salt length is maximized
-   *   -N  reserved */
-  size_t sLen;
-  if (sLenRequested == -1) {
-    sLen = hLen;
-  } else if (sLenRequested == -2) {
-    sLen = emLen - hLen - 2;
-  } else if (sLenRequested < 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
-    goto err;
-  } else {
-    sLen = (size_t)sLenRequested;
-  }
-
-  if (emLen - hLen - 2 < sLen) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (sLen > 0) {
-    salt = OPENSSL_malloc(sLen);
-    if (!salt) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-      goto err;
-    }
-    if (!RAND_bytes(salt, sLen)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-  }
-  maskedDBLen = emLen - hLen - 1;
-  H = EM + maskedDBLen;
-  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-  if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, Hash, NULL) ||
-      !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, zeroes, sizeof zeroes) ||
-      !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, mHash, hLen)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  if (sLen && !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, salt, sLen)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, H, NULL)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
-  /* Generate dbMask in place then perform XOR on it */
-  if (!PKCS1_MGF1(EM, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, mgf1Hash)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  p = EM;
-
-  /* Initial PS XORs with all zeroes which is a NOP so just update
-   * pointer. Note from a test above this value is guaranteed to
-   * be non-negative. */
-  p += emLen - sLen - hLen - 2;
-  *p++ ^= 0x1;
-  if (sLen > 0) {
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < sLen; i++) {
-      *p++ ^= salt[i];
-    }
-  }
-  if (MSBits) {
-    EM[0] &= 0xFF >> (8 - MSBits);
-  }
-
-  /* H is already in place so just set final 0xbc */
-
-  EM[emLen - 1] = 0xbc;
-
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  OPENSSL_free(salt);
-
-  return ret;
-}