grpc 1.9.1 → 1.10.0.pre1

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/{tls13_enc.c → tls13_enc.cc}

@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
+#include <utility>
+
 #include <openssl/aead.h>
 #include <openssl/bytestring.h>
 #include <openssl/digest.h>
@@ -28,27 +30,41 @@
 #include "internal.h"
 
 
-int tls13_init_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_init_hash(&hs->transcript, ssl3_protocol_version(hs->ssl),
-                                hs->new_cipher->algorithm_prf)) {
+namespace bssl {
+
+static int init_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t version,
+                             const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  if (!hs->transcript.InitHash(version, cipher)) {
     return 0;
   }
 
+  hs->hash_len = hs->transcript.DigestLen();
 
-  hs->hash_len = SSL_TRANSCRIPT_digest_len(&hs->transcript);
-
-  /* Initialize the secret to the zero key. */
+  // Initialize the secret to the zero key.
   OPENSSL_memset(hs->secret, 0, hs->hash_len);
 
-  SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript);
   return 1;
 }
 
+int tls13_init_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  if (!init_key_schedule(hs, ssl3_protocol_version(hs->ssl), hs->new_cipher)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int tls13_init_early_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  return init_key_schedule(hs, ssl_session_protocol_version(ssl->session),
+                           ssl->session->cipher);
+}
+
 int tls13_advance_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const uint8_t *in,
                                size_t len) {
-  return HKDF_extract(hs->secret, &hs->hash_len,
-                      SSL_TRANSCRIPT_md(&hs->transcript), in, len, hs->secret,
-                      hs->hash_len);
+  return HKDF_extract(hs->secret, &hs->hash_len, hs->transcript.Digest(), in,
+                      len, hs->secret, hs->hash_len);
 }
 
 static int hkdf_expand_label(uint8_t *out, const EVP_MD *digest,
@@ -57,20 +73,20 @@ static int hkdf_expand_label(uint8_t *out, const EVP_MD *digest,
                              const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_len, size_t len) {
   static const char kTLS13LabelVersion[] = "TLS 1.3, ";
 
-  CBB cbb, child;
+  ScopedCBB cbb;
+  CBB child;
   uint8_t *hkdf_label;
   size_t hkdf_label_len;
-  if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 2 + 1 + strlen(kTLS13LabelVersion) + label_len + 1 +
-                          hash_len) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16(&cbb, len) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
+  if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), 2 + 1 + strlen(kTLS13LabelVersion) + label_len + 1 +
+                               hash_len) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(cbb.get(), len) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &child) ||
       !CBB_add_bytes(&child, (const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelVersion,
                      strlen(kTLS13LabelVersion)) ||
       !CBB_add_bytes(&child, label, label_len) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &child) ||
       !CBB_add_bytes(&child, hash, hash_len) ||
-      !CBB_finish(&cbb, &hkdf_label, &hkdf_label_len)) {
-    CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+      !CBB_finish(cbb.get(), &hkdf_label, &hkdf_label_len)) {
     return 0;
   }
 
@@ -80,19 +96,18 @@ static int hkdf_expand_label(uint8_t *out, const EVP_MD *digest,
   return ret;
 }
 
-/* derive_secret derives a secret of length |len| and writes the result in |out|
- * with the given label and the current base secret and most recently-saved
- * handshake context. It returns one on success and zero on error. */
+// derive_secret derives a secret of length |len| and writes the result in |out|
+// with the given label and the current base secret and most recently-saved
+// handshake context. It returns one on success and zero on error.
 static int derive_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
                          const uint8_t *label, size_t label_len) {
   uint8_t context_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
   size_t context_hash_len;
-  if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_get_hash(&hs->transcript, context_hash,
-                               &context_hash_len)) {
+  if (!hs->transcript.GetHash(context_hash, &context_hash_len)) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  return hkdf_expand_label(out, SSL_TRANSCRIPT_md(&hs->transcript), hs->secret,
+  return hkdf_expand_label(out, hs->transcript.Digest(), hs->secret,
                            hs->hash_len, label, label_len, context_hash,
                            context_hash_len, len);
 }
@@ -100,24 +115,25 @@ static int derive_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
 int tls13_set_traffic_key(SSL *ssl, enum evp_aead_direction_t direction,
                           const uint8_t *traffic_secret,
                           size_t traffic_secret_len) {
+  const SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+  uint16_t version = ssl_session_protocol_version(session);
+
   if (traffic_secret_len > 0xff) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
     return 0;
   }
 
-  /* Look up cipher suite properties. */
+  // Look up cipher suite properties.
   const EVP_AEAD *aead;
   size_t discard;
-  if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(&aead, &discard, &discard,
-                               SSL_get_session(ssl)->cipher,
-                               ssl3_protocol_version(ssl))) {
+  if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(&aead, &discard, &discard, session->cipher,
+                               version, SSL_is_dtls(ssl))) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_get_handshake_digest(
-      SSL_get_session(ssl)->cipher->algorithm_prf, ssl3_protocol_version(ssl));
+  const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_session_get_digest(session);
 
