grpc 1.9.1 → 1.10.0.pre1

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/handshake_server.c

@@ -1,1950 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license provided above.
- *
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
- * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE. */
-
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/buf.h>
-#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
-#include <openssl/cipher.h>
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-#include <openssl/ec.h>
-#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/nid.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-
-#include "internal.h"
-#include "../crypto/internal.h"
-
-
-static int ssl3_process_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_select_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_select_parameters(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_send_certificate_status(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_send_server_hello_done(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-static int ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
-
-static struct CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX g_v2clienthello_lock =
-    CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_INIT;
-static uint64_t g_v2clienthello_count = 0;
-
-uint64_t SSL_get_v2clienthello_count(void) {
-  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_read(&g_v2clienthello_lock);
-  uint64_t ret = g_v2clienthello_count;
-  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_read(&g_v2clienthello_lock);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-int ssl3_accept(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  uint32_t alg_a;
-  int ret = -1;
-
-  assert(ssl->handshake_func == ssl3_accept);
-  assert(ssl->server);
-
-  for (;;) {
-    int state = hs->state;
-
-    switch (hs->state) {
-      case SSL_ST_INIT:
-        ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
-        ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
-        ret = ssl3_process_client_hello(hs);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
-        ret = ssl3_select_certificate(hs);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        if (hs->state != SSL_ST_TLS13) {
-          hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
-        }
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
-        ret = ssl3_select_parameters(hs);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        ssl->method->received_flight(ssl);
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
-        ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(hs);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        if (ssl->session != NULL) {
-          hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-        } else {
-          hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
-        }
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
-        if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
-          ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(hs);
-          if (ret <= 0) {
-            goto end;
-          }
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
-        if (hs->certificate_status_expected) {
-          ret = ssl3_send_certificate_status(hs);
-          if (ret <= 0) {
-            goto end;
-          }
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
-        alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
-        /* PSK ciphers send ServerKeyExchange if there is an identity hint. */
-        if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(hs->new_cipher) ||
-            ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && ssl->psk_identity_hint)) {
-          ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(hs);
-          if (ret <= 0) {
-            goto end;
-          }
-        }
-
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
-        if (hs->cert_request) {
-          ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(hs);
-          if (ret <= 0) {
-            goto end;
-          }
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
-        ret = ssl3_send_server_hello_done(hs);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
-        if (hs->cert_request) {
-          ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(hs);
-          if (ret <= 0) {
-            goto end;
-          }
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
-        ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(hs);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
-        ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(hs);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE:
-        ret = ssl->method->read_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-
-        if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
-          ret = -1;
-          goto end;
-        }
-
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
-        if (hs->next_proto_neg_seen) {
-          ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(hs);
-          if (ret <= 0) {
-            goto end;
-          }
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A:
-        if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
-          ret = ssl3_get_channel_id(hs);
-          if (ret <= 0) {
-            goto end;
-          }
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
-        ret = ssl3_get_finished(hs);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-
-        ssl->method->received_flight(ssl);
-        if (ssl->session != NULL) {
-          hs->state = SSL_ST_OK;
-        } else {
-          hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-        }
-
-        /* If this is a full handshake with ChannelID then record the handshake
-         * hashes in |hs->new_session| in case we need them to verify a
-         * ChannelID signature on a resumption of this session in the future. */
-        if (ssl->session == NULL && ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
-          ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(hs);
-          if (ret <= 0) {
-            goto end;
-          }
-        }
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
-        if (hs->ticket_expected) {
-          ret = ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(hs);
-          if (ret <= 0) {
-            goto end;
-          }
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE:
-        if (!ssl->method->add_change_cipher_spec(ssl) ||
-            !tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
-          ret = -1;
-          goto end;
-        }
-
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
-        ret = ssl3_send_finished(hs);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
-        if (ssl->session != NULL) {
-          hs->next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE;
-        } else {
-          hs->next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
-        }
-        break;
-
-      case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
-        ret = ssl->method->flush_flight(ssl);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-
-        hs->state = hs->next_state;
-        if (hs->state != SSL_ST_OK) {
-          ssl->method->expect_flight(ssl);
-        }
-        break;
-
-      case SSL_ST_TLS13:
