grpc 1.21.0 → 1.32.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8_x509.c

@@ -0,0 +1,1336 @@
+/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+ * project 1999.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+
+#include <openssl/pkcs8.h>
+
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../bytestring/internal.h"
+#include "../internal.h"
+
+
+int pkcs12_iterations_acceptable(uint64_t iterations) {
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+  static const uint64_t kIterationsLimit = 2048;
+#else
+  // Windows imposes a limit of 600K. Mozilla say: “so them increasing
+  // maximum to something like 100M or 1G (to have few decades of breathing
+  // room) would be very welcome”[1]. So here we set the limit to 100M.
+  //
+  // [1] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1436873#c14
+  static const uint64_t kIterationsLimit = 100 * 1000000;
+#endif
+
+  return 0 < iterations && iterations <= kIterationsLimit;
+}
+
+// Minor tweak to operation: zero private key data
+static int pkey_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                   void *exarg) {
+  // Since the structure must still be valid use ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE
+  if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) {
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *key = (PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *)*pval;
+    if (key->pkey) {
+      OPENSSL_cleanse(key->pkey->data, key->pkey->length);
+    }
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkey_cb) = {
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkeyalg, X509_ALGOR),
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+  ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, attributes, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 0)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO)
+
+int PKCS8_pkey_set0(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *priv, ASN1_OBJECT *aobj, int version,
+                    int ptype, void *pval, uint8_t *penc, int penclen) {
+  if (version >= 0 &&
+      !ASN1_INTEGER_set(priv->version, version)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(priv->pkeyalg, aobj, ptype, pval)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (penc != NULL) {
+    ASN1_STRING_set0(priv->pkey, penc, penclen);
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int PKCS8_pkey_get0(ASN1_OBJECT **ppkalg, const uint8_t **pk, int *ppklen,
+                    X509_ALGOR **pa, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) {
+  if (ppkalg) {
+    *ppkalg = p8->pkeyalg->algorithm;
+  }
+  if (pk) {
+    *pk = ASN1_STRING_data(p8->pkey);
+    *ppklen = ASN1_STRING_length(p8->pkey);
+  }
+  if (pa) {
+    *pa = p8->pkeyalg;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKCS82PKEY(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) {
+  uint8_t *der = NULL;
+  int der_len = i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(p8, &der);
+  if (der_len < 0) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  CBS cbs;
+  CBS_init(&cbs, der, (size_t)der_len);
+  EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_parse_private_key(&cbs);
+  if (ret == NULL || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+    OPENSSL_free(der);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_free(der);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+  CBB cbb;
+  uint8_t *der = NULL;
+  size_t der_len;
+  if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
+      !EVP_marshal_private_key(&cbb, pkey) ||
+      !CBB_finish(&cbb, &der, &der_len) ||
+      der_len > LONG_MAX) {
+    CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  const uint8_t *p = der;
+  PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, (long)der_len);
+  if (p8 == NULL || p != der + der_len) {
+    PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_free(der);
+  return p8;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(der);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *PKCS8_decrypt(X509_SIG *pkcs8, const char *pass,
+                                   int pass_len_in) {
+  size_t pass_len;
+  if (pass_len_in == -1 && pass != NULL) {
+    pass_len = strlen(pass);
+  } else {
+    pass_len = (size_t)pass_len_in;
+  }
+
+  PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *ret = NULL;
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+  uint8_t *in = NULL;
+
+  // Convert the legacy ASN.1 object to a byte string.
+  int in_len = i2d_X509_SIG(pkcs8, &in);
+  if (in_len < 0) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  CBS cbs;
+  CBS_init(&cbs, in, in_len);
+  pkey = PKCS8_parse_encrypted_private_key(&cbs, pass, pass_len);
+  if (pkey == NULL || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(pkey);
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(in);
+  EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+X509_SIG *PKCS8_encrypt(int pbe_nid, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const char *pass,
+                        int pass_len_in, const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len,
+                        int iterations, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf) {
+  size_t pass_len;
+  if (pass_len_in == -1 && pass != NULL) {
+    pass_len = strlen(pass);
+  } else {
+    pass_len = (size_t)pass_len_in;
+  }
+
+  // Parse out the private key.
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf);
+  if (pkey == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  X509_SIG *ret = NULL;
+  uint8_t *der = NULL;
+  size_t der_len;
+  CBB cbb;
+  if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 128) ||
+      !PKCS8_marshal_encrypted_private_key(&cbb, pbe_nid, cipher, pass,
+                                           pass_len, salt, salt_len, iterations,
+                                           pkey) ||
+      !CBB_finish(&cbb, &der, &der_len)) {
+    CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // Convert back to legacy ASN.1 objects.
