subagent-cli 0.3.0 → 0.3.1

package/src/tools/PowerShellTool/powershellPermissions.ts

@@ -1,1648 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * PowerShell-specific permission checking, adapted from bashPermissions.ts
- * for case-insensitive cmdlet matching.
- */
-
-import { resolve } from 'path'
-import type { ToolPermissionContext, ToolUseContext } from '../../Tool.js'
-import type {
-  PermissionDecisionReason,
-  PermissionResult,
-} from '../../types/permissions.js'
-import { getCwd } from '../../utils/cwd.js'
-import { isCurrentDirectoryBareGitRepo } from '../../utils/git.js'
-import type { PermissionRule } from '../../utils/permissions/PermissionRule.js'
-import type { PermissionUpdate } from '../../utils/permissions/PermissionUpdateSchema.js'
-import {
-  createPermissionRequestMessage,
-  getRuleByContentsForToolName,
-} from '../../utils/permissions/permissions.js'
-import {
-  matchWildcardPattern,
-  parsePermissionRule,
-  type ShellPermissionRule,
-  suggestionForExactCommand as sharedSuggestionForExactCommand,
-} from '../../utils/permissions/shellRuleMatching.js'
-import {
-  classifyCommandName,
-  deriveSecurityFlags,
-  getAllCommandNames,
-  getFileRedirections,
-  type ParsedCommandElement,
-  type ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-  PS_TOKENIZER_DASH_CHARS,
-  parsePowerShellCommand,
-  stripModulePrefix,
-} from '../../utils/powershell/parser.js'
-import { containsVulnerableUncPath } from '../../utils/shell/readOnlyCommandValidation.js'
-import { isDotGitPathPS, isGitInternalPathPS } from './gitSafety.js'
-import {
-  checkPermissionMode,
-  isSymlinkCreatingCommand,
-} from './modeValidation.js'
-import {
-  checkPathConstraints,
-  dangerousRemovalDeny,
-  isDangerousRemovalRawPath,
-} from './pathValidation.js'
-import { powershellCommandIsSafe } from './powershellSecurity.js'
-import {
-  argLeaksValue,
-  isAllowlistedCommand,
-  isCwdChangingCmdlet,
-  isProvablySafeStatement,
-  isReadOnlyCommand,
-  isSafeOutputCommand,
-  resolveToCanonical,
-} from './readOnlyValidation.js'
-import { POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME } from './toolName.js'
-
-// Matches `$var = `, `$var += `, `$env:X = `, `$x ??= ` etc. Used to strip
-// nested assignment prefixes in the parse-failed fallback path.
-const PS_ASSIGN_PREFIX_RE = /^\$[\w:]+\s*(?:[+\-*/%]|\?\?)?\s*=\s*/
-
-/**
- * Cmdlets that can place a file at a caller-specified path. The
- * git-internal-paths guard checks whether any arg is a git-internal path
- * (hooks/, refs/, objects/, HEAD). Non-creating writers (remove-item,
- * clear-content) are intentionally absent — they can't plant new hooks.
- */
-const GIT_SAFETY_WRITE_CMDLETS = new Set([
-  'new-item',
-  'set-content',
-  'add-content',
-  'out-file',
-  'copy-item',
-  'move-item',
-  'rename-item',
-  'expand-archive',
-  'invoke-webrequest',
-  'invoke-restmethod',
-  'tee-object',
-  'export-csv',
-  'export-clixml',
-])
-
-/**
- * External archive-extraction applications that write files to cwd with
- * archive-controlled paths. `tar -xf payload.tar; git status` defeats
- * isCurrentDirectoryBareGitRepo (TOCTOU): the check runs at
- * permission-eval time, tar extracts HEAD/hooks/refs/ AFTER the check and
- * BEFORE git runs. Unlike GIT_SAFETY_WRITE_CMDLETS (where we can inspect
- * args for git-internal paths), archive contents are opaque — any
- * extraction preceding git must ask. Matched by name only (lowercase,
- * with and without .exe).
- */
-const GIT_SAFETY_ARCHIVE_EXTRACTORS = new Set([
-  'tar',
-  'tar.exe',
-  'bsdtar',
-  'bsdtar.exe',
-  'unzip',
-  'unzip.exe',
-  '7z',
-  '7z.exe',
-  '7za',
-  '7za.exe',
-  'gzip',
-  'gzip.exe',
-  'gunzip',
-  'gunzip.exe',
-  'expand-archive',
-])
-
-/**
- * Extract the command name from a PowerShell command string.
- * Uses the parser to get the first command name from the AST.
- */
-async function extractCommandName(command: string): Promise<string> {
-  const trimmed = command.trim()
-  if (!trimmed) {
-    return ''
-  }
-  const parsed = await parsePowerShellCommand(trimmed)
-  const names = getAllCommandNames(parsed)
-  return names[0] ?? ''
-}
-
-/**
- * Parse a permission rule string into a structured rule object.
- * Delegates to shared parsePermissionRule.
- */
-export function powershellPermissionRule(
-  permissionRule: string,
-): ShellPermissionRule {
-  return parsePermissionRule(permissionRule)
-}
-
-/**
- * Generate permission update suggestion for exact command match.
- *
- * Skip exact-command suggestion for commands that can't round-trip cleanly:
- * - Multi-line: newlines don't survive normalization, rule would never match
- * - Literal *: storing `Remove-Item * -Force` verbatim re-parses as a wildcard
- *   rule via hasWildcards() (matches `^Remove-Item .* -Force$`). Escaping to
- *   `\*` creates a dead rule — parsePermissionRule's exact branch returns the
- *   raw string with backslash intact, so `Remove-Item \* -Force` never matches
- *   the incoming `Remove-Item * -Force`. Globs are unsafe to exact-auto-allow
- *   anyway; prefix suggestion still offered. (finding #12)
- */
-function suggestionForExactCommand(command: string): PermissionUpdate[] {
-  if (command.includes('\n') || command.includes('*')) {
-    return []
-  }
-  return sharedSuggestionForExactCommand(POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME, command)
-}
-
-/**
- * PowerShell input schema type - simplified for initial implementation
- */
-type PowerShellInput = {
-  command: string
-  timeout?: number
-}
-
-/**
- * Filter rules by contents matching an input command.
- * PowerShell-specific: uses case-insensitive matching throughout.
- * Follows the same structure as BashTool's local filterRulesByContentsMatchingInput.
