grpc 1.26.0 → 1.30.0

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/cipher_extra/derive_key.c

@@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
-
-#include <openssl/cipher.h>
-
-#include <assert.h>
-
-#include <openssl/digest.h>
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-
-
-#define PKCS5_SALT_LEN 8
-
-int EVP_BytesToKey(const EVP_CIPHER *type, const EVP_MD *md,
-                   const uint8_t *salt, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len,
-                   unsigned count, uint8_t *key, uint8_t *iv) {
-  EVP_MD_CTX c;
-  uint8_t md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-  unsigned niv, nkey, addmd = 0;
-  unsigned mds = 0, i;
-  int rv = 0;
-
-  nkey = type->key_len;
-  niv = type->iv_len;
-
-  assert(nkey <= EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH);
-  assert(niv <= EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
-
-  if (data == NULL) {
-    return nkey;
-  }
-
-  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c);
-  for (;;) {
-    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c, md, NULL)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-    if (addmd++) {
-      if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, md_buf, mds)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    }
-    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, data, data_len)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    if (salt != NULL) {
-      if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, salt, PKCS5_SALT_LEN)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    }
-    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, md_buf, &mds)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-
-    for (i = 1; i < count; i++) {
-      if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c, md, NULL) ||
-          !EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, md_buf, mds) ||
-          !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, md_buf, &mds)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    }
-
-    i = 0;
-    if (nkey) {
-      for (;;) {
-        if (nkey == 0 || i == mds) {
-          break;
-        }
-        if (key != NULL) {
-          *(key++) = md_buf[i];
-        }
-        nkey--;
-        i++;
-      }
-    }
-
-    if (niv && i != mds) {
-      for (;;) {
-        if (niv == 0 || i == mds) {
-          break;
-        }
-        if (iv != NULL) {
-          *(iv++) = md_buf[i];
-        }
-        niv--;
-        i++;
-      }
-    }
-    if (nkey == 0 && niv == 0) {
-      break;
-    }
-  }
-  rv = type->key_len;
-
-err:
-  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
-  OPENSSL_cleanse(md_buf, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
-  return rv;
-}

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/cipher_extra/e_aesgcmsiv.c

@@ -1,883 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2017, Google Inc.
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
- * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
- * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
- * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
-
-#include <openssl/aead.h>
-
-#include <assert.h>
-
-#include <openssl/cipher.h>
-#include <openssl/cpu.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-
-#include "../fipsmodule/cipher/internal.h"
-
-
-#define EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_NONCE_LEN 12
-#define EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN 16
-
-// TODO(davidben): AES-GCM-SIV assembly is not correct for Windows. It must save
-// and restore xmm6 through xmm15.
-#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && \
-    !defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
-#define AES_GCM_SIV_ASM
-
-// Optimised AES-GCM-SIV
-
-struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_ctx {
-  alignas(16) uint8_t key[16*15];
-  int is_128_bit;
-};
-
-// The assembly code assumes 8-byte alignment of the EVP_AEAD_CTX's state, and
-// aligns to 16 bytes itself.
-OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) + 8 >=
-                          sizeof(struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_ctx),
-                      "AEAD state is too small");
-#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
-OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >= 8,
-                      "AEAD state has insufficient alignment");
-#endif
-
-// asm_ctx_from_ctx returns a 16-byte aligned context pointer from |ctx|.
-static struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_ctx *asm_ctx_from_ctx(
-    const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {
-  // ctx->state must already be 8-byte aligned. Thus, at most, we may need to
-  // add eight to align it to 16 bytes.
-  const uintptr_t offset = ((uintptr_t)&ctx->state) & 8;
-  return (struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_ctx *)(&ctx->state.opaque[offset]);
-}
-
-// aes128gcmsiv_aes_ks writes an AES-128 key schedule for |key| to
-// |out_expanded_key|.
-extern void aes128gcmsiv_aes_ks(
-    const uint8_t key[16], uint8_t out_expanded_key[16*15]);
-
-// aes256gcmsiv_aes_ks writes an AES-256 key schedule for |key| to
-// |out_expanded_key|.
-extern void aes256gcmsiv_aes_ks(
-    const uint8_t key[32], uint8_t out_expanded_key[16*15]);
-
-static int aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
-                                     size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) {
-  const size_t key_bits = key_len * 8;
-
-  if (key_bits != 128 && key_bits != 256) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_KEY_LENGTH);
-    return 0;  // EVP_AEAD_CTX_init should catch this.
