grpc 1.9.1 → 1.10.0.pre1

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/cipher/tls_cbc.c

@@ -1,482 +0,0 @@
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2012 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
-
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/digest.h>
-#include <openssl/nid.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-
-#include "../internal.h"
-#include "internal.h"
-
-
-/* TODO(davidben): unsigned should be size_t. The various constant_time
- * functions need to be switched to size_t. */
-
-/* MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES is the maximum number of bytes in the hash's length
- * field. (SHA-384/512 have 128-bit length.) */
-#define MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES 16
-
-/* MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE is the maximum hash block size that we'll support.
- * Currently SHA-384/512 has a 128-byte block size and that's the largest
- * supported by TLS.) */
-#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128
-
-int EVP_tls_cbc_remove_padding(unsigned *out_padding_ok, unsigned *out_len,
-                               const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len,
-                               unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size) {
-  unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;
-  const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
-
-  /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant time. */
-  if (overhead > in_len) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  padding_length = in[in_len - 1];
-
-  good = constant_time_ge(in_len, overhead + padding_length);
-  /* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and
-   * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the
-   * length byte. Thus, with the length byte included, there are i+1
-   * bytes of padding.
-   *
-   * We can't check just |padding_length+1| bytes because that leaks
-   * decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the maximum
-   * amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record is
-   * public information so we can use it.) */
-  to_check = 256; /* maximum amount of padding, inc length byte. */
-  if (to_check > in_len) {
-    to_check = in_len;
-  }
-
-  for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) {
-    uint8_t mask = constant_time_ge_8(padding_length, i);
-    uint8_t b = in[in_len - 1 - i];
-    /* The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value
-     * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */
-    good &= ~(mask & (padding_length ^ b));
-  }
-
-  /* If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value,
-   * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. */
-  good = constant_time_eq(0xff, good & 0xff);
-
-  /* Always treat |padding_length| as zero on error. If, assuming block size of
-   * 16, a padding of [<15 arbitrary bytes> 15] treated |padding_length| as 16
-   * and returned -1, distinguishing good MAC and bad padding from bad MAC and
-   * bad padding would give POODLE's padding oracle. */
-  padding_length = good & (padding_length + 1);
-  *out_len = in_len - padding_length;
-  *out_padding_ok = good;
-  return 1;
-}
-
-void EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac(uint8_t *out, unsigned md_size,
-                          const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len,
-                          unsigned orig_len) {
-  uint8_t rotated_mac1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], rotated_mac2[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-  uint8_t *rotated_mac = rotated_mac1;
-  uint8_t *rotated_mac_tmp = rotated_mac2;
-
-  /* mac_end is the index of |in| just after the end of the MAC. */
-  unsigned mac_end = in_len;
-  unsigned mac_start = mac_end - md_size;
-
-  assert(orig_len >= in_len);
-  assert(in_len >= md_size);
-  assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
-
-  /* scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because
-   * the MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */
-  unsigned scan_start = 0;
-  /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */
-  if (orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1) {
-    scan_start = orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1);
-  }
-
-  unsigned rotate_offset = 0;
-  uint8_t mac_started = 0;
-  OPENSSL_memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size);
-  for (unsigned i = scan_start, j = 0; i < orig_len; i++, j++) {
-    if (j >= md_size) {
-      j -= md_size;
-    }
-    unsigned is_mac_start = constant_time_eq(i, mac_start);
-    mac_started |= is_mac_start;
-    uint8_t mac_ended = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_end);
-    rotated_mac[j] |= in[i] & mac_started & ~mac_ended;
-    /* Save the offset that |mac_start| is mapped to. */
-    rotate_offset |= j & is_mac_start;
-  }
-
-  /* Now rotate the MAC. We rotate in log(md_size) steps, one for each bit
-   * position. */
-  for (unsigned offset = 1; offset < md_size;
-       offset <<= 1, rotate_offset >>= 1) {
-    /* Rotate by |offset| iff the corresponding bit is set in
-     * |rotate_offset|, placing the result in |rotated_mac_tmp|. */
-    const uint8_t skip_rotate = (rotate_offset & 1) - 1;
-    for (unsigned i = 0, j = offset; i < md_size; i++, j++) {
-      if (j >= md_size) {
-        j -= md_size;
-      }
-      rotated_mac_tmp[i] =
-          constant_time_select_8(skip_rotate, rotated_mac[i], rotated_mac[j]);
-    }
-
-    /* Swap pointers so |rotated_mac| contains the (possibly) rotated value.