+  const uint8_t *ptr = der;
+  ret = d2i_X509_SIG(NULL, &ptr, der_len);
+  if (ret == NULL || ptr != der + der_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    X509_SIG_free(ret);
+    ret = NULL;
+  }
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(der);
+  EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+struct pkcs12_context {
+  EVP_PKEY **out_key;
+  STACK_OF(X509) *out_certs;
+  const char *password;
+  size_t password_len;
+};
+
+// PKCS12_handle_sequence parses a BER-encoded SEQUENCE of elements in a PKCS#12
+// structure.
+static int PKCS12_handle_sequence(
+    CBS *sequence, struct pkcs12_context *ctx,
+    int (*handle_element)(CBS *cbs, struct pkcs12_context *ctx)) {
+  uint8_t *storage = NULL;
+  CBS in;
+  int ret = 0;
+
+  // Although a BER->DER conversion is done at the beginning of |PKCS12_parse|,
+  // the ASN.1 data gets wrapped in OCTETSTRINGs and/or encrypted and the
+  // conversion cannot see through those wrappings. So each time we step
+  // through one we need to convert to DER again.
+  if (!CBS_asn1_ber_to_der(sequence, &in, &storage)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  CBS child;
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(&in, &child, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      CBS_len(&in) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  while (CBS_len(&child) > 0) {
+    CBS element;
+    if (!CBS_get_asn1(&child, &element, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!handle_element(&element, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(storage);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+// 1.2.840.113549.1.12.10.1.1
+static const uint8_t kKeyBag[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d,
+                                  0x01, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0x01, 0x01};
+
+// 1.2.840.113549.1.12.10.1.2
+static const uint8_t kPKCS8ShroudedKeyBag[] = {
+    0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0x01, 0x02};
+
+// 1.2.840.113549.1.12.10.1.3
+static const uint8_t kCertBag[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d,
+                                   0x01, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0x01, 0x03};
+
+// 1.2.840.113549.1.9.20
+static const uint8_t kFriendlyName[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
+                                        0x0d, 0x01, 0x09, 0x14};
+
+// 1.2.840.113549.1.9.21
+static const uint8_t kLocalKeyID[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
+                                      0x0d, 0x01, 0x09, 0x15};
+
+// 1.2.840.113549.1.9.22.1
+static const uint8_t kX509Certificate[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
+                                           0x0d, 0x01, 0x09, 0x16, 0x01};
+
+// parse_bag_attributes parses the bagAttributes field of a SafeBag structure.
+// It sets |*out_friendly_name| to a newly-allocated copy of the friendly name,
+// encoded as a UTF-8 string, or NULL if there is none. It returns one on
+// success and zero on error.
+static int parse_bag_attributes(CBS *attrs, uint8_t **out_friendly_name,
+                                size_t *out_friendly_name_len) {
+  *out_friendly_name = NULL;
+  *out_friendly_name_len = 0;
+
+  // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7292#section-4.2.
+  while (CBS_len(attrs) != 0) {
+    CBS attr, oid, values;
+    if (!CBS_get_asn1(attrs, &attr, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&attr, &oid, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&attr, &values, CBS_ASN1_SET) ||
+        CBS_len(&attr) != 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (CBS_mem_equal(&oid, kFriendlyName, sizeof(kFriendlyName))) {
+      // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2985, section 5.5.1.
+      CBS value;
+      if (*out_friendly_name != NULL ||
+          !CBS_get_asn1(&values, &value, CBS_ASN1_BMPSTRING) ||
+          CBS_len(&values) != 0 ||
+          CBS_len(&value) == 0) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+        goto err;
+      }
+      // Convert the friendly name to UTF-8.
+      CBB cbb;
+      if (!CBB_init(&cbb, CBS_len(&value))) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+      }
+      while (CBS_len(&value) != 0) {
+        uint32_t c;
+        if (!cbs_get_ucs2_be(&value, &c) ||
+            !cbb_add_utf8(&cbb, c)) {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_INVALID_CHARACTERS);
+          CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+          goto err;
+        }
+      }
+      if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, out_friendly_name, out_friendly_name_len)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(*out_friendly_name);
+  *out_friendly_name = NULL;
+  *out_friendly_name_len = 0;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+// PKCS12_handle_safe_bag parses a single SafeBag element in a PKCS#12
+// structure.