- */
-function filterRulesByContentsMatchingInput(
-  input: PowerShellInput,
-  rules: Map<string, PermissionRule>,
-  matchMode: 'exact' | 'prefix',
-  behavior: 'deny' | 'ask' | 'allow',
-): PermissionRule[] {
-  const command = input.command.trim()
-
-  function strEquals(a: string, b: string): boolean {
-    return a.toLowerCase() === b.toLowerCase()
-  }
-  function strStartsWith(str: string, prefix: string): boolean {
-    return str.toLowerCase().startsWith(prefix.toLowerCase())
-  }
-  // SECURITY: stripModulePrefix on RULE names widens the
-  // secondary-canonical match — a deny rule `Module\Remove-Item:*` blocking
-  // `rm` is the intent (fail-safe over-match), but an allow rule
-  // `ModuleA\Get-Thing:*` also matching `ModuleB\Get-Thing` is fail-OPEN.
-  // Deny/ask over-match is fine; allow must never over-match.
-  function stripModulePrefixForRule(name: string): string {
-    if (behavior === 'allow') {
-      return name
-    }
-    return stripModulePrefix(name)
-  }
-
-  // Extract the first word (command name) from the input for canonical matching.
-  // Keep both raw (for slicing the original `command` string) and stripped
-  // (for canonical resolution) versions. For module-qualified inputs like
-  // `Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility\Invoke-Expression foo`, rawCmdName holds the
-  // full token so `command.slice(rawCmdName.length)` yields the correct rest.
-  const rawCmdName = command.split(/\s+/)[0] ?? ''
-  const inputCmdName = stripModulePrefix(rawCmdName)
-  const inputCanonical = resolveToCanonical(inputCmdName)
-
-  // Build a version of the command with the canonical name substituted
-  // e.g., 'rm foo.txt' -> 'remove-item foo.txt' so deny rules on Remove-Item also block rm.
-  // SECURITY: Normalize the whitespace separator between name and args to a
-  // single space. PowerShell accepts any whitespace (tab, etc.) as separator,
-  // but prefix rule matching uses `prefix + ' '` (literal space). Without this,
-  // `rm\t./x` canonicalizes to `remove-item\t./x` and misses the deny rule
-  // `Remove-Item:*`, while acceptEdits auto-allow (using AST cmd.name) still
-  // matches — a deny-rule bypass. Build unconditionally (not just when the
-  // canonical differs) so non-space-separated raw commands are also normalized.
-  const rest = command.slice(rawCmdName.length).replace(/^\s+/, ' ')
-  const canonicalCommand = inputCanonical + rest
-
-  return Array.from(rules.entries())
-    .filter(([ruleContent]) => {
-      const rule = powershellPermissionRule(ruleContent)
-
-      // Also resolve the rule's command name to canonical for cross-matching
-      // e.g., a deny rule for 'rm' should also block 'Remove-Item'
-      function matchesCommand(cmd: string): boolean {
-        switch (rule.type) {
-          case 'exact':
-            return strEquals(rule.command, cmd)
-          case 'prefix':
-            switch (matchMode) {
-              case 'exact':
-                return strEquals(rule.prefix, cmd)
-              case 'prefix': {
-                if (strEquals(cmd, rule.prefix)) {
-                  return true
-                }
-                return strStartsWith(cmd, rule.prefix + ' ')
-              }
-            }
-            break
-          case 'wildcard':
-            if (matchMode === 'exact') {
-              return false
-            }
-            return matchWildcardPattern(rule.pattern, cmd, true)
-        }
-      }
-
-      // Check against the original command
-      if (matchesCommand(command)) {
-        return true
-      }
-
-      // Also check against the canonical form of the command
-      // This ensures 'deny Remove-Item' also blocks 'rm', 'del', 'ri', etc.
-      if (matchesCommand(canonicalCommand)) {
-        return true
-      }
-
-      // Also resolve the rule's command name to canonical and compare
-      // This ensures 'deny rm' also blocks 'Remove-Item'
-      // SECURITY: stripModulePrefix applied to DENY/ASK rule command
-      // names too, not just input. Otherwise a deny rule written as
-      // `Microsoft.PowerShell.Management\Remove-Item:*` is bypassed by `rm`,
-      // `del`, or plain `Remove-Item` — resolveToCanonical won't match the
-      // module-qualified form against COMMON_ALIASES.
-      if (rule.type === 'exact') {
-        const rawRuleCmdName = rule.command.split(/\s+/)[0] ?? ''
-        const ruleCanonical = resolveToCanonical(
-          stripModulePrefixForRule(rawRuleCmdName),
-        )
-        if (ruleCanonical === inputCanonical) {
-          // Rule and input resolve to same canonical cmdlet
-          // SECURITY: use normalized `rest` not a raw re-slice
-          // from `command`. The raw slice preserves tab separators so
-          // `Remove-Item\t./secret.txt` vs deny rule `rm ./secret.txt` misses.
-          // Normalize both sides identically.
-          const ruleRest = rule.command
-            .slice(rawRuleCmdName.length)
-            .replace(/^\s+/, ' ')
-          const inputRest = rest
-          if (strEquals(ruleRest, inputRest)) {
-            return true
-          }
-        }
-      } else if (rule.type === 'prefix') {
-        const rawRuleCmdName = rule.prefix.split(/\s+/)[0] ?? ''
-        const ruleCanonical = resolveToCanonical(
-          stripModulePrefixForRule(rawRuleCmdName),
-        )
-        if (ruleCanonical === inputCanonical) {
-          const ruleRest = rule.prefix
-            .slice(rawRuleCmdName.length)
-            .replace(/^\s+/, ' ')
-          const canonicalPrefix = inputCanonical + ruleRest
-          if (matchMode === 'exact') {
-            if (strEquals(canonicalPrefix, canonicalCommand)) {
-              return true
-            }
-          } else {
-            if (
-              strEquals(canonicalCommand, canonicalPrefix) ||
-              strStartsWith(canonicalCommand, canonicalPrefix + ' ')
-            ) {
-              return true
-            }
-          }
-        }
-      } else if (rule.type === 'wildcard') {
-        // Resolve the wildcard pattern's command name to canonical and re-match
-        // This ensures 'deny rm *' also blocks 'Remove-Item secret.txt'
-        const rawRuleCmdName = rule.pattern.split(/\s+/)[0] ?? ''
-        const ruleCanonical = resolveToCanonical(
-          stripModulePrefixForRule(rawRuleCmdName),
-        )
-        if (ruleCanonical === inputCanonical && matchMode !== 'exact') {
-          // Rebuild the pattern with the canonical cmdlet name
-          // Normalize separator same as exact and prefix branches.