-        ret = tls13_handshake(hs);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          goto end;
-        }
-        hs->state = SSL_ST_OK;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL_ST_OK:
-        ssl->method->release_current_message(ssl, 1 /* free_buffer */);
-
-        /* If we aren't retaining peer certificates then we can discard it
-         * now. */
-        if (hs->new_session != NULL &&
-            ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) {
-          sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(hs->new_session->certs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
-          hs->new_session->certs = NULL;
-          ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_clear(hs->new_session);
-        }
-
-        SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->s3->established_session);
-        if (ssl->session != NULL) {
-          SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->session);
-          ssl->s3->established_session = ssl->session;
-        } else {
-          ssl->s3->established_session = hs->new_session;
-          ssl->s3->established_session->not_resumable = 0;
-          hs->new_session = NULL;
-        }
-
-        if (hs->v2_clienthello) {
-          CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(&g_v2clienthello_lock);
-          g_v2clienthello_count++;
-          CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_write(&g_v2clienthello_lock);
-        }
-
-        ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = 1;
-        ssl_update_cache(hs, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
-
-        ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
-        ret = 1;
-        goto end;
-
-      default:
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
-        ret = -1;
-        goto end;
-    }
-
-    if (hs->state != state) {
-      ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
-    }
-  }
-
-end:
-  ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-int ssl_client_cipher_list_contains_cipher(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello,
-                                           uint16_t id) {
-  CBS cipher_suites;
-  CBS_init(&cipher_suites, client_hello->cipher_suites,
-           client_hello->cipher_suites_len);
-
-  while (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) {
-    uint16_t got_id;
-    if (!CBS_get_u16(&cipher_suites, &got_id)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (got_id == id) {
-      return 1;
-    }
-  }
-
-  return 0;
-}
-
-static int negotiate_version(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
-                             const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  assert(!ssl->s3->have_version);
-  uint16_t min_version, max_version;
-  if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) {
-    *out_alert = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  uint16_t version = 0;
-  /* Check supported_versions extension if it is present. */
-  CBS supported_versions;
-  if (ssl_client_hello_get_extension(client_hello, &supported_versions,
-                                     TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)) {
-    CBS versions;
-    if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&supported_versions, &versions) ||
-        CBS_len(&supported_versions) != 0 ||
-        CBS_len(&versions) == 0) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-      return 0;
-    }
-
-    /* Choose the newest commonly-supported version advertised by the client.
-     * The client orders the versions according to its preferences, but we're
-     * not required to honor the client's preferences. */
-    int found_version = 0;
-    while (CBS_len(&versions) != 0) {
-      uint16_t ext_version;
-      if (!CBS_get_u16(&versions, &ext_version)) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        return 0;
-      }
-      if (!ssl->method->version_from_wire(&ext_version, ext_version)) {
-        continue;
-      }
-      if (min_version <= ext_version &&
-          ext_version <= max_version &&
-          (!found_version || version < ext_version)) {
-        version = ext_version;
-        found_version = 1;
-      }
-    }
-
-    if (!found_version) {
-      goto unsupported_protocol;
-    }
-  } else {
-    /* Process ClientHello.version instead. Note that versions beyond (D)TLS 1.2
-     * do not use this mechanism. */
-    if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
-      if (client_hello->version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION) {
-        version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
-      } else if (client_hello->version <= DTLS1_VERSION) {
-        version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
-      } else {
-        goto unsupported_protocol;
-      }
-    } else {
-      if (client_hello->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
-        version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
-      } else if (client_hello->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
-        version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
-      } else if (client_hello->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
-        version = TLS1_VERSION;
-      } else if (client_hello->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
-        version = SSL3_VERSION;
-      } else {
-        goto unsupported_protocol;
-      }
-    }
-
-    /* Apply our minimum and maximum version. */
-    if (version > max_version) {
-      version = max_version;
-    }
-
-    if (version < min_version) {
-      goto unsupported_protocol;
-    }
-  }
-
-  /* Handle FALLBACK_SCSV. */
-  if (ssl_client_cipher_list_contains_cipher(client_hello,
-                                             SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff) &&
-      version < max_version) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
-    *out_alert = SSL3_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  hs->client_version = client_hello->version;
-  ssl->version = ssl->method->version_to_wire(version);
-
-  /* At this point, the connection's version is known and |ssl->version| is
-   * fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version. */
-  ssl->s3->have_version = 1;
-
-  return 1;
-
-unsupported_protocol:
-  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
-  *out_alert = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
-  return 0;
-}
-
-static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *
-    ssl_parse_client_cipher_list(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello) {
-  CBS cipher_suites;
-  CBS_init(&cipher_suites, client_hello->cipher_suites,
-           client_hello->cipher_suites_len);
-
-  STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
-  if (sk == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  while (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) {
-    uint16_t cipher_suite;
-
-    if (!CBS_get_u16(&cipher_suites, &cipher_suite)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    const SSL_CIPHER *c = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite);
-    if (c != NULL && !sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-      goto err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  return sk;
-
-err:
-  sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
-  return NULL;
-}
-
-/* ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers determines the key exchange and