+static int PKCS12_handle_safe_bag(CBS *safe_bag, struct pkcs12_context *ctx) {
+  CBS bag_id, wrapped_value, bag_attrs;
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(safe_bag, &bag_id, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+      !CBS_get_asn1(safe_bag, &wrapped_value,
+                    CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (CBS_len(safe_bag) == 0) {
+    CBS_init(&bag_attrs, NULL, 0);
+  } else if (!CBS_get_asn1(safe_bag, &bag_attrs, CBS_ASN1_SET) ||
+             CBS_len(safe_bag) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  const int is_key_bag = CBS_mem_equal(&bag_id, kKeyBag, sizeof(kKeyBag));
+  const int is_shrouded_key_bag = CBS_mem_equal(&bag_id, kPKCS8ShroudedKeyBag,
+                                                sizeof(kPKCS8ShroudedKeyBag));
+  if (is_key_bag || is_shrouded_key_bag) {
+    // See RFC 7292, section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.
+    if (*ctx->out_key) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_MULTIPLE_PRIVATE_KEYS_IN_PKCS12);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey =
+        is_key_bag ? EVP_parse_private_key(&wrapped_value)
+                   : PKCS8_parse_encrypted_private_key(
+                         &wrapped_value, ctx->password, ctx->password_len);
+    if (pkey == NULL) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (CBS_len(&wrapped_value) != 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    *ctx->out_key = pkey;
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (CBS_mem_equal(&bag_id, kCertBag, sizeof(kCertBag))) {
+    // See RFC 7292, section 4.2.3.
+    CBS cert_bag, cert_type, wrapped_cert, cert;
+    if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_value, &cert_bag, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&cert_bag, &cert_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&cert_bag, &wrapped_cert,
+                      CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_cert, &cert, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    // Skip unknown certificate types.
+    if (!CBS_mem_equal(&cert_type, kX509Certificate,
+                       sizeof(kX509Certificate))) {
+      return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (CBS_len(&cert) > LONG_MAX) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    const uint8_t *inp = CBS_data(&cert);
+    X509 *x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &inp, (long)CBS_len(&cert));
+    if (!x509) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (inp != CBS_data(&cert) + CBS_len(&cert)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      X509_free(x509);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *friendly_name;
+    size_t friendly_name_len;
+    if (!parse_bag_attributes(&bag_attrs, &friendly_name, &friendly_name_len)) {
+      X509_free(x509);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    int ok = friendly_name_len == 0 ||
+             X509_alias_set1(x509, friendly_name, friendly_name_len);
+    OPENSSL_free(friendly_name);
+    if (!ok ||
+        0 == sk_X509_push(ctx->out_certs, x509)) {
+      X509_free(x509);
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  // Unknown element type - ignore it.
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// 1.2.840.113549.1.7.1
+static const uint8_t kPKCS7Data[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
+                                     0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x01};
+
+// 1.2.840.113549.1.7.6
+static const uint8_t kPKCS7EncryptedData[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
+                                              0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x06};
+
+// PKCS12_handle_content_info parses a single PKCS#7 ContentInfo element in a
+// PKCS#12 structure.
+static int PKCS12_handle_content_info(CBS *content_info,
+                                      struct pkcs12_context *ctx) {
+  CBS content_type, wrapped_contents, contents;
+  int ret = 0;
+  uint8_t *storage = NULL;
+
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(content_info, &content_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+      !CBS_get_asn1(content_info, &wrapped_contents,
+                        CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0) ||
+      CBS_len(content_info) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (CBS_mem_equal(&content_type, kPKCS7EncryptedData,
+                    sizeof(kPKCS7EncryptedData))) {
+    // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-13.
+    //
+    // PKCS#7 encrypted data inside a PKCS#12 structure is generally an
+    // encrypted certificate bag and it's generally encrypted with 40-bit
+    // RC2-CBC.
+    CBS version_bytes, eci, contents_type, ai, encrypted_contents;
+    uint8_t *out;
+    size_t out_len;
+
+    if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_contents, &contents, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&contents, &version_bytes, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
+        // EncryptedContentInfo, see
+        // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-10.1
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&contents, &eci, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&eci, &contents_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+        // AlgorithmIdentifier, see
+        // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.1.1.2
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&eci, &ai, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1_implicit_string(
+            &eci, &encrypted_contents, &storage,
+            CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!CBS_mem_equal(&contents_type, kPKCS7Data, sizeof(kPKCS7Data))) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!pkcs8_pbe_decrypt(&out, &out_len, &ai, ctx->password,
+                           ctx->password_len, CBS_data(&encrypted_contents),
+                           CBS_len(&encrypted_contents))) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    CBS safe_contents;
+    CBS_init(&safe_contents, out, out_len);
+    ret = PKCS12_handle_sequence(&safe_contents, ctx, PKCS12_handle_safe_bag);
+    OPENSSL_free(out);
+  } else if (CBS_mem_equal(&content_type, kPKCS7Data, sizeof(kPKCS7Data))) {
+    CBS octet_string_contents;
+
+    if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_contents, &octet_string_contents,
+                      CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = PKCS12_handle_sequence(&octet_string_contents, ctx,
+                                 PKCS12_handle_safe_bag);
+  } else {
+    // Unknown element type - ignore it.