-          // Without this, a wildcard rule `rm\t*` produces canonicalPattern
-          // with a literal tab that never matches the space-normalized
-          // canonicalCommand.
-          const ruleRest = rule.pattern
-            .slice(rawRuleCmdName.length)
-            .replace(/^\s+/, ' ')
-          const canonicalPattern = inputCanonical + ruleRest
-          if (matchWildcardPattern(canonicalPattern, canonicalCommand, true)) {
-            return true
-          }
-        }
-      }
-
-      return false
-    })
-    .map(([, rule]) => rule)
-}
-
-/**
- * Get matching rules for input across all rule types (deny, ask, allow)
- */
-function matchingRulesForInput(
-  input: PowerShellInput,
-  toolPermissionContext: ToolPermissionContext,
-  matchMode: 'exact' | 'prefix',
-) {
-  const denyRuleByContents = getRuleByContentsForToolName(
-    toolPermissionContext,
-    POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME,
-    'deny',
-  )
-  const matchingDenyRules = filterRulesByContentsMatchingInput(
-    input,
-    denyRuleByContents,
-    matchMode,
-    'deny',
-  )
-
-  const askRuleByContents = getRuleByContentsForToolName(
-    toolPermissionContext,
-    POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME,
-    'ask',
-  )
-  const matchingAskRules = filterRulesByContentsMatchingInput(
-    input,
-    askRuleByContents,
-    matchMode,
-    'ask',
-  )
-
-  const allowRuleByContents = getRuleByContentsForToolName(
-    toolPermissionContext,
-    POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME,
-    'allow',
-  )
-  const matchingAllowRules = filterRulesByContentsMatchingInput(
-    input,
-    allowRuleByContents,
-    matchMode,
-    'allow',
-  )
-
-  return { matchingDenyRules, matchingAskRules, matchingAllowRules }
-}
-
-/**
- * Check if the command is an exact match for a permission rule.
- */
-export function powershellToolCheckExactMatchPermission(
-  input: PowerShellInput,
-  toolPermissionContext: ToolPermissionContext,
-): PermissionResult {
-  const trimmedCommand = input.command.trim()
-  const { matchingDenyRules, matchingAskRules, matchingAllowRules } =
-    matchingRulesForInput(input, toolPermissionContext, 'exact')
-
-  if (matchingDenyRules[0] !== undefined) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'deny',
-      message: `Permission to use ${POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME} with command ${trimmedCommand} has been denied.`,
-      decisionReason: { type: 'rule', rule: matchingDenyRules[0] },
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (matchingAskRules[0] !== undefined) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      message: createPermissionRequestMessage(POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME),
-      decisionReason: { type: 'rule', rule: matchingAskRules[0] },
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (matchingAllowRules[0] !== undefined) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'allow',
-      updatedInput: input,
-      decisionReason: { type: 'rule', rule: matchingAllowRules[0] },
-    }
-  }
-
-  const decisionReason: PermissionDecisionReason = {
-    type: 'other' as const,
-    reason: 'This command requires approval',
-  }
-  return {
-    behavior: 'passthrough',
-    message: createPermissionRequestMessage(
-      POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME,
-      decisionReason,
-    ),
-    decisionReason,
-    suggestions: suggestionForExactCommand(trimmedCommand),
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Check permission for a PowerShell command including prefix matches.
- */
-export function powershellToolCheckPermission(
-  input: PowerShellInput,
-  toolPermissionContext: ToolPermissionContext,
-): PermissionResult {
-  const command = input.command.trim()
-
-  // 1. Check exact match first
-  const exactMatchResult = powershellToolCheckExactMatchPermission(
-    input,
-    toolPermissionContext,
-  )
-
-  // 1a. Deny/ask if exact command has a rule
-  if (
-    exactMatchResult.behavior === 'deny' ||
-    exactMatchResult.behavior === 'ask'
-  ) {
-    return exactMatchResult
-  }
-
-  // 2. Find all matching rules (prefix or exact)
-  const { matchingDenyRules, matchingAskRules, matchingAllowRules } =
-    matchingRulesForInput(input, toolPermissionContext, 'prefix')
-
-  // 2a. Deny if command has a deny rule
-  if (matchingDenyRules[0] !== undefined) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'deny',
-      message: `Permission to use ${POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME} with command ${command} has been denied.`,
-      decisionReason: {
-        type: 'rule',
-        rule: matchingDenyRules[0],
-      },
-    }
-  }
-
-  // 2b. Ask if command has an ask rule
-  if (matchingAskRules[0] !== undefined) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      message: createPermissionRequestMessage(POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME),
-      decisionReason: {
-        type: 'rule',
-        rule: matchingAskRules[0],
-      },
-    }
-  }
-
-  // 3. Allow if command had an exact match allow
-  if (exactMatchResult.behavior === 'allow') {
-    return exactMatchResult
-  }
-
-  // 4. Allow if command has an allow rule
-  if (matchingAllowRules[0] !== undefined) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'allow',
-      updatedInput: input,
-      decisionReason: {
-        type: 'rule',
-        rule: matchingAllowRules[0],
-      },
-    }
-  }
-
-  // 5. Passthrough since no rules match, will trigger permission prompt
-  const decisionReason = {
-    type: 'other' as const,
-    reason: 'This command requires approval',
-  }
-  return {
-    behavior: 'passthrough',
-    message: createPermissionRequestMessage(
-      POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME,
-      decisionReason,
-    ),
-    decisionReason,
-    suggestions: suggestionForExactCommand(command),
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Information about a sub-command for permission checking.
- */
-type SubCommandInfo = {
-  text: string
-  element: ParsedCommandElement
-  statement: ParsedPowerShellCommand['statements'][number] | null
-  isSafeOutput: boolean
-}
-
-/**
- * Extract sub-commands that need independent permission checking from a parsed command.
- * Safe output cmdlets (Format-Table, Select-Object, etc.) are flagged but NOT
- * filtered out — step 4.4 still checks deny rules against them (deny always
- * wins), step 5 skips them for approval collection (they inherit the permission
- * of the preceding command).
- *
- * Also includes nested commands from control flow statements (if, for, foreach, etc.)
