grpc 1.26.0 → 1.30.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/evp/p_ec.c

@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+ * project 2006.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../fipsmodule/ec/internal.h"
+#include "../internal.h"
+
+
+typedef struct {
+  // message digest
+  const EVP_MD *md;
+  EC_GROUP *gen_group;
+} EC_PKEY_CTX;
+
+
+static int pkey_ec_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
+  EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx;
+  dctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EC_PKEY_CTX));
+  if (!dctx) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memset(dctx, 0, sizeof(EC_PKEY_CTX));
+
+  ctx->data = dctx;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_ec_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src) {
+  EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
+  if (!pkey_ec_init(dst)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  sctx = src->data;
+  dctx = dst->data;
+
+  dctx->md = sctx->md;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static void pkey_ec_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
+  EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+  if (!dctx) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  EC_GROUP_free(dctx->gen_group);
+  OPENSSL_free(dctx);
+}
+
+static int pkey_ec_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
+                        const uint8_t *tbs, size_t tbslen) {
+  unsigned int sltmp;
+  EC_KEY *ec = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec;
+
+  if (!sig) {
+    *siglen = ECDSA_size(ec);
+    return 1;
+  } else if (*siglen < (size_t)ECDSA_size(ec)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!ECDSA_sign(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, ec)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  *siglen = (size_t)sltmp;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_ec_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
+                          const uint8_t *tbs, size_t tbslen) {
+  return ECDSA_verify(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, ctx->pkey->pkey.ec);
+}
+
+static int pkey_ec_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *key,
+                          size_t *keylen) {
+  int ret;
+  size_t outlen;
+  const EC_POINT *pubkey = NULL;
+  EC_KEY *eckey;
+
+  if (!ctx->pkey || !ctx->peerkey) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_KEYS_NOT_SET);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  eckey = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec;
+
+  if (!key) {
+    const EC_GROUP *group;
+    group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
+    *keylen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
+    return 1;
+  }
+  pubkey = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ctx->peerkey->pkey.ec);
+
+  // NB: unlike PKCS#3 DH, if *outlen is less than maximum size this is
+  // not an error, the result is truncated.
+
+  outlen = *keylen;
+
+  ret = ECDH_compute_key(key, outlen, pubkey, eckey, 0);
+  if (ret < 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  *keylen = ret;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_ec_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) {
+  EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+
+  switch (type) {
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
+      if (EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha1 &&
+          EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1 &&
+          EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha224 &&
+          EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha256 &&
+          EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha384 &&
+          EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha512) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+      }
+      dctx->md = p2;
+      return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD:
+      *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = dctx->md;
+      return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY:
+      // Default behaviour is OK
+      return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAMGEN_CURVE_NID: {
+      EC_GROUP *group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(p1);
+      if (group == NULL) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+      EC_GROUP_free(dctx->gen_group);
+      dctx->gen_group = group;
+      return 1;
+    }
+
+    default:
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+      return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+static int pkey_ec_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+  EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+  const EC_GROUP *group = dctx->gen_group;
+  if (group == NULL) {
+    if (ctx->pkey == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ctx->pkey->pkey.ec);
+  }
+  EC_KEY *ec = EC_KEY_new();
+  if (ec == NULL ||
+      !EC_KEY_set_group(ec, group) ||
+      !EC_KEY_generate_key(ec)) {
+    EC_KEY_free(ec);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, ec);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_ec_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+  EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
+  if (dctx->gen_group == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  EC_KEY *ec = EC_KEY_new();
+  if (ec == NULL ||
+      !EC_KEY_set_group(ec, dctx->gen_group)) {
+    EC_KEY_free(ec);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, ec);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_METHOD ec_pkey_meth = {
+    EVP_PKEY_EC,
+    pkey_ec_init,
+    pkey_ec_copy,
+    pkey_ec_cleanup,
+    pkey_ec_keygen,
+    pkey_ec_sign,
+    NULL /* sign_message */,
+    pkey_ec_verify,
+    NULL /* verify_message */,
+    NULL /* verify_recover */,
+    NULL /* encrypt */,
+    NULL /* decrypt */,
+    pkey_ec_derive,
+    pkey_ec_paramgen,
+    pkey_ec_ctrl,
+};
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int nid) {
+  return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_GEN,
+                           EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAMGEN_CURVE_NID, nid, NULL);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_param_enc(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int encoding) {
+  // BoringSSL only supports named curve syntax.
