grpc 1.21.0 → 1.32.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/ec/felem.c

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2018, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../bn/internal.h"
+#include "../../internal.h"
+
+
+int ec_bignum_to_felem(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out, const BIGNUM *in) {
+  uint8_t bytes[EC_MAX_BYTES];
+  size_t len = BN_num_bytes(&group->field);
+  assert(sizeof(bytes) >= len);
+  if (BN_is_negative(in) ||
+      BN_cmp(in, &group->field) >= 0 ||
+      !BN_bn2bin_padded(bytes, len, in)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return ec_felem_from_bytes(group, out, bytes, len);
+}
+
+int ec_felem_to_bignum(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *out, const EC_FELEM *in) {
+  uint8_t bytes[EC_MAX_BYTES];
+  size_t len;
+  ec_felem_to_bytes(group, bytes, &len, in);
+  return BN_bin2bn(bytes, len, out) != NULL;
+}
+
+void ec_felem_to_bytes(const EC_GROUP *group, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+                       const EC_FELEM *in) {
+  group->meth->felem_to_bytes(group, out, out_len, in);
+}
+
+int ec_felem_from_bytes(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out, const uint8_t *in,
+                        size_t len) {
+  return group->meth->felem_from_bytes(group, out, in, len);
+}
+
+void ec_felem_neg(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out, const EC_FELEM *a) {
+  // -a is zero if a is zero and p-a otherwise.
+  BN_ULONG mask = ec_felem_non_zero_mask(group, a);
+  BN_ULONG borrow =
+      bn_sub_words(out->words, group->field.d, a->words, group->field.width);
+  assert(borrow == 0);
+  (void)borrow;
+  for (int i = 0; i < group->field.width; i++) {
+    out->words[i] &= mask;
+  }
+}
+
+void ec_felem_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out, const EC_FELEM *a,
+                  const EC_FELEM *b) {
+  EC_FELEM tmp;
+  bn_mod_add_words(out->words, a->words, b->words, group->field.d, tmp.words,
+                   group->field.width);
+}
+
+void ec_felem_sub(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out, const EC_FELEM *a,
+                  const EC_FELEM *b) {
+  EC_FELEM tmp;
+  bn_mod_sub_words(out->words, a->words, b->words, group->field.d, tmp.words,
+                   group->field.width);
+}
+
+BN_ULONG ec_felem_non_zero_mask(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_FELEM *a) {
+  BN_ULONG mask = 0;
+  for (int i = 0; i < group->field.width; i++) {
+    mask |= a->words[i];
+  }
+  return ~constant_time_is_zero_w(mask);
+}
+
+void ec_felem_select(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out, BN_ULONG mask,
+                     const EC_FELEM *a, const EC_FELEM *b) {
+  bn_select_words(out->words, mask, a->words, b->words, group->field.width);
+}
+
+int ec_felem_equal(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_FELEM *a,
+                   const EC_FELEM *b) {
+  return CRYPTO_memcmp(a->words, b->words,
+                       group->field.width * sizeof(BN_ULONG)) == 0;
+}

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/ec/internal.h

@@ -0,0 +1,776 @@
+/* Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project.
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by
+ * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems
+ * Laboratories. */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_EC_INTERNAL_H
+#define OPENSSL_HEADER_EC_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include <openssl/base.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ex_data.h>
+#include <openssl/type_check.h>
+
+#include "../bn/internal.h"
+
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+
+// EC internals.
+
+
+// Cap the size of all field elements and scalars, including custom curves, to
+// 66 bytes, large enough to fit secp521r1 and brainpoolP512r1, which appear to
+// be the largest fields anyone plausibly uses.
+#define EC_MAX_BYTES 66
+#define EC_MAX_WORDS ((EC_MAX_BYTES + BN_BYTES - 1) / BN_BYTES)
+
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(EC_MAX_WORDS <= BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS,
+                      "bn_*_small functions not usable");
+
+
+// Scalars.
+
+// An EC_SCALAR is an integer fully reduced modulo the order. Only the first
+// |order->width| words are used. An |EC_SCALAR| is specific to an |EC_GROUP|
+// and must not be mixed between groups.
+typedef union {
+  // bytes is the representation of the scalar in little-endian order.