- * to ensure commands hidden inside control flow are checked.
- *
- * Returns sub-command info including both text and the parsed element for accurate
- * suggestion generation.
- */
-async function getSubCommandsForPermissionCheck(
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-  originalCommand: string,
-): Promise<SubCommandInfo[]> {
-  if (!parsed.valid) {
-    // Return a fallback element for unparsed commands
-    return [
-      {
-        text: originalCommand,
-        element: {
-          name: await extractCommandName(originalCommand),
-          nameType: 'unknown',
-          elementType: 'CommandAst',
-          args: [],
-          text: originalCommand,
-        },
-        statement: null,
-        isSafeOutput: false,
-      },
-    ]
-  }
-
-  const subCommands: SubCommandInfo[] = []
-
-  // Check direct commands in pipelines
-  for (const statement of parsed.statements) {
-    for (const cmd of statement.commands) {
-      // Only check actual commands (CommandAst), not expressions
-      if (cmd.elementType !== 'CommandAst') {
-        continue
-      }
-      subCommands.push({
-        text: cmd.text,
-        element: cmd,
-        statement,
-        // SECURITY: nameType gate — scripts\\Out-Null strips to Out-Null and
-        // would match SAFE_OUTPUT_CMDLETS, but PowerShell runs the .ps1 file.
-        // isSafeOutput: true causes step 5 to filter this command out of the
-        // approval list, so it would silently execute. See isAllowlistedCommand.
-        // SECURITY: args.length === 0 gate — Out-Null -InputObject:(1 > /etc/x)
-        // was filtered as safe-output (name-only) → step-5 subCommands empty →
-        // auto-allow → redirection inside paren writes file. Only zero-arg
-        // Out-String/Out-Null/Out-Host invocations are provably safe.
-        isSafeOutput:
-          cmd.nameType !== 'application' &&
-          isSafeOutputCommand(cmd.name) &&
-          cmd.args.length === 0,
-      })
-    }
-
-    // Also check nested commands from control flow statements
-    if (statement.nestedCommands) {
-      for (const cmd of statement.nestedCommands) {
-        subCommands.push({
-          text: cmd.text,
-          element: cmd,
-          statement,
-          isSafeOutput:
-            cmd.nameType !== 'application' &&
-            isSafeOutputCommand(cmd.name) &&
-            cmd.args.length === 0,
-        })
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (subCommands.length > 0) {
-    return subCommands
-  }
-
-  // Fallback for commands with no sub-commands
-  return [
-    {
-      text: originalCommand,
-      element: {
-        name: await extractCommandName(originalCommand),
-        nameType: 'unknown',
-        elementType: 'CommandAst',
-        args: [],
-        text: originalCommand,
-      },
-      statement: null,
-      isSafeOutput: false,
-    },
-  ]
-}
-
-/**
- * Main permission check function for PowerShell tool.
- *
- * This function implements the full permission flow:
- * 1. Check exact match against deny/ask/allow rules
- * 2. Check prefix match against rules
- * 3. Run security check via powershellCommandIsSafe()
- * 4. Return appropriate PermissionResult
- *
- * @param input - The PowerShell tool input
- * @param context - The tool use context (for abort signal and session info)
- * @returns Promise resolving to PermissionResult
- */
-export async function powershellToolHasPermission(
-  input: PowerShellInput,
-  context: ToolUseContext,
-): Promise<PermissionResult> {
-  const toolPermissionContext = context.getAppState().toolPermissionContext
-  const command = input.command.trim()
-
-  // Empty command check
-  if (!command) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'allow',
-      updatedInput: input,
-      decisionReason: {
-        type: 'other',
-        reason: 'Empty command is safe',
-      },
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Parse the command once and thread through all sub-functions
-  const parsed = await parsePowerShellCommand(command)
-
-  // SECURITY: Check deny/ask rules BEFORE parse validity check.
-  // Deny rules operate on the raw command string and don't need the parsed AST.
-  // This ensures explicit deny rules still block commands even when parsing fails.
-  // 1. Check exact match first
-  const exactMatchResult = powershellToolCheckExactMatchPermission(
-    input,
-    toolPermissionContext,
-  )
-
-  // Exact command was denied
-  if (exactMatchResult.behavior === 'deny') {
-    return exactMatchResult
-  }
-
-  // 2. Check prefix/wildcard rules
-  const { matchingDenyRules, matchingAskRules } = matchingRulesForInput(
-    input,
-    toolPermissionContext,
-    'prefix',
-  )
-
-  // 2a. Deny if command has a deny rule
-  if (matchingDenyRules[0] !== undefined) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'deny',
-      message: `Permission to use ${POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME} with command ${command} has been denied.`,
-      decisionReason: {
-        type: 'rule',
-        rule: matchingDenyRules[0],
-      },
-    }
-  }
-
-  // 2b. Ask if command has an ask rule — DEFERRED into decisions[].
-  // Previously this early-returned before sub-command deny checks ran, so
-  // `Get-Process; Invoke-Expression evil` with ask(Get-Process:*) +
-  // deny(Invoke-Expression:*) would show the ask dialog and the deny never
-  // fired. Now: store the ask, push into decisions[] after parse succeeds.
-  // If parse fails, returned before the parse-error ask (preserves the
-  // rule-attributed decisionReason when pwsh is unavailable).
-  let preParseAskDecision: PermissionResult | null = null
-  if (matchingAskRules[0] !== undefined) {
-    preParseAskDecision = {
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      message: createPermissionRequestMessage(POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME),
-      decisionReason: {
-        type: 'rule',
-        rule: matchingAskRules[0],
-      },
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Block UNC paths — reading from UNC paths can trigger network requests
-  // and leak NTLM/Kerberos credentials. DEFERRED into decisions[].
-  // The raw-string UNC check must not early-return before sub-command deny
-  // (step 4+). Same fix as 2b above.
-  if (preParseAskDecision === null && containsVulnerableUncPath(command)) {
-    preParseAskDecision = {
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      message:
-        'Command contains a UNC path that could trigger network requests',
-    }
-  }
-
-  // 2c. Exact allow rules short-circuit here ONLY when parsing failed AND
-  // no pre-parse ask (2b prefix or UNC) is pending. Converting 2b/UNC from
-  // early-return to deferred-assign meant 2c
-  // fired before L648 consumed preParseAskDecision — silently overriding the
-  // ask with allow. Parse-succeeded path enforces ask > allow via the reduce
-  // (L917); without this guard, parse-failed was inconsistent.
