grpc 1.26.0 → 1.30.0

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/d1_both.cc

@@ -1,842 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
- * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
-
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/buf.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-
-#include "../crypto/internal.h"
-#include "internal.h"
-
-
-BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
-
-// TODO(davidben): 28 comes from the size of IP + UDP header. Is this reasonable
-// for these values? Notably, why is kMinMTU a function of the transport
-// protocol's overhead rather than, say, what's needed to hold a minimally-sized
-// handshake fragment plus protocol overhead.
-
-// kMinMTU is the minimum acceptable MTU value.
-static const unsigned int kMinMTU = 256 - 28;
-
-// kDefaultMTU is the default MTU value to use if neither the user nor
-// the underlying BIO supplies one.
-static const unsigned int kDefaultMTU = 1500 - 28;
-
-
-// Receiving handshake messages.
-
-hm_fragment::~hm_fragment() {
-  OPENSSL_free(data);
-  OPENSSL_free(reassembly);
-}
-
-static UniquePtr<hm_fragment> dtls1_hm_fragment_new(
-    const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) {
-  ScopedCBB cbb;
-  UniquePtr<hm_fragment> frag = MakeUnique<hm_fragment>();
-  if (!frag) {
-    return nullptr;
-  }
-  frag->type = msg_hdr->type;
-  frag->seq = msg_hdr->seq;
-  frag->msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
-
-  // Allocate space for the reassembled message and fill in the header.
-  frag->data =
-      (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + msg_hdr->msg_len);
-  if (frag->data == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    return nullptr;
-  }
-
-  if (!CBB_init_fixed(cbb.get(), frag->data, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8(cbb.get(), msg_hdr->type) ||
-      !CBB_add_u24(cbb.get(), msg_hdr->msg_len) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16(cbb.get(), msg_hdr->seq) ||
-      !CBB_add_u24(cbb.get(), 0 /* frag_off */) ||
-      !CBB_add_u24(cbb.get(), msg_hdr->msg_len) ||
-      !CBB_finish(cbb.get(), NULL, NULL)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    return nullptr;
-  }
-
-  // If the handshake message is empty, |frag->reassembly| is NULL.
-  if (msg_hdr->msg_len > 0) {
-    // Initialize reassembly bitmask.
-    if (msg_hdr->msg_len + 7 < msg_hdr->msg_len) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
-      return nullptr;
-    }
-    size_t bitmask_len = (msg_hdr->msg_len + 7) / 8;
-    frag->reassembly = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(bitmask_len);
-    if (frag->reassembly == NULL) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-      return nullptr;
-    }
-    OPENSSL_memset(frag->reassembly, 0, bitmask_len);
-  }
-
-  return frag;
-}
-
-// bit_range returns a |uint8_t| with bits |start|, inclusive, to |end|,
-// exclusive, set.
-static uint8_t bit_range(size_t start, size_t end) {
-  return (uint8_t)(~((1u << start) - 1) & ((1u << end) - 1));
-}
-
-// dtls1_hm_fragment_mark marks bytes |start|, inclusive, to |end|, exclusive,
-// as received in |frag|. If |frag| becomes complete, it clears
-// |frag->reassembly|. The range must be within the bounds of |frag|'s message
-// and |frag->reassembly| must not be NULL.
-static void dtls1_hm_fragment_mark(hm_fragment *frag, size_t start,
-                                   size_t end) {
-  size_t msg_len = frag->msg_len;
-
-  if (frag->reassembly == NULL || start > end || end > msg_len) {
-    assert(0);
-    return;
-  }
-  // A zero-length message will never have a pending reassembly.