-  }
-
-  if (tag_len == EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH) {
-    tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN;
-  }
-
-  if (tag_len != EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TAG_TOO_LARGE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_ctx *gcm_siv_ctx = asm_ctx_from_ctx(ctx);
-  assert((((uintptr_t)gcm_siv_ctx) & 15) == 0);
-
-  if (key_bits == 128) {
-    aes128gcmsiv_aes_ks(key, &gcm_siv_ctx->key[0]);
-    gcm_siv_ctx->is_128_bit = 1;
-  } else {
-    aes256gcmsiv_aes_ks(key, &gcm_siv_ctx->key[0]);
-    gcm_siv_ctx->is_128_bit = 0;
-  }
-
-  ctx->tag_len = tag_len;
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static void aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {}
-
-// aesgcmsiv_polyval_horner updates the POLYVAL value in |in_out_poly| to
-// include a number (|in_blocks|) of 16-byte blocks of data from |in|, given
-// the POLYVAL key in |key|.
-extern void aesgcmsiv_polyval_horner(const uint8_t in_out_poly[16],
-                                     const uint8_t key[16], const uint8_t *in,
-                                     size_t in_blocks);
-
-// aesgcmsiv_htable_init writes powers 1..8 of |auth_key| to |out_htable|.
-extern void aesgcmsiv_htable_init(uint8_t out_htable[16 * 8],
-                                  const uint8_t auth_key[16]);
-
-// aesgcmsiv_htable6_init writes powers 1..6 of |auth_key| to |out_htable|.
-extern void aesgcmsiv_htable6_init(uint8_t out_htable[16 * 6],
-                                   const uint8_t auth_key[16]);
-
-// aesgcmsiv_htable_polyval updates the POLYVAL value in |in_out_poly| to
-// include |in_len| bytes of data from |in|. (Where |in_len| must be a multiple
-// of 16.) It uses the precomputed powers of the key given in |htable|.
-extern void aesgcmsiv_htable_polyval(const uint8_t htable[16 * 8],
-                                     const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
-                                     uint8_t in_out_poly[16]);
-
-// aes128gcmsiv_dec decrypts |in_len| & ~15 bytes from |out| and writes them to
-// |in|. (The full value of |in_len| is still used to find the authentication
-// tag appended to the ciphertext, however, so must not be pre-masked.)
-//
-// |in| and |out| may be equal, but must not otherwise overlap.
-//
-// While decrypting, it updates the POLYVAL value found at the beginning of
-// |in_out_calculated_tag_and_scratch| and writes the updated value back before
-// return. During executation, it may use the whole of this space for other
-// purposes. In order to decrypt and update the POLYVAL value, it uses the
-// expanded key from |key| and the table of powers in |htable|.
-extern void aes128gcmsiv_dec(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out,
-                             uint8_t in_out_calculated_tag_and_scratch[16 * 8],
-                             const uint8_t htable[16 * 6],
-                             const struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_ctx *key,
-                             size_t in_len);
-
-// aes256gcmsiv_dec acts like |aes128gcmsiv_dec|, but for AES-256.
-extern void aes256gcmsiv_dec(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out,
-                             uint8_t in_out_calculated_tag_and_scratch[16 * 8],
-                             const uint8_t htable[16 * 6],
-                             const struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_ctx *key,
-                             size_t in_len);
-
-// aes128gcmsiv_kdf performs the AES-GCM-SIV KDF given the expanded key from
-// |key_schedule| and the nonce in |nonce|. Note that, while only 12 bytes of
-// the nonce are used, 16 bytes are read and so the value must be
-// right-padded.
-extern void aes128gcmsiv_kdf(const uint8_t nonce[16],
-                             uint64_t out_key_material[8],
-                             const uint8_t *key_schedule);
-
-// aes256gcmsiv_kdf acts like |aes128gcmsiv_kdf|, but for AES-256.
-extern void aes256gcmsiv_kdf(const uint8_t nonce[16],
-                             uint64_t out_key_material[12],
-                             const uint8_t *key_schedule);
-
-// aes128gcmsiv_aes_ks_enc_x1 performs a key expansion of the AES-128 key in
-// |key|, writes the expanded key to |out_expanded_key| and encrypts a single
-// block from |in| to |out|.