+  uint8_t bytes[EC_MAX_BYTES];
+  BN_ULONG words[EC_MAX_WORDS];
+} EC_SCALAR;
+
+// ec_bignum_to_scalar converts |in| to an |EC_SCALAR| and writes it to
+// |*out|. It returns one on success and zero if |in| is out of range.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int ec_bignum_to_scalar(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out,
+                                       const BIGNUM *in);
+
+// ec_scalar_to_bytes serializes |in| as a big-endian bytestring to |out| and
+// sets |*out_len| to the number of bytes written. The number of bytes written
+// is |BN_num_bytes(&group->order)|, which is at most |EC_MAX_BYTES|.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void ec_scalar_to_bytes(const EC_GROUP *group, uint8_t *out,
+                                       size_t *out_len, const EC_SCALAR *in);
+
+// ec_scalar_from_bytes deserializes |in| and stores the resulting scalar over
+// group |group| to |out|. It returns one on success and zero if |in| is
+// invalid.
+int ec_scalar_from_bytes(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out,
+                         const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
+
+// ec_scalar_reduce sets |out| to |words|, reduced modulo the group order.
+// |words| must be less than order^2. |num| must be at most twice the width of
+// group order. This function treats |words| as secret.
+void ec_scalar_reduce(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out,
+                      const BN_ULONG *words, size_t num);
+
+// ec_random_nonzero_scalar sets |out| to a uniformly selected random value from
+// 1 to |group->order| - 1. It returns one on success and zero on error.
+int ec_random_nonzero_scalar(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out,
+                             const uint8_t additional_data[32]);
+
+// ec_scalar_equal_vartime returns one if |a| and |b| are equal and zero
+// otherwise. Both values are treated as public.
+int ec_scalar_equal_vartime(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_SCALAR *a,
+                            const EC_SCALAR *b);
+
+// ec_scalar_is_zero returns one if |a| is zero and zero otherwise.
+int ec_scalar_is_zero(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_SCALAR *a);
+
+// ec_scalar_add sets |r| to |a| + |b|.
+void ec_scalar_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *r, const EC_SCALAR *a,
+                   const EC_SCALAR *b);
+
+// ec_scalar_sub sets |r| to |a| - |b|.
+void ec_scalar_sub(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *r, const EC_SCALAR *a,
+                   const EC_SCALAR *b);
+
+// ec_scalar_neg sets |r| to -|a|.
+void ec_scalar_neg(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *r, const EC_SCALAR *a);
+
+// ec_scalar_to_montgomery sets |r| to |a| in Montgomery form.
+void ec_scalar_to_montgomery(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *r,
+                             const EC_SCALAR *a);
+
+// ec_scalar_to_montgomery sets |r| to |a| converted from Montgomery form.
+void ec_scalar_from_montgomery(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *r,
+                               const EC_SCALAR *a);
+
+// ec_scalar_mul_montgomery sets |r| to |a| * |b| where inputs and outputs are
+// in Montgomery form.
+void ec_scalar_mul_montgomery(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *r,
+                              const EC_SCALAR *a, const EC_SCALAR *b);
+
+// ec_scalar_inv0_montgomery sets |r| to |a|^-1 where inputs and outputs are in
+// Montgomery form. If |a| is zero, |r| is set to zero.
+void ec_scalar_inv0_montgomery(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *r,
+                               const EC_SCALAR *a);
+
+// ec_scalar_to_montgomery_inv_vartime sets |r| to |a|^-1 R. That is, it takes
+// in |a| not in Montgomery form and computes the inverse in Montgomery form. It
+// returns one on success and zero if |a| has no inverse. This function assumes
+// |a| is public and may leak information about it via timing.
+//
+// Note this is not the same operation as |ec_scalar_inv0_montgomery|.
+int ec_scalar_to_montgomery_inv_vartime(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *r,
+                                        const EC_SCALAR *a);
+
+// ec_scalar_select, in constant time, sets |out| to |a| if |mask| is all ones
+// and |b| if |mask| is all zeros.
+void ec_scalar_select(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out, BN_ULONG mask,
+                      const EC_SCALAR *a, const EC_SCALAR *b);
+
+
+// Field elements.
+
+// An EC_FELEM represents a field element. Only the first |field->width| words
+// are used. An |EC_FELEM| is specific to an |EC_GROUP| and must not be mixed
+// between groups. Additionally, the representation (whether or not elements are
+// represented in Montgomery-form) may vary between |EC_METHOD|s.
+typedef union {
+  // bytes is the representation of the field element in little-endian order.
+  uint8_t bytes[EC_MAX_BYTES];
+  BN_ULONG words[EC_MAX_WORDS];
+} EC_FELEM;
+
+// ec_bignum_to_felem converts |in| to an |EC_FELEM|. It returns one on success
+// and zero if |in| is out of range.