-  assert(msg_len > 0);
-
-  if (start == end) {
-    return;
-  }
-
-  if ((start >> 3) == (end >> 3)) {
-    frag->reassembly[start >> 3] |= bit_range(start & 7, end & 7);
-  } else {
-    frag->reassembly[start >> 3] |= bit_range(start & 7, 8);
-    for (size_t i = (start >> 3) + 1; i < (end >> 3); i++) {
-      frag->reassembly[i] = 0xff;
-    }
-    if ((end & 7) != 0) {
-      frag->reassembly[end >> 3] |= bit_range(0, end & 7);
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Check if the fragment is complete.
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < (msg_len >> 3); i++) {
-    if (frag->reassembly[i] != 0xff) {
-      return;
-    }
-  }
-  if ((msg_len & 7) != 0 &&
-      frag->reassembly[msg_len >> 3] != bit_range(0, msg_len & 7)) {
-    return;
-  }
-
-  OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
-  frag->reassembly = NULL;
-}
-
-// dtls1_is_current_message_complete returns whether the current handshake
-// message is complete.
-static bool dtls1_is_current_message_complete(const SSL *ssl) {
-  size_t idx = ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq % SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT;
-  hm_fragment *frag = ssl->d1->incoming_messages[idx].get();
-  return frag != NULL && frag->reassembly == NULL;
-}
-
-// dtls1_get_incoming_message returns the incoming message corresponding to
-// |msg_hdr|. If none exists, it creates a new one and inserts it in the
-// queue. Otherwise, it checks |msg_hdr| is consistent with the existing one. It
-// returns NULL on failure. The caller does not take ownership of the result.
-static hm_fragment *dtls1_get_incoming_message(
-    SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) {
-  if (msg_hdr->seq < ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
-      msg_hdr->seq - ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq >= SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT) {
-    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-    return NULL;
-  }
-
-  size_t idx = msg_hdr->seq % SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT;
-  hm_fragment *frag = ssl->d1->incoming_messages[idx].get();
-  if (frag != NULL) {
-    assert(frag->seq == msg_hdr->seq);
-    // The new fragment must be compatible with the previous fragments from this
-    // message.
-    if (frag->type != msg_hdr->type ||
-        frag->msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_FRAGMENT_MISMATCH);
-      *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-      return NULL;
-    }
-    return frag;
-  }
-
-  // This is the first fragment from this message.
-  ssl->d1->incoming_messages[idx] = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr);
-  if (!ssl->d1->incoming_messages[idx]) {
-    *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-    return NULL;
-  }
-  return ssl->d1->incoming_messages[idx].get();
-}
-
-ssl_open_record_t dtls1_open_handshake(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
-                                       uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in) {
-  uint8_t type;
-  Span<uint8_t> record;
-  auto ret = dtls_open_record(ssl, &type, &record, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
-  if (ret != ssl_open_record_success) {
-    return ret;
-  }
-
-  switch (type) {
-    case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
-      // Unencrypted application data records are always illegal.
-      if (ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher()) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-        return ssl_open_record_error;
-      }
-
-      // Out-of-order application data may be received between ChangeCipherSpec
-      // and finished. Discard it.
-      return ssl_open_record_discard;
-
-    case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
-      // We do not support renegotiation, so encrypted ChangeCipherSpec records
-      // are illegal.
-      if (!ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher()) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-        return ssl_open_record_error;
-      }
-
-      if (record.size() != 1u || record[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
-        *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-        return ssl_open_record_error;
-      }
-
-      // Flag the ChangeCipherSpec for later.
-      ssl->d1->has_change_cipher_spec = true;
-      ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
-                          record);
-      return ssl_open_record_success;
-
-    case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
-      // Break out to main processing.
-      break;
-
-    default:
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
-      *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-      return ssl_open_record_error;
-  }
-
-  CBS cbs;
-  CBS_init(&cbs, record.data(), record.size());
-  while (CBS_len(&cbs) > 0) {
-    // Read a handshake fragment.
