grpc 1.26.0 → 1.30.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/dsa/dsa.c

@@ -0,0 +1,980 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ *
+ * The DSS routines are based on patches supplied by
+ * Steven Schoch <schoch@sheba.arc.nasa.gov>. */
+
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ex_data.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/thread.h>
+
+#include "../fipsmodule/bn/internal.h"
+#include "../internal.h"
+
+
+#define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
+
+// Primality test according to FIPS PUB 186[-1], Appendix 2.1: 50 rounds of
+// Miller-Rabin.
+#define DSS_prime_checks 50
+
+static int dsa_sign_setup(const DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **out_kinv,
+                          BIGNUM **out_r);
+
+static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT;
+
+DSA *DSA_new(void) {
+  DSA *dsa = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DSA));
+  if (dsa == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_memset(dsa, 0, sizeof(DSA));
+
+  dsa->references = 1;
+
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&dsa->method_mont_lock);
+  CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&dsa->ex_data);
+
+  return dsa;
+}
+
+void DSA_free(DSA *dsa) {
+  if (dsa == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (!CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&dsa->references)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, dsa, &dsa->ex_data);
+
+  BN_clear_free(dsa->p);
+  BN_clear_free(dsa->q);
+  BN_clear_free(dsa->g);
+  BN_clear_free(dsa->pub_key);
+  BN_clear_free(dsa->priv_key);
+  BN_MONT_CTX_free(dsa->method_mont_p);
+  BN_MONT_CTX_free(dsa->method_mont_q);
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&dsa->method_mont_lock);
+  OPENSSL_free(dsa);
+}
+
+int DSA_up_ref(DSA *dsa) {
+  CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&dsa->references);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *DSA_get0_pub_key(const DSA *dsa) { return dsa->pub_key; }
+
+const BIGNUM *DSA_get0_priv_key(const DSA *dsa) { return dsa->priv_key; }
+
+const BIGNUM *DSA_get0_p(const DSA *dsa) { return dsa->p; }
+
+const BIGNUM *DSA_get0_q(const DSA *dsa) { return dsa->q; }
+
+const BIGNUM *DSA_get0_g(const DSA *dsa) { return dsa->g; }
+
+void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *dsa, const BIGNUM **out_pub_key,
+                  const BIGNUM **out_priv_key) {
+  if (out_pub_key != NULL) {
+    *out_pub_key = dsa->pub_key;
+  }
+  if (out_priv_key != NULL) {
+    *out_priv_key = dsa->priv_key;
+  }
+}
+
+void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *dsa, const BIGNUM **out_p, const BIGNUM **out_q,
+                  const BIGNUM **out_g) {
+  if (out_p != NULL) {
+    *out_p = dsa->p;
+  }
+  if (out_q != NULL) {
+    *out_q = dsa->q;
+  }
+  if (out_g != NULL) {
+    *out_g = dsa->g;
+  }
+}
+
+int DSA_set0_key(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key) {
+  if (dsa->pub_key == NULL && pub_key == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (pub_key != NULL) {
+    BN_free(dsa->pub_key);
+    dsa->pub_key = pub_key;
+  }
+  if (priv_key != NULL) {
+    BN_free(dsa->priv_key);
+    dsa->priv_key = priv_key;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g) {
+  if ((dsa->p == NULL && p == NULL) ||
+      (dsa->q == NULL && q == NULL) ||
+      (dsa->g == NULL && g == NULL)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (p != NULL) {
+    BN_free(dsa->p);
+    dsa->p = p;
+  }
+  if (q != NULL) {
+    BN_free(dsa->q);
+    dsa->q = q;
+  }
+  if (g != NULL) {
+    BN_free(dsa->g);
+    dsa->g = g;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *dsa, unsigned bits, const uint8_t *seed_in,
+                               size_t seed_len, int *out_counter,
+                               unsigned long *out_h, BN_GENCB *cb) {
+  int ok = 0;
+  unsigned char seed[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+  unsigned char md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+  unsigned char buf[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], buf2[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+  BIGNUM *r0, *W, *X, *c, *test;
+  BIGNUM *g = NULL, *q = NULL, *p = NULL;
+  BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
+  int k, n = 0, m = 0;
+  unsigned i;
+  int counter = 0;
+  int r = 0;
+  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+  unsigned int h = 2;
+  unsigned qsize;
+  const EVP_MD *evpmd;
+
+  evpmd = (bits >= 2048) ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_sha1();
+  qsize = EVP_MD_size(evpmd);
+
+  if (bits < 512) {
+    bits = 512;
+  }
+
+  bits = (bits + 63) / 64 * 64;
+
+  if (seed_in != NULL) {
+    if (seed_len < (size_t)qsize) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    if (seed_len > (size_t)qsize) {
+      // Only consume as much seed as is expected.