+int ec_bignum_to_felem(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out, const BIGNUM *in);
+
+// ec_felem_to_bignum converts |in| to a |BIGNUM|. It returns one on success and
+// zero on allocation failure.
+int ec_felem_to_bignum(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *out, const EC_FELEM *in);
+
+// ec_felem_to_bytes serializes |in| as a big-endian bytestring to |out| and
+// sets |*out_len| to the number of bytes written. The number of bytes written
+// is |BN_num_bytes(&group->order)|, which is at most |EC_MAX_BYTES|.
+void ec_felem_to_bytes(const EC_GROUP *group, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+                       const EC_FELEM *in);
+
+// ec_felem_from_bytes deserializes |in| and stores the resulting field element
+// to |out|. It returns one on success and zero if |in| is invalid.
+int ec_felem_from_bytes(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out, const uint8_t *in,
+                        size_t len);
+
+// ec_felem_neg sets |out| to -|a|.
+void ec_felem_neg(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out, const EC_FELEM *a);
+
+// ec_felem_add sets |out| to |a| + |b|.
+void ec_felem_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out, const EC_FELEM *a,
+                  const EC_FELEM *b);
+
+// ec_felem_add sets |out| to |a| - |b|.
+void ec_felem_sub(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out, const EC_FELEM *a,
+                  const EC_FELEM *b);
+
+// ec_felem_non_zero_mask returns all ones if |a| is non-zero and all zeros
+// otherwise.
+BN_ULONG ec_felem_non_zero_mask(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_FELEM *a);
+
+// ec_felem_select, in constant time, sets |out| to |a| if |mask| is all ones
+// and |b| if |mask| is all zeros.
+void ec_felem_select(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out, BN_ULONG mask,
+                     const EC_FELEM *a, const EC_FELEM *b);
+
+// ec_felem_equal returns one if |a| and |b| are equal and zero otherwise.
+int ec_felem_equal(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_FELEM *a, const EC_FELEM *b);
+
+
+// Points.
+//
+// Points may represented in affine coordinates as |EC_AFFINE| or Jacobian
+// coordinates as |EC_RAW_POINT|. Affine coordinates directly represent a
+// point on the curve, but point addition over affine coordinates requires
+// costly field inversions, so arithmetic is done in Jacobian coordinates.
+// Converting from affine to Jacobian is cheap, while converting from Jacobian
+// to affine costs a field inversion. (Jacobian coordinates amortize the field
+// inversions needed in a sequence of point operations.)
+//
+// TODO(davidben): Rename |EC_RAW_POINT| to |EC_JACOBIAN|.
+
+// An EC_RAW_POINT represents an elliptic curve point in Jacobian coordinates.
+// Unlike |EC_POINT|, it is a plain struct which can be stack-allocated and
+// needs no cleanup. It is specific to an |EC_GROUP| and must not be mixed
+// between groups.
+typedef struct {
+  // X, Y, and Z are Jacobian projective coordinates. They represent
+  // (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3) if Z != 0 and the point at infinity otherwise.
+  EC_FELEM X, Y, Z;
+} EC_RAW_POINT;
+
+// An EC_AFFINE represents an elliptic curve point in affine coordinates.
+// coordinates. Note the point at infinity cannot be represented in affine
+// coordinates.
+typedef struct {
+  EC_FELEM X, Y;
+} EC_AFFINE;
+
+// ec_affine_to_jacobian converts |p| to Jacobian form and writes the result to
+// |*out|. This operation is very cheap and only costs a few copies.
+void ec_affine_to_jacobian(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *out,
+                           const EC_AFFINE *p);
+
+// ec_jacobian_to_affine converts |p| to affine form and writes the result to
+// |*out|. It returns one on success and zero if |p| was the point at infinity.
+// This operation performs a field inversion and should only be done once per
+// point.
+//
+// If only extracting the x-coordinate, use |ec_get_x_coordinate_*| which is
+// slightly faster.
+int ec_jacobian_to_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_AFFINE *out,
+                          const EC_RAW_POINT *p);
+
+// ec_jacobian_to_affine_batch converts |num| points in |in| from Jacobian
+// coordinates to affine coordinates and writes the results to |out|. It returns
+// one on success and zero if any of the input points were infinity.
+//
+// This function is not implemented for all curves. Add implementations as
+// needed.
+int ec_jacobian_to_affine_batch(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_AFFINE *out,
+                                const EC_RAW_POINT *in, size_t num);
+
+// ec_point_set_affine_coordinates sets |out|'s to a point with affine
+// coordinates |x| and |y|. It returns one if the point is on the curve and
+// zero otherwise. If the point is not on the curve, the value of |out| is
+// undefined.