-    struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
-    CBS body;
-    if (!dtls1_parse_fragment(&cbs, &msg_hdr, &body)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_RECORD);
-      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-      return ssl_open_record_error;
-    }
-
-    const size_t frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
-    const size_t frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
-    const size_t msg_len = msg_hdr.msg_len;
-    if (frag_off > msg_len || frag_off + frag_len < frag_off ||
-        frag_off + frag_len > msg_len ||
-        msg_len > ssl_max_handshake_message_len(ssl)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
-      *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-      return ssl_open_record_error;
-    }
-
-    // The encrypted epoch in DTLS has only one handshake message.
-    if (ssl->d1->r_epoch == 1 && msg_hdr.seq != ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
-      *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-      return ssl_open_record_error;
-    }
-
-    if (msg_hdr.seq < ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
-        msg_hdr.seq >
-            (unsigned)ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq + SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT) {
-      // Ignore fragments from the past, or ones too far in the future.
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    hm_fragment *frag = dtls1_get_incoming_message(ssl, out_alert, &msg_hdr);
-    if (frag == NULL) {
-      return ssl_open_record_error;
-    }
-    assert(frag->msg_len == msg_len);
-
-    if (frag->reassembly == NULL) {
-      // The message is already assembled.
-      continue;
-    }
-    assert(msg_len > 0);
-
-    // Copy the body into the fragment.
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(frag->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + frag_off,
-                   CBS_data(&body), CBS_len(&body));
-    dtls1_hm_fragment_mark(frag, frag_off, frag_off + frag_len);
-  }
-
-  return ssl_open_record_success;
-}
-
-bool dtls1_get_message(const SSL *ssl, SSLMessage *out) {
-  if (!dtls1_is_current_message_complete(ssl)) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  size_t idx = ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq % SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT;
-  hm_fragment *frag = ssl->d1->incoming_messages[idx].get();
-  out->type = frag->type;
-  CBS_init(&out->body, frag->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, frag->msg_len);
-  CBS_init(&out->raw, frag->data, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + frag->msg_len);
-  out->is_v2_hello = false;
-  if (!ssl->s3->has_message) {
-    ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, out->raw);
-    ssl->s3->has_message = true;
-  }
-  return true;
-}
-
-void dtls1_next_message(SSL *ssl) {
-  assert(ssl->s3->has_message);
-  assert(dtls1_is_current_message_complete(ssl));
-  size_t index = ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq % SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT;
-  ssl->d1->incoming_messages[index].reset();
-  ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
-  ssl->s3->has_message = false;
-  // If we previously sent a flight, mark it as having a reply, so
-  // |on_handshake_complete| can manage post-handshake retransmission.
-  if (ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_complete) {
-    ssl->d1->flight_has_reply = true;
-  }
-}
-
-bool dtls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data(const SSL *ssl) {
-  if (ssl->d1->has_change_cipher_spec) {
-    return true;
-  }
-
-  size_t current = ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq % SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT;
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT; i++) {
-    // Skip the current message.
-    if (ssl->s3->has_message && i == current) {
-      assert(dtls1_is_current_message_complete(ssl));
-      continue;
-    }
-    if (ssl->d1->incoming_messages[i] != nullptr) {
-      return true;
-    }
-  }
-  return false;
-}
-
-bool dtls1_parse_fragment(CBS *cbs, struct hm_header_st *out_hdr,
-                          CBS *out_body) {
-  OPENSSL_memset(out_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
-
-  if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &out_hdr->type) ||
-      !CBS_get_u24(cbs, &out_hdr->msg_len) ||
-      !CBS_get_u16(cbs, &out_hdr->seq) ||
-      !CBS_get_u24(cbs, &out_hdr->frag_off) ||
-      !CBS_get_u24(cbs, &out_hdr->frag_len) ||
-      !CBS_get_bytes(cbs, out_body, out_hdr->frag_len)) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  return true;
-}
-
-ssl_open_record_t dtls1_open_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
-                                                uint8_t *out_alert,
-                                                Span<uint8_t> in) {
-  if (!ssl->d1->has_change_cipher_spec) {
-    // dtls1_open_handshake processes both handshake and ChangeCipherSpec.