+      seed_len = qsize;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(seed, seed_in, seed_len);
+  }
+
+  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
+  r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  g = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  W = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  q = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  c = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  p = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  test = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+  if (test == NULL || !BN_lshift(test, BN_value_one(), bits - 1)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  for (;;) {
+    // Find q.
+    for (;;) {
+      // step 1
+      if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, BN_GENCB_GENERATED, m++)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      int use_random_seed = (seed_in == NULL);
+      if (use_random_seed) {
+        if (!RAND_bytes(seed, qsize)) {
+          goto err;
+        }
+      } else {
+        // If we come back through, use random seed next time.
+        seed_in = NULL;
+      }
+      OPENSSL_memcpy(buf, seed, qsize);
+      OPENSSL_memcpy(buf2, seed, qsize);
+      // precompute "SEED + 1" for step 7:
+      for (i = qsize - 1; i < qsize; i--) {
+        buf[i]++;
+        if (buf[i] != 0) {
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+
+      // step 2
+      if (!EVP_Digest(seed, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL) ||
+          !EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, buf2, NULL, evpmd, NULL)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+      for (i = 0; i < qsize; i++) {
+        md[i] ^= buf2[i];
+      }
+
+      // step 3
+      md[0] |= 0x80;
+      md[qsize - 1] |= 0x01;
+      if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, q)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      // step 4
+      r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(q, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, use_random_seed, cb);
+      if (r > 0) {
+        break;
+      }
+      if (r != 0) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      // do a callback call
+      // step 5
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 0) || !BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    // step 6
+    counter = 0;
+    // "offset = 2"
+
+    n = (bits - 1) / 160;
+
+    for (;;) {
+      if ((counter != 0) && !BN_GENCB_call(cb, BN_GENCB_GENERATED, counter)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      // step 7
+      BN_zero(W);
+      // now 'buf' contains "SEED + offset - 1"
+      for (k = 0; k <= n; k++) {
+        // obtain "SEED + offset + k" by incrementing:
+        for (i = qsize - 1; i < qsize; i--) {
+          buf[i]++;
+          if (buf[i] != 0) {
+            break;
+          }
+        }
+
+        if (!EVP_Digest(buf, qsize, md, NULL, evpmd, NULL)) {
+          goto err;
+        }
+
+        // step 8
+        if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, r0) ||
+            !BN_lshift(r0, r0, (qsize << 3) * k) ||
+            !BN_add(W, W, r0)) {
+          goto err;
+        }
+      }
+
+      // more of step 8
+      if (!BN_mask_bits(W, bits - 1) ||
+          !BN_copy(X, W) ||
+          !BN_add(X, X, test)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      // step 9
+      if (!BN_lshift1(r0, q) ||
+          !BN_mod(c, X, r0, ctx) ||
+          !BN_sub(r0, c, BN_value_one()) ||
+          !BN_sub(p, X, r0)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      // step 10
+      if (BN_cmp(p, test) >= 0) {
+        // step 11
+        r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(p, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, 1, cb);
+        if (r > 0) {
+          goto end;  // found it
+        }
+        if (r != 0) {
+          goto err;
+        }
+      }
+
+      // step 13
+      counter++;
+      // "offset = offset + n + 1"
+
+      // step 14
+      if (counter >= 4096) {
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+end:
+  if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, 1)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // We now need to generate g
+  // Set r0=(p-1)/q
+  if (!BN_sub(test, p, BN_value_one()) ||
+      !BN_div(r0, NULL, test, q, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new_for_modulus(p, ctx);
+  if (mont == NULL ||
+      !BN_set_word(test, h)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  for (;;) {
+    // g=test^r0%p
+    if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(g, test, r0, p, ctx, mont)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (!BN_is_one(g)) {
+      break;
+    }
+    if (!BN_add(test, test, BN_value_one())) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    h++;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ok = 1;
