grpc 1.9.1 → 1.10.0.pre1

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/s3_both.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,603 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+namespace bssl {
+
+static int add_record_to_flight(SSL *ssl, uint8_t type,
+                                Span<const uint8_t> in) {
+  // We'll never add a flight while in the process of writing it out.
+  assert(ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset == 0);
+
+  if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == NULL) {
+    ssl->s3->pending_flight = BUF_MEM_new();
+    if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == NULL) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  size_t max_out = in.size() + SSL_max_seal_overhead(ssl);
+  size_t new_cap = ssl->s3->pending_flight->length + max_out;
+  if (max_out < in.size() || new_cap < max_out) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  size_t len;
+  if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->s3->pending_flight, new_cap) ||
+      !tls_seal_record(ssl,
+                       (uint8_t *)ssl->s3->pending_flight->data +
+                           ssl->s3->pending_flight->length,
+                       &len, max_out, type, in.data(), in.size())) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ssl->s3->pending_flight->length += len;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_init_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type) {
+  // Pick a modest size hint to save most of the |realloc| calls.
+  if (!CBB_init(cbb, 64) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(cbb, type) ||
+      !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, body)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    CBB_cleanup(cbb);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_finish_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, Array<uint8_t> *out_msg) {
+  return CBBFinishArray(cbb, out_msg);
+}
+
+int ssl3_add_message(SSL *ssl, Array<uint8_t> msg) {
+  // Add the message to the current flight, splitting into several records if
+  // needed.
+  Span<const uint8_t> rest = msg;
+  do {
+    Span<const uint8_t> chunk = rest.subspan(0, ssl->max_send_fragment);
+    rest = rest.subspan(chunk.size());
+
+    if (!add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, chunk)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  } while (!rest.empty());
+
+  ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, msg);
+  // TODO(svaldez): Move this up a layer to fix abstraction for SSLTranscript on
+  // hs.
+  if (ssl->s3->hs != NULL &&
+      !ssl->s3->hs->transcript.Update(msg.data(), msg.size())) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_add_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) {
+  static const uint8_t kChangeCipherSpec[1] = {SSL3_MT_CCS};
+
+  if (!add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+                            kChangeCipherSpec)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+                      kChangeCipherSpec);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_add_alert(SSL *ssl, uint8_t level, uint8_t desc) {
+  uint8_t alert[2] = {level, desc};
+  if (!add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert);
+  ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, ((int)level << 8) | desc);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_flush_flight(SSL *ssl) {
+  if (ssl->s3->pending_flight == NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->s3->pending_flight->length > 0xffffffff ||
+      ssl->s3->pending_flight->length > INT_MAX) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  // If there is pending data in the write buffer, it must be flushed out before
+  // any new data in pending_flight.
+  if (ssl_write_buffer_is_pending(ssl)) {
+    int ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+      ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+      return ret;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Write the pending flight.
+  while (ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset < ssl->s3->pending_flight->length) {
+    int ret = BIO_write(
+        ssl->wbio,
+        ssl->s3->pending_flight->data + ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset,
+        ssl->s3->pending_flight->length - ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+      ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+      return ret;
+    }
+
+    ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset += ret;
+  }
+
+  if (BIO_flush(ssl->wbio) <= 0) {
+    ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  BUF_MEM_free(ssl->s3->pending_flight);
+  ssl->s3->pending_flight = NULL;
+  ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset = 0;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  const SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+
+  uint8_t finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  size_t finished_len;
+  if (!hs->transcript.GetFinishedMAC(finished, &finished_len, session,
+                                     ssl->server)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Log the master secret, if logging is enabled.
+  if (!ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_RANDOM",
+                      session->master_key,
+                      session->master_key_length)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks.