-  /* Derive the key. */
+  // Derive the key.
   size_t key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
   uint8_t key[EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
   if (!hkdf_expand_label(key, digest, traffic_secret, traffic_secret_len,
@@ -125,7 +141,7 @@ int tls13_set_traffic_key(SSL *ssl, enum evp_aead_direction_t direction,
     return 0;
   }
 
-  /* Derive the IV. */
+  // Derive the IV.
   size_t iv_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead);
   uint8_t iv[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
   if (!hkdf_expand_label(iv, digest, traffic_secret, traffic_secret_len,
@@ -133,24 +149,25 @@ int tls13_set_traffic_key(SSL *ssl, enum evp_aead_direction_t direction,
     return 0;
   }
 
-  SSL_AEAD_CTX *traffic_aead = SSL_AEAD_CTX_new(
-      direction, ssl3_protocol_version(ssl), SSL_get_session(ssl)->cipher, key,
-      key_len, NULL, 0, iv, iv_len);
-  if (traffic_aead == NULL) {
+  UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> traffic_aead =
+      SSLAEADContext::Create(direction, session->ssl_version, SSL_is_dtls(ssl),
+                             session->cipher, MakeConstSpan(key, key_len),
+                             Span<const uint8_t>(), MakeConstSpan(iv, iv_len));
+  if (!traffic_aead) {
     return 0;
   }
 
   if (direction == evp_aead_open) {
-    if (!ssl->method->set_read_state(ssl, traffic_aead)) {
+    if (!ssl->method->set_read_state(ssl, std::move(traffic_aead))) {
       return 0;
     }
   } else {
-    if (!ssl->method->set_write_state(ssl, traffic_aead)) {
+    if (!ssl->method->set_write_state(ssl, std::move(traffic_aead))) {
       return 0;
     }
   }
 
-  /* Save the traffic secret. */
+  // Save the traffic secret.
   if (direction == evp_aead_open) {
     OPENSSL_memmove(ssl->s3->read_traffic_secret, traffic_secret,
                     traffic_secret_len);
@@ -164,6 +181,11 @@ int tls13_set_traffic_key(SSL *ssl, enum evp_aead_direction_t direction,
   return 1;
 }
 
+static const char kTLS13LabelExporter[] = "exporter master secret";
+static const char kTLS13LabelEarlyExporter[] = "early exporter master secret";
+
+static const char kTLS13LabelClientEarlyTraffic[] =
+    "client early traffic secret";
 static const char kTLS13LabelClientHandshakeTraffic[] =
     "client handshake traffic secret";
 static const char kTLS13LabelServerHandshakeTraffic[] =
@@ -173,6 +195,18 @@ static const char kTLS13LabelClientApplicationTraffic[] =
 static const char kTLS13LabelServerApplicationTraffic[] =
     "server application traffic secret";
 
+int tls13_derive_early_secrets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  return derive_secret(hs, hs->early_traffic_secret, hs->hash_len,
+                       (const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelClientEarlyTraffic,
+                       strlen(kTLS13LabelClientEarlyTraffic)) &&
+         ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET",
+                        hs->early_traffic_secret, hs->hash_len) &&
+         derive_secret(hs, ssl->s3->early_exporter_secret, hs->hash_len,
+                       (const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelEarlyExporter,
+                       strlen(kTLS13LabelEarlyExporter));
+}
+
 int tls13_derive_handshake_secrets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
   return derive_secret(hs, hs->client_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len,
@@ -187,8 +221,6 @@ int tls13_derive_handshake_secrets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
                         hs->server_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len);
 }
 
-static const char kTLS13LabelExporter[] = "exporter master secret";
-
 int tls13_derive_application_secrets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
   ssl->s3->exporter_secret_len = hs->hash_len;
@@ -204,16 +236,15 @@ int tls13_derive_application_secrets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
                         hs->server_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len) &&
          derive_secret(hs, ssl->s3->exporter_secret, hs->hash_len,
                        (const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelExporter,
-                       strlen(kTLS13LabelExporter));
+                       strlen(kTLS13LabelExporter)) &&
+         ssl_log_secret(ssl, "EXPORTER_SECRET", ssl->s3->exporter_secret,
+                        hs->hash_len);
 }
 
 static const char kTLS13LabelApplicationTraffic[] =
     "application traffic secret";
 
 int tls13_rotate_traffic_key(SSL *ssl, enum evp_aead_direction_t direction) {
-  const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_get_handshake_digest(
-      SSL_get_session(ssl)->cipher->algorithm_prf, ssl3_protocol_version(ssl));
-
   uint8_t *secret;
   size_t secret_len;
   if (direction == evp_aead_open) {
@@ -224,6 +255,7 @@ int tls13_rotate_traffic_key(SSL *ssl, enum evp_aead_direction_t direction) {
     secret_len = ssl->s3->write_traffic_secret_len;
   }
 