+
+err:
+  if (ok) {
+    BN_free(dsa->p);
+    BN_free(dsa->q);
+    BN_free(dsa->g);
+    dsa->p = BN_dup(p);
+    dsa->q = BN_dup(q);
+    dsa->g = BN_dup(g);
+    if (dsa->p == NULL || dsa->q == NULL || dsa->g == NULL) {
+      ok = 0;
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (out_counter != NULL) {
+      *out_counter = counter;
+    }
+    if (out_h != NULL) {
+      *out_h = h;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (ctx) {
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  }
+
+  BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
+
+  return ok;
+}
+
+DSA *DSAparams_dup(const DSA *dsa) {
+  DSA *ret = DSA_new();
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  ret->p = BN_dup(dsa->p);
+  ret->q = BN_dup(dsa->q);
+  ret->g = BN_dup(dsa->g);
+  if (ret->p == NULL || ret->q == NULL || ret->g == NULL) {
+    DSA_free(ret);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int DSA_generate_key(DSA *dsa) {
+  int ok = 0;
+  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+  BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+
+  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  priv_key = dsa->priv_key;
+  if (priv_key == NULL) {
+    priv_key = BN_new();
+    if (priv_key == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_rand_range_ex(priv_key, 1, dsa->q)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  pub_key = dsa->pub_key;
+  if (pub_key == NULL) {
+    pub_key = BN_new();
+    if (pub_key == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p, &dsa->method_mont_lock,
+                              dsa->p, ctx) ||
+      !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(pub_key, dsa->g, priv_key, dsa->p, ctx,
+                                 dsa->method_mont_p)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  dsa->priv_key = priv_key;
+  dsa->pub_key = pub_key;
+  ok = 1;
+
+err:
+  if (dsa->pub_key == NULL) {
+    BN_free(pub_key);
+  }
+  if (dsa->priv_key == NULL) {
+    BN_free(priv_key);
+  }
+  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+  return ok;
+}
+
+DSA_SIG *DSA_SIG_new(void) {
+  DSA_SIG *sig;
+  sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DSA_SIG));
+  if (!sig) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  sig->r = NULL;
+  sig->s = NULL;
+  return sig;
+}
+
+void DSA_SIG_free(DSA_SIG *sig) {
+  if (!sig) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  BN_free(sig->r);
+  BN_free(sig->s);
+  OPENSSL_free(sig);
+}
+
+// mod_mul_consttime sets |r| to |a| * |b| modulo |mont->N|, treating |a| and
+// |b| as secret. This function internally uses Montgomery reduction, but
+// neither inputs nor outputs are in Montgomery form.
+static int mod_mul_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                             const BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  BIGNUM *tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  // |BN_mod_mul_montgomery| removes a factor of R, so we cancel it with a
+  // single |BN_to_montgomery| which adds one factor of R.
+  int ok = tmp != NULL &&
+           BN_to_montgomery(tmp, a, mont, ctx) &&
+           BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, tmp, b, mont, ctx);
+  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+  return ok;
+}
+
+DSA_SIG *DSA_do_sign(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, const DSA *dsa) {
+  if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  // Reject invalid parameters. In particular, the algorithm will infinite loop
+  // if |g| is zero.
+  if (BN_is_zero(dsa->p) || BN_is_zero(dsa->q) || BN_is_zero(dsa->g)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  // We only support DSA keys that are a multiple of 8 bits. (This is a weaker
+  // check than the one in |DSA_do_check_signature|, which only allows 160-,
+  // 224-, and 256-bit keys.
+  if (BN_num_bits(dsa->q) % 8 != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
+  BIGNUM m;
+  BIGNUM xr;
+  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+  DSA_SIG *ret = NULL;
+
+  BN_init(&m);
+  BN_init(&xr);
+  s = BN_new();
+  if (s == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+redo:
+  if (!dsa_sign_setup(dsa, ctx, &kinv, &r)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (digest_len > BN_num_bytes(dsa->q)) {
+    // If the digest length is greater than the size of |dsa->q| use the
+    // BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see FIPS 186-3, 4.2.
+    // Note the above check that |dsa->q| is a multiple of 8 bits.
+    digest_len = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q);
+  }
+
+  if (BN_bin2bn(digest, digest_len, &m) == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // |m| is bounded by 2^(num_bits(q)), which is slightly looser than q. This
+  // violates |bn_mod_add_consttime| and |mod_mul_consttime|'s preconditions.
