grpc 1.26.0 → 1.30.0

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/handshake.cc

@@ -1,691 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */
-
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-
-#include <assert.h>
-
-#include <utility>
-
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-
-#include "../crypto/internal.h"
-#include "internal.h"
-
-
-BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
-
-SSL_HANDSHAKE::SSL_HANDSHAKE(SSL *ssl_arg)
-    : ssl(ssl_arg),
-      scts_requested(false),
-      needs_psk_binder(false),
-      received_hello_retry_request(false),
-      sent_hello_retry_request(false),
-      handshake_finalized(false),
-      accept_psk_mode(false),
-      cert_request(false),
-      certificate_status_expected(false),
-      ocsp_stapling_requested(false),
-      delegated_credential_requested(false),
-      should_ack_sni(false),
-      in_false_start(false),
-      in_early_data(false),
-      early_data_offered(false),
-      can_early_read(false),
-      can_early_write(false),
-      next_proto_neg_seen(false),
-      ticket_expected(false),
-      extended_master_secret(false),
-      pending_private_key_op(false),
-      grease_seeded(false),
-      handback(false),
-      cert_compression_negotiated(false),
-      apply_jdk11_workaround(false) {
-  assert(ssl);
-}
-
-SSL_HANDSHAKE::~SSL_HANDSHAKE() {
-  ssl->ctx->x509_method->hs_flush_cached_ca_names(this);
-}
-
-void SSL_HANDSHAKE::ResizeSecrets(size_t hash_len) {
-  if (hash_len > SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE) {
-    abort();
-  }
-  hash_len_ = hash_len;
-}
-
-UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE> ssl_handshake_new(SSL *ssl) {
-  UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE> hs = MakeUnique<SSL_HANDSHAKE>(ssl);
-  if (!hs || !hs->transcript.Init()) {
-    return nullptr;
-  }
-  hs->config = ssl->config.get();
-  if (!hs->config) {
-    assert(hs->config);
-    return nullptr;
-  }
-  return hs;
-}
-
-bool ssl_check_message_type(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg, int type) {
-  if (msg.type != type) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-    ERR_add_error_dataf("got type %d, wanted type %d", msg.type, type);
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  return true;
-}
-
-bool ssl_add_message_cbb(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) {
-  Array<uint8_t> msg;
-  if (!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb, &msg) ||
-      !ssl->method->add_message(ssl, std::move(msg))) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  return true;
-}
-
-size_t ssl_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *ssl) {
-  // kMaxMessageLen is the default maximum message size for handshakes which do
-  // not accept peer certificate chains.
-  static const size_t kMaxMessageLen = 16384;
-
-  if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
-    SSL_CONFIG *config = ssl->config.get();  // SSL_in_init() implies not NULL.
-    if ((!ssl->server || (config->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) &&
-        kMaxMessageLen < ssl->max_cert_list) {
-      return ssl->max_cert_list;
-    }
-    return kMaxMessageLen;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
-    // In TLS 1.2 and below, the largest acceptable post-handshake message is
-    // a HelloRequest.
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->server) {
-    // The largest acceptable post-handshake message for a server is a
-    // KeyUpdate. We will never initiate post-handshake auth.
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  // Clients must accept NewSessionTicket, so allow the default size.
-  return kMaxMessageLen;
-}
-
-bool ssl_hash_message(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg) {
-  // V2ClientHello messages are pre-hashed.
-  if (msg.is_v2_hello) {
-    return true;
-  }
-
-  return hs->transcript.Update(msg.raw);
-}
-
-int ssl_parse_extensions(const CBS *cbs, uint8_t *out_alert,
-                         const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE *ext_types,
-                         size_t num_ext_types, int ignore_unknown) {
-  // Reset everything.
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < num_ext_types; i++) {
-    *ext_types[i].out_present = 0;
-    CBS_init(ext_types[i].out_data, NULL, 0);
-  }
-
-  CBS copy = *cbs;
-  while (CBS_len(&copy) != 0) {
-    uint16_t type;
-    CBS data;
-    if (!CBS_get_u16(&copy, &type) ||
-        !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&copy, &data)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
-      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-      return 0;
-    }
-
-    const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE *ext_type = NULL;
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < num_ext_types; i++) {
-      if (type == ext_types[i].type) {
-        ext_type = &ext_types[i];
-        break;
-      }
-    }
-
-    if (ext_type == NULL) {
-      if (ignore_unknown) {
-        continue;
-      }
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
-      *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
-      return 0;
-    }
-
-    // Duplicate ext_types are forbidden.
-    if (*ext_type->out_present) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DUPLICATE_EXTENSION);
-      *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-      return 0;
-    }
-
-    *ext_type->out_present = 1;
-    *ext_type->out_data = data;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-enum ssl_verify_result_t ssl_verify_peer_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  const SSL_SESSION *prev_session = ssl->s3->established_session.get();
-  if (prev_session != NULL) {
-    // If renegotiating, the server must not change the server certificate. See
-    // https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE. We never resume on renegotiation,
-    // so this check is sufficient to ensure the reported peer certificate never
-    // changes on renegotiation.