-    auto ret = dtls1_open_handshake(ssl, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
-    if (ret != ssl_open_record_success) {
-      return ret;
-    }
-  }
-  if (ssl->d1->has_change_cipher_spec) {
-    ssl->d1->has_change_cipher_spec = false;
-    return ssl_open_record_success;
-  }
-  return ssl_open_record_discard;
-}
-
-
-// Sending handshake messages.
-
-void DTLS_OUTGOING_MESSAGE::Clear() {
-  OPENSSL_free(data);
-  data = nullptr;
-}
-
-void dtls_clear_outgoing_messages(SSL *ssl) {
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len; i++) {
-    ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[i].Clear();
-  }
-  ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len = 0;
-  ssl->d1->outgoing_written = 0;
-  ssl->d1->outgoing_offset = 0;
-  ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_complete = false;
-  ssl->d1->flight_has_reply = false;
-}
-
-bool dtls1_init_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type) {
-  // Pick a modest size hint to save most of the |realloc| calls.
-  if (!CBB_init(cbb, 64) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8(cbb, type) ||
-      !CBB_add_u24(cbb, 0 /* length (filled in later) */) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16(cbb, ssl->d1->handshake_write_seq) ||
-      !CBB_add_u24(cbb, 0 /* offset */) ||
-      !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, body)) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  return true;
-}
-
-bool dtls1_finish_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, Array<uint8_t> *out_msg) {
-  if (!CBBFinishArray(cbb, out_msg) ||
-      out_msg->size() < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  // Fix up the header. Copy the fragment length into the total message
-  // length.
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_msg->data() + 1,
-                 out_msg->data() + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 3, 3);
-  return true;
-}
-
-// ssl_size_t_greater_than_32_bits returns whether |v| exceeds the bounds of a
-// 32-bit value. The obvious thing doesn't work because, in some 32-bit build
-// configurations, the compiler warns that the test is always false and breaks
-// the build.
-static bool ssl_size_t_greater_than_32_bits(size_t v) {
-#if defined(OPENSSL_64_BIT)
-  return v > 0xffffffff;
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_32_BIT)
-  return false;
-#else
-#error "Building for neither 32- nor 64-bits."
-#endif
-}
-
-// add_outgoing adds a new handshake message or ChangeCipherSpec to the current
-// outgoing flight. It returns true on success and false on error.
-static bool add_outgoing(SSL *ssl, bool is_ccs, Array<uint8_t> data) {
-  if (ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_complete) {
-    // If we've begun writing a new flight, we received the peer flight. Discard
-    // the timer and the our flight.
-    dtls1_stop_timer(ssl);
-    dtls_clear_outgoing_messages(ssl);
-  }
-
-  static_assert(SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT <
-                    (1 << 8 * sizeof(ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len)),
-                "outgoing_messages_len is too small");
-  if (ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len >= SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT ||
-      ssl_size_t_greater_than_32_bits(data.size())) {
-    assert(false);
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  if (!is_ccs) {
-    // TODO(svaldez): Move this up a layer to fix abstraction for SSLTranscript
-    // on hs.
-    if (ssl->s3->hs != NULL &&
-        !ssl->s3->hs->transcript.Update(data)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return false;
-    }
-    ssl->d1->handshake_write_seq++;
-  }
-
-  DTLS_OUTGOING_MESSAGE *msg =
-      &ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len];
-  size_t len;
-  data.Release(&msg->data, &len);
-  msg->len = len;
-  msg->epoch = ssl->d1->w_epoch;
-  msg->is_ccs = is_ccs;
-
-  ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len++;
-  return true;
-}
-
-bool dtls1_add_message(SSL *ssl, Array<uint8_t> data) {
-  return add_outgoing(ssl, false /* handshake */, std::move(data));
-}
-
-bool dtls1_add_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) {
-  return add_outgoing(ssl, true /* ChangeCipherSpec */, Array<uint8_t>());
-}
-
-// dtls1_update_mtu updates the current MTU from the BIO, ensuring it is above
-// the minimum.
