grpc 1.9.1 → 1.10.0.pre1

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/handshake_client.c

@@ -1,1883 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license provided above.
- *
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
- * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/aead.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/buf.h>
-#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
-#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-
-#include "../crypto/internal.h"
-#include "internal.h"
-
-
-static int ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_verify_server_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_get_server_hello_done(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_send_cert_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-
-int ssl3_connect(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  int ret = -1;
-
-  assert(ssl->handshake_func == ssl3_connect);
-  assert(!ssl->server);
-
-  for (;;) {
-    int state = hs->state;
-
-    switch (hs->state) {
-      case SSL_ST_INIT:
-        ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
-        ret = ssl3_send_client_hello(hs);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-
-        if (!SSL_is_dtls(ssl) || ssl->d1->send_cookie) {
-          hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
-        } else {
-          hs->next_state = DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
-        break;
-
-      case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
-        assert(SSL_is_dtls(ssl));
-        ret = dtls1_get_hello_verify(hs);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        if (ssl->d1->send_cookie) {
-          ssl->method->received_flight(ssl);
-          hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
-        } else {
-          hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
-        }
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
-        ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(hs);
-        if (hs->state == SSL_ST_TLS13) {
-          break;
-        }
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-
-        if (ssl->session != NULL) {
-          hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-        } else {
-          hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
-        }
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
-        if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
-          ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(hs);
-          if (ret <= 0) {
-            goto end;
-          }
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
-        if (hs->certificate_status_expected) {
-          ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(hs);
-          if (ret <= 0) {
-            goto end;
-          }
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT:
-        if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
-          ret = ssl3_verify_server_cert(hs);
-          if (ret <= 0) {
-            goto end;
-          }
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
-        ret = ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(hs);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
-        if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
-          ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(hs);
-          if (ret <= 0) {
-            goto end;
-          }
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
-        ret = ssl3_get_server_hello_done(hs);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        ssl->method->received_flight(ssl);
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
-        if (hs->cert_request) {
-          ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(hs);
-          if (ret <= 0) {
-            goto end;
-          }
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
-        ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(hs);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
-      case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
-        if (hs->cert_request && ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
-          ret = ssl3_send_cert_verify(hs);
-          if (ret <= 0) {
-            goto end;
-          }
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE:
-        if (!ssl->method->add_change_cipher_spec(ssl) ||
-            !tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
-          ret = -1;
-          goto end;
-        }
-
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
-        if (hs->next_proto_neg_seen) {
-          ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(hs);
-          if (ret <= 0) {
-            goto end;
-          }
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A:
-        if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
-          ret = ssl3_send_channel_id(hs);
-          if (ret <= 0) {
-            goto end;
-          }
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
-        ret = ssl3_send_finished(hs);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
-
-        if (ssl->session != NULL) {
-          hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_FINISH_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE;
-        } else {
-          /* This is a non-resumption handshake. If it involves ChannelID, then
-           * record the handshake hashes at this point in the session so that
-           * any resumption of this session with ChannelID can sign those
-           * hashes. */
-          ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(hs);
-          if (ret <= 0) {
-            goto end;
-          }
-          if ((SSL_get_mode(ssl) & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START) &&
-              ssl3_can_false_start(ssl) &&
-              /* No False Start on renegotiation (would complicate the state
-               * machine). */
-              !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
-            hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_FALSE_START;
-          } else {
-            hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-          }
-        }
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_FALSE_START:
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-        hs->in_false_start = 1;
-        ret = 1;
-        goto end;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
-        if (hs->ticket_expected) {
-          ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(hs);
-          if (ret <= 0) {
-            goto end;
-          }
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE:
-        ret = ssl->method->read_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-
-        if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
-          ret = -1;
-          goto end;
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
-        ret = ssl3_get_finished(hs);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        ssl->method->received_flight(ssl);