+  const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_session_get_digest(SSL_get_session(ssl));
   if (!hkdf_expand_label(secret, digest, secret, secret_len,
                          (const uint8_t *)kTLS13LabelApplicationTraffic,
                          strlen(kTLS13LabelApplicationTraffic), NULL, 0,
@@ -250,8 +282,8 @@ int tls13_derive_resumption_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
 
 static const char kTLS13LabelFinished[] = "finished";
 
-/* tls13_verify_data sets |out| to be the HMAC of |context| using a derived
- * Finished key for both Finished messages and the PSK binder. */
+// tls13_verify_data sets |out| to be the HMAC of |context| using a derived
+// Finished key for both Finished messages and the PSK binder.
 static int tls13_verify_data(const EVP_MD *digest, uint8_t *out,
                              size_t *out_len, const uint8_t *secret,
                              size_t hash_len, uint8_t *context,
@@ -270,22 +302,18 @@ static int tls13_verify_data(const EVP_MD *digest, uint8_t *out,
 
 int tls13_finished_mac(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
                        int is_server) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
   const uint8_t *traffic_secret;
-  if (is_server == ssl->server) {
-    traffic_secret = ssl->s3->write_traffic_secret;
+  if (is_server) {
+    traffic_secret = hs->server_handshake_secret;
   } else {
-    traffic_secret = ssl->s3->read_traffic_secret;
+    traffic_secret = hs->client_handshake_secret;
   }
 
   uint8_t context_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
   size_t context_hash_len;
-  if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_get_hash(&hs->transcript, context_hash,
-                               &context_hash_len) ||
-      !tls13_verify_data(SSL_TRANSCRIPT_md(&hs->transcript), out, out_len,
-                         traffic_secret, hs->hash_len, context_hash,
-                         context_hash_len)) {
+  if (!hs->transcript.GetHash(context_hash, &context_hash_len) ||
+      !tls13_verify_data(hs->transcript.Digest(), out, out_len, traffic_secret,
+                         hs->hash_len, context_hash, context_hash_len)) {
     return 0;
   }
   return 1;
@@ -295,15 +323,14 @@ int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
                                  const char *label, size_t label_len,
                                  const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len,
                                  int use_context) {
-  const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_get_handshake_digest(
-      SSL_get_session(ssl)->cipher->algorithm_prf, ssl3_protocol_version(ssl));
-
   const uint8_t *hash = NULL;
   size_t hash_len = 0;
   if (use_context) {
     hash = context;
     hash_len = context_len;
   }
+
+  const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_session_get_digest(SSL_get_session(ssl));
   return hkdf_expand_label(out, digest, ssl->s3->exporter_secret,
                            ssl->s3->exporter_secret_len, (const uint8_t *)label,
                            label_len, hash, hash_len, out_len);
@@ -343,11 +370,7 @@ static int tls13_psk_binder(uint8_t *out, const EVP_MD *digest, uint8_t *psk,
 
 int tls13_write_psk_binder(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *msg, size_t len) {
   SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  const EVP_MD *digest = SSL_SESSION_get_digest(ssl->session, ssl);
-  if (digest == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return 0;
-  }
+  const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_session_get_digest(ssl->session);
   size_t hash_len = EVP_MD_size(digest);
 
   if (len < hash_len + 3) {
@@ -355,21 +378,17 @@ int tls13_write_psk_binder(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *msg, size_t len) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+  ScopedEVP_MD_CTX ctx;
   uint8_t context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
   unsigned context_len;
-  if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, digest, NULL) ||
-      !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, hs->transcript.buffer->data,
-                        hs->transcript.buffer->length) ||
-      !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, msg, len - hash_len - 3) ||
-      !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, context, &context_len)) {
-    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+  if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx.get(), digest, NULL) ||
+      !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), hs->transcript.buffer_data(),
+                        hs->transcript.buffer_len()) ||
+      !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), msg, len - hash_len - 3) ||
+      !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx.get(), context, &context_len)) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
   uint8_t verify_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
   if (!tls13_psk_binder(verify_data, digest, ssl->session->master_key,
                         ssl->session->master_key_length, context, context_len,
@@ -382,34 +401,31 @@ int tls13_write_psk_binder(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *msg, size_t len) {
 }
 
 int tls13_verify_psk_binder(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, SSL_SESSION *session,
-                            CBS *binders) {
-  size_t hash_len = SSL_TRANSCRIPT_digest_len(&hs->transcript);
-
-  /* Get the full ClientHello, including message header. It must be large enough
-   * to exclude the binders. */
-  CBS message;
-  hs->ssl->method->get_current_message(hs->ssl, &message);
-  if (CBS_len(&message) < CBS_len(binders) + 2) {
+                            const SSLMessage &msg, CBS *binders) {
+  size_t hash_len = hs->transcript.DigestLen();
+
+  // The message must be large enough to exclude the binders.
+  if (CBS_len(&msg.raw) < CBS_len(binders) + 2) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     return 0;
   }
 