-     * Note the number of iterations and thus the identity of these pointers is
-     * public information. */
-    uint8_t *tmp = rotated_mac;
-    rotated_mac = rotated_mac_tmp;
-    rotated_mac_tmp = tmp;
-  }
-
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(out, rotated_mac, md_size);
-}
-
-/* u32toBE serialises an unsigned, 32-bit number (n) as four bytes at (p) in
- * big-endian order. The value of p is advanced by four. */
-#define u32toBE(n, p)                \
-  do {                               \
-    *((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 24); \
-    *((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 16); \
-    *((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 8);  \
-    *((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n));       \
-  } while (0)
-
-/* u64toBE serialises an unsigned, 64-bit number (n) as eight bytes at (p) in
- * big-endian order. The value of p is advanced by eight. */
-#define u64toBE(n, p)                \
-  do {                               \
-    *((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 56); \
-    *((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 48); \
-    *((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 40); \
-    *((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 32); \
-    *((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 24); \
-    *((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 16); \
-    *((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n) >> 8);  \
-    *((p)++) = (uint8_t)((n));       \
-  } while (0)
-
-/* These functions serialize the state of a hash and thus perform the standard
- * "final" operation without adding the padding and length that such a function
- * typically does. */
-static void tls1_sha1_final_raw(void *ctx, uint8_t *md_out) {
-  SHA_CTX *sha1 = ctx;
-  u32toBE(sha1->h[0], md_out);
-  u32toBE(sha1->h[1], md_out);
-  u32toBE(sha1->h[2], md_out);
-  u32toBE(sha1->h[3], md_out);
-  u32toBE(sha1->h[4], md_out);
-}
-#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA_CTX
-
-static void tls1_sha256_final_raw(void *ctx, uint8_t *md_out) {
-  SHA256_CTX *sha256 = ctx;
-  unsigned i;
-
-  for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
-    u32toBE(sha256->h[i], md_out);
-  }
-}
-#undef  LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX
-#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA256_CTX
-
-static void tls1_sha512_final_raw(void *ctx, uint8_t *md_out) {
-  SHA512_CTX *sha512 = ctx;
-  unsigned i;
-
-  for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
-    u64toBE(sha512->h[i], md_out);
-  }
-}
-#undef  LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX
-#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA512_CTX
-
-int EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD *md) {
-  switch (EVP_MD_type(md)) {
-    case NID_sha1:
-    case NID_sha256:
-    case NID_sha384:
-      return 1;
-
-    default:
-      return 0;
-  }
-}
-
-int EVP_tls_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t *md_out,
-                              size_t *md_out_size, const uint8_t header[13],
-                              const uint8_t *data, size_t data_plus_mac_size,
-                              size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
-                              const uint8_t *mac_secret,
-                              unsigned mac_secret_length) {
-  union {
-    double align;
-    uint8_t c[sizeof(LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX)];
-  } md_state;
-  void (*md_final_raw)(void *ctx, uint8_t *md_out);
-  void (*md_transform)(void *ctx, const uint8_t *block);
-  unsigned md_size, md_block_size = 64;
-  unsigned len, max_mac_bytes, num_blocks, num_starting_blocks, k,
-           mac_end_offset, c, index_a, index_b;
-  unsigned int bits; /* at most 18 bits */
-  uint8_t length_bytes[MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES];
-  /* hmac_pad is the masked HMAC key. */
-  uint8_t hmac_pad[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
-  uint8_t first_block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
-  uint8_t mac_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-  unsigned i, j, md_out_size_u;
-  EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
-  /* mdLengthSize is the number of bytes in the length field that terminates
-  * the hash. */
-  unsigned md_length_size = 8;
-
-  /* This is a, hopefully redundant, check that allows us to forget about
-   * many possible overflows later in this function. */
-  assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024 * 1024);
-
-  switch (EVP_MD_type(md)) {
-    case NID_sha1:
-      SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX *)md_state.c);
-      md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw;
-      md_transform =
-          (void (*)(void *ctx, const uint8_t *block))SHA1_Transform;
-      md_size = 20;
-      break;
-
-    case NID_sha256:
-      SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c);
-      md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
-      md_transform =
-          (void (*)(void *ctx, const uint8_t *block))SHA256_Transform;
-      md_size = 32;
-      break;
-
-    case NID_sha384:
-      SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c);
-      md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
-      md_transform =
-          (void (*)(void *ctx, const uint8_t *block))SHA512_Transform;
-      md_size = 384 / 8;
-      md_block_size = 128;
-      md_length_size = 16;
-      break;
-
-    default:
-      /* EVP_tls_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been called first to
-       * check that the hash function is supported. */
-      assert(0);
-      *md_out_size = 0;
-      return 0;
-  }
-
-  assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES);
-  assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
-  assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
-
-  static const unsigned kHeaderLength = 13;
-
-  /* kVarianceBlocks is the number of blocks of the hash that we have to
-   * calculate in constant time because they could be altered by the
-   * padding value.