+  if (ssl->version != SSL3_VERSION) {
+    if (finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished) ||
+        finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (ssl->server) {
+      OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, finished, finished_len);
+      ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len;
+    } else {
+      OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, finished, finished_len);
+      ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len;
+    }
+  }
+
+  ScopedCBB cbb;
+  CBB body;
+  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&body, finished, finished_len) ||
+      !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *ssl) {
+  ScopedCBB cbb;
+  CBB body;
+  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) ||
+      !ssl_add_cert_chain(ssl, &body) ||
+      !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int extend_handshake_buffer(SSL *ssl, size_t length) {
+  if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->init_buf, length)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  while (ssl->init_buf->length < length) {
+    int ret = ssl3_read_handshake_bytes(
+        ssl, (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data + ssl->init_buf->length,
+        length - ssl->init_buf->length);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+      return ret;
+    }
+    ssl->init_buf->length += (size_t)ret;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int read_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl) {
+  // Read the first 5 bytes, the size of the TLS record header. This is
+  // sufficient to detect a V2ClientHello and ensures that we never read beyond
+  // the first record.
+  int ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+  const uint8_t *p = ssl_read_buffer(ssl).data();
+
+  // Some dedicated error codes for protocol mixups should the application wish
+  // to interpret them differently. (These do not overlap with ClientHello or
+  // V2ClientHello.)
+  if (strncmp("GET ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0 ||
+      strncmp("POST ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 ||
+      strncmp("HEAD ", (const char *)p, 5) == 0 ||
+      strncmp("PUT ", (const char *)p, 4) == 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  if (strncmp("CONNE", (const char *)p, 5) == 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if ((p[0] & 0x80) == 0 || p[2] != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO ||
+      p[3] != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+    // Not a V2ClientHello.
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  // Determine the length of the V2ClientHello.
+  size_t msg_length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1];
+  if (msg_length > (1024 * 4)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  if (msg_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - 2) {
+    // Reject lengths that are too short early. We have already read
+    // |SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH| bytes, so we should not attempt to process an
+    // (invalid) V2ClientHello which would be shorter than that.
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  // Read the remainder of the V2ClientHello.
+  ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, 2 + msg_length);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+
+  CBS v2_client_hello = CBS(ssl_read_buffer(ssl).subspan(2, msg_length));
+  // The V2ClientHello without the length is incorporated into the handshake
+  // hash. This is only ever called at the start of the handshake, so hs is
+  // guaranteed to be non-NULL.
+  if (!ssl->s3->hs->transcript.Update(CBS_data(&v2_client_hello),
+                                      CBS_len(&v2_client_hello))) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, 0 /* V2ClientHello */,
+                      v2_client_hello);
+
+  uint8_t msg_type;
+  uint16_t version, cipher_spec_length, session_id_length, challenge_length;
+  CBS cipher_specs, session_id, challenge;
+  if (!CBS_get_u8(&v2_client_hello, &msg_type) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &version) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_spec_length) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &session_id_length) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(&v2_client_hello, &challenge_length) ||
+      !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &cipher_specs, cipher_spec_length) ||
+      !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &session_id, session_id_length) ||
+      !CBS_get_bytes(&v2_client_hello, &challenge, challenge_length) ||
+      CBS_len(&v2_client_hello) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  // msg_type has already been checked.
+  assert(msg_type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO);
+
+  // The client_random is the V2ClientHello challenge. Truncate or left-pad with
+  // zeros as needed.
+  size_t rand_len = CBS_len(&challenge);
+  if (rand_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) {
+    rand_len = SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+  }
+  uint8_t random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
+  OPENSSL_memset(random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(random + (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - rand_len), CBS_data(&challenge),
+                 rand_len);
+
+  // Write out an equivalent SSLv3 ClientHello.
+  size_t max_v3_client_hello = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 /* version */ +
+                               SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 /* session ID length */ +
+                               2 /* cipher list length */ +
+                               CBS_len(&cipher_specs) / 3 * 2 +
+                               1 /* compression length */ + 1 /* compression */;
+  ScopedCBB client_hello;
+  CBB hello_body, cipher_suites;
+  if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->init_buf, max_v3_client_hello) ||
+      !CBB_init_fixed(client_hello.get(), (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data,
+                      ssl->init_buf->max) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(client_hello.get(), SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
+      !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(client_hello.get(), &hello_body) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&hello_body, version) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&hello_body, random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+      // No session id.