-
-        if (ssl->session != NULL) {
-          hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE;
-        } else {
-          hs->state = SSL3_ST_FINISH_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE;
-        }
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
-        ret = ssl->method->flush_flight(ssl);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        hs->state = hs->next_state;
-        if (hs->state != SSL3_ST_FINISH_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE) {
-          ssl->method->expect_flight(ssl);
-        }
-        break;
-
-      case SSL_ST_TLS13:
-        ret = tls13_handshake(hs);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_FINISH_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_FINISH_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE:
-        ssl->method->release_current_message(ssl, 1 /* free_buffer */);
-
-        SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->s3->established_session);
-        if (ssl->session != NULL) {
-          SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->session);
-          ssl->s3->established_session = ssl->session;
-        } else {
-          /* We make a copy of the session in order to maintain the immutability
-           * of the new established_session due to False Start. The caller may
-           * have taken a reference to the temporary session. */
-          ssl->s3->established_session =
-              SSL_SESSION_dup(hs->new_session, SSL_SESSION_DUP_ALL);
-          if (ssl->s3->established_session == NULL) {
-            ret = -1;
-            goto end;
-          }
-          ssl->s3->established_session->not_resumable = 0;
-
-          SSL_SESSION_free(hs->new_session);
-          hs->new_session = NULL;
-        }
-
-        hs->state = SSL_ST_OK;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL_ST_OK: {
-        const int is_initial_handshake = !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete;
-        ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = 1;
-        if (is_initial_handshake) {
-          /* Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption. */
-          ssl_update_cache(hs, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
-        }
-
-        ret = 1;
-        ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
-        goto end;
-      }
-
-      default:
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
-        ret = -1;
-        goto end;
-    }
-
-    if (hs->state != state) {
-      ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
-    }
-  }
-
-end:
-  ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-uint16_t ssl_get_grease_value(const SSL *ssl, enum ssl_grease_index_t index) {
-  /* Use the client_random for entropy. This both avoids calling |RAND_bytes| on
-   * a single byte repeatedly and ensures the values are deterministic. This
-   * allows the same ClientHello be sent twice for a HelloRetryRequest or the
-   * same group be advertised in both supported_groups and key_shares. */
-  uint16_t ret = ssl->s3->client_random[index];
-  /* This generates a random value of the form 0xωaωa, for all 0 ≤ ω < 16. */
-  ret = (ret & 0xf0) | 0x0a;
-  ret |= ret << 8;
-  return ret;
-}
-
-/* ssl_get_client_disabled sets |*out_mask_a| and |*out_mask_k| to masks of
- * disabled algorithms. */
-static void ssl_get_client_disabled(SSL *ssl, uint32_t *out_mask_a,
-                                    uint32_t *out_mask_k) {
-  int have_rsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
-  *out_mask_a = 0;
-  *out_mask_k = 0;
-
-  /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for RSA or
-   * ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. */
-  const uint16_t *sigalgs;
-  size_t num_sigalgs = tls12_get_verify_sigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs);
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < num_sigalgs; i++) {
-    switch (sigalgs[i]) {
-      case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA512:
-      case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA384:
-      case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA256:
-      case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512:
-      case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384:
-      case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256:
-      case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1:
-        have_rsa = 1;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512:
-      case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384:
-      case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256:
-      case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1:
-        have_ecdsa = 1;
-        break;
-    }
-  }
-
-  /* Disable auth if we don't include any appropriate signature algorithms. */
-  if (!have_rsa) {
-    *out_mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
-  }
-  if (!have_ecdsa) {
-    *out_mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
-  }
-
-  /* PSK requires a client callback. */
-  if (ssl->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
-    *out_mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
-    *out_mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
-  }
-}
-
-static int ssl_write_client_cipher_list(SSL *ssl, CBB *out,
-                                        uint16_t min_version,
-                                        uint16_t max_version) {
-  uint32_t mask_a, mask_k;
-  ssl_get_client_disabled(ssl, &mask_a, &mask_k);
-
-  CBB child;
-  if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &child)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  /* Add a fake cipher suite. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01. */
-  if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled &&
-      !CBB_add_u16(&child, ssl_get_grease_value(ssl, ssl_grease_cipher))) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  /* Add TLS 1.3 ciphers. Order ChaCha20-Poly1305 relative to AES-GCM based on
-   * hardware support. */
-  if (max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
-    if (!EVP_has_aes_hardware() &&
-        !CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 & 0xffff)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-    if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 & 0xffff) ||
-        !CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 & 0xffff)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-    if (EVP_has_aes_hardware() &&
-        !CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 & 0xffff)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (min_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
-    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
-    int any_enabled = 0;
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
-      const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
-      /* Skip disabled ciphers */
-      if ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & mask_k) ||
-          (cipher->algorithm_auth & mask_a)) {