+  if (encoding != OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/evp/p_rsa.c

@@ -0,0 +1,648 @@
+/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+ * project 2006.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#include "../internal.h"
+#include "../fipsmodule/rsa/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+typedef struct {
+  // Key gen parameters
+  int nbits;
+  BIGNUM *pub_exp;
+  // RSA padding mode
+  int pad_mode;
+  // message digest
+  const EVP_MD *md;
+  // message digest for MGF1
+  const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
+  // PSS salt length
+  int saltlen;
+  // tbuf is a buffer which is either NULL, or is the size of the RSA modulus.
+  // It's used to store the output of RSA operations.
+  uint8_t *tbuf;
+  // OAEP label
+  uint8_t *oaep_label;
+  size_t oaep_labellen;
+} RSA_PKEY_CTX;
+
+typedef struct {
+  uint8_t *data;
+  size_t len;
+} RSA_OAEP_LABEL_PARAMS;
+
+static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
+  RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx;
+  rctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA_PKEY_CTX));
+  if (!rctx) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memset(rctx, 0, sizeof(RSA_PKEY_CTX));
+
+  rctx->nbits = 2048;
+  rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+  rctx->saltlen = -2;
+
+  ctx->data = rctx;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src) {
+  RSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
+  if (!pkey_rsa_init(dst)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  sctx = src->data;
+  dctx = dst->data;
+  dctx->nbits = sctx->nbits;
+  if (sctx->pub_exp) {
+    dctx->pub_exp = BN_dup(sctx->pub_exp);
+    if (!dctx->pub_exp) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  dctx->pad_mode = sctx->pad_mode;
+  dctx->md = sctx->md;
+  dctx->mgf1md = sctx->mgf1md;
+  dctx->saltlen = sctx->saltlen;
+  if (sctx->oaep_label) {
+    OPENSSL_free(dctx->oaep_label);
+    dctx->oaep_label = OPENSSL_memdup(sctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_labellen);
+    if (!dctx->oaep_label) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    dctx->oaep_labellen = sctx->oaep_labellen;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static void pkey_rsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) {
+  RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+
+  if (rctx == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
+  OPENSSL_free(rctx->tbuf);
+  OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
+  OPENSSL_free(rctx);
+}
+
+static int setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pk) {
+  if (ctx->tbuf) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pk->pkey));
+  if (!ctx->tbuf) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
+                         const uint8_t *tbs, size_t tbslen) {
+  RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+  RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+  const size_t key_len = EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey);
+
+  if (!sig) {
+    *siglen = key_len;
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (*siglen < key_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (rctx->md) {
+    unsigned out_len;
+    switch (rctx->pad_mode) {
+      case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+        if (!RSA_sign(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen, sig, &out_len, rsa)) {
+          return 0;
+        }
+        *siglen = out_len;
+        return 1;
+
+      case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
+        return RSA_sign_pss_mgf1(rsa, siglen, sig, *siglen, tbs, tbslen,
+                                 rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md, rctx->saltlen);
+
+      default:
+        return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return RSA_sign_raw(rsa, siglen, sig, *siglen, tbs, tbslen, rctx->pad_mode);
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *sig,
+                           size_t siglen, const uint8_t *tbs,
+                           size_t tbslen) {
+  RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+  RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+
+  if (rctx->md) {
+    switch (rctx->pad_mode) {
+      case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+        return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, rsa);
+
+      case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
+        return RSA_verify_pss_mgf1(rsa, tbs, tbslen, rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
+                                   rctx->saltlen, sig, siglen);
+
+      default:
+        return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  size_t rslen;
+  const size_t key_len = EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey);
+  if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx) ||
+      !RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &rslen, rctx->tbuf, key_len, sig, siglen,
+                      rctx->pad_mode) ||
+      rslen != tbslen ||
+      CRYPTO_memcmp(tbs, rctx->tbuf, rslen) != 0) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
+                                   size_t *out_len, const uint8_t *sig,
+                                   size_t sig_len) {
+  RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+  RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+  const size_t key_len = EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey);
+
+  if (out == NULL) {
+    *out_len = key_len;
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (*out_len < key_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (rctx->md == NULL) {
+    return RSA_verify_raw(rsa, out_len, out, *out_len, sig, sig_len,
+                          rctx->pad_mode);
+  }
+
+  if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Assemble the encoded hash, using a placeholder hash value.