-extern void aes128gcmsiv_aes_ks_enc_x1(const uint8_t in[16], uint8_t out[16],
-                                       uint8_t out_expanded_key[16 * 15],
-                                       const uint64_t key[2]);
-
-// aes256gcmsiv_aes_ks_enc_x1 acts like |aes128gcmsiv_aes_ks_enc_x1|, but for
-// AES-256.
-extern void aes256gcmsiv_aes_ks_enc_x1(const uint8_t in[16], uint8_t out[16],
-                                       uint8_t out_expanded_key[16 * 15],
-                                       const uint64_t key[4]);
-
-// aes128gcmsiv_ecb_enc_block encrypts a single block from |in| to |out| using
-// the expanded key in |expanded_key|.
-extern void aes128gcmsiv_ecb_enc_block(
-    const uint8_t in[16], uint8_t out[16],
-    const struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_ctx *expanded_key);
-
-// aes256gcmsiv_ecb_enc_block acts like |aes128gcmsiv_ecb_enc_block|, but for
-// AES-256.
-extern void aes256gcmsiv_ecb_enc_block(
-    const uint8_t in[16], uint8_t out[16],
-    const struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_ctx *expanded_key);
-
-// aes128gcmsiv_enc_msg_x4 encrypts |in_len| bytes from |in| to |out| using the
-// expanded key from |key|. (The value of |in_len| must be a multiple of 16.)
-// The |in| and |out| buffers may be equal but must not otherwise overlap. The
-// initial counter is constructed from the given |tag| as required by
-// AES-GCM-SIV.
-extern void aes128gcmsiv_enc_msg_x4(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out,
-                                    const uint8_t *tag,
-                                    const struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_ctx *key,
-                                    size_t in_len);
-
-// aes256gcmsiv_enc_msg_x4 acts like |aes128gcmsiv_enc_msg_x4|, but for
-// AES-256.
-extern void aes256gcmsiv_enc_msg_x4(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out,
-                                    const uint8_t *tag,
-                                    const struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_ctx *key,
-                                    size_t in_len);
-
-// aes128gcmsiv_enc_msg_x8 acts like |aes128gcmsiv_enc_msg_x4|, but is
-// optimised for longer messages.
-extern void aes128gcmsiv_enc_msg_x8(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out,
-                                    const uint8_t *tag,
-                                    const struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_ctx *key,
-                                    size_t in_len);
-
-// aes256gcmsiv_enc_msg_x8 acts like |aes256gcmsiv_enc_msg_x4|, but is
-// optimised for longer messages.
-extern void aes256gcmsiv_enc_msg_x8(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out,
-                                    const uint8_t *tag,
-                                    const struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_ctx *key,
-                                    size_t in_len);
-
-// gcm_siv_asm_polyval evaluates POLYVAL at |auth_key| on the given plaintext
-// and AD. The result is written to |out_tag|.
-static void gcm_siv_asm_polyval(uint8_t out_tag[16], const uint8_t *in,
-                                size_t in_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len,
-                                const uint8_t auth_key[16],
-                                const uint8_t nonce[12]) {
-  OPENSSL_memset(out_tag, 0, 16);
-  const size_t ad_blocks = ad_len / 16;
-  const size_t in_blocks = in_len / 16;
-  int htable_init = 0;
-  alignas(16) uint8_t htable[16*8];
-
-  if (ad_blocks > 8 || in_blocks > 8) {
-    htable_init = 1;
-    aesgcmsiv_htable_init(htable, auth_key);
-  }
-
-  if (htable_init) {
-    aesgcmsiv_htable_polyval(htable, ad, ad_len & ~15, out_tag);
-  } else {
-    aesgcmsiv_polyval_horner(out_tag, auth_key, ad, ad_blocks);
-  }
-
-  uint8_t scratch[16];
-  if (ad_len & 15) {
-    OPENSSL_memset(scratch, 0, sizeof(scratch));
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(scratch, &ad[ad_len & ~15], ad_len & 15);
-    aesgcmsiv_polyval_horner(out_tag, auth_key, scratch, 1);
-  }
-
-  if (htable_init) {
-    aesgcmsiv_htable_polyval(htable, in, in_len & ~15, out_tag);
-  } else {
-    aesgcmsiv_polyval_horner(out_tag, auth_key, in, in_blocks);
-  }
-
-  if (in_len & 15) {
-    OPENSSL_memset(scratch, 0, sizeof(scratch));
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(scratch, &in[in_len & ~15], in_len & 15);
-    aesgcmsiv_polyval_horner(out_tag, auth_key, scratch, 1);
-  }
-
-  union {
-    uint8_t c[16];
-    struct {
-      uint64_t ad;
-      uint64_t in;
-    } bitlens;
-  } length_block;
-
-  length_block.bitlens.ad = ad_len * 8;
-  length_block.bitlens.in = in_len * 8;
-  aesgcmsiv_polyval_horner(out_tag, auth_key, length_block.c, 1);
-
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < 12; i++) {
-    out_tag[i] ^= nonce[i];
-  }
-
-  out_tag[15] &= 0x7f;
-}
-
-// aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_crypt_last_block handles the encryption/decryption
-// (same thing in CTR mode) of the final block of a plaintext/ciphertext. It
-// writes |in_len| & 15 bytes to |out| + |in_len|, based on an initial counter
-// derived from |tag|.
