grpc 1.21.0 → 1.32.0

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/gcd.c

@@ -1,683 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-
-#include <assert.h>
-
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-
-#include "internal.h"
-
-
-static BN_ULONG word_is_odd_mask(BN_ULONG a) { return (BN_ULONG)0 - (a & 1); }
-
-static void maybe_rshift1_words(BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG mask, BN_ULONG *tmp,
-                                size_t num) {
-  bn_rshift1_words(tmp, a, num);
-  bn_select_words(a, mask, tmp, a, num);
-}
-
-static void maybe_rshift1_words_carry(BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG carry,
-                                      BN_ULONG mask, BN_ULONG *tmp,
-                                      size_t num) {
-  maybe_rshift1_words(a, mask, tmp, num);
-  if (num != 0) {
-    carry &= mask;
-    a[num - 1] |= carry << (BN_BITS2-1);
-  }
-}
-
-static BN_ULONG maybe_add_words(BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG mask, const BN_ULONG *b,
-                                BN_ULONG *tmp, size_t num) {
-  BN_ULONG carry = bn_add_words(tmp, a, b, num);
-  bn_select_words(a, mask, tmp, a, num);
-  return carry & mask;
-}
-
-static int bn_gcd_consttime(BIGNUM *r, unsigned *out_shift, const BIGNUM *x,
-                            const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  size_t width = x->width > y->width ? x->width : y->width;
-  if (width == 0) {
-    *out_shift = 0;
-    BN_zero(r);
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  // This is a constant-time implementation of Stein's algorithm (binary GCD).
-  int ret = 0;
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *u = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *v = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  if (u == NULL || v == NULL || tmp == NULL ||
-      !BN_copy(u, x) ||
-      !BN_copy(v, y) ||
-      !bn_resize_words(u, width) ||
-      !bn_resize_words(v, width) ||
-      !bn_resize_words(tmp, width)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  // Each loop iteration halves at least one of |u| and |v|. Thus we need at
-  // most the combined bit width of inputs for at least one value to be zero.
-  unsigned x_bits = x->width * BN_BITS2, y_bits = y->width * BN_BITS2;
-  unsigned num_iters = x_bits + y_bits;
-  if (num_iters < x_bits) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  unsigned shift = 0;
-  for (unsigned i = 0; i < num_iters; i++) {
-    BN_ULONG both_odd = word_is_odd_mask(u->d[0]) & word_is_odd_mask(v->d[0]);
-
-    // If both |u| and |v| are odd, subtract the smaller from the larger.
-    BN_ULONG u_less_than_v =
-        (BN_ULONG)0 - bn_sub_words(tmp->d, u->d, v->d, width);
-    bn_select_words(u->d, both_odd & ~u_less_than_v, tmp->d, u->d, width);
-    bn_sub_words(tmp->d, v->d, u->d, width);
-    bn_select_words(v->d, both_odd & u_less_than_v, tmp->d, v->d, width);
-
-    // At least one of |u| and |v| is now even.
-    BN_ULONG u_is_odd = word_is_odd_mask(u->d[0]);
-    BN_ULONG v_is_odd = word_is_odd_mask(v->d[0]);
-    assert(!(u_is_odd & v_is_odd));
-
-    // If both are even, the final GCD gains a factor of two.
-    shift += 1 & (~u_is_odd & ~v_is_odd);
-
-    // Halve any which are even.
-    maybe_rshift1_words(u->d, ~u_is_odd, tmp->d, width);
-    maybe_rshift1_words(v->d, ~v_is_odd, tmp->d, width);
-  }
-
-  // One of |u| or |v| is zero at this point. The algorithm usually makes |u|
-  // zero, unless |y| was already zero on input. Fix this by combining the
-  // values.
-  assert(BN_is_zero(u) || BN_is_zero(v));
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < width; i++) {
-    v->d[i] |= u->d[i];
-  }
-
-  *out_shift = shift;
-  ret = bn_set_words(r, v->d, width);
-
-err:
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-int BN_gcd(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  unsigned shift;
-  return bn_gcd_consttime(r, &shift, x, y, ctx) &&
-         BN_lshift(r, r, shift);
-}
-
-int bn_is_relatively_prime(int *out_relatively_prime, const BIGNUM *x,
-                           const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  int ret = 0;
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  unsigned shift;
-  BIGNUM *gcd = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  if (gcd == NULL ||
-      !bn_gcd_consttime(gcd, &shift, x, y, ctx)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  // Check that 2^|shift| * |gcd| is one.