+    ret = 1;
+  }
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(storage);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int pkcs12_check_mac(int *out_mac_ok, const char *password,
+                            size_t password_len, const CBS *salt,
+                            unsigned iterations, const EVP_MD *md,
+                            const CBS *authsafes, const CBS *expected_mac) {
+  int ret = 0;
+  uint8_t hmac_key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  if (!pkcs12_key_gen(password, password_len, CBS_data(salt), CBS_len(salt),
+                      PKCS12_MAC_ID, iterations, EVP_MD_size(md), hmac_key,
+                      md)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  unsigned hmac_len;
+  if (NULL == HMAC(md, hmac_key, EVP_MD_size(md), CBS_data(authsafes),
+                   CBS_len(authsafes), hmac, &hmac_len)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  *out_mac_ok = CBS_mem_equal(expected_mac, hmac, hmac_len);
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+  *out_mac_ok = 1;
+#endif
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key));
+  return ret;
+}
+
+
+int PKCS12_get_key_and_certs(EVP_PKEY **out_key, STACK_OF(X509) *out_certs,
+                             CBS *ber_in, const char *password) {
+  uint8_t *storage = NULL;
+  CBS in, pfx, mac_data, authsafe, content_type, wrapped_authsafes, authsafes;
+  uint64_t version;
+  int ret = 0;
+  struct pkcs12_context ctx;
+  const size_t original_out_certs_len = sk_X509_num(out_certs);
+
+  // The input may be in BER format.
+  if (!CBS_asn1_ber_to_der(ber_in, &in, &storage)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  *out_key = NULL;
+  OPENSSL_memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+
+  // See ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-12/pkcs-12v1.pdf, section
+  // four.
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(&in, &pfx, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      CBS_len(&in) != 0 ||
+      !CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&pfx, &version)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (version < 3) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_VERSION);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(&pfx, &authsafe, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (CBS_len(&pfx) == 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_MISSING_MAC);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(&pfx, &mac_data, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // authsafe is a PKCS#7 ContentInfo. See
+  // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-7.
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(&authsafe, &content_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+      !CBS_get_asn1(&authsafe, &wrapped_authsafes,
+                        CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // The content type can either be data or signedData. The latter indicates
+  // that it's signed by a public key, which isn't supported.
+  if (!CBS_mem_equal(&content_type, kPKCS7Data, sizeof(kPKCS7Data))) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_PKCS12_PUBLIC_KEY_INTEGRITY_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_authsafes, &authsafes, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ctx.out_key = out_key;
+  ctx.out_certs = out_certs;
+  ctx.password = password;
+  ctx.password_len = password != NULL ? strlen(password) : 0;
+
+  // Verify the MAC.
+  {
+    CBS mac, salt, expected_mac;
+    if (!CBS_get_asn1(&mac_data, &mac, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    const EVP_MD *md = EVP_parse_digest_algorithm(&mac);
+    if (md == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!CBS_get_asn1(&mac, &expected_mac, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+        !CBS_get_asn1(&mac_data, &salt, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    // The iteration count is optional and the default is one.
+    uint64_t iterations = 1;
+    if (CBS_len(&mac_data) > 0) {
+      if (!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&mac_data, &iterations) ||
+          !pkcs12_iterations_acceptable(iterations)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+
+    int mac_ok;
+    if (!pkcs12_check_mac(&mac_ok, ctx.password, ctx.password_len, &salt,
+                          iterations, md, &authsafes, &expected_mac)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (!mac_ok && ctx.password_len == 0) {
+      // PKCS#12 encodes passwords as NUL-terminated UCS-2, so the empty
+      // password is encoded as {0, 0}. Some implementations use the empty byte
+      // array for "no password". OpenSSL considers a non-NULL password as {0,
+      // 0} and a NULL password as {}. It then, in high-level PKCS#12 parsing
+      // code, tries both options. We match this behavior.
+      ctx.password = ctx.password != NULL ? NULL : "";
+      if (!pkcs12_check_mac(&mac_ok, ctx.password, ctx.password_len, &salt,
+                            iterations, md, &authsafes, &expected_mac)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+    if (!mac_ok) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_INCORRECT_PASSWORD);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // authsafes contains a series of PKCS#7 ContentInfos.