-static void aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_crypt_last_block(
-    int is_128_bit, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
-    const uint8_t tag[16],
-    const struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_ctx *enc_key_expanded) {
-  alignas(16) union {
-    uint8_t c[16];
-    uint32_t u32[4];
-  } counter;
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(&counter, tag, sizeof(counter));
-  counter.c[15] |= 0x80;
-  counter.u32[0] += in_len / 16;
-
-  if (is_128_bit) {
-    aes128gcmsiv_ecb_enc_block(&counter.c[0], &counter.c[0], enc_key_expanded);
-  } else {
-    aes256gcmsiv_ecb_enc_block(&counter.c[0], &counter.c[0], enc_key_expanded);
-  }
-
-  const size_t last_bytes_offset = in_len & ~15;
-  const size_t last_bytes_len = in_len & 15;
-  uint8_t *last_bytes_out = &out[last_bytes_offset];
-  const uint8_t *last_bytes_in = &in[last_bytes_offset];
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < last_bytes_len; i++) {
-    last_bytes_out[i] = last_bytes_in[i] ^ counter.c[i];
-  }
-}
-
-// aead_aes_gcm_siv_kdf calculates the record encryption and authentication
-// keys given the |nonce|.
-static void aead_aes_gcm_siv_kdf(
-    int is_128_bit, const struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_ctx *gcm_siv_ctx,
-    uint64_t out_record_auth_key[2], uint64_t out_record_enc_key[4],
-    const uint8_t nonce[12]) {
-  alignas(16) uint8_t padded_nonce[16];
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(padded_nonce, nonce, 12);
-
-  alignas(16) uint64_t key_material[12];
-  if (is_128_bit) {
-    aes128gcmsiv_kdf(padded_nonce, key_material, &gcm_siv_ctx->key[0]);
-    out_record_enc_key[0] = key_material[4];
-    out_record_enc_key[1] = key_material[6];
-  } else {
-    aes256gcmsiv_kdf(padded_nonce, key_material, &gcm_siv_ctx->key[0]);
-    out_record_enc_key[0] = key_material[4];
-    out_record_enc_key[1] = key_material[6];
-    out_record_enc_key[2] = key_material[8];
-    out_record_enc_key[3] = key_material[10];
-  }
-
-  out_record_auth_key[0] = key_material[0];
-  out_record_auth_key[1] = key_material[2];
-}
-
-static int aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_seal_scatter(
-    const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag,
-    size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len, const uint8_t *nonce,
-    size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *extra_in,
-    size_t extra_in_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
-  const struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_ctx *gcm_siv_ctx = asm_ctx_from_ctx(ctx);
-  const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
-  const uint64_t ad_len_64 = ad_len;
-
-  if (in_len_64 > (UINT64_C(1) << 36) ||
-      ad_len_64 >= (UINT64_C(1) << 61)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (max_out_tag_len < EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_NONCE_LEN) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  alignas(16) uint64_t record_auth_key[2];
-  alignas(16) uint64_t record_enc_key[4];
-  aead_aes_gcm_siv_kdf(gcm_siv_ctx->is_128_bit, gcm_siv_ctx, record_auth_key,
-                       record_enc_key, nonce);
-
-  alignas(16) uint8_t tag[16] = {0};
-  gcm_siv_asm_polyval(tag, in, in_len, ad, ad_len,
-                      (const uint8_t *)record_auth_key, nonce);
-
-  struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_ctx enc_key_expanded;
-
-  if (gcm_siv_ctx->is_128_bit) {
-    aes128gcmsiv_aes_ks_enc_x1(tag, tag, &enc_key_expanded.key[0],
-                               record_enc_key);
-
-    if (in_len < 128) {
-      aes128gcmsiv_enc_msg_x4(in, out, tag, &enc_key_expanded, in_len & ~15);
-    } else {
-      aes128gcmsiv_enc_msg_x8(in, out, tag, &enc_key_expanded, in_len & ~15);
-    }
-  } else {
-    aes256gcmsiv_aes_ks_enc_x1(tag, tag, &enc_key_expanded.key[0],
-                               record_enc_key);
-
-    if (in_len < 128) {
-      aes256gcmsiv_enc_msg_x4(in, out, tag, &enc_key_expanded, in_len & ~15);
-    } else {
-      aes256gcmsiv_enc_msg_x8(in, out, tag, &enc_key_expanded, in_len & ~15);
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (in_len & 15) {
-    aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_crypt_last_block(gcm_siv_ctx->is_128_bit, out, in,
-                                          in_len, tag, &enc_key_expanded);
-  }