-  /* Hash a ClientHello prefix up to the binders. For now, this assumes we only
-   * ever verify PSK binders on initial ClientHellos. */
+  // Hash a ClientHello prefix up to the binders. This includes the header. For
+  // now, this assumes we only ever verify PSK binders on initial
+  // ClientHellos.
   uint8_t context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
   unsigned context_len;
-  if (!EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&message), CBS_len(&message) - CBS_len(binders) - 2,
-                  context, &context_len, SSL_TRANSCRIPT_md(&hs->transcript),
-                  NULL)) {
+  if (!EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&msg.raw), CBS_len(&msg.raw) - CBS_len(binders) - 2,
+                  context, &context_len, hs->transcript.Digest(), NULL)) {
     return 0;
   }
 
   uint8_t verify_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
   CBS binder;
-  if (!tls13_psk_binder(verify_data, SSL_TRANSCRIPT_md(&hs->transcript),
+  if (!tls13_psk_binder(verify_data, hs->transcript.Digest(),
                         session->master_key, session->master_key_length,
                         context, context_len, hash_len) ||
-      /* We only consider the first PSK, so compare against the first binder. */
+      // We only consider the first PSK, so compare against the first binder.
       !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(binders, &binder)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     return 0;
@@ -428,3 +444,5 @@ int tls13_verify_psk_binder(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, SSL_SESSION *session,
 