-        continue;
-      }
-      if (SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(cipher) > max_version ||
-          SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(cipher) < min_version) {
-        continue;
-      }
-      any_enabled = 1;
-      if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, ssl_cipher_get_value(cipher))) {
-        return 0;
-      }
-    }
-
-    /* If all ciphers were disabled, return the error to the caller. */
-    if (!any_enabled && max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
-      return 0;
-    }
-  }
-
-  /* For SSLv3, the SCSV is added. Otherwise the renegotiation extension is
-   * added. */
-  if (max_version == SSL3_VERSION &&
-      !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
-    if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xffff)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
-    if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-  }
-
-  return CBB_flush(out);
-}
-
-int ssl_write_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  uint16_t min_version, max_version;
-  if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  CBB cbb, body;
-  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  /* Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption. */
-  int has_session = ssl->session != NULL &&
-                    !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete;
-
-  CBB child;
-  if (!CBB_add_u16(&body, hs->client_version) ||
-      !CBB_add_bytes(&body, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
-      (has_session &&
-       !CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->session->session_id,
-                      ssl->session->session_id_length))) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
-    if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
-        !CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->d1->cookie, ssl->d1->cookie_len)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  size_t header_len =
-      SSL_is_dtls(ssl) ? DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH : SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-  if (!ssl_write_client_cipher_list(ssl, &body, min_version, max_version) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8(&body, 1 /* one compression method */) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8(&body, 0 /* null compression */) ||
-      !ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(hs, &body, header_len + CBB_len(&body))) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  uint8_t *msg = NULL;
-  size_t len;
-  if (!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb, &msg, &len)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  /* Now that the length prefixes have been computed, fill in the placeholder
-   * PSK binder. */
-  if (hs->needs_psk_binder &&
-      !tls13_write_psk_binder(hs, msg, len)) {
-    OPENSSL_free(msg);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  return ssl->method->add_message(ssl, msg, len);
-
- err:
-  CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
-  return 0;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  /* The handshake buffer is reset on every ClientHello. Notably, in DTLS, we
-   * may send multiple ClientHellos if we receive HelloVerifyRequest. */
-  if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_init(&hs->transcript)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  uint16_t min_version, max_version;
-  if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  uint16_t max_wire_version = ssl->method->version_to_wire(max_version);
-  assert(hs->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A);
-  if (!ssl->s3->have_version) {
-    ssl->version = max_wire_version;
-  }
-
-  /* Always advertise the ClientHello version from the original maximum version,
-   * even on renegotiation. The static RSA key exchange uses this field, and
-   * some servers fail when it changes across handshakes. */
-  hs->client_version = max_wire_version;
-  if (max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
-    hs->client_version = ssl->method->version_to_wire(TLS1_2_VERSION);
-  }
-
-  /* If the configured session has expired or was created at a disabled
-   * version, drop it. */
-  if (ssl->session != NULL) {
-    uint16_t session_version;
-    if (ssl->session->is_server ||
-        !ssl->method->version_from_wire(&session_version,
-                                        ssl->session->ssl_version) ||
-        (session_version < TLS1_3_VERSION &&
-         ssl->session->session_id_length == 0) ||
-        ssl->session->not_resumable ||
-        !ssl_session_is_time_valid(ssl, ssl->session) ||
-        session_version < min_version || session_version > max_version) {
-      ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
-    }
-  }
-
-  /* If resending the ClientHello in DTLS after a HelloVerifyRequest, don't
-   * renegerate the client_random. The random must be reused. */
-  if ((!SSL_is_dtls(ssl) || !ssl->d1->send_cookie) &&
-      !RAND_bytes(ssl->s3->client_random, sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random))) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_write_client_hello(hs)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  int al;
-  CBS hello_verify_request, cookie;
-  uint16_t server_version;
-
-  int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
-  if (ret <= 0) {
-    return ret;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
-    ssl->d1->send_cookie = 0;
-    ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  CBS_init(&hello_verify_request, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
-  if (!CBS_get_u16(&hello_verify_request, &server_version) ||
-      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&hello_verify_request, &cookie) ||
-      CBS_len(&hello_verify_request) != 0) {
-    al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  if (CBS_len(&cookie) > sizeof(ssl->d1->cookie)) {
-    al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->d1->cookie, CBS_data(&cookie), CBS_len(&cookie));
-  ssl->d1->cookie_len = CBS_len(&cookie);
-
-  ssl->d1->send_cookie = 1;
-  return 1;
-
-f_err:
-  ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-  return -1;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-  CBS server_hello, server_random, session_id;
-  uint16_t server_wire_version, cipher_suite;
-  uint8_t compression_method;
-
-  int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
-  if (ret <= 0) {
-    uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error();
-    if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SSL &&
-        ERR_GET_REASON(err) == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) {
-      /* Add a dedicated error code to the queue for a handshake_failure alert
-       * in response to ClientHello. This matches NSS's client behavior and
-       * gives a better error on a (probable) failure to negotiate initial
-       * parameters. Note: this error code comes after the original one.