-    assert(!ssl->server);
-    if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(prev_session->certs.get()) !=
-        sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs.get())) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-      return ssl_verify_invalid;
-    }
-
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs.get());
-         i++) {
-      const CRYPTO_BUFFER *old_cert =
-          sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(prev_session->certs.get(), i);
-      const CRYPTO_BUFFER *new_cert =
-          sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(hs->new_session->certs.get(), i);
-      if (CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(old_cert) != CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(new_cert) ||
-          OPENSSL_memcmp(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(old_cert),
-                         CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(new_cert),
-                         CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(old_cert)) != 0) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED);
-        ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-        return ssl_verify_invalid;
-      }
-    }
-
-    // The certificate is identical, so we may skip re-verifying the
-    // certificate. Since we only authenticated the previous one, copy other
-    // authentication from the established session and ignore what was newly
-    // received.
-    hs->new_session->ocsp_response = UpRef(prev_session->ocsp_response);
-    hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list =
-        UpRef(prev_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
-    hs->new_session->verify_result = prev_session->verify_result;
-    return ssl_verify_ok;
-  }
-
-  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
-  enum ssl_verify_result_t ret;
-  if (hs->config->custom_verify_callback != nullptr) {
-    ret = hs->config->custom_verify_callback(ssl, &alert);
-    switch (ret) {
-      case ssl_verify_ok:
-        hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
-        break;
-      case ssl_verify_invalid:
-        // If |SSL_VERIFY_NONE|, the error is non-fatal, but we keep the result.
-        if (hs->config->verify_mode == SSL_VERIFY_NONE) {
-          ERR_clear_error();
-          ret = ssl_verify_ok;
-        }
-        hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
-        break;
-      case ssl_verify_retry:
-        break;
-    }
-  } else {
-    ret = ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_verify_cert_chain(
-              hs->new_session.get(), hs, &alert)
-              ? ssl_verify_ok
-              : ssl_verify_invalid;
-  }
-
-  if (ret == ssl_verify_invalid) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
-  }
-
-  // Emulate OpenSSL's client OCSP callback. OpenSSL verifies certificates
-  // before it receives the OCSP, so it needs a second callback for OCSP.
-  if (ret == ssl_verify_ok && !ssl->server &&
-      hs->config->ocsp_stapling_enabled &&
-      ssl->ctx->legacy_ocsp_callback != nullptr) {
-    int cb_ret =
-        ssl->ctx->legacy_ocsp_callback(ssl, ssl->ctx->legacy_ocsp_callback_arg);
-    if (cb_ret <= 0) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OCSP_CB_ERROR);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
-                     cb_ret == 0 ? SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
-                                 : SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      ret = ssl_verify_invalid;
-    }
-  }
-
-  return ret;
-}
-
-// Verifies a stored certificate when resuming a session. A few things are
-// different from verify_peer_cert:
-// 1. We can't be renegotiating if we're resuming a session.
-// 2. The session is immutable, so we don't support verify_mode ==
-// SSL_VERIFY_NONE
-// 3. We don't call the OCSP callback.
-// 4. We only support custom verify callbacks.
-enum ssl_verify_result_t ssl_reverify_peer_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  assert(ssl->s3->established_session == nullptr);
-  assert(hs->config->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE);
-
-  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
-  enum ssl_verify_result_t ret = ssl_verify_invalid;
-  if (hs->config->custom_verify_callback != nullptr) {
-    ret = hs->config->custom_verify_callback(ssl, &alert);
-  }
-
-  if (ret == ssl_verify_invalid) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
-  }
-
-  return ret;
-}
-
-uint16_t ssl_get_grease_value(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
-                              enum ssl_grease_index_t index) {
-  // Draw entropy for all GREASE values at once. This avoids calling
-  // |RAND_bytes| repeatedly and makes the values consistent within a
-  // connection. The latter is so the second ClientHello matches after
-  // HelloRetryRequest and so supported_groups and key_shares are consistent.
-  if (!hs->grease_seeded) {
-    RAND_bytes(hs->grease_seed, sizeof(hs->grease_seed));
-    hs->grease_seeded = true;
-  }
-
-  // This generates a random value of the form 0xωaωa, for all 0 ≤ ω < 16.
-  uint16_t ret = hs->grease_seed[index];
-  ret = (ret & 0xf0) | 0x0a;
-  ret |= ret << 8;
-  return ret;
-}
-
-enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_get_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  SSLMessage msg;
-  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_read_message;
-  }
-
-  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_FINISHED)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message.
-  uint8_t finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-  size_t finished_len;
-  if (!hs->transcript.GetFinishedMAC(finished, &finished_len,
-                                     SSL_get_session(ssl), !ssl->server) ||
-      !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  int finished_ok = CBS_mem_equal(&msg.body, finished, finished_len);
-#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
-  finished_ok = 1;
-#endif
-  if (!finished_ok) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks.
-  if (finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished) ||
-      finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->server) {
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, finished, finished_len);
-    ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len;
-  } else {
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, finished, finished_len);
-    ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len;
-  }
-
-  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
-  return ssl_hs_ok;
-}
-
-bool ssl_send_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  const SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
-
-  uint8_t finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-  size_t finished_len;
-  if (!hs->transcript.GetFinishedMAC(finished, &finished_len, session,
-                                     ssl->server)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // Log the master secret, if logging is enabled.