+  // (The underlying algorithms could accept looser bounds, but we reduce for
+  // simplicity.)
+  size_t q_width = bn_minimal_width(dsa->q);
+  if (!bn_resize_words(&m, q_width) ||
+      !bn_resize_words(&xr, q_width)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  bn_reduce_once_in_place(m.d, 0 /* no carry word */, dsa->q->d,
+                          xr.d /* scratch space */, q_width);
+
+  // Compute s = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q. Note |dsa->method_mont_q| is
+  // initialized by |dsa_sign_setup|.
+  if (!mod_mul_consttime(&xr, dsa->priv_key, r, dsa->method_mont_q, ctx) ||
+      !bn_mod_add_consttime(s, &xr, &m, dsa->q, ctx) ||
+      !mod_mul_consttime(s, s, kinv, dsa->method_mont_q, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is
+  // very unlikely.
+  if (BN_is_zero(r) || BN_is_zero(s)) {
+    goto redo;
+  }
+  ret = DSA_SIG_new();
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  ret->r = r;
+  ret->s = s;
+
+err:
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    BN_free(r);
+    BN_free(s);
+  }
+  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  BN_clear_free(&m);
+  BN_clear_free(&xr);
+  BN_clear_free(kinv);
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int DSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, DSA_SIG *sig,
+                  const DSA *dsa) {
+  int valid;
+  if (!DSA_do_check_signature(&valid, digest, digest_len, sig, dsa)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return valid;
+}
+
+int DSA_do_check_signature(int *out_valid, const uint8_t *digest,
+                           size_t digest_len, DSA_SIG *sig, const DSA *dsa) {
+  BN_CTX *ctx;
+  BIGNUM u1, u2, t1;
+  int ret = 0;
+  unsigned i;
+
+  *out_valid = 0;
+
+  if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  i = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
+  // FIPS 186-3 allows only different sizes for q.
+  if (i != 160 && i != 224 && i != 256) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  BN_init(&u1);
+  BN_init(&u2);
+  BN_init(&t1);
+
+  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) ||
+      BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) {
+    ret = 1;
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || BN_is_negative(sig->s) ||
+      BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) {
+    ret = 1;
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // Calculate W = inv(S) mod Q
+  // save W in u2
+  if (BN_mod_inverse(&u2, sig->s, dsa->q, ctx) == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // save M in u1
+  if (digest_len > (i >> 3)) {
+    // if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the
+    // BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see
+    // fips 186-3, 4.2
+    digest_len = (i >> 3);
+  }
+
+  if (BN_bin2bn(digest, digest_len, &u1) == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // u1 = M * w mod q
+  if (!BN_mod_mul(&u1, &u1, &u2, dsa->q, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // u2 = r * w mod q
+  if (!BN_mod_mul(&u2, sig->r, &u2, dsa->q, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked((BN_MONT_CTX **)&dsa->method_mont_p,
+                              (CRYPTO_MUTEX *)&dsa->method_mont_lock, dsa->p,
+                              ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!BN_mod_exp2_mont(&t1, dsa->g, &u1, dsa->pub_key, &u2, dsa->p, ctx,
+                        dsa->method_mont_p)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // BN_copy(&u1,&t1);
+  // let u1 = u1 mod q
+  if (!BN_mod(&u1, &t1, dsa->q, ctx)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // V is now in u1.  If the signature is correct, it will be
+  // equal to R.
+  *out_valid = BN_ucmp(&u1, sig->r) == 0;
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  if (ret != 1) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+  }
+  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  BN_free(&u1);
+  BN_free(&u2);
+  BN_free(&t1);
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int DSA_sign(int type, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
+             uint8_t *out_sig, unsigned int *out_siglen, const DSA *dsa) {
+  DSA_SIG *s;
+
+  s = DSA_do_sign(digest, digest_len, dsa);
+  if (s == NULL) {
+    *out_siglen = 0;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  *out_siglen = i2d_DSA_SIG(s, &out_sig);
+  DSA_SIG_free(s);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int DSA_verify(int type, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
+               const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len, const DSA *dsa) {
+  int valid;
+  if (!DSA_check_signature(&valid, digest, digest_len, sig, sig_len, dsa)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return valid;
+}
+
+int DSA_check_signature(int *out_valid, const uint8_t *digest,
+                        size_t digest_len, const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len,
+                        const DSA *dsa) {
+  DSA_SIG *s = NULL;
+  int ret = 0;
+  uint8_t *der = NULL;
+
+  s = DSA_SIG_new();
+  if (s == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  const uint8_t *sigp = sig;
+  if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s, &sigp, sig_len) == NULL || sigp != sig + sig_len) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // Ensure that the signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage.