+int ec_point_set_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_AFFINE *out,
+                                    const EC_FELEM *x, const EC_FELEM *y);
+
+// ec_point_mul_scalar sets |r| to |p| * |scalar|. Both inputs are considered
+// secret.
+int ec_point_mul_scalar(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
+                        const EC_RAW_POINT *p, const EC_SCALAR *scalar);
+
+// ec_point_mul_scalar_base sets |r| to generator * |scalar|. |scalar| is
+// treated as secret.
+int ec_point_mul_scalar_base(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
+                             const EC_SCALAR *scalar);
+
+// ec_point_mul_scalar_batch sets |r| to |p0| * |scalar0| + |p1| * |scalar1| +
+// |p2| * |scalar2|. |p2| may be NULL to skip that term.
+//
+// The inputs are treated as secret, however, this function leaks information
+// about whether intermediate computations add a point to itself. Callers must
+// ensure that discrete logs between |p0|, |p1|, and |p2| are uniformly
+// distributed and independent of the scalars, which should be uniformly
+// selected and not under the attackers control. This ensures the doubling case
+// will occur with negligible probability.
+//
+// This function is not implemented for all curves. Add implementations as
+// needed.
+//
+// TODO(davidben): This function does not use base point tables. For now, it is
+// only used with the generic |EC_GFp_mont_method| implementation which has
+// none. If generalizing to tuned curves, this may be useful. However, we still
+// must double up to the least efficient input, so precomputed tables can only
+// save table setup and allow a wider window size.
+int ec_point_mul_scalar_batch(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
+                              const EC_RAW_POINT *p0, const EC_SCALAR *scalar0,
+                              const EC_RAW_POINT *p1, const EC_SCALAR *scalar1,
+                              const EC_RAW_POINT *p2, const EC_SCALAR *scalar2);
+
+#define EC_MONT_PRECOMP_COMB_SIZE 5
+
+// An |EC_PRECOMP| stores precomputed information about a point, to optimize
+// repeated multiplications involving it. It is a union so different
+// |EC_METHOD|s can store different information in it.
+typedef union {
+  EC_AFFINE comb[(1 << EC_MONT_PRECOMP_COMB_SIZE) - 1];
+} EC_PRECOMP;
+
+// ec_init_precomp precomputes multiples of |p| and writes the result to |out|.
+// It returns one on success and zero on error. The resulting table may be used
+// with |ec_point_mul_scalar_precomp|. This function will fail if |p| is the
+// point at infinity.
+//
+// This function is not implemented for all curves. Add implementations as
+// needed.
+int ec_init_precomp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_PRECOMP *out,
+                    const EC_RAW_POINT *p);
+
+// ec_point_mul_scalar_precomp sets |r| to |p0| * |scalar0| + |p1| * |scalar1| +
+// |p2| * |scalar2|. |p1| or |p2| may be NULL to skip the corresponding term.
+// The points are represented as |EC_PRECOMP| and must be initialized with
+// |ec_init_precomp|. This function runs faster than |ec_point_mul_scalar_batch|
+// but requires setup work per input point, so it is only appropriate for points
+// which are used frequently.
+//
+// The inputs are treated as secret, however, this function leaks information
+// about whether intermediate computations add a point to itself. Callers must
+// ensure that discrete logs between |p0|, |p1|, and |p2| are uniformly
+// distributed and independent of the scalars, which should be uniformly
+// selected and not under the attackers control. This ensures the doubling case
+// will occur with negligible probability.
+//
+// This function is not implemented for all curves. Add implementations as
+// needed.
+//
+// TODO(davidben): This function does not use base point tables. For now, it is
+// only used with the generic |EC_GFp_mont_method| implementation which has
+// none. If generalizing to tuned curves, we should add a parameter for the base
+// point and arrange for the generic implementation to have base point tables
+// available.
+int ec_point_mul_scalar_precomp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
+                                const EC_PRECOMP *p0, const EC_SCALAR *scalar0,
+                                const EC_PRECOMP *p1, const EC_SCALAR *scalar1,
+                                const EC_PRECOMP *p2, const EC_SCALAR *scalar2);
+
+// ec_point_mul_scalar_public sets |r| to
+// generator * |g_scalar| + |p| * |p_scalar|. It assumes that the inputs are
+// public so there is no concern about leaking their values through timing.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int ec_point_mul_scalar_public(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                              EC_RAW_POINT *r,
+                                              const EC_SCALAR *g_scalar,
+                                              const EC_RAW_POINT *p,
+                                              const EC_SCALAR *p_scalar);
+
+// ec_point_mul_scalar_public_batch sets |r| to the sum of generator *
+// |g_scalar| and |points[i]| * |scalars[i]| where |points| and |scalars| have
+// |num| elements. It assumes that the inputs are public so there is no concern
+// about leaking their values through timing. |g_scalar| may be NULL to skip
+// that term.