- * authentication cipher suite masks compatible with the server configuration
- * and current ClientHello parameters of |hs|. It sets |*out_mask_k| to the key
- * exchange mask and |*out_mask_a| to the authentication mask. */
-static void ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
-                                              uint32_t *out_mask_k,
-                                              uint32_t *out_mask_a) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
-    *out_mask_k = SSL_kGENERIC;
-    *out_mask_a = SSL_aGENERIC;
-    return;
-  }
-
-  uint32_t mask_k = 0;
-  uint32_t mask_a = 0;
-
-  if (ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
-    int type = ssl_private_key_type(ssl);
-    if (type == NID_rsaEncryption) {
-      mask_k |= SSL_kRSA;
-      mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
-    } else if (ssl_is_ecdsa_key_type(type)) {
-      mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->cert->dh_tmp != NULL || ssl->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL) {
-    mask_k |= SSL_kDHE;
-  }
-
-  /* Check for a shared group to consider ECDHE ciphers. */
-  uint16_t unused;
-  if (tls1_get_shared_group(hs, &unused)) {
-    mask_k |= SSL_kECDHE;
-  }
-
-  /* PSK requires a server callback. */
-  if (ssl->psk_server_callback != NULL) {
-    mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
-    mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
-  }
-
-  *out_mask_k = mask_k;
-  *out_mask_a = mask_a;
-}
-
-static const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(
-    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello,
-    const struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *server_pref) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  const SSL_CIPHER *c, *ret = NULL;
-  STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *srvr = server_pref->ciphers, *prio, *allow;
-  int ok;
-  size_t cipher_index;
-  uint32_t alg_k, alg_a, mask_k, mask_a;
-  /* in_group_flags will either be NULL, or will point to an array of bytes
-   * which indicate equal-preference groups in the |prio| stack. See the
-   * comment about |in_group_flags| in the |ssl_cipher_preference_list_st|
-   * struct. */
-  const uint8_t *in_group_flags;
-  /* group_min contains the minimal index so far found in a group, or -1 if no
-   * such value exists yet. */
-  int group_min = -1;
-
-  STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt = ssl_parse_client_cipher_list(client_hello);
-  if (clnt == NULL) {
-    return NULL;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
-    prio = srvr;
-    in_group_flags = server_pref->in_group_flags;
-    allow = clnt;
-  } else {
-    prio = clnt;
-    in_group_flags = NULL;
-    allow = srvr;
-  }
-
-  ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers(hs, &mask_k, &mask_a);
-
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); i++) {
-    c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, i);
-
-    ok = 1;
-
-    /* Check the TLS version. */
-    if (SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(c) > ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) ||
-        SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(c) < ssl3_protocol_version(ssl)) {
-      ok = 0;
-    }
-
-    alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
-    alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
-
-    ok = ok && (alg_k & mask_k) && (alg_a & mask_a);
-
-    if (ok && sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, &cipher_index, c)) {
-      if (in_group_flags != NULL && in_group_flags[i] == 1) {
-        /* This element of |prio| is in a group. Update the minimum index found
-         * so far and continue looking. */
-        if (group_min == -1 || (size_t)group_min > cipher_index) {
-          group_min = cipher_index;
-        }
-      } else {
-        if (group_min != -1 && (size_t)group_min < cipher_index) {
-          cipher_index = group_min;
-        }
-        ret = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow, cipher_index);
-        break;
-      }
-    }
-
-    if (in_group_flags != NULL && in_group_flags[i] == 0 && group_min != -1) {
-      /* We are about to leave a group, but we found a match in it, so that's
-       * our answer. */
-      ret = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow, group_min);
-      break;
-    }
-  }
-
-  sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(clnt);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_process_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
-  if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello, ssl->init_msg,
-                             ssl->init_num)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  /* Run the early callback. */
-  if (ssl->ctx->select_certificate_cb != NULL) {
-    switch (ssl->ctx->select_certificate_cb(&client_hello)) {
-      case 0:
-        ssl->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING;
-        return -1;
-
-      case -1:
-        /* Connection rejected. */
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
-        ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-        return -1;
-
-      default:
-        /* fallthrough */;
-    }
-  }
-
-  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-  if (!negotiate_version(hs, &alert, &client_hello)) {
-    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  /* Load the client random. */
-  if (client_hello.random_len != SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return -1;
-  }
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->client_random, client_hello.random,
-                 client_hello.random_len);
-
-  /* Only null compression is supported. TLS 1.3 further requires the peer
-   * advertise no other compression. */
-  if (OPENSSL_memchr(client_hello.compression_methods, 0,
-                     client_hello.compression_methods_len) == NULL ||
-      (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION &&
-       client_hello.compression_methods_len != 1)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_LIST);
-    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  /* TLS extensions. */
-  if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(hs, &client_hello)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_select_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  /* Call |cert_cb| to update server certificates if required. */
-  if (ssl->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
-    int rv = ssl->cert->cert_cb(ssl, ssl->cert->cert_cb_arg);
-    if (rv == 0) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
-      ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return -1;
-    }
-    if (rv < 0) {
-      ssl->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
-      return -1;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_auto_chain_if_needed(ssl)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
-    /* Jump to the TLS 1.3 state machine. */
-    hs->state = SSL_ST_TLS13;
-    hs->do_tls13_handshake = tls13_server_handshake;
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
-  if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello, ssl->init_msg,
-                             ssl->init_num)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  /* Negotiate the cipher suite. This must be done after |cert_cb| so the