-
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_tag, tag, sizeof(tag));
-  *out_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN;
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-// TODO(martinkr): Add aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_open_gather. N.B. aes128gcmsiv_dec
-// expects ciphertext and tag in a contiguous buffer.
-
-static int aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
-                                     size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
-                                     const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
-                                     const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
-                                     const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
-  const uint64_t ad_len_64 = ad_len;
-  if (ad_len_64 >= (UINT64_C(1) << 61)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
-  if (in_len < EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN ||
-      in_len_64 > (UINT64_C(1) << 36) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_NONCE_LEN) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  const struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_ctx *gcm_siv_ctx = asm_ctx_from_ctx(ctx);
-  const size_t plaintext_len = in_len - EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN;
-  const uint8_t *const given_tag = in + plaintext_len;
-
-  if (max_out_len < plaintext_len) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  alignas(16) uint64_t record_auth_key[2];
-  alignas(16) uint64_t record_enc_key[4];
-  aead_aes_gcm_siv_kdf(gcm_siv_ctx->is_128_bit, gcm_siv_ctx, record_auth_key,
-                       record_enc_key, nonce);
-
-  struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_ctx expanded_key;
-  if (gcm_siv_ctx->is_128_bit) {
-    aes128gcmsiv_aes_ks((const uint8_t *) record_enc_key, &expanded_key.key[0]);
-  } else {
-    aes256gcmsiv_aes_ks((const uint8_t *) record_enc_key, &expanded_key.key[0]);
-  }
-  // calculated_tag is 16*8 bytes, rather than 16 bytes, because
-  // aes[128|256]gcmsiv_dec uses the extra as scratch space.
-  alignas(16) uint8_t calculated_tag[16 * 8] = {0};
-
-  OPENSSL_memset(calculated_tag, 0, EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN);
-  const size_t ad_blocks = ad_len / 16;
-  aesgcmsiv_polyval_horner(calculated_tag, (const uint8_t *)record_auth_key, ad,
-                           ad_blocks);
-
-  uint8_t scratch[16];
-  if (ad_len & 15) {
-    OPENSSL_memset(scratch, 0, sizeof(scratch));
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(scratch, &ad[ad_len & ~15], ad_len & 15);
-    aesgcmsiv_polyval_horner(calculated_tag, (const uint8_t *)record_auth_key,
-                             scratch, 1);
-  }
-
-  alignas(16) uint8_t htable[16 * 6];
-  aesgcmsiv_htable6_init(htable, (const uint8_t *)record_auth_key);
-
-  if (gcm_siv_ctx->is_128_bit) {
-    aes128gcmsiv_dec(in, out, calculated_tag, htable, &expanded_key,
-                     plaintext_len);
-  } else {
-    aes256gcmsiv_dec(in, out, calculated_tag, htable, &expanded_key,
-                     plaintext_len);
-  }
-
-  if (plaintext_len & 15) {
-    aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_crypt_last_block(gcm_siv_ctx->is_128_bit, out, in,
-                                          plaintext_len, given_tag,
-                                          &expanded_key);
-    OPENSSL_memset(scratch, 0, sizeof(scratch));
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(scratch, out + (plaintext_len & ~15), plaintext_len & 15);
-    aesgcmsiv_polyval_horner(calculated_tag, (const uint8_t *)record_auth_key,
-                             scratch, 1);
-  }
-
-  union {
-    uint8_t c[16];
-    struct {
-      uint64_t ad;
-      uint64_t in;
-    } bitlens;
-  } length_block;
-
-  length_block.bitlens.ad = ad_len * 8;
-  length_block.bitlens.in = plaintext_len * 8;
-  aesgcmsiv_polyval_horner(calculated_tag, (const uint8_t *)record_auth_key,
-                           length_block.c, 1);
-
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < 12; i++) {
-    calculated_tag[i] ^= nonce[i];
-  }
-
-  calculated_tag[15] &= 0x7f;
-
-  if (gcm_siv_ctx->is_128_bit) {
-    aes128gcmsiv_ecb_enc_block(calculated_tag, calculated_tag, &expanded_key);
-  } else {
-    aes256gcmsiv_ecb_enc_block(calculated_tag, calculated_tag, &expanded_key);