-  // This ensures user-configured exact allow rules work even when pwsh is
-  // unavailable. When parsing succeeds, the exact allow check is deferred to
-  // after step 4.4 (sub-command deny/ask) — matching BashTool's ordering where
-  // the main-flow exact allow at bashPermissions.ts:1520 runs after sub-command
-  // deny checks (1442-1458). Without this, an exact allow on a compound command
-  // would bypass deny rules on sub-commands.
-  //
-  // SECURITY (parse-failed branch): the nameType guard in step 5 lives
-  // inside the sub-command loop, which only runs when parsed.valid.
-  // This is the !parsed.valid escape hatch. Input-side stripModulePrefix
-  // is unconditional — `scripts\build.exe --flag` strips to `build.exe`,
-  // canonicalCommand matches exact allow, and without this guard we'd
-  // return allow here and execute the local script. classifyCommandName
-  // is a pure string function (no AST needed). `scripts\build.exe` →
-  // 'application' (has `\`). Same tradeoff as step 5: `build.exe` alone
-  // also classifies 'application' (has `.`) so legitimate executable
-  // exact-allows downgrade to ask when pwsh is degraded — fail-safe.
-  // Module-qualified cmdlets (Module\Cmdlet) also classify 'application'
-  // (same `\`); same fail-safe over-fire.
-  if (
-    exactMatchResult.behavior === 'allow' &&
-    !parsed.valid &&
-    preParseAskDecision === null &&
-    classifyCommandName(command.split(/\s+/)[0] ?? '') !== 'application'
-  ) {
-    return exactMatchResult
-  }
-
-  // 0. Check if command can be parsed - if not, require approval but don't suggest persisting
-  // This matches Bash behavior: invalid syntax triggers a permission prompt but we don't
-  // recommend saving invalid commands to settings
-  // NOTE: This check is intentionally AFTER deny/ask rules so explicit rules still work
-  // even when the parser fails (e.g., pwsh unavailable).
-  if (!parsed.valid) {
-    // SECURITY: Fallback sub-command deny scan for parse-failed path.
-    // The sub-command deny loop at L851+ needs the AST; when parsing fails
-    // (command exceeds MAX_COMMAND_LENGTH, pwsh unavailable, timeout, bad
-    // JSON), we'd return 'ask' without ever checking sub-command deny rules.
-    // Attack: `Get-ChildItem # <~2000 chars padding> ; Invoke-Expression evil`
-    // → padding forces valid=false → generic ask prompt, deny(iex:*) never
-    // fires. This fallback splits on PowerShell separators/grouping and runs
-    // each fragment through the SAME rule matcher as step 2a (prefix deny).
-    // Conservative: fragments inside string literals/comments may false-positive
-    // deny — safe here (parse-failed is already a degraded state, and this is
-    // a deny-DOWNGRADE fix). Match against full fragment (not just first token)
-    // so multi-word rules like `Remove-Item foo:*` still fire; the matcher's
-    // canonical resolution handles aliases (`iex` → `Invoke-Expression`).
-    //
-    // SECURITY: backtick is PS escape/line-continuation, NOT a separator.
-    // Splitting on it would fragment `Invoke-Ex`pression` into non-matching
-    // pieces. Instead: collapse backtick-newline (line continuation) so
-    // `Invoke-Ex`<nl>pression` rejoins, strip remaining backticks (escape
-    // chars — ``x → x), then split on actual statement/grouping separators.
-    const backtickStripped = command
-      .replace(/`[\r\n]+\s*/g, '')
-      .replace(/`/g, '')
-    for (const fragment of backtickStripped.split(/[;|\n\r{}()&]+/)) {
-      const trimmedFrag = fragment.trim()
-      if (!trimmedFrag) continue // skip empty fragments
-      // Skip the full command ONLY if it starts with a cmdlet name (no
-      // assignment prefix). The full command was already checked at 2a, but
-      // 2a uses the raw text — $x %= iex as first token `$x` misses the
-      // deny(iex:*) rule. If normalization would change the fragment
-      // (assignment prefix, dot-source), don't skip — let it be re-checked
-      // after normalization. (bug #10/#24)
-      if (
-        trimmedFrag === command &&
-        !/^\$[\w:]/.test(trimmedFrag) &&
-        !/^[&.]\s/.test(trimmedFrag)
-      ) {
-        continue
-      }
-      // SECURITY: Normalize invocation-operator and assignment prefixes before
-      // rule matching (findings #5/#22). The splitter gives us the raw fragment
-      // text; matchingRulesForInput extracts the first token as the cmdlet name.
-      // Without normalization:
-      //   `$x = Invoke-Expression 'p'` → first token `$x` → deny(iex:*) misses
-      //   `. Invoke-Expression 'p'`    → first token `.`  → deny(iex:*) misses
-      //   `& 'Invoke-Expression' 'p'`  → first token `&` removed by split but
-      //                                  `'Invoke-Expression'` retains quotes
-      //                                  → deny(iex:*) misses
-      // The parse-succeeded path handles these via AST (parser.ts:839 strips
-      // quotes from rawNameUnstripped; invocation operators are separate AST
-      // nodes). This fallback mirrors that normalization.
-      // Loop strips nested assignments: $x = $y = iex → $y = iex → iex
-      let normalized = trimmedFrag
-      let m: RegExpMatchArray | null
-      while ((m = normalized.match(PS_ASSIGN_PREFIX_RE))) {
-        normalized = normalized.slice(m[0].length)
-      }
-      normalized = normalized.replace(/^[&.]\s+/, '') // & cmd, . cmd (dot-source)
-      const rawFirst = normalized.split(/\s+/)[0] ?? ''
-      const firstTok = rawFirst.replace(/^['"]|['"]$/g, '')
-      const normalizedFrag = firstTok + normalized.slice(rawFirst.length)
-      // SECURITY: parse-independent dangerous-removal hard-deny. The
-      // isDangerousRemovalPath check in checkPathConstraintsForStatement
-      // requires a valid AST; when pwsh times out or is unavailable,
-      // `Remove-Item /` degrades from hard-deny to generic ask. Check
-      // raw positional args here so root/home/system deletion is denied
-      // regardless of parser availability. Conservative: only positional
-      // args (skip -Param tokens); over-deny in degraded state is safe
-      // (same deny-downgrade rationale as the sub-command scan above).