-   * certificate is finalized. */
-  hs->new_cipher =
-      ssl3_choose_cipher(hs, &client_hello, ssl_get_cipher_preferences(ssl));
-  if (hs->new_cipher == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
-    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_select_parameters(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  uint8_t al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-  int ret = -1;
-  SSL_SESSION *session = NULL;
-
-  SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
-  if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello, ssl->init_msg,
-                             ssl->init_num)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  /* Determine whether we are doing session resumption. */
-  int tickets_supported = 0, renew_ticket = 0;
-  switch (ssl_get_prev_session(ssl, &session, &tickets_supported, &renew_ticket,
-                               &client_hello)) {
-    case ssl_session_success:
-      break;
-    case ssl_session_error:
-      goto err;
-    case ssl_session_retry:
-      ssl->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_SESSION;
-      goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (session != NULL) {
-    if (session->extended_master_secret && !hs->extended_master_secret) {
-      /* A ClientHello without EMS that attempts to resume a session with EMS
-       * is fatal to the connection. */
-      al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    if (!ssl_session_is_resumable(hs, session) ||
-        /* If the client offers the EMS extension, but the previous session
-         * didn't use it, then negotiate a new session. */
-        hs->extended_master_secret != session->extended_master_secret) {
-      SSL_SESSION_free(session);
-      session = NULL;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (session != NULL) {
-    /* Use the old session. */
-    hs->ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
-    ssl->session = session;
-    session = NULL;
-    ssl->s3->session_reused = 1;
-  } else {
-    hs->ticket_expected = tickets_supported;
-    ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
-    if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs, 1 /* server */)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    /* Clear the session ID if we want the session to be single-use. */
-    if (!(ssl->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)) {
-      hs->new_session->session_id_length = 0;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb != NULL &&
-      ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb(&client_hello) == 0) {
-    /* Connection rejected for DOS reasons. */
-    al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->session == NULL) {
-    hs->new_session->cipher = hs->new_cipher;
-
-    /* On new sessions, stash the SNI value in the session. */
-    if (hs->hostname != NULL) {
-      OPENSSL_free(hs->new_session->tlsext_hostname);
-      hs->new_session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(hs->hostname);
-      if (hs->new_session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
-        al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-        goto f_err;
-      }
-    }
-
-    /* Determine whether to request a client certificate. */
-    hs->cert_request = !!(ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER);
-    /* Only request a certificate if Channel ID isn't negotiated. */
-    if ((ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER_IF_NO_OBC) &&
-        ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
-      hs->cert_request = 0;
-    }
-    /* CertificateRequest may only be sent in certificate-based ciphers. */
-    if (!ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
-      hs->cert_request = 0;
-    }
-
-    if (!hs->cert_request) {
-      /* OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are requested. This is
-       * classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX. */
-      hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
-    }
-  }
-
-  /* HTTP/2 negotiation depends on the cipher suite, so ALPN negotiation was
-   * deferred. Complete it now. */
-  if (!ssl_negotiate_alpn(hs, &al, &client_hello)) {
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  /* Now that all parameters are known, initialize the handshake hash and hash
-   * the ClientHello. */
-  if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_init_hash(&hs->transcript, ssl3_protocol_version(ssl),
-                                hs->new_cipher->algorithm_prf) ||
-      !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  /* Release the handshake buffer if client authentication isn't required. */
-  if (!hs->cert_request) {
-    SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript);
-  }
-
-  ret = 1;
-
-  if (0) {
-  f_err:
-    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-  }
-
-err:
-  SSL_SESSION_free(session);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-
-  /* We only accept ChannelIDs on connections with ECDHE in order to avoid a
-   * known attack while we fix ChannelID itself. */
-  if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid &&
-      (hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kECDHE) == 0) {
-    ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
-  }
-
-  /* If this is a resumption and the original handshake didn't support
-   * ChannelID then we didn't record the original handshake hashes in the
-   * session and so cannot resume with ChannelIDs. */
-  if (ssl->session != NULL &&
-      ssl->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) {
-    ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0;
-  }
-
-  struct timeval now;
-  ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
-  ssl->s3->server_random[0] = now.tv_sec >> 24;
-  ssl->s3->server_random[1] = now.tv_sec >> 16;
-  ssl->s3->server_random[2] = now.tv_sec >> 8;
-  ssl->s3->server_random[3] = now.tv_sec;
-  if (!RAND_bytes(ssl->s3->server_random + 4, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - 4)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  /* TODO(davidben): Implement the TLS 1.1 and 1.2 downgrade sentinels once TLS
-   * 1.3 is finalized and we are not implementing a draft version. */
-
-  const SSL_SESSION *session = hs->new_session;
-  if (ssl->session != NULL) {
-    session = ssl->session;
-  }
-
-  CBB cbb, body, session_id;
-  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16(&body, ssl->version) ||
-      !CBB_add_bytes(&body, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &session_id) ||
-      !CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, session->session_id,
-                     session->session_id_length) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16(&body, ssl_cipher_get_value(hs->new_cipher)) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8(&body, 0 /* no compression */) ||
-      !ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(hs, &body) ||
-      !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(ssl)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_send_certificate_status(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  CBB cbb, body, ocsp_response;
-  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body,
-                                 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8(&body, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) ||