+//
+// This function is not implemented for all curves. Add implementations as
+// needed.
+int ec_point_mul_scalar_public_batch(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
+                                     const EC_SCALAR *g_scalar,
+                                     const EC_RAW_POINT *points,
+                                     const EC_SCALAR *scalars, size_t num);
+
+// ec_point_select, in constant time, sets |out| to |a| if |mask| is all ones
+// and |b| if |mask| is all zeros.
+void ec_point_select(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *out, BN_ULONG mask,
+                     const EC_RAW_POINT *a, const EC_RAW_POINT *b);
+
+// ec_affine_select behaves like |ec_point_select| but acts on affine points.
+void ec_affine_select(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_AFFINE *out, BN_ULONG mask,
+                      const EC_AFFINE *a, const EC_AFFINE *b);
+
+// ec_precomp_select behaves like |ec_point_select| but acts on |EC_PRECOMP|.
+void ec_precomp_select(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_PRECOMP *out, BN_ULONG mask,
+                       const EC_PRECOMP *a, const EC_PRECOMP *b);
+
+// ec_cmp_x_coordinate compares the x (affine) coordinate of |p|, mod the group
+// order, with |r|. It returns one if the values match and zero if |p| is the
+// point at infinity of the values do not match.
+int ec_cmp_x_coordinate(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_RAW_POINT *p,
+                        const EC_SCALAR *r);
+
+// ec_get_x_coordinate_as_scalar sets |*out| to |p|'s x-coordinate, modulo
+// |group->order|. It returns one on success and zero if |p| is the point at
+// infinity.
+int ec_get_x_coordinate_as_scalar(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out,
+                                  const EC_RAW_POINT *p);
+
+// ec_get_x_coordinate_as_bytes writes |p|'s affine x-coordinate to |out|, which
+// must have at must |max_out| bytes. It sets |*out_len| to the number of bytes
+// written. The value is written big-endian and zero-padded to the size of the
+// field. This function returns one on success and zero on failure.
+int ec_get_x_coordinate_as_bytes(const EC_GROUP *group, uint8_t *out,
+                                 size_t *out_len, size_t max_out,
+                                 const EC_RAW_POINT *p);
+
+// ec_point_to_bytes behaves like |EC_POINT_point2oct| but takes an
+// |EC_AFFINE|.
+size_t ec_point_to_bytes(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_AFFINE *point,
+                         point_conversion_form_t form, uint8_t *buf,
+                         size_t len);
+
+// ec_point_from_uncompressed parses |in| as a point in uncompressed form and
+// sets the result to |out|. It returns one on success and zero if the input was
+// invalid.
+int ec_point_from_uncompressed(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_AFFINE *out,
+                               const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
+
+// ec_set_to_safe_point sets |out| to an arbitrary point on |group|, either the
+// generator or the point at infinity. This is used to guard against callers of
+// external APIs not checking the return value.
+void ec_set_to_safe_point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *out);
+
+// ec_affine_jacobian_equal returns one if |a| and |b| represent the same point
+// and zero otherwise. It treats both inputs as secret.
+int ec_affine_jacobian_equal(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_AFFINE *a,
+                             const EC_RAW_POINT *b);
+
+
+// Implementation details.
+
+struct ec_method_st {
+  int (*group_init)(EC_GROUP *);
+  void (*group_finish)(EC_GROUP *);
+  int (*group_set_curve)(EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
+                         const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
+
+  // point_get_affine_coordinates sets |*x| and |*y| to the affine coordinates
+  // of |p|. Either |x| or |y| may be NULL to omit it. It returns one on success
+  // and zero if |p| is the point at infinity.
+  int (*point_get_affine_coordinates)(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_RAW_POINT *p,
+                                      EC_FELEM *x, EC_FELEM *y);
+
+  // jacobian_to_affine_batch implements |ec_jacobian_to_affine_batch|.
+  int (*jacobian_to_affine_batch)(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_AFFINE *out,
+                                  const EC_RAW_POINT *in, size_t num);
+
+  // add sets |r| to |a| + |b|.
+  void (*add)(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r, const EC_RAW_POINT *a,
+              const EC_RAW_POINT *b);
+  // dbl sets |r| to |a| + |a|.