+  if (!PKCS12_handle_sequence(&authsafes, &ctx, PKCS12_handle_content_info)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_free(storage);
+  if (!ret) {
+    EVP_PKEY_free(*out_key);
+    *out_key = NULL;
+    while (sk_X509_num(out_certs) > original_out_certs_len) {
+      X509 *x509 = sk_X509_pop(out_certs);
+      X509_free(x509);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+void PKCS12_PBE_add(void) {}
+
+struct pkcs12_st {
+  uint8_t *ber_bytes;
+  size_t ber_len;
+};
+
+PKCS12 *d2i_PKCS12(PKCS12 **out_p12, const uint8_t **ber_bytes,
+                   size_t ber_len) {
+  PKCS12 *p12;
+
+  p12 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(PKCS12));
+  if (!p12) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  p12->ber_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(ber_len);
+  if (!p12->ber_bytes) {
+    OPENSSL_free(p12);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(p12->ber_bytes, *ber_bytes, ber_len);
+  p12->ber_len = ber_len;
+  *ber_bytes += ber_len;
+
+  if (out_p12) {
+    PKCS12_free(*out_p12);
+
+    *out_p12 = p12;
+  }
+
+  return p12;
+}
+
+PKCS12* d2i_PKCS12_bio(BIO *bio, PKCS12 **out_p12) {
+  size_t used = 0;
+  BUF_MEM *buf;
+  const uint8_t *dummy;
+  static const size_t kMaxSize = 256 * 1024;
+  PKCS12 *ret = NULL;
+
+  buf = BUF_MEM_new();
+  if (buf == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  if (BUF_MEM_grow(buf, 8192) == 0) {
+    goto out;
+  }
+
+  for (;;) {
+    int n = BIO_read(bio, &buf->data[used], buf->length - used);
+    if (n < 0) {
+      if (used == 0) {
+        goto out;
+      }
+      // Workaround a bug in node.js. It uses a memory BIO for this in the wrong
+      // mode.
+      n = 0;
+    }
+
+    if (n == 0) {
+      break;
+    }
+    used += n;
+
+    if (used < buf->length) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    if (buf->length > kMaxSize ||
+        BUF_MEM_grow(buf, buf->length * 2) == 0) {
+      goto out;
+    }
+  }
+
+  dummy = (uint8_t*) buf->data;
+  ret = d2i_PKCS12(out_p12, &dummy, used);
+
+out:
+  BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+PKCS12* d2i_PKCS12_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS12 **out_p12) {
+  BIO *bio;
+  PKCS12 *ret;
+
+  bio = BIO_new_fp(fp, 0 /* don't take ownership */);
+  if (!bio) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  ret = d2i_PKCS12_bio(bio, out_p12);
+  BIO_free(bio);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int i2d_PKCS12(const PKCS12 *p12, uint8_t **out) {
+  if (p12->ber_len > INT_MAX) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (out == NULL) {
+    return (int)p12->ber_len;
+  }
+
+  if (*out == NULL) {
+    *out = OPENSSL_malloc(p12->ber_len);
+    if (*out == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return -1;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(*out, p12->ber_bytes, p12->ber_len);
+  } else {
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(*out, p12->ber_bytes, p12->ber_len);
+    *out += p12->ber_len;
+  }
+  return (int)p12->ber_len;
+}
+
+int i2d_PKCS12_bio(BIO *bio, const PKCS12 *p12) {
+  return BIO_write_all(bio, p12->ber_bytes, p12->ber_len);
+}
+
+int i2d_PKCS12_fp(FILE *fp, const PKCS12 *p12) {
+  BIO *bio = BIO_new_fp(fp, 0 /* don't take ownership */);
+  if (bio == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int ret = i2d_PKCS12_bio(bio, p12);
+  BIO_free(bio);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int PKCS12_parse(const PKCS12 *p12, const char *password, EVP_PKEY **out_pkey,
+                 X509 **out_cert, STACK_OF(X509) **out_ca_certs) {
+  CBS ber_bytes;
+  STACK_OF(X509) *ca_certs = NULL;
+  char ca_certs_alloced = 0;
+
+  if (out_ca_certs != NULL && *out_ca_certs != NULL) {
+    ca_certs = *out_ca_certs;
+  }
+
+  if (!ca_certs) {
+    ca_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
+    if (ca_certs == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    ca_certs_alloced = 1;
+  }
+
+  CBS_init(&ber_bytes, p12->ber_bytes, p12->ber_len);
+  if (!PKCS12_get_key_and_certs(out_pkey, ca_certs, &ber_bytes, password)) {
+    if (ca_certs_alloced) {
+      sk_X509_free(ca_certs);
+    }
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // OpenSSL selects the last certificate which matches the private key as
+  // |out_cert|.