-static void dtls1_update_mtu(SSL *ssl) {
-  // TODO(davidben): No consumer implements |BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU| and the
-  // only |BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU| implementation could use
-  // |SSL_set_mtu|. Does this need to be so complex?
-  if (ssl->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu() &&
-      !(SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
-    long mtu = BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio.get(), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
-    if (mtu >= 0 && mtu <= (1 << 30) && (unsigned)mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu()) {
-      ssl->d1->mtu = (unsigned)mtu;
-    } else {
-      ssl->d1->mtu = kDefaultMTU;
-      BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio.get(), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU, ssl->d1->mtu, NULL);
-    }
-  }
-
-  // The MTU should be above the minimum now.
-  assert(ssl->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu());
-}
-
-enum seal_result_t {
-  seal_error,
-  seal_no_progress,
-  seal_partial,
-  seal_success,
-};
-
-// seal_next_message seals |msg|, which must be the next message, to |out|. If
-// progress was made, it returns |seal_partial| or |seal_success| and sets
-// |*out_len| to the number of bytes written.
-static enum seal_result_t seal_next_message(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out,
-                                            size_t *out_len, size_t max_out,
-                                            const DTLS_OUTGOING_MESSAGE *msg) {
-  assert(ssl->d1->outgoing_written < ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len);
-  assert(msg == &ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[ssl->d1->outgoing_written]);
-
-  enum dtls1_use_epoch_t use_epoch = dtls1_use_current_epoch;
-  if (ssl->d1->w_epoch >= 1 && msg->epoch == ssl->d1->w_epoch - 1) {
-    use_epoch = dtls1_use_previous_epoch;
-  } else if (msg->epoch != ssl->d1->w_epoch) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return seal_error;
-  }
-
-  size_t overhead = dtls_max_seal_overhead(ssl, use_epoch);
-  size_t prefix = dtls_seal_prefix_len(ssl, use_epoch);
-
-  if (msg->is_ccs) {
-    // Check there is room for the ChangeCipherSpec.
-    static const uint8_t kChangeCipherSpec[1] = {SSL3_MT_CCS};
-    if (max_out < sizeof(kChangeCipherSpec) + overhead) {
-      return seal_no_progress;
-    }
-
-    if (!dtls_seal_record(ssl, out, out_len, max_out,
-                          SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, kChangeCipherSpec,
-                          sizeof(kChangeCipherSpec), use_epoch)) {
-      return seal_error;
-    }
-
-    ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
-                        kChangeCipherSpec);
-    return seal_success;
-  }
-
-  // DTLS messages are serialized as a single fragment in |msg|.
-  CBS cbs, body;
-  struct hm_header_st hdr;
-  CBS_init(&cbs, msg->data, msg->len);
-  if (!dtls1_parse_fragment(&cbs, &hdr, &body) ||
-      hdr.frag_off != 0 ||
-      hdr.frag_len != CBS_len(&body) ||
-      hdr.msg_len != CBS_len(&body) ||
-      !CBS_skip(&body, ssl->d1->outgoing_offset) ||
-      CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return seal_error;
-  }
-
-  // Determine how much progress can be made.
-  if (max_out < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 1 + overhead || max_out < prefix) {
-    return seal_no_progress;
-  }
-  size_t todo = CBS_len(&body);
-  if (todo > max_out - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - overhead) {
-    todo = max_out - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - overhead;
-  }
-
-  // Assemble a fragment, to be sealed in-place.