-   *
-   * TLSv1 has MACs up to 48 bytes long (SHA-384) and the padding is not
-   * required to be minimal. Therefore we say that the final six blocks
-   * can vary based on the padding. */
-  static const unsigned kVarianceBlocks = 6;
-
-  /* From now on we're dealing with the MAC, which conceptually has 13
-   * bytes of `header' before the start of the data. */
-  len = data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + kHeaderLength;
-  /* max_mac_bytes contains the maximum bytes of bytes in the MAC, including
-  * |header|, assuming that there's no padding. */
-  max_mac_bytes = len - md_size - 1;
-  /* num_blocks is the maximum number of hash blocks. */
-  num_blocks =
-      (max_mac_bytes + 1 + md_length_size + md_block_size - 1) / md_block_size;
-  /* In order to calculate the MAC in constant time we have to handle
-   * the final blocks specially because the padding value could cause the
-   * end to appear somewhere in the final |kVarianceBlocks| blocks and we
-   * can't leak where. However, |num_starting_blocks| worth of data can
-   * be hashed right away because no padding value can affect whether
-   * they are plaintext. */
-  num_starting_blocks = 0;
-  /* k is the starting byte offset into the conceptual header||data where
-   * we start processing. */
-  k = 0;
-  /* mac_end_offset is the index just past the end of the data to be
-   * MACed. */
-  mac_end_offset = data_plus_mac_size + kHeaderLength - md_size;
-  /* c is the index of the 0x80 byte in the final hash block that
-   * contains application data. */
-  c = mac_end_offset % md_block_size;
-  /* index_a is the hash block number that contains the 0x80 terminating
-   * value. */
-  index_a = mac_end_offset / md_block_size;
-  /* index_b is the hash block number that contains the 64-bit hash
-   * length, in bits. */
-  index_b = (mac_end_offset + md_length_size) / md_block_size;
-  /* bits is the hash-length in bits. It includes the additional hash
-   * block for the masked HMAC key. */
-
-  if (num_blocks > kVarianceBlocks) {
-    num_starting_blocks = num_blocks - kVarianceBlocks;
-    k = md_block_size * num_starting_blocks;
-  }
-
-  bits = 8 * mac_end_offset;
-
-  /* Compute the initial HMAC block. */
-  bits += 8 * md_block_size;
-  OPENSSL_memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size);
-  assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad));
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
-  for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++) {
-    hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36;
-  }
-
-  md_transform(md_state.c, hmac_pad);
-
-  OPENSSL_memset(length_bytes, 0, md_length_size - 4);
-  length_bytes[md_length_size - 4] = (uint8_t)(bits >> 24);
-  length_bytes[md_length_size - 3] = (uint8_t)(bits >> 16);
-  length_bytes[md_length_size - 2] = (uint8_t)(bits >> 8);
-  length_bytes[md_length_size - 1] = (uint8_t)bits;
-
-  if (k > 0) {
-    /* k is a multiple of md_block_size. */
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(first_block, header, 13);
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(first_block + 13, data, md_block_size - 13);
-    md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
-    for (i = 1; i < k / md_block_size; i++) {
-      md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size * i - 13);
-    }
-  }
-
-  OPENSSL_memset(mac_out, 0, sizeof(mac_out));
-
-  /* We now process the final hash blocks. For each block, we construct
-   * it in constant time. If the |i==index_a| then we'll include the 0x80
-   * bytes and zero pad etc. For each block we selectively copy it, in
-   * constant time, to |mac_out|. */
-  for (i = num_starting_blocks; i <= num_starting_blocks + kVarianceBlocks;
-       i++) {
-    uint8_t block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
-    uint8_t is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_a);
-    uint8_t is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_b);
-    for (j = 0; j < md_block_size; j++) {
-      uint8_t b = 0, is_past_c, is_past_cp1;
-      if (k < kHeaderLength) {
-        b = header[k];
-      } else if (k < data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + kHeaderLength) {
-        b = data[k - kHeaderLength];
-      }
-      k++;
-
-      is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c);
-      is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c + 1);
-      /* If this is the block containing the end of the
-       * application data, and we are at the offset for the
-       * 0x80 value, then overwrite b with 0x80. */
-      b = constant_time_select_8(is_past_c, 0x80, b);
-      /* If this the the block containing the end of the
-       * application data and we're past the 0x80 value then
-       * just write zero. */
-      b = b & ~is_past_cp1;
-      /* If this is index_b (the final block), but not
-       * index_a (the end of the data), then the 64-bit
-       * length didn't fit into index_a and we're having to
-       * add an extra block of zeros. */
-      b &= ~is_block_b | is_block_a;
-
-      /* The final bytes of one of the blocks contains the
-       * length. */
-      if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size) {
-        /* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */
-        b = constant_time_select_8(
-            is_block_b, length_bytes[j - (md_block_size - md_length_size)], b);
-      }
-      block[j] = b;
-    }
-
-    md_transform(md_state.c, block);
-    md_final_raw(md_state.c, block);
-    /* If this is index_b, copy the hash value to |mac_out|. */
-    for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++) {
-      mac_out[j] |= block[j] & is_block_b;
-    }
-  }
-
-  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
-  if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL /* engine */)) {
-    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  /* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */
-  for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++) {
-    hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a;
-  }
-
-  EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size);
-  EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);
-  EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u);
-  *md_out_size = md_out_size_u;
-  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
-
-  return 1;
-}