-       *
-       * See https://crbug.com/446505. */
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ON_CLIENT_HELLO);
-    }
-    return ret;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO &&
-      ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
-    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  CBS_init(&server_hello, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
-
-  if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &server_wire_version)) {
-    al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  uint16_t min_version, max_version, server_version;
-  if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version) ||
-      !ssl->method->version_from_wire(&server_version, server_wire_version) ||
-      server_version < min_version || server_version > max_version) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
-    al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  assert(ssl->s3->have_version == ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
-  if (!ssl->s3->have_version) {
-    ssl->version = server_wire_version;
-    /* At this point, the connection's version is known and ssl->version is
-     * fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version. */
-    ssl->s3->have_version = 1;
-  } else if (server_wire_version != ssl->version) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
-    al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
-    hs->state = SSL_ST_TLS13;
-    hs->do_tls13_handshake = tls13_client_handshake;
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  ssl_clear_tls13_state(hs);
-
-  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  if (!CBS_get_bytes(&server_hello, &server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
-      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_hello, &session_id) ||
-      CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE ||
-      !CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &cipher_suite) ||
-      !CBS_get_u8(&server_hello, &compression_method)) {
-    al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  /* Copy over the server random. */
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->server_random, CBS_data(&server_random), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-
-  /* TODO(davidben): Implement the TLS 1.1 and 1.2 downgrade sentinels once TLS
-   * 1.3 is finalized and we are not implementing a draft version. */
-
-  if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete && ssl->session != NULL &&
-      ssl->session->session_id_length != 0 &&
-      CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, ssl->session->session_id,
-                    ssl->session->session_id_length)) {
-    ssl->s3->session_reused = 1;
-  } else {
-    /* The session wasn't resumed. Create a fresh SSL_SESSION to
-     * fill out. */
-    ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
-    if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs, 0 /* client */)) {
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-    /* Note: session_id could be empty. */
-    hs->new_session->session_id_length = CBS_len(&session_id);
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(hs->new_session->session_id, CBS_data(&session_id),
-                   CBS_len(&session_id));
-  }
-
-  const SSL_CIPHER *c = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite);
-  if (c == NULL) {
-    /* unknown cipher */
-    al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  /* The cipher must be allowed in the selected version and enabled. */
-  uint32_t mask_a, mask_k;
-  ssl_get_client_disabled(ssl, &mask_a, &mask_k);
-  if ((c->algorithm_mkey & mask_k) || (c->algorithm_auth & mask_a) ||
-      SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(c) > ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) ||
-      SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(c) < ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) ||
-      !sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(ssl), NULL, c)) {
-    al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->session != NULL) {
-    if (ssl->session->ssl_version != ssl->version) {
-      al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_VERSION_NOT_RETURNED);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-    if (ssl->session->cipher != c) {
-      al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-    if (!ssl_session_is_context_valid(ssl, ssl->session)) {
-      /* This is actually a client application bug. */
-      al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL,
-                        SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-  } else {
-    hs->new_session->cipher = c;
-  }
-  hs->new_cipher = c;
-
-  /* Now that the cipher is known, initialize the handshake hash and hash the
-   * ServerHello. */
-  if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_init_hash(&hs->transcript, ssl3_protocol_version(ssl),
-                                c->algorithm_prf) ||
-      !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  /* If doing a full handshake, the server may request a client certificate
-   * which requires hashing the handshake transcript. Otherwise, the handshake
-   * buffer may be released. */
-  if (ssl->session != NULL ||
-      !ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
-    SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript);
-  }
-
-  /* Only the NULL compression algorithm is supported. */
-  if (compression_method != 0) {
-    al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  /* TLS extensions */
-  if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(hs, &server_hello)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  /* There should be nothing left over in the record. */
-  if (CBS_len(&server_hello) != 0) {
-    /* wrong packet length */
-    al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->session != NULL &&
-      hs->extended_master_secret != ssl->session->extended_master_secret) {
-    al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-    if (ssl->session->extended_master_secret) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION);
-    } else {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_NON_EMS_SESSION_WITH_EMS_EXTENSION);
-    }
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-
-f_err:
-  ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-err:
-  return -1;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
-  if (ret <= 0) {
-    return ret;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) ||
-      !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  CBS cbs;
-  CBS_init(&cbs, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
-
-  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-  sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(hs->new_session->certs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