+  //
+  // TODO(davidben): OpenSSL additionally reverses the order of the
+  // certificates, which was likely originally a bug, but may be a feature by
+  // now. See https://crbug.com/boringssl/250 and
+  // https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/6698.
+  *out_cert = NULL;
+  size_t num_certs = sk_X509_num(ca_certs);
+  if (*out_pkey != NULL && num_certs > 0) {
+    for (size_t i = num_certs - 1; i < num_certs; i--) {
+      X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ca_certs, i);
+      if (X509_check_private_key(cert, *out_pkey)) {
+        *out_cert = cert;
+        sk_X509_delete(ca_certs, i);
+        break;
+      }
+      ERR_clear_error();
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (out_ca_certs) {
+    *out_ca_certs = ca_certs;
+  } else {
+    sk_X509_pop_free(ca_certs, X509_free);
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int PKCS12_verify_mac(const PKCS12 *p12, const char *password,
+                      int password_len) {
+  if (password == NULL) {
+    if (password_len != 0) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  } else if (password_len != -1 &&
+             (password[password_len] != 0 ||
+              OPENSSL_memchr(password, 0, password_len) != NULL)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+  X509 *cert = NULL;
+  if (!PKCS12_parse(p12, password, &pkey, &cert, NULL)) {
+    ERR_clear_error();
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+  X509_free(cert);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// add_bag_attributes adds the bagAttributes field of a SafeBag structure,
+// containing the specified friendlyName and localKeyId attributes.
+static int add_bag_attributes(CBB *bag, const char *name, const uint8_t *key_id,
+                              size_t key_id_len) {
+  if (name == NULL && key_id_len == 0) {
+    return 1;  // Omit the OPTIONAL SET.
+  }
+  // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7292#section-4.2.
+  CBB attrs, attr, oid, values, value;
+  if (!CBB_add_asn1(bag, &attrs, CBS_ASN1_SET)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (name != NULL) {
+    // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2985, section 5.5.1.
+    if (!CBB_add_asn1(&attrs, &attr, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+        !CBB_add_asn1(&attr, &oid, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&oid, kFriendlyName, sizeof(kFriendlyName)) ||
+        !CBB_add_asn1(&attr, &values, CBS_ASN1_SET) ||
+        !CBB_add_asn1(&values, &value, CBS_ASN1_BMPSTRING)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    // Convert the friendly name to a BMPString.
+    CBS name_cbs;
+    CBS_init(&name_cbs, (const uint8_t *)name, strlen(name));
+    while (CBS_len(&name_cbs) != 0) {
+      uint32_t c;
+      if (!cbs_get_utf8(&name_cbs, &c) ||
+          !cbb_add_ucs2_be(&value, c)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_INVALID_CHARACTERS);
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  if (key_id_len != 0) {
+    // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2985, section 5.5.2.
+    if (!CBB_add_asn1(&attrs, &attr, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+        !CBB_add_asn1(&attr, &oid, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&oid, kLocalKeyID, sizeof(kLocalKeyID)) ||
+        !CBB_add_asn1(&attr, &values, CBS_ASN1_SET) ||
+        !CBB_add_asn1(&values, &value, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&value, key_id, key_id_len)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  return CBB_flush_asn1_set_of(&attrs) &&
+         CBB_flush(bag);
+}
+
+static int add_cert_bag(CBB *cbb, X509 *cert, const char *name,
+                        const uint8_t *key_id, size_t key_id_len) {
+  CBB bag, bag_oid, bag_contents, cert_bag, cert_type, wrapped_cert, cert_value;
+  if (// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7292#section-4.2.
+      !CBB_add_asn1(cbb, &bag, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&bag, &bag_oid, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&bag_oid, kCertBag, sizeof(kCertBag)) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&bag, &bag_contents,
+                    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0) ||
+      // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7292#section-4.2.3.
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&bag_contents, &cert_bag, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&cert_bag, &cert_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&cert_type, kX509Certificate, sizeof(kX509Certificate)) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&cert_bag, &wrapped_cert,
+                    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&wrapped_cert, &cert_value, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  uint8_t *buf;
+  int len = i2d_X509(cert, NULL);
+  if (len < 0 ||
+      !CBB_add_space(&cert_value, &buf, (size_t)len) ||
+      i2d_X509(cert, &buf) < 0 ||
+      !add_bag_attributes(&bag, name, key_id, key_id_len) ||
+      !CBB_flush(cbb)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int make_cert_safe_contents(uint8_t **out_data, size_t *out_len,
+                                   X509 *cert, const STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+                                   const char *name, const uint8_t *key_id,
+                                   size_t key_id_len) {
+  int ret = 0;
+  CBB cbb, safe_contents;
+  if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&cbb, &safe_contents, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      (cert != NULL &&
+       !add_cert_bag(&safe_contents, cert, name, key_id, key_id_len))) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+    // Only the leaf certificate gets attributes.