   return 1;
 }
+
+}  // namespace bssl

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/tls13_server.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,967 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2016, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+// Per C99, various stdint.h macros are unavailable in C++ unless some macros
+// are defined. C++11 overruled this decision, but older Android NDKs still
+// require it.
+#if !defined(__STDC_LIMIT_MACROS)
+#define __STDC_LIMIT_MACROS
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/aead.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+namespace bssl {
+
+enum server_hs_state_t {
+  state_select_parameters = 0,
+  state_select_session,
+  state_send_hello_retry_request,
+  state_read_second_client_hello,
+  state_send_server_hello,
+  state_send_server_certificate_verify,
+  state_send_server_finished,
+  state_read_second_client_flight,
+  state_process_change_cipher_spec,
+  state_process_end_of_early_data,
+  state_read_client_certificate,
+  state_read_client_certificate_verify,
+  state_read_channel_id,
+  state_read_client_finished,
+  state_send_new_session_ticket,
+  state_done,
+};
+
+static const uint8_t kZeroes[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
+
+static int resolve_ecdhe_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, bool *out_need_retry,
+                                SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  *out_need_retry = false;
+
+  // We only support connections that include an ECDHE key exchange.
+  CBS key_share;
+  if (!ssl_client_hello_get_extension(client_hello, &key_share,
+                                      TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_KEY_SHARE);
+    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  bool found_key_share;
+  Array<uint8_t> dhe_secret;
+  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+  if (!ssl_ext_key_share_parse_clienthello(hs, &found_key_share, &dhe_secret,
+                                           &alert, &key_share)) {
+    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!found_key_share) {
+    *out_need_retry = true;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return tls13_advance_key_schedule(hs, dhe_secret.data(), dhe_secret.size());
+}
+
+static int ssl_ext_supported_versions_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                                      CBB *out) {
+  CBB contents;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&contents, hs->ssl->version) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static const SSL_CIPHER *choose_tls13_cipher(
+    const SSL *ssl, const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello) {
+  if (client_hello->cipher_suites_len % 2 != 0) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  CBS cipher_suites;
+  CBS_init(&cipher_suites, client_hello->cipher_suites,
+           client_hello->cipher_suites_len);
+
+  const int aes_is_fine = EVP_has_aes_hardware();
+  const uint16_t version = ssl3_protocol_version(ssl);
+
+  const SSL_CIPHER *best = NULL;
+  while (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) {
+    uint16_t cipher_suite;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16(&cipher_suites, &cipher_suite)) {
+      return NULL;
+    }
+
+    // Limit to TLS 1.3 ciphers we know about.
+    const SSL_CIPHER *candidate = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite);
+    if (candidate == NULL ||
+        SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(candidate) > version ||
+        SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(candidate) < version) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // TLS 1.3 removes legacy ciphers, so honor the client order, but prefer
+    // ChaCha20 if we do not have AES hardware.
+    if (aes_is_fine) {
+      return candidate;
+    }
+
+    if (candidate->algorithm_enc == SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) {
+      return candidate;
+    }
+
+    if (best == NULL) {
+      best = candidate;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return best;
+}
+
+static int add_new_session_tickets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  // TLS 1.3 recommends single-use tickets, so issue multiple tickets in case
+  // the client makes several connections before getting a renewal.
+  static const int kNumTickets = 2;
+
+  // Rebase the session timestamp so that it is measured from ticket
+  // issuance.
+  ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, hs->new_session.get());
+
+  for (int i = 0; i < kNumTickets; i++) {
+    if (!RAND_bytes((uint8_t *)&hs->new_session->ticket_age_add, 4)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    hs->new_session->ticket_age_add_valid = 1;
+
+    if (ssl->cert->enable_early_data) {
+      hs->new_session->ticket_max_early_data = kMaxEarlyDataAccepted;
+    }
+
+    ScopedCBB cbb;
+    CBB body, ticket, extensions;
+    if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
+                                   SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) ||
+        !CBB_add_u32(&body, hs->new_session->timeout) ||
+        !CBB_add_u32(&body, hs->new_session->ticket_age_add) ||
+        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &ticket) ||
+        !ssl_encrypt_ticket(ssl, &ticket, hs->new_session.get()) ||
+        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &extensions)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (ssl->cert->enable_early_data) {
+      CBB early_data_info;
+      if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, TLSEXT_TYPE_ticket_early_data_info) ||
+          !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &early_data_info) ||
+          !CBB_add_u32(&early_data_info,
+                       hs->new_session->ticket_max_early_data) ||
+          !CBB_flush(&extensions)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Add a fake extension. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01.
+    if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions,
+                     ssl_get_grease_value(ssl, ssl_grease_ticket_extension)) ||
+        !CBB_add_u16(&extensions, 0 /* empty */)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_select_parameters(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  // At this point, most ClientHello extensions have already been processed by
+  // the common handshake logic. Resolve the remaining non-PSK parameters.
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_read_message;
+  }
+  SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
+  if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello, msg)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_PARSE_FAILED);
+    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(hs->session_id, client_hello.session_id,
+                 client_hello.session_id_len);
+  hs->session_id_len = client_hello.session_id_len;
+
+  // Negotiate the cipher suite.
+  hs->new_cipher = choose_tls13_cipher(ssl, &client_hello);
+  if (hs->new_cipher == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // HTTP/2 negotiation depends on the cipher suite, so ALPN negotiation was
+  // deferred. Complete it now.
+  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+  if (!ssl_negotiate_alpn(hs, &alert, &client_hello)) {
+    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // The PRF hash is now known. Set up the key schedule and hash the
+  // ClientHello.
+  if (!tls13_init_key_schedule(hs) ||
+      !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  hs->tls13_state = state_select_session;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t select_session(
+    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert, UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> *out_session,
+    int32_t *out_ticket_age_skew, const SSLMessage &msg,
+    const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  *out_session = NULL;
+
+  // Decode the ticket if we agreed on a PSK key exchange mode.
+  CBS pre_shared_key;