-      if (resolveToCanonical(firstTok) === 'remove-item') {
-        for (const arg of normalized.split(/\s+/).slice(1)) {
-          if (PS_TOKENIZER_DASH_CHARS.has(arg[0] ?? '')) continue
-          if (isDangerousRemovalRawPath(arg)) {
-            return dangerousRemovalDeny(arg)
-          }
-        }
-      }
-      const { matchingDenyRules: fragDenyRules } = matchingRulesForInput(
-        { command: normalizedFrag },
-        toolPermissionContext,
-        'prefix',
-      )
-      if (fragDenyRules[0] !== undefined) {
-        return {
-          behavior: 'deny',
-          message: `Permission to use ${POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME} with command ${command} has been denied.`,
-          decisionReason: { type: 'rule', rule: fragDenyRules[0] },
-        }
-      }
-    }
-    // Preserve pre-parse ask messaging when parse fails. The deferred ask
-    // (2b prefix rule or UNC) carries a better decisionReason than the
-    // generic parse-error ask. Sub-command deny can't run the AST loop
-    // without a parse, so the fallback scan above is best-effort.
-    if (preParseAskDecision !== null) {
-      return preParseAskDecision
-    }
-    const decisionReason = {
-      type: 'other' as const,
-      reason: `Command contains malformed syntax that cannot be parsed: ${parsed.errors[0]?.message ?? 'unknown error'}`,
-    }
-    return {
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      decisionReason,
-      message: createPermissionRequestMessage(
-        POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME,
-        decisionReason,
-      ),
-      // No suggestions - don't recommend persisting invalid syntax
-    }
-  }
-
-  // ========================================================================
-  // COLLECT-THEN-REDUCE: post-parse decisions (deny > ask > allow > passthrough)
-  // ========================================================================
-  // Ported from bashPermissions.ts:1446-1472. Every post-parse check pushes
-  // its decision into a single array; a single reduce applies precedence.
-  // This structurally closes the ask-before-deny bug class: an 'ask' from an
-  // earlier check (security flags, provider paths, cd+git) can no longer mask
-  // a 'deny' from a later check (sub-command deny, checkPathConstraints).
-  //
-  // Supersedes the firstSubCommandAskRule stash from commit 8f5ae6c56b — that
-  // fix only patched step 4; steps 3, 3.5, 4.42 had the same flaw. The stash
-  // pattern is also fragile: the next author who writes `return ask` is back
-  // where we started. Collect-then-reduce makes the bypass impossible to write.
-  //
-  // First-of-each-behavior wins (array order = step order), so single-check
-  // ask messages are unchanged vs. sequential-early-return.
-  //
-  // Pre-parse deny checks above (exact/prefix deny) stay sequential: they
-  // fire even when pwsh is unavailable. Pre-parse asks (prefix ask, raw UNC)
-  // are now deferred here so sub-command deny (step 4) beats them.
-
-  // Gather sub-commands once (used by decisions 3, 4, and fallthrough step 5).
-  const allSubCommands = await getSubCommandsForPermissionCheck(parsed, command)
-
-  const decisions: PermissionResult[] = []
-
-  // Decision: deferred pre-parse ask (2b prefix ask or UNC path).
-  // Pushed first so its message wins over later asks (first-of-behavior wins),
-  // but the reduce ensures any deny in decisions[] still beats it.
-  if (preParseAskDecision !== null) {
-    decisions.push(preParseAskDecision)
-  }
-
-  // Decision: security check — was step 3 (:630-650).
-  // powershellCommandIsSafe returns 'ask' for subexpressions, script blocks,
-  // encoded commands, download cradles, etc. Only 'ask' | 'passthrough'.
-  const safetyResult = powershellCommandIsSafe(command, parsed)
-  if (safetyResult.behavior !== 'passthrough') {
-    const decisionReason: PermissionDecisionReason = {
-      type: 'other' as const,
-      reason:
-        safetyResult.behavior === 'ask' && safetyResult.message
-          ? safetyResult.message
-          : 'This command contains patterns that could pose security risks and requires approval',
-    }
-    decisions.push({
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      message: createPermissionRequestMessage(
-        POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME,
-        decisionReason,
-      ),
-      decisionReason,
-      suggestions: suggestionForExactCommand(command),
-    })
-  }
-
-  // Decision: using statements / script requirements — invisible to AST block walk.
-  // `using module ./evil.psm1` loads and executes a module's top-level script body;
-  // `using assembly ./evil.dll` loads a .NET assembly (module initializers run).
-  // `#Requires -Modules <name>` triggers module loading from PSModulePath.
-  // These are siblings of the named blocks on ScriptBlockAst, not children, so
-  // Process-BlockStatements and all downstream command walkers never see them.
-  // Without this check, a decoy cmdlet like Get-Process fills subCommands,
-  // bypassing the empty-statement fallback, and isReadOnlyCommand auto-allows.
-  if (parsed.hasUsingStatements) {
-    const decisionReason: PermissionDecisionReason = {
-      type: 'other' as const,
-      reason:
-        'Command contains a `using` statement that may load external code (module or assembly)',
-    }
-    decisions.push({
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      message: createPermissionRequestMessage(
-        POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME,
-        decisionReason,
-      ),
-      decisionReason,
-      suggestions: suggestionForExactCommand(command),
-    })
-  }
-  if (parsed.hasScriptRequirements) {
-    const decisionReason: PermissionDecisionReason = {
-      type: 'other' as const,
-      reason:
-        'Command contains a `#Requires` directive that may trigger module loading',
-    }
-    decisions.push({
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      message: createPermissionRequestMessage(
-        POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME,
-        decisionReason,
-      ),
-      decisionReason,
-      suggestions: suggestionForExactCommand(command),
-    })
-  }
-
-  // Decision: resolved-arg provider/UNC scan — was step 3.5 (:652-709).
-  // Provider paths (env:, HKLM:, function:) access non-filesystem resources.
-  // UNC paths can leak NTLM/Kerberos credentials on Windows. The raw-string
-  // UNC check above (pre-parse) misses backtick-escaped forms; cmd.args has
-  // backtick escapes resolved by the parser. Labeled loop breaks on FIRST
-  // match (same as the previous early-return).
-  // Provider prefix matches both the short form (`env:`, `HKLM:`) and the
-  // fully-qualified form (`Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry::HKLM\...`).