+  void (*dbl)(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r, const EC_RAW_POINT *a);
+
+  // mul sets |r| to |scalar|*|p|.
+  void (*mul)(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r, const EC_RAW_POINT *p,
+              const EC_SCALAR *scalar);
+  // mul_base sets |r| to |scalar|*generator.
+  void (*mul_base)(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
+                   const EC_SCALAR *scalar);
+  // mul_batch implements |ec_mul_scalar_batch|.
+  void (*mul_batch)(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
+                    const EC_RAW_POINT *p0, const EC_SCALAR *scalar0,
+                    const EC_RAW_POINT *p1, const EC_SCALAR *scalar1,
+                    const EC_RAW_POINT *p2, const EC_SCALAR *scalar2);
+  // mul_public sets |r| to |g_scalar|*generator + |p_scalar|*|p|. It assumes
+  // that the inputs are public so there is no concern about leaking their
+  // values through timing.
+  //
+  // This function may be omitted if |mul_public_batch| is provided.
+  void (*mul_public)(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
+                     const EC_SCALAR *g_scalar, const EC_RAW_POINT *p,
+                     const EC_SCALAR *p_scalar);
+  // mul_public_batch implements |ec_point_mul_scalar_public_batch|.
+  int (*mul_public_batch)(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
+                          const EC_SCALAR *g_scalar, const EC_RAW_POINT *points,
+                          const EC_SCALAR *scalars, size_t num);
+
+  // init_precomp implements |ec_init_precomp|.
+  int (*init_precomp)(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_PRECOMP *out,
+                      const EC_RAW_POINT *p);
+  // mul_precomp implements |ec_point_mul_scalar_precomp|.
+  void (*mul_precomp)(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
+                      const EC_PRECOMP *p0, const EC_SCALAR *scalar0,
+                      const EC_PRECOMP *p1, const EC_SCALAR *scalar1,
+                      const EC_PRECOMP *p2, const EC_SCALAR *scalar2);
+
+  // felem_mul and felem_sqr implement multiplication and squaring,
+  // respectively, so that the generic |EC_POINT_add| and |EC_POINT_dbl|
+  // implementations can work both with |EC_GFp_mont_method| and the tuned
+  // operations.
+  //
+  // TODO(davidben): This constrains |EC_FELEM|'s internal representation, adds
+  // many indirect calls in the middle of the generic code, and a bunch of
+  // conversions. If p224-64.c were easily convertable to Montgomery form, we
+  // could say |EC_FELEM| is always in Montgomery form. If we routed the rest of
+  // simple.c to |EC_METHOD|, we could give |EC_POINT| an |EC_METHOD|-specific
+  // representation and say |EC_FELEM| is purely a |EC_GFp_mont_method| type.
+  void (*felem_mul)(const EC_GROUP *, EC_FELEM *r, const EC_FELEM *a,
+                    const EC_FELEM *b);
+  void (*felem_sqr)(const EC_GROUP *, EC_FELEM *r, const EC_FELEM *a);
+
+  void (*felem_to_bytes)(const EC_GROUP *group, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+                         const EC_FELEM *in);
+  int (*felem_from_bytes)(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out,
+                          const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
+
+  // felem_reduce sets |out| to |words|, reduced modulo the field size, p.
+  // |words| must be less than p^2. |num| must be at most twice the width of p.
+  // This function treats |words| as secret.
+  //
+  // This function is only used in hash-to-curve and may be omitted in curves
+  // that do not support it.
+  void (*felem_reduce)(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out,
+                       const BN_ULONG *words, size_t num);
+
+  // felem_exp sets |out| to |a|^|exp|. It treats |a| is secret but |exp| as
+  // public.
+  //
+  // This function is used in hash-to-curve and may be NULL in curves not used
+  // with hash-to-curve.
+  void (*felem_exp)(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out, const EC_FELEM *a,
+                    const BN_ULONG *exp, size_t num_exp);
+
+  // scalar_inv0_montgomery implements |ec_scalar_inv0_montgomery|.
+  void (*scalar_inv0_montgomery)(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out,
+                                 const EC_SCALAR *in);
+
+  // scalar_to_montgomery_inv_vartime implements
+  // |ec_scalar_to_montgomery_inv_vartime|.
+  int (*scalar_to_montgomery_inv_vartime)(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out,
+                                          const EC_SCALAR *in);
+
+  // cmp_x_coordinate compares the x (affine) coordinate of |p|, mod the group
+  // order, with |r|. It returns one if the values match and zero if |p| is the
+  // point at infinity of the values do not match.