-  EVP_PKEY_free(hs->peer_pubkey);
-  hs->peer_pubkey = NULL;
-  hs->new_session->certs = ssl_parse_cert_chain(&alert, &hs->peer_pubkey, NULL,
-                                                &cbs, ssl->ctx->pool);
-  if (hs->new_session->certs == NULL) {
-    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs) == 0 ||
-      CBS_len(&cbs) != 0 ||
-      !ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_cache_objects(hs->new_session)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_check_leaf_certificate(
-          hs, hs->peer_pubkey,
-          sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(hs->new_session->certs, 0))) {
-    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  int al;
-  CBS certificate_status, ocsp_response;
-  uint8_t status_type;
-
-  int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
-  if (ret <= 0) {
-    return ret;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
-    /* A server may send status_request in ServerHello and then change
-     * its mind about sending CertificateStatus. */
-    ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  CBS_init(&certificate_status, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
-  if (!CBS_get_u8(&certificate_status, &status_type) ||
-      status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp ||
-      !CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_status, &ocsp_response) ||
-      CBS_len(&ocsp_response) == 0 ||
-      CBS_len(&certificate_status) != 0) {
-    al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  if (!CBS_stow(&ocsp_response, &hs->new_session->ocsp_response,
-                &hs->new_session->ocsp_response_length)) {
-    al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-  return 1;
-
-f_err:
-  ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-  return -1;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_verify_server_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  if (!ssl_verify_cert_chain(ssl, &hs->new_session->verify_result,
-                             hs->new_session->x509_chain)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  int al;
-  DH *dh = NULL;
-  EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
-  EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
-
-  int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
-  if (ret <= 0) {
-    return ret;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
-    /* Some ciphers (pure PSK) have an optional ServerKeyExchange message. */
-    if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(hs->new_cipher)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-      ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-      return -1;
-    }
-
-    ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  /* Retain a copy of the original CBS to compute the signature over. */
-  CBS server_key_exchange;
-  CBS_init(&server_key_exchange, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
-  CBS server_key_exchange_orig = server_key_exchange;
-
-  uint32_t alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-  uint32_t alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
-  if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
-    CBS psk_identity_hint;
-
-    /* Each of the PSK key exchanges begins with a psk_identity_hint. */
-    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange,
-                                     &psk_identity_hint)) {
-      al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    /* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
-     * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange.  Assume that the maximum length of a PSK
-     * identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK identity.
-     * Also do not allow NULL characters; identities are saved as C strings.
-     *
-     * TODO(davidben): Should invalid hints be ignored? It's a hint rather than
-     * a specific identity. */
-    if (CBS_len(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN ||
-        CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity_hint)) {
-      al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    /* Save non-empty identity hints as a C string. Empty identity hints we
-     * treat as missing. Plain PSK makes it possible to send either no hint
-     * (omit ServerKeyExchange) or an empty hint, while ECDHE_PSK can only spell
-     * empty hint. Having different capabilities is odd, so we interpret empty
-     * and missing as identical. */
-    if (CBS_len(&psk_identity_hint) != 0 &&
-        !CBS_strdup(&psk_identity_hint, &hs->peer_psk_identity_hint)) {
-      al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
-    CBS dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys;
-    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_p) ||
-        CBS_len(&dh_p) == 0 ||
-        !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_g) ||
-        CBS_len(&dh_g) == 0 ||
-        !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_Ys) ||
-        CBS_len(&dh_Ys) == 0) {
-      al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    dh = DH_new();
-    if (dh == NULL) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    dh->p = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_p), CBS_len(&dh_p), NULL);
-    dh->g = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_g), CBS_len(&dh_g), NULL);
-    if (dh->p == NULL || dh->g == NULL) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    unsigned bits = DH_num_bits(dh);
-    if (bits < 1024) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
-      goto err;
-    } else if (bits > 4096) {
-      /* Overly large DHE groups are prohibitively expensive, so enforce a limit
-       * to prevent a server from causing us to perform too expensive of a
-       * computation. */
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DH_P_TOO_LONG);
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    SSL_ECDH_CTX_init_for_dhe(&hs->ecdh_ctx, dh);
-    dh = NULL;
-
-    /* Save the peer public key for later. */
-    if (!CBS_stow(&dh_Ys, &hs->peer_key, &hs->peer_key_len)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-  } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
-    /* Parse the server parameters. */
-    uint8_t group_type;
-    uint16_t group_id;
-    CBS point;
-    if (!CBS_get_u8(&server_key_exchange, &group_type) ||
-        group_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE ||
-        !CBS_get_u16(&server_key_exchange, &group_id) ||
-        !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &point)) {
-      al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-    hs->new_session->group_id = group_id;
-
-    /* Ensure the group is consistent with preferences. */