-  if (gcd->width == 0) {
-    *out_relatively_prime = 0;
-  } else {
-    BN_ULONG mask = shift | (gcd->d[0] ^ 1);
-    for (int i = 1; i < gcd->width; i++) {
-      mask |= gcd->d[i];
-    }
-    *out_relatively_prime = mask == 0;
-  }
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-int bn_lcm_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  unsigned shift;
-  BIGNUM *gcd = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  int ret = gcd != NULL &&
-            bn_mul_consttime(r, a, b, ctx) &&
-            bn_gcd_consttime(gcd, &shift, a, b, ctx) &&
-            bn_div_consttime(r, NULL, r, gcd, ctx) &&
-            bn_rshift_secret_shift(r, r, shift, ctx);
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-int bn_mod_inverse_consttime(BIGNUM *r, int *out_no_inverse, const BIGNUM *a,
-                             const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  *out_no_inverse = 0;
-  if (BN_is_negative(a) || BN_ucmp(a, n) >= 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED);
-    return 0;
-  }
-  if (BN_is_zero(a)) {
-    if (BN_is_one(n)) {
-      BN_zero(r);
-      return 1;
-    }
-    *out_no_inverse = 1;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NO_INVERSE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // This is a constant-time implementation of the extended binary GCD
-  // algorithm. It is adapted from the Handbook of Applied Cryptography, section
-  // 14.4.3, algorithm 14.51, and modified to bound coefficients and avoid
-  // negative numbers.
-  //
-  // For more details and proof of correctness, see
-  // https://github.com/mit-plv/fiat-crypto/pull/333. In particular, see |step|
-  // and |mod_inverse_consttime| for the algorithm in Gallina and see
-  // |mod_inverse_consttime_spec| for the correctness result.
-
-  if (!BN_is_odd(a) && !BN_is_odd(n)) {
-    *out_no_inverse = 1;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NO_INVERSE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // This function exists to compute the RSA private exponent, where |a| is one
-  // word. We'll thus use |a_width| when available.
-  size_t n_width = n->width, a_width = a->width;
-  if (a_width > n_width) {
-    a_width = n_width;
-  }
-
-  int ret = 0;
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *u = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *v = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *A = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *B = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *C = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *D = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *tmp2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  if (u == NULL || v == NULL || A == NULL || B == NULL || C == NULL ||
-      D == NULL || tmp == NULL || tmp2 == NULL ||
-      !BN_copy(u, a) ||
-      !BN_copy(v, n) ||
-      !BN_one(A) ||
-      !BN_one(D) ||
-      // For convenience, size |u| and |v| equivalently.
-      !bn_resize_words(u, n_width) ||
-      !bn_resize_words(v, n_width) ||
-      // |A| and |C| are bounded by |m|.
-      !bn_resize_words(A, n_width) ||
-      !bn_resize_words(C, n_width) ||
-      // |B| and |D| are bounded by |a|.
-      !bn_resize_words(B, a_width) ||
-      !bn_resize_words(D, a_width) ||
-      // |tmp| and |tmp2| may be used at either size.
-      !bn_resize_words(tmp, n_width) ||
-      !bn_resize_words(tmp2, n_width)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  // Each loop iteration halves at least one of |u| and |v|. Thus we need at
-  // most the combined bit width of inputs for at least one value to be zero.
-  unsigned a_bits = a_width * BN_BITS2, n_bits = n_width * BN_BITS2;
-  unsigned num_iters = a_bits + n_bits;
-  if (num_iters < a_bits) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  // Before and after each loop iteration, the following hold:
-  //
-  //   u = A*a - B*n
-  //   v = D*n - C*a
-  //   0 < u <= a
-  //   0 <= v <= n
-  //   0 <= A < n
-  //   0 <= B <= a
-  //   0 <= C < n
-  //   0 <= D <= a
-  //
-  // After each loop iteration, u and v only get smaller, and at least one of
-  // them shrinks by at least a factor of two.
-  for (unsigned i = 0; i < num_iters; i++) {
-    BN_ULONG both_odd = word_is_odd_mask(u->d[0]) & word_is_odd_mask(v->d[0]);
-
-    // If both |u| and |v| are odd, subtract the smaller from the larger.
-    BN_ULONG v_less_than_u =
-        (BN_ULONG)0 - bn_sub_words(tmp->d, v->d, u->d, n_width);
-    bn_select_words(v->d, both_odd & ~v_less_than_u, tmp->d, v->d, n_width);
-    bn_sub_words(tmp->d, u->d, v->d, n_width);
-    bn_select_words(u->d, both_odd & v_less_than_u, tmp->d, u->d, n_width);
-
-    // If we updated one of the values, update the corresponding coefficient.