-      !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&body, &ocsp_response) ||
-      !CBB_add_bytes(&ocsp_response,
-                     CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(ssl->cert->ocsp_response),
-                     CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(ssl->cert->ocsp_response)) ||
-      !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  CBB cbb, child;
-  CBB_zero(&cbb);
-
-  /* Put together the parameters. */
-  if (hs->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
-    uint32_t alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-    uint32_t alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
-    /* Pre-allocate enough room to comfortably fit an ECDHE public key. */
-    if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 128)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    /* PSK ciphers begin with an identity hint. */
-    if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
-      size_t len =
-          (ssl->psk_identity_hint == NULL) ? 0 : strlen(ssl->psk_identity_hint);
-      if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
-          !CBB_add_bytes(&child, (const uint8_t *)ssl->psk_identity_hint,
-                         len)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    }
-
-    if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
-      /* Determine the group to use. */
-      DH *params = ssl->cert->dh_tmp;
-      if (params == NULL && ssl->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL) {
-        params = ssl->cert->dh_tmp_cb(ssl, 0, 1024);
-      }
-      if (params == NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
-        ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-        goto err;
-      }
-
-      /* Set up DH, generate a key, and emit the public half. */
-      DH *dh = DHparams_dup(params);
-      if (dh == NULL) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-
-      SSL_ECDH_CTX_init_for_dhe(&hs->ecdh_ctx, dh);
-      if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
-          !BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, BN_num_bytes(params->p), params->p) ||
-          !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
-          !BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, BN_num_bytes(params->g), params->g) ||
-          !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
-          !SSL_ECDH_CTX_offer(&hs->ecdh_ctx, &child)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
-      /* Determine the group to use. */
-      uint16_t group_id;
-      if (!tls1_get_shared_group(hs, &group_id)) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
-        ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-        goto err;
-      }
-      hs->new_session->group_id = group_id;
-
-      /* Set up ECDH, generate a key, and emit the public half. */
-      if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(&hs->ecdh_ctx, group_id) ||
-          !CBB_add_u8(&cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
-          !CBB_add_u16(&cbb, group_id) ||
-          !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
-          !SSL_ECDH_CTX_offer(&hs->ecdh_ctx, &child)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    } else {
-      assert(alg_k & SSL_kPSK);
-    }
-
-    if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, &hs->server_params, &hs->server_params_len)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  /* Assemble the message. */
-  CBB body;
-  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body,
-                                 SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
-      !CBB_add_bytes(&body, hs->server_params, hs->server_params_len)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  /* Add a signature. */
-  if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
-    if (!ssl_has_private_key(ssl)) {
-      ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    /* Determine the signature algorithm. */
-    uint16_t signature_algorithm;
-    if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(hs, &signature_algorithm)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
-      if (!CBB_add_u16(&body, signature_algorithm)) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        goto err;
-      }
-    }
-
-    /* Add space for the signature. */
-    const size_t max_sig_len = ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(ssl);
-    uint8_t *ptr;
-    if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
-        !CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    size_t sig_len;
-    enum ssl_private_key_result_t sign_result;
-    if (hs->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
-      CBB transcript;
-      uint8_t *transcript_data;
-      size_t transcript_len;
-      if (!CBB_init(&transcript,
-                    2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + hs->server_params_len) ||
-          !CBB_add_bytes(&transcript, ssl->s3->client_random,
-                         SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
-          !CBB_add_bytes(&transcript, ssl->s3->server_random,
-                         SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
-          !CBB_add_bytes(&transcript, hs->server_params,
-                         hs->server_params_len) ||
-          !CBB_finish(&transcript, &transcript_data, &transcript_len)) {
-        CBB_cleanup(&transcript);
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        goto err;
-      }
-
-      sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign(ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len,
-                                         signature_algorithm, transcript_data,
-                                         transcript_len);
-      OPENSSL_free(transcript_data);
-    } else {
-      assert(hs->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B);
-      sign_result = ssl_private_key_complete(ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len);
-    }
-
-    switch (sign_result) {
-      case ssl_private_key_success:
-        if (!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len)) {
-          goto err;
-        }
-        break;
-      case ssl_private_key_failure:
-        goto err;
-      case ssl_private_key_retry:
-        ssl->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
-        goto err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  OPENSSL_free(hs->server_params);
-  hs->server_params = NULL;
-  hs->server_params_len = 0;
-
-  return 1;
-
-err:
-  CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
-  return -1;
-}
-
-static int add_cert_types(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) {
-  /* Get configured signature algorithms. */
-  int have_rsa_sign = 0;
-  int have_ecdsa_sign = 0;
-  const uint16_t *sig_algs;
-  size_t num_sig_algs = tls12_get_verify_sigalgs(ssl, &sig_algs);
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < num_sig_algs; i++) {
-    switch (sig_algs[i]) {
-      case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512:
-      case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384:
-      case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256:
-      case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1:
-        have_rsa_sign = 1;
-        break;
-
-      case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512:
-      case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384:
-      case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256:
-      case SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1:
-        have_ecdsa_sign = 1;
-        break;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (have_rsa_sign && !CBB_add_u8(cbb, SSL3_CT_RSA_SIGN)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  /* ECDSA certs can be used with RSA cipher suites as well so we don't need to
-   * check for SSL_kECDH or SSL_kECDHE. */
-  if (ssl->version >= TLS1_VERSION && have_ecdsa_sign &&
-      !CBB_add_u8(cbb, TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  CBB cbb, body, cert_types, sigalgs_cbb;
-  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body,
-                                 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &cert_types) ||
-      !add_cert_types(ssl, &cert_types)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
-    const uint16_t *sigalgs;
-    size_t num_sigalgs = tls12_get_verify_sigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs);
-    if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &sigalgs_cbb)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < num_sigalgs; i++) {
-      if (!CBB_add_u16(&sigalgs_cbb, sigalgs[i])) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_add_client_CA_list(ssl, &body) ||
-      !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-
-err:
-  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-  CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
-  return -1;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_send_server_hello_done(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  CBB cbb, body;
-  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) ||
-      !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  assert(hs->cert_request);
-
-  int msg_ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
-  if (msg_ret <= 0) {
-    return msg_ret;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
-    if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION &&
-        ssl->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
-      /* In SSL 3.0, the Certificate message is omitted to signal no
-       * certificate. */
-      if (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
-        ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-        return -1;
-      }
-
-      /* OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are received. This is
-       * classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX. */
-      hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
-      ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
-      return 1;
-    }
-
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  CBS certificate_msg;
-  CBS_init(&certificate_msg, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
-
-  sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(hs->new_session->certs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
-  EVP_PKEY_free(hs->peer_pubkey);
-  hs->peer_pubkey = NULL;
-  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-  hs->new_session->certs = ssl_parse_cert_chain(
-      &alert, &hs->peer_pubkey,
-      ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs ? hs->new_session->peer_sha256
-                                              : NULL,
-      &certificate_msg, ssl->ctx->pool);
-  if (hs->new_session->certs == NULL) {
-    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  if (CBS_len(&certificate_msg) != 0 ||
-      !ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_cache_objects(hs->new_session)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs) == 0) {
-    /* No client certificate so the handshake buffer may be discarded. */
-    SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript);
-
-    /* In SSL 3.0, sending no certificate is signaled by omitting the
-     * Certificate message. */
-    if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
-      ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-      return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) {
-      /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
-      ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-      return -1;
-    }
-
-    /* OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are received. This is
-     * classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX. */
-    hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  /* The hash will have been filled in. */
-  if (ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) {
-    hs->new_session->peer_sha256_valid = 1;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_verify_cert_chain(ssl, &hs->new_session->verify_result,
-                             hs->new_session->x509_chain)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  int al;
-  CBS client_key_exchange;
-  uint32_t alg_k;
-  uint32_t alg_a;
-  uint8_t *premaster_secret = NULL;
-  size_t premaster_secret_len = 0;
-  uint8_t *decrypt_buf = NULL;
-
-  unsigned psk_len = 0;
-  uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
-
-  if (hs->state == SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A) {
-    int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
-    if (ret <= 0) {
-      return ret;
-    }
-
-    if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
-        !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
-      return -1;
-    }
-  }
-
-  CBS_init(&client_key_exchange, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
-  alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-  alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
-  /* If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key. */
-  if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
-    CBS psk_identity;
-
-    /* If using PSK, the ClientKeyExchange contains a psk_identity. If PSK,
-     * then this is the only field in the message. */
-    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange, &psk_identity) ||
-        ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-      al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    if (ssl->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
-      al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    if (CBS_len(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN ||
-        CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-      al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    if (!CBS_strdup(&psk_identity, &hs->new_session->psk_identity)) {
-      al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    /* Look up the key for the identity. */
-    psk_len = ssl->psk_server_callback(ssl, hs->new_session->psk_identity, psk,
-                                       sizeof(psk));
-    if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-      goto f_err;
-    } else if (psk_len == 0) {
-      /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
-      al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  /* Depending on the key exchange method, compute |premaster_secret| and
-   * |premaster_secret_len|. */
-  if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
-    /* Allocate a buffer large enough for an RSA decryption. */
-    const size_t rsa_size = ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(ssl);
-    decrypt_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size);