+  int (*cmp_x_coordinate)(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_RAW_POINT *p,
+                          const EC_SCALAR *r);
+} /* EC_METHOD */;
+
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_mont_method(void);
+
+struct ec_group_st {
+  const EC_METHOD *meth;
+
+  // Unlike all other |EC_POINT|s, |generator| does not own |generator->group|
+  // to avoid a reference cycle. Additionally, Z is guaranteed to be one, so X
+  // and Y are suitable for use as an |EC_AFFINE|.
+  EC_POINT *generator;
+  BIGNUM order;
+
+  int curve_name;  // optional NID for named curve
+
+  BN_MONT_CTX *order_mont;  // data for ECDSA inverse
+
+  // The following members are handled by the method functions,
+  // even if they appear generic
+
+  BIGNUM field;  // For curves over GF(p), this is the modulus.
+
+  EC_FELEM a, b;  // Curve coefficients.
+
+  // a_is_minus3 is one if |a| is -3 mod |field| and zero otherwise. Point
+  // arithmetic is optimized for -3.
+  int a_is_minus3;
+
+  // field_greater_than_order is one if |field| is greate than |order| and zero
+  // otherwise.
+  int field_greater_than_order;
+
+  // field_minus_order, if |field_greater_than_order| is true, is |field| minus
+  // |order| represented as an |EC_FELEM|. Otherwise, it is zero.
+  //
+  // Note: unlike |EC_FELEM|s used as intermediate values internal to the
+  // |EC_METHOD|, this value is not encoded in Montgomery form.
+  EC_FELEM field_minus_order;
+
+  CRYPTO_refcount_t references;
+
+  BN_MONT_CTX *mont;  // Montgomery structure.
+
+  EC_FELEM one;  // The value one.
+} /* EC_GROUP */;
+
+struct ec_point_st {
+  // group is an owning reference to |group|, unless this is
+  // |group->generator|.
+  EC_GROUP *group;
+  // raw is the group-specific point data. Functions that take |EC_POINT|
+  // typically check consistency with |EC_GROUP| while functions that take
+  // |EC_RAW_POINT| do not. Thus accesses to this field should be externally
+  // checked for consistency.
+  EC_RAW_POINT raw;
+} /* EC_POINT */;
+
+EC_GROUP *ec_group_new(const EC_METHOD *meth);
+
+void ec_GFp_mont_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
+                     const EC_RAW_POINT *p, const EC_SCALAR *scalar);
+void ec_GFp_mont_mul_base(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
+                          const EC_SCALAR *scalar);
+void ec_GFp_mont_mul_batch(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
+                           const EC_RAW_POINT *p0, const EC_SCALAR *scalar0,
+                           const EC_RAW_POINT *p1, const EC_SCALAR *scalar1,
+                           const EC_RAW_POINT *p2, const EC_SCALAR *scalar2);
+int ec_GFp_mont_init_precomp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_PRECOMP *out,
+                             const EC_RAW_POINT *p);
+void ec_GFp_mont_mul_precomp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
+                             const EC_PRECOMP *p0, const EC_SCALAR *scalar0,
+                             const EC_PRECOMP *p1, const EC_SCALAR *scalar1,
+                             const EC_PRECOMP *p2, const EC_SCALAR *scalar2);
+
+// ec_compute_wNAF writes the modified width-(w+1) Non-Adjacent Form (wNAF) of
+// |scalar| to |out|. |out| must have room for |bits| + 1 elements, each of
+// which will be either zero or odd with an absolute value less than  2^w
+// satisfying
+//     scalar = \sum_j out[j]*2^j
+// where at most one of any  w+1  consecutive digits is non-zero
+// with the exception that the most significant digit may be only
+// w-1 zeros away from that next non-zero digit.
