grpc 1.21.0 → 1.32.0

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c

@@ -1,866 +0,0 @@
-/* v3_purp.c */
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 2001.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/buf.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/digest.h>
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/obj.h>
-#include <openssl/thread.h>
-#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-
-#include "../internal.h"
-
-#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
-#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
-        (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
-#define xku_reject(x, usage) \
-        (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
-#define ns_reject(x, usage) \
-        (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
-
-static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x);
-
-static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x);
-static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                    int ca);
-static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                    int ca);
-static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                       int ca);
-static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca);
-static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                    int ca);
-static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                       int ca);
-static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                  int ca);
-static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                        int ca);
-static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
-static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
-
-static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE **a, const X509_PURPOSE **b);
-static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p);
-
-static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = {
-    {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0,
-     check_purpose_ssl_client, (char *)"SSL client", (char *)"sslclient",
-     NULL},
-    {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0,
-     check_purpose_ssl_server, (char *)"SSL server", (char *)"sslserver",
-     NULL},
-    {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0,
-     check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, (char *)"Netscape SSL server",
-     (char *)"nssslserver", NULL},
-    {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign,
-     (char *)"S/MIME signing", (char *)"smimesign", NULL},
-    {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0,
-     check_purpose_smime_encrypt, (char *)"S/MIME encryption",
-     (char *)"smimeencrypt", NULL},
-    {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign,
-     (char *)"CRL signing", (char *)"crlsign", NULL},
-    {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, (char *)"Any Purpose",
-     (char *)"any", NULL},
-    {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper,
-     (char *)"OCSP helper", (char *)"ocsphelper", NULL},
-    {X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0,
-     check_purpose_timestamp_sign, (char *)"Time Stamp signing",
-     (char *)"timestampsign", NULL},
-};
-
-#define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE))
-
-static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL;
-
-static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE **a, const X509_PURPOSE **b)
-{
-    return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose;
-}
-
-/*
- * As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I
- * really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const
- * things.
- */
-int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca)
-{
-    int idx;
-    const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
-    x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
-    if (id == -1)
-        return 1;
-    idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
-    if (idx == -1)
-        return -1;
-    pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
-    return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca);
-}
-
-int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose)
-{
-    if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    *p = purpose;
-    return 1;
-}
-
-int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void)
-{
-    if (!xptable)
-        return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
-    return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
-}
-
-X509_PURPOSE *X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx)
-{
-    if (idx < 0)
-        return NULL;
-    if (idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT)
-        return xstandard + idx;
-    return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT);
-}
-
-int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname)
-{
-    int i;
-    X509_PURPOSE *xptmp;
-    for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
-        xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
-        if (!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname))
-            return i;
-    }
-    return -1;
-}
-
-int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose)
-{
-    X509_PURPOSE tmp;
-    size_t idx;
-
-    if ((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX))
-        return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN;
-    tmp.purpose = purpose;
-    if (!xptable)
-        return -1;
-
-    if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &idx, &tmp))
-        return -1;
-    return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
-}
-
-int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags,
-                     int (*ck) (const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int),
-                     char *name, char *sname, void *arg)
-{
-    int idx;
-    X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
-    char *name_dup, *sname_dup;
-
-    /*
-     * This is set according to what we change: application can't set it
-     */
-    flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
-    /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
-    flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME;
-    /* Get existing entry if any */
-    idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
-    /* Need a new entry */
-    if (idx == -1) {
-        if (!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) {
-            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
-    } else
-        ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
-
-    /* Duplicate the supplied names. */
-    name_dup = BUF_strdup(name);
-    sname_dup = BUF_strdup(sname);
-    if (name_dup == NULL || sname_dup == NULL) {
-        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        if (name_dup != NULL)
-            OPENSSL_free(name_dup);
-        if (sname_dup != NULL)
-            OPENSSL_free(sname_dup);
-        if (idx == -1)
-            OPENSSL_free(ptmp);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
-    if (ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
-        OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name);
-        OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname);
-    }
-    /* dup supplied name */
-    ptmp->name = name_dup;
-    ptmp->sname = sname_dup;
-    /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
-    ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
-    /* Set all other flags */
-    ptmp->flags |= flags;
-
-    ptmp->purpose = id;
-    ptmp->trust = trust;
-    ptmp->check_purpose = ck;
-    ptmp->usr_data = arg;
-
-    /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
-    if (idx == -1) {
-        if (!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) {
-            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            xptable_free(ptmp);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) {
-            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            xptable_free(ptmp);
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p)
-{
-    if (!p)
-        return;
-    if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) {
-        if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
-            OPENSSL_free(p->name);
-            OPENSSL_free(p->sname);
-        }
-        OPENSSL_free(p);
-    }
-}
-
-void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void)
-{
-    unsigned int i;
-    sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free);
-    for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++)
-        xptable_free(xstandard + i);
-    xptable = NULL;
-}
-
-int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
-{
-    return xp->purpose;
-}
-
-char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
-{
-    return xp->name;
-}
-
-char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
-{
-    return xp->sname;
-}
-
-int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
-{
-    return xp->trust;
-}
-
-static int nid_cmp(const void *void_a, const void *void_b)
-{
-    const int *a = void_a, *b = void_b;
-
-    return *a - *b;
-}
-
-int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex)
-{
-    /*
-     * This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions: that is
-     * those which are used by the verify process. If an extension is
-     * critical and doesn't appear in this list then the verify process will
-     * normally reject the certificate. The list must be kept in numerical
-     * order because it will be searched using bsearch.