-    if (decrypt_buf == NULL) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    enum ssl_private_key_result_t decrypt_result;
-    size_t decrypt_len;
-    if (hs->state == SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A) {
-      if (!ssl_has_private_key(ssl) ||
-          ssl_private_key_type(ssl) != NID_rsaEncryption) {
-        al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
-        goto f_err;
-      }
-      CBS encrypted_premaster_secret;
-      if (ssl->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
-        if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_key_exchange,
-                                         &encrypted_premaster_secret) ||
-            CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) {
-          al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL,
-                            SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
-          goto f_err;
-        }
-      } else {
-        encrypted_premaster_secret = client_key_exchange;
-      }
-
-      /* Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of the
-       * timing-sensitive code below. */
-      decrypt_result = ssl_private_key_decrypt(
-          ssl, decrypt_buf, &decrypt_len, rsa_size,
-          CBS_data(&encrypted_premaster_secret),
-          CBS_len(&encrypted_premaster_secret));
-    } else {
-      assert(hs->state == SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B);
-      /* Complete async decrypt. */
-      decrypt_result =
-          ssl_private_key_complete(ssl, decrypt_buf, &decrypt_len, rsa_size);
-    }
-
-    switch (decrypt_result) {
-      case ssl_private_key_success:
-        break;
-      case ssl_private_key_failure:
-        goto err;
-      case ssl_private_key_retry:
-        ssl->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
-        hs->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B;
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    if (decrypt_len != rsa_size) {
-      al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    /* Prepare a random premaster, to be used on invalid padding. See RFC 5246,
-     * section 7.4.7.1. */
-    premaster_secret_len = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
-    premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(premaster_secret_len);
-    if (premaster_secret == NULL) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-      goto err;
-    }
-    if (!RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    /* The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys are
-     * publicly invalid. */
-    if (decrypt_len < 11 + premaster_secret_len) {
-      al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
-    size_t padding_len = decrypt_len - premaster_secret_len;
-    uint8_t good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_buf[0], 0) &
-                   constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_buf[1], 2);
-    for (size_t i = 2; i < padding_len - 1; i++) {
-      good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(decrypt_buf[i]);
-    }
-    good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(decrypt_buf[padding_len - 1]);
-
-    /* The premaster secret must begin with |client_version|. This too must be
-     * checked in constant time (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/). */
-    good &= constant_time_eq_8(decrypt_buf[padding_len],
-                               (unsigned)(hs->client_version >> 8));
-    good &= constant_time_eq_8(decrypt_buf[padding_len + 1],
-                               (unsigned)(hs->client_version & 0xff));
-
-    /* Select, in constant time, either the decrypted premaster or the random
-     * premaster based on |good|. */
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < premaster_secret_len; i++) {
-      premaster_secret[i] = constant_time_select_8(
-          good, decrypt_buf[padding_len + i], premaster_secret[i]);
-    }
-
-    OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf);
-    decrypt_buf = NULL;
-  } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kDHE)) {
-    /* Parse the ClientKeyExchange. */
-    CBS peer_key;
-    if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_get_key(&hs->ecdh_ctx, &client_key_exchange, &peer_key) ||
-        CBS_len(&client_key_exchange) != 0) {
-      al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    /* Compute the premaster. */
-    uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-    if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_finish(&hs->ecdh_ctx, &premaster_secret,
-                             &premaster_secret_len, &alert, CBS_data(&peer_key),
-                             CBS_len(&peer_key))) {
-      al = alert;
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-
-    /* The key exchange state may now be discarded. */
-    SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(&hs->ecdh_ctx);
-  } else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
-    /* For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as the
-     * pre-shared key. */
-    premaster_secret_len = psk_len;
-    premaster_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(premaster_secret_len);
-    if (premaster_secret == NULL) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-      goto err;
-    }
-    OPENSSL_memset(premaster_secret, 0, premaster_secret_len);
-  } else {
-    al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  /* For a PSK cipher suite, the actual pre-master secret is combined with the
-   * pre-shared key. */
-  if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
-    CBB new_premaster, child;
-    uint8_t *new_data;
-    size_t new_len;
-
-    CBB_zero(&new_premaster);
-    if (!CBB_init(&new_premaster, 2 + psk_len + 2 + premaster_secret_len) ||
-        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&new_premaster, &child) ||
-        !CBB_add_bytes(&child, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len) ||
-        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&new_premaster, &child) ||
-        !CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) ||
-        !CBB_finish(&new_premaster, &new_data, &new_len)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-      CBB_cleanup(&new_premaster);
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
-    OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
-    premaster_secret = new_data;
-    premaster_secret_len = new_len;
-  }
-
-  /* Compute the master secret */
-  hs->new_session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(
-      hs, hs->new_session->master_key, premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
-  if (hs->new_session->master_key_length == 0) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  hs->new_session->extended_master_secret = hs->extended_master_secret;
-
-  OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
-  OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
-  return 1;
-
-f_err:
-  ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-err:
-  if (premaster_secret != NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, premaster_secret_len);
-    OPENSSL_free(premaster_secret);
-  }
-  OPENSSL_free(decrypt_buf);
-
-  return -1;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  int al;
-  CBS certificate_verify, signature;
-
-  /* Only RSA and ECDSA client certificates are supported, so a
-   * CertificateVerify is required if and only if there's a client certificate.