-  }
-
-  if (CRYPTO_memcmp(calculated_tag, given_tag, EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN) !=
-      0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  *out_len = in_len - EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN;
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_gcm_siv_asm = {
-    16,                              // key length
-    EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_NONCE_LEN,  // nonce length
-    EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN,    // overhead
-    EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN,    // max tag length
-    0,                               // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in
-
-    aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_init,
-    NULL /* init_with_direction */,
-    aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_cleanup,
-    aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_open,
-    aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_seal_scatter,
-    NULL /* open_gather */,
-    NULL /* get_iv */,
-    NULL /* tag_len */,
-};
-
-static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_gcm_siv_asm = {
-    32,                              // key length
-    EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_NONCE_LEN,  // nonce length
-    EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN,    // overhead
-    EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN,    // max tag length
-    0,                               // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in
-
-    aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_init,
-    NULL /* init_with_direction */,
-    aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_cleanup,
-    aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_open,
-    aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_seal_scatter,
-    NULL /* open_gather */,
-    NULL /* get_iv */,
-    NULL /* tag_len */,
-};
-
-#endif  // X86_64 && !NO_ASM && !WINDOWS
-
-struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_ctx {
-  union {
-    double align;
-    AES_KEY ks;
-  } ks;
-  block128_f kgk_block;
-  unsigned is_256:1;
-};
-
-OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
-                          sizeof(struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_ctx),
-                      "AEAD state is too small");
-#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
-OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
-                          alignof(struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_ctx),
-                      "AEAD state has insufficient alignment");
-#endif
-
-static int aead_aes_gcm_siv_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
-                                 size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) {
-  const size_t key_bits = key_len * 8;
-
-  if (key_bits != 128 && key_bits != 256) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_KEY_LENGTH);
-    return 0;  // EVP_AEAD_CTX_init should catch this.
-  }
-
-  if (tag_len == EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH) {
-    tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN;
-  }
-  if (tag_len != EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TAG_TOO_LARGE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_ctx *gcm_siv_ctx =
-      (struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_ctx *)&ctx->state;
-  OPENSSL_memset(gcm_siv_ctx, 0, sizeof(struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_ctx));
-
-  aes_ctr_set_key(&gcm_siv_ctx->ks.ks, NULL, &gcm_siv_ctx->kgk_block, key,
-                  key_len);
-  gcm_siv_ctx->is_256 = (key_len == 32);
-  ctx->tag_len = tag_len;
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static void aead_aes_gcm_siv_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {}
-
-// gcm_siv_crypt encrypts (or decrypts—it's the same thing) |in_len| bytes from
-// |in| to |out|, using the block function |enc_block| with |key| in counter
-// mode, starting at |initial_counter|. This differs from the traditional
-// counter mode code in that the counter is handled little-endian, only the
-// first four bytes are used and the GCM-SIV tweak to the final byte is
-// applied. The |in| and |out| pointers may be equal but otherwise must not
-// alias.