-     */
-
-    static const int supported_nids[] = {
-        NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */
-        NID_key_usage,          /* 83 */
-        NID_subject_alt_name,   /* 85 */
-        NID_basic_constraints,  /* 87 */
-        NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */
-        NID_ext_key_usage,      /* 126 */
-        NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */
-        NID_proxyCertInfo,      /* 663 */
-        NID_name_constraints,   /* 666 */
-        NID_policy_mappings,    /* 747 */
-        NID_inhibit_any_policy  /* 748 */
-    };
-
-    int ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex));
-
-    if (ex_nid == NID_undef)
-        return 0;
-
-    if (bsearch
-        (&ex_nid, supported_nids, sizeof(supported_nids) / sizeof(int),
-         sizeof(int), nid_cmp) != NULL)
-        return 1;
-    return 0;
-}
-
-static void setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp)
-{
-    X509_NAME *iname = NULL;
-    size_t i;
-    if (dp->reasons) {
-        if (dp->reasons->length > 0)
-            dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0];
-        if (dp->reasons->length > 1)
-            dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8);
-        dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
-    } else
-        dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
-    if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1))
-        return;
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
-        GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
-        if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
-            iname = gen->d.directoryName;
-            break;
-        }
-    }
-    if (!iname)
-        iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
-
-    DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname);
-
-}
-
-static void setup_crldp(X509 *x)
-{
-    size_t i;
-    x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL);
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
-        setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i));
-}
-
-static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
-{
-    BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
-    PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci;
-    ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage;
-    ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns;
-    EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
-    X509_EXTENSION *ex;
-    size_t i;
-    int j;
-
-    CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&x->lock);
-    const int is_set = x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET;
-    CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_read(&x->lock);
-
-    if (is_set) {
-        return;
-    }
-
-    CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&x->lock);
-    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) {
-        CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&x->lock);
-        return;
-    }
-
-    X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL);
-    /* V1 should mean no extensions ... */
-    if (!X509_get_version(x))
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1;
-    /* Handle basic constraints */
-    if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) {
-        if (bs->ca)
-            x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA;
-        if (bs->pathlen) {
-            if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
-                || !bs->ca) {
-                x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-                x->ex_pathlen = 0;
-            } else
-                x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
-        } else
-            x->ex_pathlen = -1;
-        BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs);
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS;
-    }
-    /* Handle proxy certificates */
-    if ((pci = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) {
-        if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA
-            || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0
-            || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) {
-            x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-        }
-        if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) {
-            x->ex_pcpathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint);
-        } else
-            x->ex_pcpathlen = -1;
-        PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY;
-    }
-    /* Handle key usage */
-    if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
-        if (usage->length > 0) {
-            x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0];
-            if (usage->length > 1)
-                x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8;
-        } else
-            x->ex_kusage = 0;
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE;
-        ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
-    }
-    x->ex_xkusage = 0;
-    if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE;
-        for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
-            switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) {
-            case NID_server_auth:
-                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER;
-                break;
-
-            case NID_client_auth:
-                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT;
-                break;
-
-            case NID_email_protect:
-                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME;
-                break;
-
-            case NID_code_sign:
-                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN;
-                break;
-
-            case NID_ms_sgc:
-            case NID_ns_sgc:
-                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC;
-                break;
-
-            case NID_OCSP_sign:
-                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN;
-                break;
-
-            case NID_time_stamp:
-                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP;
-                break;
-
-            case NID_dvcs:
-                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS;
-                break;
-
-            case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage:
-                x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU;
-                break;
-            }
-        }
-        sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
-    }
-
-    if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) {
-        if (ns->length > 0)
-            x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0];
-        else
-            x->ex_nscert = 0;
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT;
-        ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns);
-    }
-    x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
-    x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
-    /* Does subject name match issuer ? */
-    if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) {
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI;
-        /* If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed */
-        if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK &&
-            !ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
-            x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS;
-    }
-    x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
-    x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &j, NULL);
-    if (!x->nc && (j != -1))
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-    setup_crldp(x);
-
-    for (j = 0; j < X509_get_ext_count(x); j++) {
-        ex = X509_get_ext(x, j);
-        if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex))
-            == NID_freshest_crl)
-            x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST;
-        if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex))
-            continue;
-        if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) {
-            x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
-            break;
-        }
-    }
-    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
-
-    CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&x->lock);
-}
-
-/*
- * CA checks common to all purposes return codes: 0 not a CA 1 is a CA 2
- * basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA 3 basicConstraints absent but self
- * signed V1. 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign
- * asserted.