-  ScopedCBB cbb;
-  uint8_t *frag = out + prefix;
-  size_t max_frag = max_out - prefix, frag_len;
-  if (!CBB_init_fixed(cbb.get(), frag, max_frag) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8(cbb.get(), hdr.type) ||
-      !CBB_add_u24(cbb.get(), hdr.msg_len) ||
-      !CBB_add_u16(cbb.get(), hdr.seq) ||
-      !CBB_add_u24(cbb.get(), ssl->d1->outgoing_offset) ||
-      !CBB_add_u24(cbb.get(), todo) ||
-      !CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(), CBS_data(&body), todo) ||
-      !CBB_finish(cbb.get(), NULL, &frag_len)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-    return seal_error;
-  }
-
-  ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
-                      MakeSpan(frag, frag_len));
-
-  if (!dtls_seal_record(ssl, out, out_len, max_out, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
-                        out + prefix, frag_len, use_epoch)) {
-    return seal_error;
-  }
-
-  if (todo == CBS_len(&body)) {
-    // The next message is complete.
-    ssl->d1->outgoing_offset = 0;
-    return seal_success;
-  }
-
-  ssl->d1->outgoing_offset += todo;
-  return seal_partial;
-}
-
-// seal_next_packet writes as much of the next flight as possible to |out| and
-// advances |ssl->d1->outgoing_written| and |ssl->d1->outgoing_offset| as
-// appropriate.
-static bool seal_next_packet(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
-                             size_t max_out) {
-  bool made_progress = false;
-  size_t total = 0;
-  assert(ssl->d1->outgoing_written < ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len);
-  for (; ssl->d1->outgoing_written < ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len;
-       ssl->d1->outgoing_written++) {
-    const DTLS_OUTGOING_MESSAGE *msg =
-        &ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[ssl->d1->outgoing_written];
-    size_t len;
-    enum seal_result_t ret = seal_next_message(ssl, out, &len, max_out, msg);
-    switch (ret) {
-      case seal_error:
-        return false;
-
-      case seal_no_progress:
-        goto packet_full;
-
-      case seal_partial:
-      case seal_success:
-        out += len;
-        max_out -= len;
-        total += len;
-        made_progress = true;
-
-        if (ret == seal_partial) {
-          goto packet_full;
-        }
-        break;
-    }
-  }
-
-packet_full:
-  // The MTU was too small to make any progress.
-  if (!made_progress) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MTU_TOO_SMALL);
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  *out_len = total;
-  return true;
-}
-
-static int send_flight(SSL *ssl) {
-  if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  dtls1_update_mtu(ssl);
-
-  int ret = -1;
-  uint8_t *packet = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(ssl->d1->mtu);
-  if (packet == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  while (ssl->d1->outgoing_written < ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len) {
-    uint8_t old_written = ssl->d1->outgoing_written;
-    uint32_t old_offset = ssl->d1->outgoing_offset;
-
-    size_t packet_len;
-    if (!seal_next_packet(ssl, packet, &packet_len, ssl->d1->mtu)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    int bio_ret = BIO_write(ssl->wbio.get(), packet, packet_len);
-    if (bio_ret <= 0) {
-      // Retry this packet the next time around.
-      ssl->d1->outgoing_written = old_written;
-      ssl->d1->outgoing_offset = old_offset;
-      ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE;
-      ret = bio_ret;
-      goto err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (BIO_flush(ssl->wbio.get()) <= 0) {
-    ssl->s3->rwstate = SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE;
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  OPENSSL_free(packet);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-int dtls1_flush_flight(SSL *ssl) {
-  ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_complete = true;
-  // Start the retransmission timer for the next flight (if any).
-  dtls1_start_timer(ssl);
-  return send_flight(ssl);
-}
-
-int dtls1_retransmit_outgoing_messages(SSL *ssl) {
-  // Rewind to the start of the flight and write it again.
-  //
-  // TODO(davidben): This does not allow retransmits to be resumed on
-  // non-blocking write.
-  ssl->d1->outgoing_written = 0;
-  ssl->d1->outgoing_offset = 0;
-
-  return send_flight(ssl);
-}
-
-unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void) {
-  return kMinMTU;
-}
-
-BSSL_NAMESPACE_END