+    if (!add_cert_bag(&safe_contents, sk_X509_value(chain, i), NULL, NULL, 0)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  ret = CBB_finish(&cbb, out_data, out_len);
+
+err:
+  CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int add_encrypted_data(CBB *out, int pbe_nid, const char *password,
+                              size_t password_len, unsigned iterations,
+                              const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
+  uint8_t salt[PKCS5_SALT_LEN];
+  if (!RAND_bytes(salt, sizeof(salt))) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int ret = 0;
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+  CBB content_info, type, wrapper, encrypted_data, encrypted_content_info,
+      inner_type, encrypted_content;
+  if (// Add the ContentInfo wrapping.
+      !CBB_add_asn1(out, &content_info, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&content_info, &type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&type, kPKCS7EncryptedData, sizeof(kPKCS7EncryptedData)) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&content_info, &wrapper,
+                    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0) ||
+      // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-13.
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&wrapper, &encrypted_data, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&encrypted_data, 0 /* version */) ||
+      // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-10.1.
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&encrypted_data, &encrypted_content_info,
+                    CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&encrypted_content_info, &inner_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&inner_type, kPKCS7Data, sizeof(kPKCS7Data)) ||
+      // Set up encryption and fill in contentEncryptionAlgorithm.
+      !pkcs12_pbe_encrypt_init(&encrypted_content_info, &ctx, pbe_nid,
+                               iterations, password, password_len, salt,
+                               sizeof(salt)) ||
+      // Note this tag is primitive. It is an implicitly-tagged OCTET_STRING, so
+      // it inherits the inner tag's constructed bit.
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&encrypted_content_info, &encrypted_content,
+                    CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  size_t max_out = in_len + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&ctx);
+  if (max_out < in_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_TOO_LONG);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t *ptr;
+  int n1, n2;
+  if (!CBB_reserve(&encrypted_content, &ptr, max_out) ||
+      !EVP_CipherUpdate(&ctx, ptr, &n1, in, in_len) ||
+      !EVP_CipherFinal_ex(&ctx, ptr + n1, &n2) ||
+      !CBB_did_write(&encrypted_content, n1 + n2) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(const char *password, const char *name,
+                      const EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert,
+                      const STACK_OF(X509)* chain, int key_nid, int cert_nid,
+                      int iterations, int mac_iterations, int key_type) {
+  if (key_nid == 0) {
+    key_nid = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
+  }
+  if (cert_nid == 0) {
+    cert_nid = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
+  }
+  if (iterations == 0) {
+    iterations = PKCS5_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS;
+  }
+  if (mac_iterations == 0) {
+    mac_iterations = 1;
+  }
+  if (// In OpenSSL, this specifies a non-standard Microsoft key usage extension
+      // which we do not currently support.
+      key_type != 0 ||
+      // In OpenSSL, -1 here means to use no encryption, which we do not
+      // currently support.
+      key_nid < 0 || cert_nid < 0 ||
+      // In OpenSSL, -1 here means to omit the MAC, which we do not
+      // currently support. Omitting it is also invalid for a password-based
+      // PKCS#12 file.
+      mac_iterations < 0 ||
+      // Don't encode empty objects.
+      (pkey == NULL && cert == NULL && sk_X509_num(chain) == 0)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_UNSUPPORTED_OPTIONS);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Note that |password| may be NULL to specify no password, rather than the
+  // empty string. They are encoded differently in PKCS#12. (One is the empty
+  // byte array and the other is NUL-terminated UCS-2.)
+  size_t password_len = password != NULL ? strlen(password) : 0;
+
+  uint8_t key_id[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  unsigned key_id_len = 0;
+  if (cert != NULL && pkey != NULL) {
+    if (!X509_check_private_key(cert, pkey) ||
+        // Matching OpenSSL, use the SHA-1 hash of the certificate as the local
+        // key ID. Some PKCS#12 consumers require one to connect the private key
+        // and certificate.
+        !X509_digest(cert, EVP_sha1(), key_id, &key_id_len)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7292#section-4.
+  PKCS12 *ret = NULL;
+  CBB cbb, pfx, auth_safe, auth_safe_oid, auth_safe_wrapper, auth_safe_data,
+      content_infos;
+  uint8_t mac_key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&cbb, &pfx, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&pfx, 3) ||
+      // auth_safe is a data ContentInfo.