-   * */
-  if (hs->peer_pubkey == NULL) {
-    SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript);
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  int msg_ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
-  if (msg_ret <= 0) {
-    return msg_ret;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  CBS_init(&certificate_verify, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
-
-  /* Determine the digest type if needbe. */
-  uint16_t signature_algorithm = 0;
-  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
-    if (!CBS_get_u16(&certificate_verify, &signature_algorithm)) {
-      al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-    if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(ssl, &al, signature_algorithm)) {
-      goto f_err;
-    }
-    hs->new_session->peer_signature_algorithm = signature_algorithm;
-  } else if (hs->peer_pubkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
-    signature_algorithm = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1;
-  } else if (hs->peer_pubkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
-    signature_algorithm = SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1;
-  } else {
-    al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  /* Parse and verify the signature. */
-  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_verify, &signature) ||
-      CBS_len(&certificate_verify) != 0) {
-    al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  int sig_ok;
-  /* The SSL3 construction for CertificateVerify does not decompose into a
-   * single final digest and signature, and must be special-cased. */
-  if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) == SSL3_VERSION) {
-    uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-    size_t digest_len;
-    if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_ssl3_cert_verify_hash(&hs->transcript, digest,
-                                              &digest_len, hs->new_session,
-                                              signature_algorithm)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(hs->peer_pubkey, NULL);
-    sig_ok = pctx != NULL &&
-             EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) &&
-             EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature),
-                             digest, digest_len);
-    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
-  } else {
-    sig_ok = ssl_public_key_verify(
-        ssl, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature), signature_algorithm,
-        hs->peer_pubkey, (const uint8_t *)hs->transcript.buffer->data,
-        hs->transcript.buffer->length);
-  }
-
-#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
-  sig_ok = 1;
-  ERR_clear_error();
-#endif
-  if (!sig_ok) {
-    al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-    goto f_err;
-  }
-
-  /* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary, and we may hash the current
-   * message.*/
-  SSL_TRANSCRIPT_free_buffer(&hs->transcript);
-  if (!ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-
-f_err:
-  ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-err:
-  return 0;
-}
-
-/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
- * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
-static int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
-  if (ret <= 0) {
-    return ret;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) ||
-      !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  CBS next_protocol, selected_protocol, padding;
-  CBS_init(&next_protocol, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
-  if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &selected_protocol) ||
-      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&next_protocol, &padding) ||
-      CBS_len(&next_protocol) != 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (!CBS_stow(&selected_protocol, &ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated,
-                &ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-/* ssl3_get_channel_id reads and verifies a ClientID handshake message. */
-static int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  int msg_ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
-  if (msg_ret <= 0) {
-    return msg_ret;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, SSL3_MT_CHANNEL_ID) ||
-      !tls1_verify_channel_id(hs) ||
-      !ssl_hash_current_message(hs)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int ssl3_send_new_session_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  const SSL_SESSION *session;
-  SSL_SESSION *session_copy = NULL;
-  if (ssl->session == NULL) {
-    /* Fix the timeout to measure from the ticket issuance time. */
-    ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, hs->new_session);
-    session = hs->new_session;
-  } else {
-    /* We are renewing an existing session. Duplicate the session to adjust the
-     * timeout. */
-    session_copy = SSL_SESSION_dup(ssl->session, SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH);
-    if (session_copy == NULL) {
-      return -1;
-    }
-
-    ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, session_copy);
-    session = session_copy;
-  }
-
-  CBB cbb, body, ticket;
-  int ok =
-      ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) &&
-      CBB_add_u32(&body, session->timeout) &&
-      CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &ticket) &&
-      ssl_encrypt_ticket(ssl, &ticket, session) &&
-      ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb);
-
-  SSL_SESSION_free(session_copy);
-  CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
-
-  if (!ok) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}