+void ec_compute_wNAF(const EC_GROUP *group, int8_t *out,
+                     const EC_SCALAR *scalar, size_t bits, int w);
+
+int ec_GFp_mont_mul_public_batch(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
+                                 const EC_SCALAR *g_scalar,
+                                 const EC_RAW_POINT *points,
+                                 const EC_SCALAR *scalars, size_t num);
+
+// method functions in simple.c
+int ec_GFp_simple_group_init(EC_GROUP *);
+void ec_GFp_simple_group_finish(EC_GROUP *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
+                                  const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a,
+                                  BIGNUM *b);
+void ec_GFp_simple_point_init(EC_RAW_POINT *);
+void ec_GFp_simple_point_copy(EC_RAW_POINT *, const EC_RAW_POINT *);
+void ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *, EC_RAW_POINT *);
+void ec_GFp_mont_add(const EC_GROUP *, EC_RAW_POINT *r, const EC_RAW_POINT *a,
+                     const EC_RAW_POINT *b);
+void ec_GFp_mont_dbl(const EC_GROUP *, EC_RAW_POINT *r, const EC_RAW_POINT *a);
+void ec_GFp_simple_invert(const EC_GROUP *, EC_RAW_POINT *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_RAW_POINT *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_RAW_POINT *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_points_equal(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_RAW_POINT *a,
+                               const EC_RAW_POINT *b);
+void ec_simple_scalar_inv0_montgomery(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *r,
+                                      const EC_SCALAR *a);
+
+int ec_simple_scalar_to_montgomery_inv_vartime(const EC_GROUP *group,
+                                               EC_SCALAR *r,
+                                               const EC_SCALAR *a);
+
+int ec_GFp_simple_cmp_x_coordinate(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_RAW_POINT *p,
+                                   const EC_SCALAR *r);
+
+void ec_GFp_simple_felem_to_bytes(const EC_GROUP *group, uint8_t *out,
+                                  size_t *out_len, const EC_FELEM *in);
+int ec_GFp_simple_felem_from_bytes(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out,
+                                   const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
+
+// method functions in montgomery.c
+int ec_GFp_mont_group_init(EC_GROUP *);
+int ec_GFp_mont_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
+                                const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
+void ec_GFp_mont_group_finish(EC_GROUP *);
+void ec_GFp_mont_felem_mul(const EC_GROUP *, EC_FELEM *r, const EC_FELEM *a,
+                           const EC_FELEM *b);
+void ec_GFp_mont_felem_sqr(const EC_GROUP *, EC_FELEM *r, const EC_FELEM *a);
+
+void ec_GFp_mont_felem_to_bytes(const EC_GROUP *group, uint8_t *out,
+                                size_t *out_len, const EC_FELEM *in);
+int ec_GFp_mont_felem_from_bytes(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_FELEM *out,
+                                 const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
+
+void ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(crypto_word_t *sign, crypto_word_t *digit,
+                                     crypto_word_t in);
+
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp224_method(void);
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp256_method(void);
+
+// EC_GFp_nistz256_method is a GFp method using montgomery multiplication, with
+// x86-64 optimized P256. See http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/816.
+const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistz256_method(void);
+
+// An EC_WRAPPED_SCALAR is an |EC_SCALAR| with a parallel |BIGNUM|
+// representation. It exists to support the |EC_KEY_get0_private_key| API.
+typedef struct {
+  BIGNUM bignum;
+  EC_SCALAR scalar;
+} EC_WRAPPED_SCALAR;
+
+struct ec_key_st {
+  EC_GROUP *group;
+
+  // Ideally |pub_key| would be an |EC_AFFINE| so serializing it does not pay an
+  // inversion each time, but the |EC_KEY_get0_public_key| API implies public
+  // keys are stored in an |EC_POINT|-compatible form.
+  EC_POINT *pub_key;
+  EC_WRAPPED_SCALAR *priv_key;
+
+  // fixed_k may contain a specific value of 'k', to be used in ECDSA signing.
+  // This is only for the FIPS power-on tests.
+  BIGNUM *fixed_k;
+
+  unsigned int enc_flag;
+  point_conversion_form_t conv_form;
+
+  CRYPTO_refcount_t references;
+
+  ECDSA_METHOD *ecdsa_meth;
+
+  CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+} /* EC_KEY */;
+
+struct built_in_curve {
+  int nid;
+  const uint8_t *oid;
+  uint8_t oid_len;
+  // comment is a human-readable string describing the curve.
+  const char *comment;
+  // param_len is the number of bytes needed to store a field element.
+  uint8_t param_len;
+  // params points to an array of 6*|param_len| bytes which hold the field
+  // elements of the following (in big-endian order): prime, a, b, generator x,
+  // generator y, order.
+  const uint8_t *params;
+  const EC_METHOD *method;
+};
+
+#define OPENSSL_NUM_BUILT_IN_CURVES 4
+
+struct built_in_curves {
+  struct built_in_curve curves[OPENSSL_NUM_BUILT_IN_CURVES];
+};
+
+// OPENSSL_built_in_curves returns a pointer to static information about
+// standard curves. The array is terminated with an entry where |nid| is
+// |NID_undef|.
+const struct built_in_curves *OPENSSL_built_in_curves(void);
+
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+}  // extern C
+#endif
+
+#endif  // OPENSSL_HEADER_EC_INTERNAL_H