-    if (!tls1_check_group_id(ssl, group_id)) {
-      al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    /* Initialize ECDH and save the peer public key for later. */
-    if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(&hs->ecdh_ctx, group_id) ||
-        !CBS_stow(&point, &hs->peer_key, &hs->peer_key_len)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-  } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
-    al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  /* At this point, |server_key_exchange| contains the signature, if any, while
-   * |server_key_exchange_orig| contains the entire message. From that, derive
-   * a CBS containing just the parameter. */
-  CBS parameter;
-  CBS_init(&parameter, CBS_data(&server_key_exchange_orig),
-           CBS_len(&server_key_exchange_orig) - CBS_len(&server_key_exchange));
-
-  /* ServerKeyExchange should be signed by the server's public key. */
-  if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
-    uint16_t signature_algorithm = 0;
-    if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
-      if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_key_exchange, &signature_algorithm)) {
-        al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-        goto f_err;
-      }
-      if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(ssl, &al, signature_algorithm)) {
-        goto f_err;
-      }
-      hs->new_session->peer_signature_algorithm = signature_algorithm;
-    } else if (hs->peer_pubkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
-      signature_algorithm = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1;
-    } else if (hs->peer_pubkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
-      signature_algorithm = SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1;
-    } else {
-      al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    /* The last field in |server_key_exchange| is the signature. */
-    CBS signature;
-    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &signature) ||
-        CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) != 0) {
-      al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    CBB transcript;
-    uint8_t *transcript_data;
-    size_t transcript_len;
-    if (!CBB_init(&transcript, 2*SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + CBS_len(&parameter)) ||
-        !CBB_add_bytes(&transcript, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
-        !CBB_add_bytes(&transcript, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
-        !CBB_add_bytes(&transcript, CBS_data(&parameter), CBS_len(&parameter)) ||
-        !CBB_finish(&transcript, &transcript_data, &transcript_len)) {
-      CBB_cleanup(&transcript);
-      al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    int sig_ok = ssl_public_key_verify(
-        ssl, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature), signature_algorithm,
-        hs->peer_pubkey, transcript_data, transcript_len);
-    OPENSSL_free(transcript_data);
-
-#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
-    sig_ok = 1;
-    ERR_clear_error();
-#endif
-    if (!sig_ok) {
-      /* bad signature */
-      al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-  } else {
-    /* PSK ciphers are the only supported certificate-less ciphers. */
-    assert(alg_a == SSL_aPSK);
-
-    if (CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) > 0) {
-      al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-  }
-  return 1;
-
-f_err:
-  ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-err:
-  DH_free(dh);
-  EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
-  EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
-  return -1;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  int msg_ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
-  if (msg_ret <= 0) {
-    return msg_ret;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) {
-    ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
-    /* If we get here we don't need the handshake buffer as we won't be doing
-     * client auth. */
-    SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript);
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) ||
-      !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  CBS cbs;
-  CBS_init(&cbs, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
-
-  /* Get the certificate types. */
-  CBS certificate_types;
-  if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_types)) {
-    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  if (!CBS_stow(&certificate_types, &hs->certificate_types,
-                &hs->num_certificate_types)) {
-    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
-    CBS supported_signature_algorithms;
-    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &supported_signature_algorithms) ||
-        !tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(hs, &supported_signature_algorithms)) {
-      ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-      return -1;
-    }
-  }
-
-  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-  STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = ssl_parse_client_CA_list(ssl, &alert, &cbs);
-  if (ca_sk == NULL) {
-    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
-    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-    sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  hs->cert_request = 1;
-  sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(hs->ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
-  hs->ca_names = ca_sk;
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_get_server_hello_done(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
-  if (ret <= 0) {
-    return ret;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) ||
-      !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  /* ServerHelloDone is empty. */
-  if (ssl->init_num > 0) {
-    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  /* Call cert_cb to update the certificate. */
-  if (ssl->cert->cert_cb) {
-    int ret = ssl->cert->cert_cb(ssl, ssl->cert->cert_cb_arg);
-    if (ret < 0) {
-      ssl->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
-      return -1;
-    }
-    if (ret == 0) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
-      ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return -1;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
-    /* Without a client certificate, the handshake buffer may be released. */
-    SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript);
-
-    /* In SSL 3.0, the Certificate message is replaced with a warning alert. */
-    if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
-      if (!ssl->method->add_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_WARNING,