-  if (!ssl_log_secret(
-          ssl, "CLIENT_RANDOM",
-          MakeConstSpan(session->master_key, session->master_key_length))) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks.
-  if (finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished) ||
-      finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (ssl->server) {
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, finished, finished_len);
-    ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len;
-  } else {
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, finished, finished_len);
-    ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len;
-  }
-
-  ScopedCBB cbb;
-  CBB body;
-  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ||
-      !CBB_add_bytes(&body, finished, finished_len) ||
-      !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-bool ssl_output_cert_chain(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  ScopedCBB cbb;
-  CBB body;
-  if (!hs->ssl->method->init_message(hs->ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
-                                     SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) ||
-      !ssl_add_cert_chain(hs, &body) ||
-      !ssl_add_message_cbb(hs->ssl, cbb.get())) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  return true;
-}
-
-int ssl_run_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, bool *out_early_return) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  for (;;) {
-    // Resolve the operation the handshake was waiting on.
-    switch (hs->wait) {
-      case ssl_hs_error:
-        ERR_restore_state(hs->error.get());
-        return -1;
-
-      case ssl_hs_flush: {
-        int ret = ssl->method->flush_flight(ssl);
-        if (ret <= 0) {
-          return ret;
-        }
-        break;
-      }
-
-      case ssl_hs_read_server_hello:
-      case ssl_hs_read_message:
-      case ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec: {
-        if (ssl->quic_method) {
-          hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
-          // The change cipher spec is omitted in QUIC.
-          if (hs->wait != ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec) {
-            ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ;
-            return -1;
-          }
-          break;
-        }
-
-        uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        size_t consumed = 0;
-        ssl_open_record_t ret;
-        if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec) {
-          ret = ssl_open_change_cipher_spec(ssl, &consumed, &alert,
-                                            ssl->s3->read_buffer.span());
-        } else {
-          ret = ssl_open_handshake(ssl, &consumed, &alert,
-                                   ssl->s3->read_buffer.span());
-        }
-        if (ret == ssl_open_record_error &&
-            hs->wait == ssl_hs_read_server_hello) {
-          uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error();
-          if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SSL &&
-              ERR_GET_REASON(err) == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) {
-            // Add a dedicated error code to the queue for a handshake_failure
-            // alert in response to ClientHello. This matches NSS's client
-            // behavior and gives a better error on a (probable) failure to
-            // negotiate initial parameters. Note: this error code comes after
-            // the original one.
-            //
-            // See https://crbug.com/446505.
-            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ON_CLIENT_HELLO);
-          }
-        }
-        bool retry;
-        int bio_ret = ssl_handle_open_record(ssl, &retry, ret, consumed, alert);
-        if (bio_ret <= 0) {
-          return bio_ret;
-        }
-        if (retry) {
-          continue;
-        }
-        ssl->s3->read_buffer.DiscardConsumed();
-        break;
-      }
-
-      case ssl_hs_read_end_of_early_data: {
-        if (ssl->s3->hs->can_early_read) {
-          // While we are processing early data, the handshake returns early.
-          *out_early_return = true;
-          return 1;
-        }
-        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
-        break;
-      }
-
-      case ssl_hs_certificate_selection_pending:
-        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_PENDING_CERTIFICATE;
-        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
-        return -1;
-
-      case ssl_hs_handoff:
-        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_HANDOFF;
-        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
-        return -1;
-
-      case ssl_hs_handback:
-        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_HANDBACK;
-        hs->wait = ssl_hs_handback;
-        return -1;
-
-      case ssl_hs_x509_lookup:
-        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP;
-        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
-        return -1;
-
-      case ssl_hs_channel_id_lookup:
-        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP;
-        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
-        return -1;
-
-      case ssl_hs_private_key_operation:
-        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
-        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
-        return -1;
-
-      case ssl_hs_pending_session:
-        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_PENDING_SESSION;
-        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
-        return -1;
-
-      case ssl_hs_pending_ticket:
-        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_PENDING_TICKET;
-        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
-        return -1;
-
-      case ssl_hs_certificate_verify:
-        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
-        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
-        return -1;
-
-      case ssl_hs_early_data_rejected:
-        assert(ssl->s3->early_data_reason != ssl_early_data_unknown);
-        ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
-        // Cause |SSL_write| to start failing immediately.
-        hs->can_early_write = false;
-        return -1;
-
-      case ssl_hs_early_return:
-        *out_early_return = true;
-        hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
-        return 1;
-
-      case ssl_hs_ok:
-        break;
-    }
-
-    // Run the state machine again.
-    hs->wait = ssl->do_handshake(hs);
-    if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_error) {
-      hs->error.reset(ERR_save_state());
-      return -1;
-    }
-    if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_ok) {
-      // The handshake has completed.
-      *out_early_return = false;
-      return 1;
-    }
-
-    // Otherwise, loop to the beginning and resolve what was blocking the
-    // handshake.
-  }
-}
-
-BSSL_NAMESPACE_END