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&pfx, &auth_safe, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&auth_safe, &auth_safe_oid, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&auth_safe_oid, kPKCS7Data, sizeof(kPKCS7Data)) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&auth_safe, &auth_safe_wrapper,
+                    CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&auth_safe_wrapper, &auth_safe_data,
+                    CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+      // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7292#section-4.1. |auth_safe|'s
+      // contains a SEQUENCE of ContentInfos.
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&auth_safe_data, &content_infos, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // If there are any certificates, place them in CertBags wrapped in a single
+  // encrypted ContentInfo.
+  if (cert != NULL || sk_X509_num(chain) > 0) {
+    uint8_t *data;
+    size_t len;
+    if (!make_cert_safe_contents(&data, &len, cert, chain, name, key_id,
+                                 key_id_len)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    int ok = add_encrypted_data(&content_infos, cert_nid, password,
+                                password_len, iterations, data, len);
+    OPENSSL_free(data);
+    if (!ok) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // If there is a key, place it in a single PKCS8ShroudedKeyBag wrapped in an
+  // unencrypted ContentInfo. (One could also place it in a KeyBag inside an
+  // encrypted ContentInfo, but OpenSSL does not do this and some PKCS#12
+  // consumers do not support KeyBags.)
+  if (pkey != NULL) {
+    CBB content_info, oid, wrapper, data, safe_contents, bag, bag_oid,
+        bag_contents;
+    if (// Add another data ContentInfo.
+        !CBB_add_asn1(&content_infos, &content_info, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+        !CBB_add_asn1(&content_info, &oid, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&oid, kPKCS7Data, sizeof(kPKCS7Data)) ||
+        !CBB_add_asn1(&content_info, &wrapper,
+                      CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0) ||
+        !CBB_add_asn1(&wrapper, &data, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+        !CBB_add_asn1(&data, &safe_contents, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+        // Add a SafeBag containing a PKCS8ShroudedKeyBag.
+        !CBB_add_asn1(&safe_contents, &bag, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+        !CBB_add_asn1(&bag, &bag_oid, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&bag_oid, kPKCS8ShroudedKeyBag,
+                       sizeof(kPKCS8ShroudedKeyBag)) ||
+        !CBB_add_asn1(&bag, &bag_contents,
+                      CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0) ||
+        !PKCS8_marshal_encrypted_private_key(
+            &bag_contents, key_nid, NULL, password, password_len,
+            NULL /* generate a random salt */, 0 /* use default salt length */,
+            iterations, pkey) ||
+        !add_bag_attributes(&bag, name, key_id, key_id_len) ||
+        !CBB_flush(&content_infos)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Compute the MAC. Match OpenSSL in using SHA-1 as the hash function. The MAC
+  // covers |auth_safe_data|.
+  const EVP_MD *mac_md = EVP_sha1();
+  uint8_t mac_salt[PKCS5_SALT_LEN];
+  uint8_t mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  unsigned mac_len;
+  if (!CBB_flush(&auth_safe_data) ||
+      !RAND_bytes(mac_salt, sizeof(mac_salt)) ||
+      !pkcs12_key_gen(password, password_len, mac_salt, sizeof(mac_salt),
+                      PKCS12_MAC_ID, mac_iterations, EVP_MD_size(mac_md),
+                      mac_key, mac_md) ||
+      !HMAC(mac_md, mac_key, EVP_MD_size(mac_md), CBB_data(&auth_safe_data),
+            CBB_len(&auth_safe_data), mac, &mac_len)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  CBB mac_data, digest_info, mac_cbb, mac_salt_cbb;
+  if (!CBB_add_asn1(&pfx, &mac_data, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&mac_data, &digest_info, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+      !EVP_marshal_digest_algorithm(&digest_info, mac_md) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&digest_info, &mac_cbb, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&mac_cbb, mac, mac_len) ||
+      !CBB_add_asn1(&mac_data, &mac_salt_cbb, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&mac_salt_cbb, mac_salt, sizeof(mac_salt)) ||
+      // The iteration count has a DEFAULT of 1, but RFC 7292 says "The default
+      // is for historical reasons and its use is deprecated." Thus we
+      // explicitly encode the iteration count, though it is not valid DER.
+      !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&mac_data, mac_iterations)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(PKCS12));
+  if (ret == NULL ||
+      !CBB_finish(&cbb, &ret->ber_bytes, &ret->ber_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_free(ret);
+    ret = NULL;
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+err:
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(mac_key, sizeof(mac_key));
+  CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+void PKCS12_free(PKCS12 *p12) {
+  if (p12 == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_free(p12->ber_bytes);
+  OPENSSL_free(p12);
+}