+  if (!hs->accept_psk_mode ||
+      !ssl_client_hello_get_extension(client_hello, &pre_shared_key,
+                                      TLSEXT_TYPE_pre_shared_key)) {
+    return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
+  }
+
+  // Verify that the pre_shared_key extension is the last extension in
+  // ClientHello.
+  if (CBS_data(&pre_shared_key) + CBS_len(&pre_shared_key) !=
+      client_hello->extensions + client_hello->extensions_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PRE_SHARED_KEY_MUST_BE_LAST);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    return ssl_ticket_aead_error;
+  }
+
+  CBS ticket, binders;
+  uint32_t client_ticket_age;
+  if (!ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_parse_clienthello(hs, &ticket, &binders,
+                                                &client_ticket_age, out_alert,
+                                                &pre_shared_key)) {
+    return ssl_ticket_aead_error;
+  }
+
+  // TLS 1.3 session tickets are renewed separately as part of the
+  // NewSessionTicket.
+  bool unused_renew;
+  UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session;
+  enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t ret =
+      ssl_process_ticket(ssl, &session, &unused_renew, CBS_data(&ticket),
+                         CBS_len(&ticket), NULL, 0);
+  switch (ret) {
+    case ssl_ticket_aead_success:
+      break;
+    case ssl_ticket_aead_error:
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+      return ret;
+    default:
+      return ret;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_session_is_resumable(hs, session.get()) ||
+      // Historically, some TLS 1.3 tickets were missing ticket_age_add.
+      !session->ticket_age_add_valid) {
+    return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
+  }
+
+  // Recover the client ticket age and convert to seconds.
+  client_ticket_age -= session->ticket_age_add;
+  client_ticket_age /= 1000;
+
+  struct OPENSSL_timeval now;
+  ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
+
+  // Compute the server ticket age in seconds.
+  assert(now.tv_sec >= session->time);
+  uint64_t server_ticket_age = now.tv_sec - session->time;
+
+  // To avoid overflowing |hs->ticket_age_skew|, we will not resume
+  // 68-year-old sessions.
+  if (server_ticket_age > INT32_MAX) {
+    return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
+  }
+
+  // TODO(davidben,svaldez): Measure this value to decide on tolerance. For
+  // now, accept all values. https://crbug.com/boringssl/113.
+  *out_ticket_age_skew =
+      (int32_t)client_ticket_age - (int32_t)server_ticket_age;
+
+  // Check the PSK binder.
+  if (!tls13_verify_psk_binder(hs, session.get(), msg, &binders)) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+    return ssl_ticket_aead_error;
+  }
+
+  *out_session = std::move(session);
+  return ssl_ticket_aead_success;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_select_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_read_message;
+  }
+  SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
+  if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello, msg)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_PARSE_FAILED);
+    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+  UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session;
+  switch (select_session(hs, &alert, &session, &ssl->s3->ticket_age_skew, msg,
+                         &client_hello)) {
+    case ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket:
+      assert(!session);
+      if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs, 1 /* server */)) {
+        ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return ssl_hs_error;
+      }
+      break;
+
+    case ssl_ticket_aead_success:
+      // Carry over authentication information from the previous handshake into
+      // a fresh session.
+      hs->new_session =
+          SSL_SESSION_dup(session.get(), SSL_SESSION_DUP_AUTH_ONLY);
+
+      if (// Early data must be acceptable for this ticket.
+          ssl->cert->enable_early_data &&
+          session->ticket_max_early_data != 0 &&
+          // The client must have offered early data.
+          hs->early_data_offered &&
+          // Channel ID is incompatible with 0-RTT.
+          !ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid &&
+          // Custom extensions is incompatible with 0-RTT.
+          hs->custom_extensions.received == 0 &&
+          // The negotiated ALPN must match the one in the ticket.
+          ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len == session->early_alpn_len &&
+          OPENSSL_memcmp(ssl->s3->alpn_selected, session->early_alpn,
+                         ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len) == 0) {
+        ssl->early_data_accepted = 1;
+      }
+
+      if (hs->new_session == NULL) {
+        ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return ssl_hs_error;
+      }
+
+      ssl->s3->session_reused = true;
+
+      // Resumption incorporates fresh key material, so refresh the timeout.
+      ssl_session_renew_timeout(ssl, hs->new_session.get(),
+                                ssl->session_ctx->session_psk_dhe_timeout);
+      break;
+
+    case ssl_ticket_aead_error:
+      ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+
+    case ssl_ticket_aead_retry:
+      hs->tls13_state = state_select_session;
+      return ssl_hs_pending_ticket;
+  }
+
+  // Record connection properties in the new session.
+  hs->new_session->cipher = hs->new_cipher;
+
+  // Store the initial negotiated ALPN in the session.
+  if (ssl->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
+    hs->new_session->early_alpn = (uint8_t *)BUF_memdup(
+        ssl->s3->alpn_selected, ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len);
+    if (hs->new_session->early_alpn == NULL) {
+      ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+    hs->new_session->early_alpn_len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb != NULL &&
+      ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb(&client_hello) == 0) {
+    // Connection rejected for DOS reasons.
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
+    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // Incorporate the PSK into the running secret.
+  if (ssl->s3->session_reused) {
+    if (!tls13_advance_key_schedule(hs, hs->new_session->master_key,
+                                    hs->new_session->master_key_length)) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  } else if (!tls13_advance_key_schedule(hs, kZeroes, hs->hash_len)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->early_data_accepted) {
+    if (!tls13_derive_early_secrets(hs)) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  } else if (hs->early_data_offered) {
+    ssl->s3->skip_early_data = true;
+  }
+
+  // Resolve ECDHE and incorporate it into the secret.
+  bool need_retry;
+  if (!resolve_ecdhe_secret(hs, &need_retry, &client_hello)) {
+    if (need_retry) {
+      ssl->early_data_accepted = 0;
+      ssl->s3->skip_early_data = true;
+      ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+      hs->tls13_state = state_send_hello_retry_request;
+      return ssl_hs_ok;
+    }
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+  hs->tls13_state = state_send_server_hello;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_hello_retry_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  ScopedCBB cbb;
+  CBB body, extensions;
+  uint16_t group_id;
+  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
+                                 SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&body, ssl->version) ||
+      !tls1_get_shared_group(hs, &group_id) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &extensions) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&extensions, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&extensions, 2 /* length */) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&extensions, group_id) ||