-  // The optional `(?:[\w.]+\\)?` handles the module-qualified prefix; `::?`
-  // matches either single-colon drive syntax or double-colon provider syntax.
-  const NON_FS_PROVIDER_PATTERN =
-    /^(?:[\w.]+\\)?(env|hklm|hkcu|function|alias|variable|cert|wsman|registry)::?/i
-  function extractProviderPathFromArg(arg: string): string {
-    // Handle colon parameter syntax: -Path:env:HOME → extract 'env:HOME'.
-    // SECURITY: PowerShell's tokenizer accepts en-dash/em-dash/horizontal-bar
-    // (U+2013/2014/2015) as parameter prefixes. `–Path:env:HOME` (en-dash)
-    // must also strip the `–Path:` prefix or NON_FS_PROVIDER_PATTERN won't
-    // match (pattern is `^(env|...):` which fails on `–Path:env:...`).
-    let s = arg
-    if (s.length > 0 && PS_TOKENIZER_DASH_CHARS.has(s[0]!)) {
-      const colonIdx = s.indexOf(':', 1) // skip the leading dash
-      if (colonIdx > 0) {
-        s = s.substring(colonIdx + 1)
-      }
-    }
-    // Strip backtick escapes before matching: `Registry`::HKLM\...` has a
-    // backtick before `::` that the PS tokenizer removes at runtime but that
-    // would otherwise prevent the ^-anchored pattern from matching.
-    return s.replace(/`/g, '')
-  }
-  function providerOrUncDecisionForArg(arg: string): PermissionResult | null {
-    const value = extractProviderPathFromArg(arg)
-    if (NON_FS_PROVIDER_PATTERN.test(value)) {
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message: `Command argument '${arg}' uses a non-filesystem provider path and requires approval`,
-      }
-    }
-    if (containsVulnerableUncPath(value)) {
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message: `Command argument '${arg}' contains a UNC path that could trigger network requests`,
-      }
-    }
-    return null
-  }
-  providerScan: for (const statement of parsed.statements) {
-    for (const cmd of statement.commands) {
-      if (cmd.elementType !== 'CommandAst') continue
-      for (const arg of cmd.args) {
-        const decision = providerOrUncDecisionForArg(arg)
-        if (decision !== null) {
-          decisions.push(decision)
-          break providerScan
-        }
-      }
-    }
-    if (statement.nestedCommands) {
-      for (const cmd of statement.nestedCommands) {
-        for (const arg of cmd.args) {
-          const decision = providerOrUncDecisionForArg(arg)
-          if (decision !== null) {
-            decisions.push(decision)
-            break providerScan
-          }
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Decision: per-sub-command deny/ask rules — was step 4 (:711-803).
-  // Each sub-command produces at most one decision (deny or ask). Deny rules
-  // on LATER sub-commands still beat ask rules on EARLIER ones via the reduce.
-  // No stash needed — the reduce structurally enforces deny > ask.
-  //
-  // SECURITY: Always build a canonical command string from AST-derived data
-  // (element.name + space-joined args) and check rules against it too. Deny
-  // and allow must use the same normalized form to close asymmetries:
-  //   - Invocation operators (`& 'Remove-Item' ./x`): raw text starts with `&`,
-  //     splitting on whitespace yields the operator, not the cmdlet name.
-  //   - Non-space whitespace (`rm\t./x`): raw prefix match uses `prefix + ' '`
-  //     (literal space), but PowerShell accepts any whitespace separator.
-  //     checkPermissionMode auto-allow (using AST cmd.name) WOULD match while
-  //     deny-rule match on raw text would miss — a deny-rule bypass.
-  //   - Module prefixes (`Microsoft.PowerShell.Management\Remove-Item`):
-  //     element.name has the module prefix stripped.
-  for (const { text: subCmd, element } of allSubCommands) {
-    // element.name is quote-stripped at the parser (transformCommandAst) so
-    // `& 'Invoke-Expression' 'x'` yields name='Invoke-Expression', not
-    // "'Invoke-Expression'". canonicalSubCmd is built from the same stripped
-    // name, so deny-rule prefix matching on `Invoke-Expression:*` hits.
-    const canonicalSubCmd =
-      element.name !== '' ? [element.name, ...element.args].join(' ') : null
-
-    const subInput = { command: subCmd }
-    const { matchingDenyRules: subDenyRules, matchingAskRules: subAskRules } =
-      matchingRulesForInput(subInput, toolPermissionContext, 'prefix')
-    let matchedDenyRule = subDenyRules[0]
-    let matchedAskRule = subAskRules[0]
-
-    if (matchedDenyRule === undefined && canonicalSubCmd !== null) {
-      const {
-        matchingDenyRules: canonicalDenyRules,
-        matchingAskRules: canonicalAskRules,
-      } = matchingRulesForInput(
-        { command: canonicalSubCmd },
-        toolPermissionContext,
-        'prefix',
-      )
-      matchedDenyRule = canonicalDenyRules[0]
-      if (matchedAskRule === undefined) {
-        matchedAskRule = canonicalAskRules[0]
-      }
-    }
-
-    if (matchedDenyRule !== undefined) {
-      decisions.push({
-        behavior: 'deny',
-        message: `Permission to use ${POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME} with command ${command} has been denied.`,
-        decisionReason: {
-          type: 'rule',
-          rule: matchedDenyRule,
-        },
-      })
-    } else if (matchedAskRule !== undefined) {
-      decisions.push({
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message: createPermissionRequestMessage(POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME),
-        decisionReason: {
-          type: 'rule',
-          rule: matchedAskRule,
-        },
-      })
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Decision: cd+git compound guard — was step 4.42 (:805-833).
-  // When cd/Set-Location is paired with git, don't allow without prompting —
-  // cd to a malicious directory makes git dangerous (fake hooks, bare repo
-  // attacks). Collect-then-reduce keeps the improvement over BashTool: in
-  // bash, cd+git (B9, line 1416) runs BEFORE sub-command deny (B11), so cd+git
-  // ask masks deny. Here, both are in the same decision array; deny wins.
-  //
-  // SECURITY: NO cd-to-CWD no-op exclusion. A previous iteration excluded
-  // `Set-Location .` as a no-op, but the "first non-dash arg" heuristic used
-  // to extract the target is fooled by colon-bound params:
-  // `Set-Location -Path:/etc .` — real target is /etc, heuristic sees `.`,
-  // exclusion fires, bypass. The UX case (model emitting `Set-Location .; foo`)
-  // is rare; the attack surface isn't worth the special-case. Any cd-family
-  // cmdlet in the compound sets this flag, period.