+  static const uint8_t kDummyHash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
+  const size_t hash_len = EVP_MD_size(rctx->md);
+  uint8_t *asn1_prefix;
+  size_t asn1_prefix_len;
+  int asn1_prefix_allocated;
+  if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx) ||
+      !RSA_add_pkcs1_prefix(&asn1_prefix, &asn1_prefix_len,
+                            &asn1_prefix_allocated, EVP_MD_type(rctx->md),
+                            kDummyHash, hash_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  size_t rslen;
+  int ok = 1;
+  if (!RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &rslen, rctx->tbuf, key_len, sig, sig_len,
+                      RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) ||
+      rslen != asn1_prefix_len ||
+      // Compare all but the hash suffix.
+      CRYPTO_memcmp(rctx->tbuf, asn1_prefix, asn1_prefix_len - hash_len) != 0) {
+    ok = 0;
+  }
+
+  if (asn1_prefix_allocated) {
+    OPENSSL_free(asn1_prefix);
+  }
+
+  if (!ok) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (out != NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(out, rctx->tbuf + rslen - hash_len, hash_len);
+  }
+  *out_len = hash_len;
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *outlen,
+                            const uint8_t *in, size_t inlen) {
+  RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+  RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+  const size_t key_len = EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey);
+
+  if (!out) {
+    *outlen = key_len;
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (*outlen < key_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+    if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx) ||
+        !RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(rctx->tbuf, key_len, in, inlen,
+                                         rctx->oaep_label, rctx->oaep_labellen,
+                                         rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md) ||
+        !RSA_encrypt(rsa, outlen, out, *outlen, rctx->tbuf, key_len,
+                     RSA_NO_PADDING)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  return RSA_encrypt(rsa, outlen, out, *outlen, in, inlen, rctx->pad_mode);
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
+                            size_t *outlen, const uint8_t *in,
+                            size_t inlen) {
+  RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+  RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+  const size_t key_len = EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey);
+
+  if (!out) {
+    *outlen = key_len;
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (*outlen < key_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+    size_t padded_len;
+    if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx) ||
+        !RSA_decrypt(rsa, &padded_len, rctx->tbuf, key_len, in, inlen,
+                     RSA_NO_PADDING) ||
+        !RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(
+            out, outlen, key_len, rctx->tbuf, padded_len, rctx->oaep_label,
+            rctx->oaep_labellen, rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  return RSA_decrypt(rsa, outlen, out, key_len, in, inlen, rctx->pad_mode);
+}
+
+static int check_padding_md(const EVP_MD *md, int padding) {
+  if (!md) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int is_known_padding(int padding_mode) {
+  switch (padding_mode) {
+    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+    case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+    case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
+      return 1;
+    default:
+      return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) {
+  RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+  switch (type) {
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING:
+      if (!is_known_padding(p1) || !check_padding_md(rctx->md, p1) ||
+          (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING &&
+           0 == (ctx->operation & (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY))) ||
+          (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING &&
+           0 == (ctx->operation & EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT))) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
+        return 0;
+      }
+      if ((p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING || p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) &&
+          rctx->md == NULL) {
+        rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
+      }
+      rctx->pad_mode = p1;
+      return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING:
+      *(int *)p2 = rctx->pad_mode;
+      return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
+      if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
+        return 0;
+      }
+      if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN) {
+        *(int *)p2 = rctx->saltlen;
+      } else {
+        if (p1 < -2) {
+          return 0;
+        }
+        rctx->saltlen = p1;
+      }
+      return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS:
+      if (p1 < 256) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEYBITS);
+        return 0;
+      }
+      rctx->nbits = p1;
+      return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP:
+      if (!p2) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+      BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
+      rctx->pub_exp = p2;
+      return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD:
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD:
+      if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
+        return 0;
+      }
+      if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD) {
+        *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
+      } else {
+        rctx->md = p2;
+      }
+      return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