-                                  SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE)) {
-        return -1;
-      }
-      return 1;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_auto_chain_if_needed(ssl) ||
-      !ssl3_output_cert_chain(ssl)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-  return 1;
-}
-
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(size_t) >= sizeof(unsigned),
-                       SIZE_T_IS_SMALLER_THAN_UNSIGNED);
-
-static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  uint8_t *pms = NULL;
-  size_t pms_len = 0;
-  CBB cbb, body;
-  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body,
-                                 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  uint32_t alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-  uint32_t alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
-  /* If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key. */
-  unsigned psk_len = 0;
-  uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
-  if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
-    if (ssl->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
-    OPENSSL_memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
-    psk_len =
-        ssl->psk_client_callback(ssl, hs->peer_psk_identity_hint, identity,
-                                 sizeof(identity), psk, sizeof(psk));
-    if (psk_len == 0) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
-      ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-      goto err;
-    }
-    assert(psk_len <= PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN);
-
-    OPENSSL_free(hs->new_session->psk_identity);
-    hs->new_session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
-    if (hs->new_session->psk_identity == NULL) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    /* Write out psk_identity. */
-    CBB child;
-    if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
-        !CBB_add_bytes(&child, (const uint8_t *)identity,
-                       OPENSSL_strnlen(identity, sizeof(identity))) ||
-        !CBB_flush(&body)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  /* Depending on the key exchange method, compute |pms| and |pms_len|. */
-  if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
-    pms_len = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
-    pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len);
-    if (pms == NULL) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(hs->peer_pubkey);
-    if (rsa == NULL) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    pms[0] = hs->client_version >> 8;
-    pms[1] = hs->client_version & 0xff;
-    if (!RAND_bytes(&pms[2], SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH - 2)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    CBB child, *enc_pms = &body;
-    size_t enc_pms_len;
-    /* In TLS, there is a length prefix. */
-    if (ssl->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
-      if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-      enc_pms = &child;
-    }
-
-    uint8_t *ptr;
-    if (!CBB_reserve(enc_pms, &ptr, RSA_size(rsa)) ||
-        !RSA_encrypt(rsa, &enc_pms_len, ptr, RSA_size(rsa), pms, pms_len,
-                     RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) ||
-        !CBB_did_write(enc_pms, enc_pms_len) ||
-        !CBB_flush(&body)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-  } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kDHE)) {
-    /* Generate a keypair and serialize the public half. */
-    CBB child;
-    if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_add_key(&hs->ecdh_ctx, &body, &child)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    /* Compute the premaster. */
-    uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-    if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_accept(&hs->ecdh_ctx, &child, &pms, &pms_len, &alert,
-                             hs->peer_key, hs->peer_key_len)) {
-      ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
-      goto err;
-    }
-    if (!CBB_flush(&body)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    /* The key exchange state may now be discarded. */
-    SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(&hs->ecdh_ctx);
-    OPENSSL_free(hs->peer_key);
-    hs->peer_key = NULL;
-    hs->peer_key_len = 0;
-  } else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
-    /* For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as
-     * the pre-shared key. */
-    pms_len = psk_len;
-    pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len);
-    if (pms == NULL) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-      goto err;
-    }
-    OPENSSL_memset(pms, 0, pms_len);
-  } else {
-    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  /* For a PSK cipher suite, other_secret is combined with the pre-shared
-   * key. */
-  if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
-    CBB pms_cbb, child;
-    uint8_t *new_pms;
-    size_t new_pms_len;
-
-    CBB_zero(&pms_cbb);
-    if (!CBB_init(&pms_cbb, 2 + psk_len + 2 + pms_len) ||
-        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&pms_cbb, &child) ||
-        !CBB_add_bytes(&child, pms, pms_len) ||
-        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&pms_cbb, &child) ||
-        !CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) ||
-        !CBB_finish(&pms_cbb, &new_pms, &new_pms_len)) {
-      CBB_cleanup(&pms_cbb);
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-      goto err;
-    }
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len);
-    OPENSSL_free(pms);
-    pms = new_pms;
-    pms_len = new_pms_len;
-  }
-
-  /* The message must be added to the finished hash before calculating the
-   * master secret. */
-  if (!ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  hs->new_session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(
-      hs, hs->new_session->master_key, pms, pms_len);
-  if (hs->new_session->master_key_length == 0) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  hs->new_session->extended_master_secret = hs->extended_master_secret;
-  OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len);
-  OPENSSL_free(pms);
-
-  return 1;
-
-err:
-  CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
-  if (pms != NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len);
-    OPENSSL_free(pms);
-  }
-  return -1;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_send_cert_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  assert(ssl_has_private_key(ssl));
-
-  CBB cbb, body, child;
-  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body,
-                                 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  uint16_t signature_algorithm;