-    BN_ULONG carry = bn_add_words(tmp->d, A->d, C->d, n_width);
-    carry -= bn_sub_words(tmp2->d, tmp->d, n->d, n_width);
-    bn_select_words(tmp->d, carry, tmp->d, tmp2->d, n_width);
-    bn_select_words(A->d, both_odd & v_less_than_u, tmp->d, A->d, n_width);
-    bn_select_words(C->d, both_odd & ~v_less_than_u, tmp->d, C->d, n_width);
-
-    bn_add_words(tmp->d, B->d, D->d, a_width);
-    bn_sub_words(tmp2->d, tmp->d, a->d, a_width);
-    bn_select_words(tmp->d, carry, tmp->d, tmp2->d, a_width);
-    bn_select_words(B->d, both_odd & v_less_than_u, tmp->d, B->d, a_width);
-    bn_select_words(D->d, both_odd & ~v_less_than_u, tmp->d, D->d, a_width);
-
-    // Our loop invariants hold at this point. Additionally, exactly one of |u|
-    // and |v| is now even.
-    BN_ULONG u_is_even = ~word_is_odd_mask(u->d[0]);
-    BN_ULONG v_is_even = ~word_is_odd_mask(v->d[0]);
-    assert(u_is_even != v_is_even);
-
-    // Halve the even one and adjust the corresponding coefficient.
-    maybe_rshift1_words(u->d, u_is_even, tmp->d, n_width);
-    BN_ULONG A_or_B_is_odd =
-        word_is_odd_mask(A->d[0]) | word_is_odd_mask(B->d[0]);
-    BN_ULONG A_carry =
-        maybe_add_words(A->d, A_or_B_is_odd & u_is_even, n->d, tmp->d, n_width);
-    BN_ULONG B_carry =
-        maybe_add_words(B->d, A_or_B_is_odd & u_is_even, a->d, tmp->d, a_width);
-    maybe_rshift1_words_carry(A->d, A_carry, u_is_even, tmp->d, n_width);
-    maybe_rshift1_words_carry(B->d, B_carry, u_is_even, tmp->d, a_width);
-
-    maybe_rshift1_words(v->d, v_is_even, tmp->d, n_width);
-    BN_ULONG C_or_D_is_odd =
-        word_is_odd_mask(C->d[0]) | word_is_odd_mask(D->d[0]);
-    BN_ULONG C_carry =
-        maybe_add_words(C->d, C_or_D_is_odd & v_is_even, n->d, tmp->d, n_width);
-    BN_ULONG D_carry =
-        maybe_add_words(D->d, C_or_D_is_odd & v_is_even, a->d, tmp->d, a_width);
-    maybe_rshift1_words_carry(C->d, C_carry, v_is_even, tmp->d, n_width);
-    maybe_rshift1_words_carry(D->d, D_carry, v_is_even, tmp->d, a_width);
-  }
-
-  assert(BN_is_zero(v));
-  if (!BN_is_one(u)) {
-    *out_no_inverse = 1;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NO_INVERSE);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  ret = BN_copy(r, A) != NULL;
-
-err:
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-int BN_mod_inverse_odd(BIGNUM *out, int *out_no_inverse, const BIGNUM *a,
-                       const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  *out_no_inverse = 0;
-
-  if (!BN_is_odd(n)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (BN_is_negative(a) || BN_cmp(a, n) >= 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  BIGNUM *A, *B, *X, *Y;
-  int ret = 0;
-  int sign;
-
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  A = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  B = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  Y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  if (Y == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  BIGNUM *R = out;
-
-  BN_zero(Y);
-  if (!BN_one(X) || BN_copy(B, a) == NULL || BN_copy(A, n) == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  A->neg = 0;
-  sign = -1;
-  // From  B = a mod |n|,  A = |n|  it follows that
-  //
-  //      0 <= B < A,
-  //     -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
-  //      sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|).
-
-  // Binary inversion algorithm; requires odd modulus. This is faster than the
-  // general algorithm if the modulus is sufficiently small (about 400 .. 500
-  // bits on 32-bit systems, but much more on 64-bit systems)
-  int shift;
-
-  while (!BN_is_zero(B)) {
-    //      0 < B < |n|,
-    //      0 < A <= |n|,
-    // (1) -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
-    // (2)  sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|)
-
-    // Now divide  B  by the maximum possible power of two in the integers,
-    // and divide  X  by the same value mod |n|.
-    // When we're done, (1) still holds.
-    shift = 0;
-    while (!BN_is_bit_set(B, shift)) {
-      // note that 0 < B
-      shift++;
-
-      if (BN_is_odd(X)) {
-        if (!BN_uadd(X, X, n)) {
-          goto err;
-        }
-      }
-      // now X is even, so we can easily divide it by two
-      if (!BN_rshift1(X, X)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    }
-    if (shift > 0) {
-      if (!BN_rshift(B, B, shift)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    }
-
-    // Same for A and Y. Afterwards, (2) still holds.