+      !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&hello_body, &cipher_suites)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  // Copy the cipher suites.
+  while (CBS_len(&cipher_specs) > 0) {
+    uint32_t cipher_spec;
+    if (!CBS_get_u24(&cipher_specs, &cipher_spec)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      return -1;
+    }
+
+    // Skip SSLv2 ciphers.
+    if ((cipher_spec & 0xff0000) != 0) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (!CBB_add_u16(&cipher_suites, cipher_spec)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return -1;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Add the null compression scheme and finish.
+  if (!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 1) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
+      !CBB_finish(client_hello.get(), NULL, &ssl->init_buf->length)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  // Consume and discard the V2ClientHello.
+  ssl_read_buffer_consume(ssl, 2 + msg_length);
+  ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
+
+  ssl->s3->is_v2_hello = true;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// TODO(davidben): Remove |out_bytes_needed| and inline into |ssl3_get_message|
+// when the entire record is copied into |init_buf|.
+static bool parse_message(SSL *ssl, SSLMessage *out, size_t *out_bytes_needed) {
+  if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) {
+    *out_bytes_needed = 4;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  CBS cbs;
+  uint32_t len;
+  CBS_init(&cbs, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(ssl->init_buf->data),
+           ssl->init_buf->length);
+  if (!CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &out->type) ||
+      !CBS_get_u24(&cbs, &len)) {
+    *out_bytes_needed = 4;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &out->body, len)) {
+    *out_bytes_needed = 4 + len;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  CBS_init(&out->raw, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(ssl->init_buf->data),
+           4 + len);
+  out->is_v2_hello = ssl->s3->is_v2_hello;
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl3_get_message(SSL *ssl, SSLMessage *out) {
+  size_t unused;
+  if (!parse_message(ssl, out, &unused)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (!ssl->s3->has_message) {
+    if (!out->is_v2_hello) {
+      ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, out->raw);
+    }
+    ssl->s3->has_message = true;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+int ssl3_read_message(SSL *ssl) {
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  size_t bytes_needed;
+  if (parse_message(ssl, &msg, &bytes_needed)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  // Enforce the limit so the peer cannot force us to buffer 16MB.
+  if (bytes_needed > 4 + ssl_max_handshake_message_len(ssl)) {
+    ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  // Re-create the handshake buffer if needed.
+  if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) {
+    ssl->init_buf = BUF_MEM_new();
+    if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) {
+      return -1;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Bypass the record layer for the first message to handle V2ClientHello.
+  if (ssl->server && !ssl->s3->v2_hello_done) {
+    int ret = read_v2_client_hello(ssl);
+    if (ret > 0) {
+      ssl->s3->v2_hello_done = true;
+    }
+    return ret;
+  }
+
+  return extend_handshake_buffer(ssl, bytes_needed);
+}
+
+void ssl3_next_message(SSL *ssl) {
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  if (!ssl3_get_message(ssl, &msg) ||
+      ssl->init_buf == NULL ||
+      ssl->init_buf->length < CBS_len(&msg.raw)) {
+    assert(0);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_memmove(ssl->init_buf->data, ssl->init_buf->data + CBS_len(&msg.raw),
+                  ssl->init_buf->length - CBS_len(&msg.raw));
+  ssl->init_buf->length -= CBS_len(&msg.raw);
+  ssl->s3->is_v2_hello = false;
+  ssl->s3->has_message = false;
+
+  // Post-handshake messages are rare, so release the buffer after every
+  // message. During the handshake, |on_handshake_complete| will release it.
+  if (!SSL_in_init(ssl) && ssl->init_buf->length == 0) {
+    BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf);
+    ssl->init_buf = NULL;
+  }
+}
+
+}  // namespace bssl