-  if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(hs, &signature_algorithm)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
-    /* Write out the digest type in TLS 1.2. */
-    if (!CBB_add_u16(&body, signature_algorithm)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      goto err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  /* Set aside space for the signature. */
-  const size_t max_sig_len = ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(ssl);
-  uint8_t *ptr;
-  if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
-      !CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  size_t sig_len = max_sig_len;
-  enum ssl_private_key_result_t sign_result;
-  if (hs->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
-    /* The SSL3 construction for CertificateVerify does not decompose into a
-     * single final digest and signature, and must be special-cased. */
-    if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) == SSL3_VERSION) {
-      if (ssl->cert->key_method != NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_FOR_CUSTOM_KEY);
-        goto err;
-      }
-
-      uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-      size_t digest_len;
-      if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_ssl3_cert_verify_hash(&hs->transcript, digest,
-                                                &digest_len, hs->new_session,
-                                                signature_algorithm)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-
-      sign_result = ssl_private_key_success;
-
-      EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ssl->cert->privatekey, NULL);
-      if (pctx == NULL ||
-          !EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx) ||
-          !EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, ptr, &sig_len, digest, digest_len)) {
-        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
-        sign_result = ssl_private_key_failure;
-        goto err;
-      }
-      EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
-    } else {
-      sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign(
-          ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len, signature_algorithm,
-          (const uint8_t *)hs->transcript.buffer->data,
-          hs->transcript.buffer->length);
-    }
-
-    /* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary. */
-    SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript);
-  } else {
-    assert(hs->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B);
-    sign_result = ssl_private_key_complete(ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len);
-  }
-
-  switch (sign_result) {
-    case ssl_private_key_success:
-      break;
-    case ssl_private_key_failure:
-      goto err;
-    case ssl_private_key_retry:
-      ssl->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
-      hs->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
-      goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len) ||
-      !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-
-err:
-  CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
-  return -1;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  static const uint8_t kZero[32] = {0};
-  size_t padding_len = 32 - ((ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len + 2) % 32);
-
-  CBB cbb, body, child;
-  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
-      !CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated,
-                     ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
-      !CBB_add_bytes(&child, kZero, padding_len) ||
-      !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  if (!ssl_do_channel_id_callback(ssl)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private == NULL) {
-    ssl->rwstate = SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP;
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  CBB cbb, body;
-  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_CHANNEL_ID) ||
-      !tls1_write_channel_id(hs, &body) ||
-      !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
-  if (ret <= 0) {
-    return ret;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) ||
-      !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  CBS new_session_ticket, ticket;
-  uint32_t tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint;
-  CBS_init(&new_session_ticket, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
-  if (!CBS_get_u32(&new_session_ticket, &tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint) ||
-      !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&new_session_ticket, &ticket) ||
-      CBS_len(&new_session_ticket) != 0) {
-    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  if (CBS_len(&ticket) == 0) {
-    /* RFC 5077 allows a server to change its mind and send no ticket after
-     * negotiating the extension. The value of |ticket_expected| is checked in
-     * |ssl_update_cache| so is cleared here to avoid an unnecessary update. */
-    hs->ticket_expected = 0;
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  int session_renewed = ssl->session != NULL;
-  SSL_SESSION *session = hs->new_session;
-  if (session_renewed) {
-    /* The server is sending a new ticket for an existing session. Sessions are
-     * immutable once established, so duplicate all but the ticket of the
-     * existing session. */
-    session = SSL_SESSION_dup(ssl->session, SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH);
-    if (session == NULL) {
-      /* This should never happen. */
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      goto err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  /* |tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint| is measured from when the ticket was issued. */
-  ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, session);
-
-  if (!CBS_stow(&ticket, &session->tlsext_tick, &session->tlsext_ticklen)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    goto err;
-  }
-  session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint;
-
-  /* Generate a session ID for this session based on the session ticket. We use
-   * the session ID mechanism for detecting ticket resumption. This also fits in
-   * with assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL.*/
-  if (!EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&ticket), CBS_len(&ticket),
-                  session->session_id, &session->session_id_length,
-                  EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (session_renewed) {
-    session->not_resumable = 0;
-    SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session);
-    ssl->session = session;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-
-err:
-  if (session_renewed) {
-    SSL_SESSION_free(session);
-  }
-  return -1;
-}