-    shift = 0;
-    while (!BN_is_bit_set(A, shift)) {
-      // note that 0 < A
-      shift++;
-
-      if (BN_is_odd(Y)) {
-        if (!BN_uadd(Y, Y, n)) {
-          goto err;
-        }
-      }
-      // now Y is even
-      if (!BN_rshift1(Y, Y)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    }
-    if (shift > 0) {
-      if (!BN_rshift(A, A, shift)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    }
-
-    // We still have (1) and (2).
-    // Both  A  and  B  are odd.
-    // The following computations ensure that
-    //
-    //     0 <= B < |n|,
-    //      0 < A < |n|,
-    // (1) -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
-    // (2)  sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|),
-    //
-    // and that either  A  or  B  is even in the next iteration.
-    if (BN_ucmp(B, A) >= 0) {
-      // -sign*(X + Y)*a == B - A  (mod |n|)
-      if (!BN_uadd(X, X, Y)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-      // NB: we could use BN_mod_add_quick(X, X, Y, n), but that
-      // actually makes the algorithm slower
-      if (!BN_usub(B, B, A)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    } else {
-      //  sign*(X + Y)*a == A - B  (mod |n|)
-      if (!BN_uadd(Y, Y, X)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-      // as above, BN_mod_add_quick(Y, Y, X, n) would slow things down
-      if (!BN_usub(A, A, B)) {
-        goto err;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (!BN_is_one(A)) {
-    *out_no_inverse = 1;
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NO_INVERSE);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  // The while loop (Euclid's algorithm) ends when
-  //      A == gcd(a,n);
-  // we have
-  //       sign*Y*a  ==  A  (mod |n|),
-  // where  Y  is non-negative.
-
-  if (sign < 0) {
-    if (!BN_sub(Y, n, Y)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-  }
-  // Now  Y*a  ==  A  (mod |n|).
-
-  // Y*a == 1  (mod |n|)
-  if (!Y->neg && BN_ucmp(Y, n) < 0) {
-    if (!BN_copy(R, Y)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-  } else {
-    if (!BN_nnmod(R, Y, n, ctx)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
-                       BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  BIGNUM *new_out = NULL;
-  if (out == NULL) {
-    new_out = BN_new();
-    if (new_out == NULL) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-      return NULL;
-    }
-    out = new_out;
-  }
-
-  int ok = 0;
-  BIGNUM *a_reduced = NULL;
-  if (a->neg || BN_ucmp(a, n) >= 0) {
-    a_reduced = BN_dup(a);
-    if (a_reduced == NULL) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    if (!BN_nnmod(a_reduced, a_reduced, n, ctx)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    a = a_reduced;
-  }
-
-  int no_inverse;
-  if (!BN_is_odd(n)) {
-    if (!bn_mod_inverse_consttime(out, &no_inverse, a, n, ctx)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-  } else if (!BN_mod_inverse_odd(out, &no_inverse, a, n, ctx)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  ok = 1;
-
-err:
-  if (!ok) {
-    BN_free(new_out);
-    out = NULL;
-  }
-  BN_free(a_reduced);
-  return out;
-}
-
-int BN_mod_inverse_blinded(BIGNUM *out, int *out_no_inverse, const BIGNUM *a,
-                           const BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx) {
-  *out_no_inverse = 0;
-
-  if (BN_is_negative(a) || BN_cmp(a, &mont->N) >= 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  int ret = 0;
-  BIGNUM blinding_factor;
-  BN_init(&blinding_factor);
-
-  if (!BN_rand_range_ex(&blinding_factor, 1, &mont->N) ||
-      !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(out, &blinding_factor, a, mont, ctx) ||
-      !BN_mod_inverse_odd(out, out_no_inverse, out, &mont->N, ctx) ||
-      !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(out, &blinding_factor, out, mont, ctx)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  ret = 1;
-
-err:
-  BN_free(&blinding_factor);
-  return ret;
-}
-
-int bn_mod_inverse_prime(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
-                         BN_CTX *ctx, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont_p) {
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *p_minus_2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  int ok = p_minus_2 != NULL &&
-           BN_copy(p_minus_2, p) &&
-           BN_sub_word(p_minus_2, 2) &&
-           BN_mod_exp_mont(out, a, p_minus_2, p, ctx, mont_p);
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return ok;
-}
-
-int bn_mod_inverse_secret_prime(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
-                                BN_CTX *ctx, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont_p) {
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  BIGNUM *p_minus_2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  int ok = p_minus_2 != NULL &&
-           BN_copy(p_minus_2, p) &&
-           BN_sub_word(p_minus_2, 2) &&
-           BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(out, a, p_minus_2, p, ctx, mont_p);
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return ok;
-}