- */
-
-static int check_ca(const X509 *x)
-{
-    /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */
-    if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
-        return 0;
-    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) {
-        if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
-            return 1;
-        /* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */
-        else
-            return 0;
-    } else {
-        /* we support V1 roots for...  uh, I don't really know why. */
-        if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT)
-            return 3;
-        /*
-         * If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it
-         */
-        else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
-            return 4;
-        /* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */
-        else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA)
-            return 5;
-        /* can this still be regarded a CA certificate?  I doubt it */
-        return 0;
-    }
-}
-
-int X509_check_ca(X509 *x)
-{
-    x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
-    return check_ca(x);
-}
-
-/* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */
-static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x)
-{
-    int ca_ret;
-    ca_ret = check_ca(x);
-    if (!ca_ret)
-        return 0;
-    /* check nsCertType if present */
-    if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA)
-        return ca_ret;
-    else
-        return 0;
-}
-
-static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                    int ca)
-{
-    if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT))
-        return 0;
-    if (ca)
-        return check_ssl_ca(x);
-    /* We need to do digital signatures or key agreement */
-    if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT))
-        return 0;
-    /* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */
-    if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT))
-        return 0;
-    return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Key usage needed for TLS/SSL server: digital signature, encipherment or
- * key agreement. The ssl code can check this more thoroughly for individual
- * key types.
- */
-#define KU_TLS \
-        (KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)
-
-static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                    int ca)
-{
-    if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER | XKU_SGC))
-        return 0;
-    if (ca)
-        return check_ssl_ca(x);
-
-    if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER))
-        return 0;
-    if (ku_reject(x, KU_TLS))
-        return 0;
-
-    return 1;
-
-}
-
-static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                       int ca)
-{
-    int ret;
-    ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca);
-    if (!ret || ca)
-        return ret;
-    /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */
-    if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
-        return 0;
-    return ret;
-}
-
-/* common S/MIME checks */
-static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca)
-{
-    if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME))
-        return 0;
-    if (ca) {
-        int ca_ret;
-        ca_ret = check_ca(x);
-        if (!ca_ret)
-            return 0;
-        /* check nsCertType if present */
-        if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA)
-            return ca_ret;
-        else
-            return 0;
-    }
-    if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
-        if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME)
-            return 1;
-        /* Workaround for some buggy certificates */
-        if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT)
-            return 2;
-        return 0;
-    }
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                    int ca)
-{
-    int ret;
-    ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
-    if (!ret || ca)
-        return ret;
-    if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_NON_REPUDIATION))
-        return 0;
-    return ret;
-}
-
-static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                       int ca)
-{
-    int ret;
-    ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
-    if (!ret || ca)
-        return ret;
-    if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
-        return 0;
-    return ret;
-}
-
-static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                  int ca)
-{
-    if (ca) {
-        int ca_ret;
-        if ((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2)
-            return ca_ret;
-        else
-            return 0;
-    }
-    if (ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN))
-        return 0;
-    return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that each CA
- * is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain.
- */
-
-static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
-{
-    /*
-     * Must be a valid CA.  Should we really support the "I don't know" value
-     * (2)?
-     */
-    if (ca)
-        return check_ca(x);
-    /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                        int ca)
-{
-    int i_ext;
-
-    /* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */
-    if (ca)
-        return check_ca(x);
-
-    /*
-     * Check the optional key usage field:
-     * if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature
-     * and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall
-     * be rejected).
-     */
-    if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
-        && ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) ||
-            !(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))))
-        return 0;
-
-    /* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */
-    if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP)
-        return 0;
-
-    /* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */
-    i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *)x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1);
-    if (i_ext >= 0) {
-        X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *)x, i_ext);
-        if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext))
-            return 0;
-    }
-
-    return 1;
-}
-
-static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
-{
-    return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second. This can be
- * used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates which have been looked
- * up using some simple method such as by subject name. These are: 1. Check
- * issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer) 2. If akid(subject) exists
- * check it matches issuer 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports
- * certificate signing returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch,
- * reasons match codes for X509_verify_cert()
- */
-
-int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
-{
-    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
-                      X509_get_issuer_name(subject)))
-        return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
-    x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer);
-    x509v3_cache_extensions(subject);
-
-    if (subject->akid) {
-        int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid);
-        if (ret != X509_V_OK)
-            return ret;
-    }
-
-    if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
-        if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
-            return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
-    } else if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
-        return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN;
-    return X509_V_OK;
-}
-
-int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
-{
-
-    if (!akid)
-        return X509_V_OK;
-
-    /* Check key ids (if present) */
-    if (akid->keyid && issuer->skid &&
-        ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid))
-        return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
-    /* Check serial number */
-    if (akid->serial &&
-        ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial))
-        return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
-    /* Check issuer name */
-    if (akid->issuer) {
-        /*
-         * Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes SEQUENCE OF
-         * GeneralName. So look for a DirName. There may be more than one but
-         * we only take any notice of the first.
-         */
-        GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
-        GENERAL_NAME *gen;
-        X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
-        size_t i;
-        gens = akid->issuer;
-        for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
-            gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
-            if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
-                nm = gen->d.dirn;
-                break;
-            }
-        }
-        if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)))
-            return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
-    }
-    return X509_V_OK;
-}