+      !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  hs->tls13_state = state_read_second_client_hello;
+  return ssl_hs_flush;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_second_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_read_message;
+  }
+  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+  SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
+  if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello, msg)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_PARSE_FAILED);
+    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  bool need_retry;
+  if (!resolve_ecdhe_secret(hs, &need_retry, &client_hello)) {
+    if (need_retry) {
+      // Only send one HelloRetryRequest.
+      ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+    }
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+  hs->tls13_state = state_send_server_hello;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+  uint16_t version = ssl->version;
+  if (ssl_is_resumption_experiment(ssl->version)) {
+    version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+  }
+
+  // Send a ServerHello.
+  ScopedCBB cbb;
+  CBB body, extensions, session_id;
+  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&body, version) ||
+      !RAND_bytes(ssl->s3->server_random, sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random)) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&body, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+      (ssl_is_resumption_experiment(ssl->version) &&
+       (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &session_id) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, hs->session_id, hs->session_id_len))) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&body, ssl_cipher_get_value(hs->new_cipher)) ||
+      (ssl_is_resumption_experiment(ssl->version) && !CBB_add_u8(&body, 0)) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &extensions) ||
+      !ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_add_serverhello(hs, &extensions) ||
+      !ssl_ext_key_share_add_serverhello(hs, &extensions) ||
+      (ssl_is_resumption_experiment(ssl->version) &&
+       !ssl_ext_supported_versions_add_serverhello(hs, &extensions)) ||
+      !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl_is_resumption_experiment(ssl->version) &&
+      !ssl3_add_change_cipher_spec(ssl)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // Derive and enable the handshake traffic secrets.
+  if (!tls13_derive_handshake_secrets(hs) ||
+      !tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_seal, hs->server_handshake_secret,
+                             hs->hash_len)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // Send EncryptedExtensions.
+  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
+                                 SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) ||
+      !ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(hs, &body) ||
+      !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl->s3->session_reused) {
+    // Determine whether to request a client certificate.
+    hs->cert_request = !!(ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER);
+    // Only request a certificate if Channel ID isn't negotiated.
+    if ((ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER_IF_NO_OBC) &&
+        ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
+      hs->cert_request = false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Send a CertificateRequest, if necessary.
+  if (hs->cert_request) {
+    CBB sigalgs_cbb;
+    if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
+                                   SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) ||
+        !CBB_add_u8(&body, 0 /* no certificate_request_context. */) ||
+        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &sigalgs_cbb) ||
+        !tls12_add_verify_sigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs_cbb) ||
+        !ssl_add_client_CA_list(ssl, &body) ||
+        !CBB_add_u16(&body, 0 /* empty certificate_extensions. */) ||
+        !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Send the server Certificate message, if necessary.
+  if (!ssl->s3->session_reused) {
+    if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    if (!tls13_add_certificate(hs)) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    hs->tls13_state = state_send_server_certificate_verify;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  hs->tls13_state = state_send_server_finished;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  switch (tls13_add_certificate_verify(hs)) {
+    case ssl_private_key_success:
+      hs->tls13_state = state_send_server_finished;
+      return ssl_hs_ok;
+
+    case ssl_private_key_retry:
+      hs->tls13_state = state_send_server_certificate_verify;
+      return ssl_hs_private_key_operation;
+
+    case ssl_private_key_failure:
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  assert(0);
+  return ssl_hs_error;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (!tls13_add_finished(hs) ||
+      // Update the secret to the master secret and derive traffic keys.
+      !tls13_advance_key_schedule(hs, kZeroes, hs->hash_len) ||
+      !tls13_derive_application_secrets(hs) ||
+      !tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_seal, hs->server_traffic_secret_0,
+                             hs->hash_len)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->early_data_accepted) {
+    // If accepting 0-RTT, we send tickets half-RTT. This gets the tickets on
+    // the wire sooner and also avoids triggering a write on |SSL_read| when
+    // processing the client Finished. This requires computing the client
+    // Finished early. See draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18, section 4.5.1.
+    size_t finished_len;
+    if (!tls13_finished_mac(hs, hs->expected_client_finished, &finished_len,
+                            0 /* client */)) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    if (finished_len != hs->hash_len) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    // Feed the predicted Finished into the transcript. This allows us to derive
+    // the resumption secret early and send half-RTT tickets.
+    //
+    // TODO(davidben): This will need to be updated for DTLS 1.3.
+    assert(!SSL_is_dtls(hs->ssl));
+    assert(hs->hash_len <= 0xff);
+    uint8_t header[4] = {SSL3_MT_FINISHED, 0, 0,
+                         static_cast<uint8_t>(hs->hash_len)};
+    if (!hs->transcript.Update(header, sizeof(header)) ||
+        !hs->transcript.Update(hs->expected_client_finished, hs->hash_len) ||
+        !tls13_derive_resumption_secret(hs) ||
+        !add_new_session_tickets(hs)) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  hs->tls13_state = state_read_second_client_flight;
+  return ssl_hs_flush;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_second_client_flight(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (ssl->early_data_accepted) {
+    if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_open, hs->early_traffic_secret,
+                               hs->hash_len)) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+    hs->can_early_write = true;
+    hs->can_early_read = true;
+    hs->in_early_data = true;
+    hs->tls13_state = state_process_end_of_early_data;
+    return ssl_hs_read_end_of_early_data;
+  }
+  hs->tls13_state = state_process_end_of_early_data;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_process_end_of_early_data(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  hs->tls13_state = state_process_change_cipher_spec;
+  // If early data was accepted, the ChangeCipherSpec message will be in the
+  // discarded early data.
+  if (hs->early_data_offered && !hs->ssl->early_data_accepted) {
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+  return ssl_is_resumption_client_ccs_experiment(hs->ssl->version)
+             ? ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec
+             : ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_open, hs->client_handshake_secret,
+                             hs->hash_len)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+  hs->tls13_state = ssl->early_data_accepted ? state_read_client_finished
+                                             : state_read_client_certificate;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (!hs->cert_request) {
+    // OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are requested. This is
+    // classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX.
+    hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+
+    // Skip this state.
+    hs->tls13_state = state_read_channel_id;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  const int allow_anonymous =
+      (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) == 0;
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_read_message;
+  }
+  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) ||
+      !tls13_process_certificate(hs, msg, allow_anonymous) ||
+      !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+  hs->tls13_state = state_read_client_certificate_verify;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_client_certificate_verify(
+    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs) == 0) {
+    // Skip this state.
+    hs->tls13_state = state_read_channel_id;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_read_message;
+  }
+
+  switch (ssl_verify_peer_cert(hs)) {
+    case ssl_verify_ok:
+      break;
+    case ssl_verify_invalid:
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    case ssl_verify_retry:
+      hs->tls13_state = state_read_client_certificate_verify;
+      return ssl_hs_certificate_verify;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) ||
+      !tls13_process_certificate_verify(hs, msg) ||
+      !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+  hs->tls13_state = state_read_channel_id;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (!ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
+    hs->tls13_state = state_read_client_finished;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_read_message;
+  }
+  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CHANNEL_ID) ||
+      !tls1_verify_channel_id(hs, msg) ||
+      !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+  hs->tls13_state = state_read_client_finished;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_client_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_read_message;
+  }
+  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ||
+      // If early data was accepted, we've already computed the client Finished
+      // and derived the resumption secret.
+      !tls13_process_finished(hs, msg, ssl->early_data_accepted) ||
+      // evp_aead_seal keys have already been switched.
+      !tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_open, hs->client_traffic_secret_0,
+                             hs->hash_len)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl->early_data_accepted) {
+    if (!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg) ||
+        !tls13_derive_resumption_secret(hs)) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    // We send post-handshake tickets as part of the handshake in 1-RTT.
+    hs->tls13_state = state_send_new_session_ticket;
+  } else {
+    // We already sent half-RTT tickets.
+    hs->tls13_state = state_done;
+  }
+
+  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_new_session_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  // If the client doesn't accept resumption with PSK_DHE_KE, don't send a
+  // session ticket.
+  if (!hs->accept_psk_mode) {
+    hs->tls13_state = state_done;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  if (!add_new_session_tickets(hs)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  hs->tls13_state = state_done;
+  return ssl_hs_flush;
+}
+
+enum ssl_hs_wait_t tls13_server_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  while (hs->tls13_state != state_done) {
+    enum ssl_hs_wait_t ret = ssl_hs_error;
+    enum server_hs_state_t state =
+        static_cast<enum server_hs_state_t>(hs->tls13_state);
+    switch (state) {
+      case state_select_parameters:
+        ret = do_select_parameters(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_select_session:
+        ret = do_select_session(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_send_hello_retry_request:
+        ret = do_send_hello_retry_request(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_read_second_client_hello:
+        ret = do_read_second_client_hello(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_send_server_hello:
+        ret = do_send_server_hello(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_send_server_certificate_verify:
+        ret = do_send_server_certificate_verify(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_send_server_finished:
+        ret = do_send_server_finished(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_read_second_client_flight:
+        ret = do_read_second_client_flight(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_process_end_of_early_data:
+        ret = do_process_end_of_early_data(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_process_change_cipher_spec:
+        ret = do_process_change_cipher_spec(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_read_client_certificate:
+        ret = do_read_client_certificate(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_read_client_certificate_verify:
+        ret = do_read_client_certificate_verify(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_read_channel_id:
+        ret = do_read_channel_id(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_read_client_finished:
+        ret = do_read_client_finished(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_send_new_session_ticket:
+        ret = do_send_new_session_ticket(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_done:
+        ret = ssl_hs_ok;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    if (hs->tls13_state != state) {
+      ssl_do_info_callback(hs->ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
+    }
+
+    if (ret != ssl_hs_ok) {
+      return ret;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+const char *tls13_server_handshake_state(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  enum server_hs_state_t state =
+      static_cast<enum server_hs_state_t>(hs->tls13_state);
+  switch (state) {
+    case state_select_parameters:
+      return "TLS 1.3 server select_parameters";
+    case state_select_session:
+      return "TLS 1.3 server select_session";
+    case state_send_hello_retry_request:
+      return "TLS 1.3 server send_hello_retry_request";
+    case state_read_second_client_hello:
+      return "TLS 1.3 server read_second_client_hello";
+    case state_send_server_hello:
+      return "TLS 1.3 server send_server_hello";
+    case state_send_server_certificate_verify:
+      return "TLS 1.3 server send_server_certificate_verify";
+    case state_send_server_finished:
+      return "TLS 1.3 server send_server_finished";
+    case state_read_second_client_flight:
+      return "TLS 1.3 server read_second_client_flight";
+    case state_process_change_cipher_spec:
+      return "TLS 1.3 server process_change_cipher_spec";
+    case state_process_end_of_early_data:
+      return "TLS 1.3 server process_end_of_early_data";
+    case state_read_client_certificate:
+      return "TLS 1.3 server read_client_certificate";
+    case state_read_client_certificate_verify:
+      return "TLS 1.3 server read_client_certificate_verify";
+    case state_read_channel_id:
+      return "TLS 1.3 server read_channel_id";
+    case state_read_client_finished:
+      return "TLS 1.3 server read_client_finished";
+    case state_send_new_session_ticket:
+      return "TLS 1.3 server send_new_session_ticket";
+    case state_done:
+      return "TLS 1.3 server done";
+  }
+
+  return "TLS 1.3 server unknown";
+}
+
+}  // namespace bssl