+  int der_len = i2d_DSA_SIG(s, &der);
+  if (der_len < 0 || (size_t)der_len != sig_len ||
+      OPENSSL_memcmp(sig, der, sig_len)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = DSA_do_check_signature(out_valid, digest, digest_len, s, dsa);
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(der);
+  DSA_SIG_free(s);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+// der_len_len returns the number of bytes needed to represent a length of |len|
+// in DER.
+static size_t der_len_len(size_t len) {
+  if (len < 0x80) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  size_t ret = 1;
+  while (len > 0) {
+    ret++;
+    len >>= 8;
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int DSA_size(const DSA *dsa) {
+  size_t order_len = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q);
+  // Compute the maximum length of an |order_len| byte integer. Defensively
+  // assume that the leading 0x00 is included.
+  size_t integer_len = 1 /* tag */ + der_len_len(order_len + 1) + 1 + order_len;
+  if (integer_len < order_len) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  // A DSA signature is two INTEGERs.
+  size_t value_len = 2 * integer_len;
+  if (value_len < integer_len) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  // Add the header.
+  size_t ret = 1 /* tag */ + der_len_len(value_len) + value_len;
+  if (ret < value_len) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int dsa_sign_setup(const DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM **out_kinv,
+                          BIGNUM **out_r) {
+  if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int ret = 0;
+  BIGNUM k;
+  BN_init(&k);
+  BIGNUM *r = BN_new();
+  BIGNUM *kinv = BN_new();
+  if (r == NULL || kinv == NULL ||
+      // Get random k
+      !BN_rand_range_ex(&k, 1, dsa->q) ||
+      !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked((BN_MONT_CTX **)&dsa->method_mont_p,
+                              (CRYPTO_MUTEX *)&dsa->method_mont_lock, dsa->p,
+                              ctx) ||
+      !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked((BN_MONT_CTX **)&dsa->method_mont_q,
+                              (CRYPTO_MUTEX *)&dsa->method_mont_lock, dsa->q,
+                              ctx) ||
+      // Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q
+      !BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(r, dsa->g, &k, dsa->p, ctx,
+                                 dsa->method_mont_p) ||
+      // Note |BN_mod| below is not constant-time and may leak information about
+      // |r|. |dsa->p| may be significantly larger than |dsa->q|, so this is not
+      // easily performed in constant-time with Montgomery reduction.
+      //
+      // However, |r| at this point is g^k (mod p). It is almost the value of
+      // |r| revealed in the signature anyway (g^k (mod p) (mod q)), going from
+      // it to |k| would require computing a discrete log.
+      !BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx) ||
+      // Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' using Fermat's Little
+      // Theorem.
+      !bn_mod_inverse_prime(kinv, &k, dsa->q, ctx, dsa->method_mont_q)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  BN_clear_free(*out_kinv);
+  *out_kinv = kinv;
+  kinv = NULL;
+
+  BN_clear_free(*out_r);
+  *out_r = r;
+  r = NULL;
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  BN_clear_free(&k);
+  BN_clear_free(r);
+  BN_clear_free(kinv);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int DSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
+                         CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
+  int index;
+  if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
+                               free_func)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return index;
+}
+
+int DSA_set_ex_data(DSA *dsa, int idx, void *arg) {
+  return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&dsa->ex_data, idx, arg);
+}
+
+void *DSA_get_ex_data(const DSA *dsa, int idx) {
+  return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&dsa->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+DH *DSA_dup_DH(const DSA *dsa) {
+  if (dsa == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  DH *ret = DH_new();
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (dsa->q != NULL) {
+    ret->priv_length = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
+    if ((ret->q = BN_dup(dsa->q)) == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+  if ((dsa->p != NULL && (ret->p = BN_dup(dsa->p)) == NULL) ||
+      (dsa->g != NULL && (ret->g = BN_dup(dsa->g)) == NULL) ||
+      (dsa->pub_key != NULL && (ret->pub_key = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL) ||
+      (dsa->priv_key != NULL &&
+       (ret->priv_key = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+
+err:
+  DH_free(ret);
+  return NULL;
+}