-static void gcm_siv_crypt(uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
-                          const uint8_t initial_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
-                          block128_f enc_block, const AES_KEY *key) {
-  union {
-    uint32_t w[4];
-    uint8_t c[16];
-  } counter;
-
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(counter.c, initial_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-  counter.c[15] |= 0x80;
-
-  for (size_t done = 0; done < in_len;) {
-    uint8_t keystream[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-    enc_block(counter.c, keystream, key);
-    counter.w[0]++;
-
-    size_t todo = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-    if (in_len - done < todo) {
-      todo = in_len - done;
-    }
-
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < todo; i++) {
-      out[done + i] = keystream[i] ^ in[done + i];
-    }
-
-    done += todo;
-  }
-}
-
-// gcm_siv_polyval evaluates POLYVAL at |auth_key| on the given plaintext and
-// AD. The result is written to |out_tag|.
-static void gcm_siv_polyval(
-    uint8_t out_tag[16], const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *ad,
-    size_t ad_len, const uint8_t auth_key[16],
-    const uint8_t nonce[EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_NONCE_LEN]) {
-  struct polyval_ctx polyval_ctx;
-  CRYPTO_POLYVAL_init(&polyval_ctx, auth_key);
-
-  CRYPTO_POLYVAL_update_blocks(&polyval_ctx, ad, ad_len & ~15);
-
-  uint8_t scratch[16];
-  if (ad_len & 15) {
-    OPENSSL_memset(scratch, 0, sizeof(scratch));
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(scratch, &ad[ad_len & ~15], ad_len & 15);
-    CRYPTO_POLYVAL_update_blocks(&polyval_ctx, scratch, sizeof(scratch));
-  }
-
-  CRYPTO_POLYVAL_update_blocks(&polyval_ctx, in, in_len & ~15);
-  if (in_len & 15) {
-    OPENSSL_memset(scratch, 0, sizeof(scratch));
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(scratch, &in[in_len & ~15], in_len & 15);
-    CRYPTO_POLYVAL_update_blocks(&polyval_ctx, scratch, sizeof(scratch));
-  }
-
-  union {
-    uint8_t c[16];
-    struct {
-      uint64_t ad;
-      uint64_t in;
-    } bitlens;
-  } length_block;
-
-  length_block.bitlens.ad = ad_len * 8;
-  length_block.bitlens.in = in_len * 8;
-  CRYPTO_POLYVAL_update_blocks(&polyval_ctx, length_block.c,
-                               sizeof(length_block));
-
-  CRYPTO_POLYVAL_finish(&polyval_ctx, out_tag);
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_NONCE_LEN; i++) {
-    out_tag[i] ^= nonce[i];
-  }
-  out_tag[15] &= 0x7f;
-}
-
-// gcm_siv_record_keys contains the keys used for a specific GCM-SIV record.
-struct gcm_siv_record_keys {
-  uint8_t auth_key[16];
-  union {
-    double align;
-    AES_KEY ks;
-  } enc_key;
-  block128_f enc_block;
-};
-
-// gcm_siv_keys calculates the keys for a specific GCM-SIV record with the
-// given nonce and writes them to |*out_keys|.
-static void gcm_siv_keys(
-    const struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_ctx *gcm_siv_ctx,
-    struct gcm_siv_record_keys *out_keys,
-    const uint8_t nonce[EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_NONCE_LEN]) {
-  const AES_KEY *const key = &gcm_siv_ctx->ks.ks;
-  uint8_t key_material[(128 /* POLYVAL key */ + 256 /* max AES key */) / 8];
-  const size_t blocks_needed = gcm_siv_ctx->is_256 ? 6 : 4;
-
-  uint8_t counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-  OPENSSL_memset(counter, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE - EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_NONCE_LEN);
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(counter + AES_BLOCK_SIZE - EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_NONCE_LEN,
-                 nonce, EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_NONCE_LEN);
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < blocks_needed; i++) {
-    counter[0] = i;
-
-    uint8_t ciphertext[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-    gcm_siv_ctx->kgk_block(counter, ciphertext, key);
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(&key_material[i * 8], ciphertext, 8);
-  }
-
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_keys->auth_key, key_material, 16);
-  aes_ctr_set_key(&out_keys->enc_key.ks, NULL, &out_keys->enc_block,
-                  key_material + 16, gcm_siv_ctx->is_256 ? 32 : 16);
-}
-
-static int aead_aes_gcm_siv_seal_scatter(
-    const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag,
-    size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len, const uint8_t *nonce,
-    size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *extra_in,
-    size_t extra_in_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
-  const struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_ctx *gcm_siv_ctx =