+      if (!check_padding_md(p2, rctx->pad_mode)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+      rctx->md = p2;
+      return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD:
+      *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
+      return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD:
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD:
+      if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING &&
+          rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
+        return 0;
+      }
+      if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD) {
+        if (rctx->mgf1md) {
+          *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->mgf1md;
+        } else {
+          *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
+        }
+      } else {
+        rctx->mgf1md = p2;
+      }
+      return 1;
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL: {
+      if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
+        return 0;
+      }
+      OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
+      RSA_OAEP_LABEL_PARAMS *params = p2;
+      rctx->oaep_label = params->data;
+      rctx->oaep_labellen = params->len;
+      return 1;
+    }
+
+    case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
+      if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
+        return 0;
+      }
+      CBS_init((CBS *)p2, rctx->oaep_label, rctx->oaep_labellen);
+      return 1;
+
+    default:
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+      return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+  RSA *rsa = NULL;
+  RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+
+  if (!rctx->pub_exp) {
+    rctx->pub_exp = BN_new();
+    if (!rctx->pub_exp || !BN_set_word(rctx->pub_exp, RSA_F4)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  rsa = RSA_new();
+  if (!rsa) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, rctx->nbits, rctx->pub_exp, NULL)) {
+    RSA_free(rsa);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pkey_meth = {
+    EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+    pkey_rsa_init,
+    pkey_rsa_copy,
+    pkey_rsa_cleanup,
+    pkey_rsa_keygen,
+    pkey_rsa_sign,
+    NULL /* sign_message */,
+    pkey_rsa_verify,
+    NULL /* verify_message */,
+    pkey_rsa_verify_recover,
+    pkey_rsa_encrypt,
+    pkey_rsa_decrypt,
+    NULL /* derive */,
+    NULL /* paramgen */,
+    pkey_rsa_ctrl,
+};
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int padding) {
+  return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING,
+                           padding, NULL);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *out_padding) {
+  return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING,
+                           0, out_padding);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) {
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int salt_len) {
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                            const EVP_MD *md) {
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int salt_len) {
+  return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+                           (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY),
+                           EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, salt_len, NULL);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *out_salt_len) {
+  return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+                           (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY),
+                           EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, 0, out_salt_len);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int bits) {
+  return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
+                           EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS, bits, NULL);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *e) {
+  return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
+                           EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, e);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) {
+  return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+                           EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)md);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **out_md) {
+  return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+                           EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void*) out_md);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) {
+  return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+                           EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+                           EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void*) md);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **out_md) {
+  return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+                           EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+                           EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void*) out_md);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *label,
+                                     size_t label_len) {
+  RSA_OAEP_LABEL_PARAMS params = {label, label_len};
+  return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+                           EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, 0, &params);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+                                     const uint8_t **out_label) {
+  CBS label;
+  if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+                         EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, 0, &label)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  if (CBS_len(&label) > INT_MAX) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  *out_label = CBS_data(&label);
+  return (int)CBS_len(&label);
+}