-      (struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_ctx *)&ctx->state;
-  const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
-  const uint64_t ad_len_64 = ad_len;
-
-  if (in_len + EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN < in_len ||
-      in_len_64 > (UINT64_C(1) << 36) ||
-      ad_len_64 >= (UINT64_C(1) << 61)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (max_out_tag_len < EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_NONCE_LEN) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  struct gcm_siv_record_keys keys;
-  gcm_siv_keys(gcm_siv_ctx, &keys, nonce);
-
-  uint8_t tag[16];
-  gcm_siv_polyval(tag, in, in_len, ad, ad_len, keys.auth_key, nonce);
-  keys.enc_block(tag, tag, &keys.enc_key.ks);
-
-  gcm_siv_crypt(out, in, in_len, tag, keys.enc_block, &keys.enc_key.ks);
-
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_tag, tag, EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN);
-  *out_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN;
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int aead_aes_gcm_siv_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
-                                        const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
-                                        const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
-                                        const uint8_t *in_tag,
-                                        size_t in_tag_len, const uint8_t *ad,
-                                        size_t ad_len) {
-  const uint64_t ad_len_64 = ad_len;
-  if (ad_len_64 >= (UINT64_C(1) << 61)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
-  if (in_tag_len != EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN ||
-      in_len_64 > (UINT64_C(1) << 36) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_NONCE_LEN) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  const struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_ctx *gcm_siv_ctx =
-      (struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_ctx *)&ctx->state;
-
-  struct gcm_siv_record_keys keys;
-  gcm_siv_keys(gcm_siv_ctx, &keys, nonce);
-
-  gcm_siv_crypt(out, in, in_len, in_tag, keys.enc_block, &keys.enc_key.ks);
-
-  uint8_t expected_tag[EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN];
-  gcm_siv_polyval(expected_tag, out, in_len, ad, ad_len, keys.auth_key, nonce);
-  keys.enc_block(expected_tag, expected_tag, &keys.enc_key.ks);
-
-  if (CRYPTO_memcmp(expected_tag, in_tag, sizeof(expected_tag)) != 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_gcm_siv = {
-    16,                              // key length
-    EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_NONCE_LEN,  // nonce length
-    EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN,    // overhead
-    EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN,    // max tag length
-    0,                               // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in
-
-    aead_aes_gcm_siv_init,
-    NULL /* init_with_direction */,
-    aead_aes_gcm_siv_cleanup,
-    NULL /* open */,
-    aead_aes_gcm_siv_seal_scatter,
-    aead_aes_gcm_siv_open_gather,
-    NULL /* get_iv */,
-    NULL /* tag_len */,
-};
-
-static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_gcm_siv = {
-    32,                              // key length
-    EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_NONCE_LEN,  // nonce length
-    EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN,    // overhead
-    EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_SIV_TAG_LEN,    // max tag length
-    0,                               // seal_scatter_supports_extra_in
-
-    aead_aes_gcm_siv_init,
-    NULL /* init_with_direction */,
-    aead_aes_gcm_siv_cleanup,
-    NULL /* open */,
-    aead_aes_gcm_siv_seal_scatter,
-    aead_aes_gcm_siv_open_gather,
-    NULL /* get_iv */,
-    NULL /* tag_len */,
-};
-
-#if defined(AES_GCM_SIV_ASM)
-
-static char avx_aesni_capable(void) {
-  const uint32_t ecx = OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1];
-
-  return (ecx & (1 << (57 - 32))) != 0 /* AESNI */ &&
-         (ecx & (1 << 28)) != 0 /* AVX */;
-}
-
-const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_siv(void) {
-  if (avx_aesni_capable()) {
-    return &aead_aes_128_gcm_siv_asm;
-  }
-  return &aead_aes_128_gcm_siv;
-}
-
-const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_siv(void) {
-  if (avx_aesni_capable()) {
-    return &aead_aes_256_gcm_siv_asm;
-  }
-  return &aead_aes_256_gcm_siv;
-}
-
-#else
-
-const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_siv(void) {
-  return &aead_aes_128_gcm_siv;
-}
-
-const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_siv(void) {
-  return &aead_aes_256_gcm_siv;
-}
-
-#endif  // AES_GCM_SIV_ASM