-  // Only flag compound cd when there are multiple sub-commands. A standalone
-  // `Set-Location ./subdir` is not a TOCTOU risk (no later statement resolves
-  // relative paths against stale cwd). Without this, standalone cd forces the
-  // compound guard, suppressing the per-subcommand auto-allow path. (bug #25)
-  const hasCdSubCommand =
-    allSubCommands.length > 1 &&
-    allSubCommands.some(({ element }) => isCwdChangingCmdlet(element.name))
-  // Symlink-create compound guard (finding #18 / bug 001+004): when the
-  // compound creates a filesystem link, subsequent writes through that link
-  // land outside the validator's view. Same TOCTOU shape as cwd desync.
-  const hasSymlinkCreate =
-    allSubCommands.length > 1 &&
-    allSubCommands.some(({ element }) => isSymlinkCreatingCommand(element))
-  const hasGitSubCommand = allSubCommands.some(
-    ({ element }) => resolveToCanonical(element.name) === 'git',
-  )
-  if (hasCdSubCommand && hasGitSubCommand) {
-    decisions.push({
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      message:
-        'Compound commands with cd/Set-Location and git require approval to prevent bare repository attacks',
-    })
-  }
-
-  // cd+write compound guard — SUBSUMED by checkPathConstraints(compoundCommandHasCd).
-  // Previously this block pushed 'ask' when hasCdSubCommand && hasAcceptEditsWrite,
-  // but checkPathConstraints now receives hasCdSubCommand and pushes 'ask' for ANY
-  // path operation (read or write) in a cd-compound — broader coverage at the path
-  // layer (BashTool parity). The step-5 !hasCdSubCommand gates and modeValidation's
-  // compound-cd guard remain as defense-in-depth for paths that don't reach
-  // checkPathConstraints (e.g., cmdlets not in CMDLET_PATH_CONFIG).
-
-  // Decision: bare-git-repo guard — bash parity.
-  // If cwd has HEAD/objects/refs/ without a valid .git/HEAD, Git treats
-  // cwd as a bare repository and runs hooks from cwd. Attacker creates
-  // hooks/pre-commit, deletes .git/HEAD, then any git subcommand runs it.
-  // Port of BashTool readOnlyValidation.ts isCurrentDirectoryBareGitRepo.
-  if (hasGitSubCommand && isCurrentDirectoryBareGitRepo()) {
-    decisions.push({
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      message:
-        'Git command in a directory with bare-repository indicators (HEAD, objects/, refs/ in cwd without .git/HEAD). Git may execute hooks from cwd.',
-    })
-  }
-
-  // Decision: git-internal-paths write guard — bash parity.
-  // Compound command creates HEAD/objects/refs/hooks/ then runs git → the
-  // git subcommand executes freshly-created malicious hooks. Check all
-  // extracted write paths + redirection targets against git-internal patterns.
-  // Port of BashTool commandWritesToGitInternalPaths, adapted for AST.
-  if (hasGitSubCommand) {
-    const writesToGitInternal = allSubCommands.some(
-      ({ element, statement }) => {
-        // Redirection targets on this sub-command (raw Extent.Text — quotes
-        // and ./ intact; normalizer handles both)
-        for (const r of element.redirections ?? []) {
-          if (isGitInternalPathPS(r.target)) return true
-        }
-        // Write cmdlet args (new-item HEAD; mkdir hooks; set-content hooks/pre-commit)
-        const canonical = resolveToCanonical(element.name)
-        if (!GIT_SAFETY_WRITE_CMDLETS.has(canonical)) return false
-        // Raw arg text — normalizer strips colon-bound params, quotes, ./, case.
-        // PS ArrayLiteralAst (`New-Item a,hooks/pre-commit`) surfaces as a single
-        // comma-joined arg — split before checking.
-        if (
-          element.args
-            .flatMap(a => a.split(','))
-            .some(a => isGitInternalPathPS(a))
-        ) {
-          return true
-        }
-        // Pipeline input: `"hooks/pre-commit" | New-Item -ItemType File` binds the
-        // string to -Path at runtime. The path is in a non-CommandAst pipeline
-        // element, not in element.args. The hasExpressionSource guard at step 5
-        // already forces approval here; this check just adds the git-internal
-        // warning text.
-        if (statement !== null) {
-          for (const c of statement.commands) {
-            if (c.elementType === 'CommandAst') continue
-            if (isGitInternalPathPS(c.text)) return true
-          }
-        }
-        return false
-      },
-    )
-    // Also check top-level file redirections (> hooks/pre-commit)
-    const redirWritesToGitInternal = getFileRedirections(parsed).some(r =>
-      isGitInternalPathPS(r.target),
-    )
-    if (writesToGitInternal || redirWritesToGitInternal) {
-      decisions.push({
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message:
-          'Command writes to a git-internal path (HEAD, objects/, refs/, hooks/, .git/) and runs git. This could plant a malicious hook that git then executes.',
-      })
-    }
-    // SECURITY: Archive-extraction TOCTOU. isCurrentDirectoryBareGitRepo
-    // checks at permission-eval time; `tar -xf x.tar; git status` extracts
-    // bare-repo indicators AFTER the check, BEFORE git runs. Unlike write
-    // cmdlets (where we inspect args for git-internal paths), archive
-    // contents are opaque — any extraction in a compound with git must ask.
-    const hasArchiveExtractor = allSubCommands.some(({ element }) =>
-      GIT_SAFETY_ARCHIVE_EXTRACTORS.has(element.name.toLowerCase()),
-    )
-    if (hasArchiveExtractor) {
-      decisions.push({
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message:
-          'Compound command extracts an archive and runs git. Archive contents may plant bare-repository indicators (HEAD, hooks/, refs/) that git then treats as the repository root.',
-      })
-    }
-  }
-
-  // .git/ writes are dangerous even WITHOUT a git subcommand — a planted
-  // .git/hooks/pre-commit fires on the user's next commit. Unlike the
-  // bare-repo check above (which gates on hasGitSubCommand because `hooks/`
-  // is a common project dirname), `.git/` is unambiguous.
-  {
-    const found =
-      allSubCommands.some(({ element }) => {
-        for (const r of element.redirections ?? []) {
-          if (isDotGitPathPS(r.target)) return true
-        }
-        const canonical = resolveToCanonical(element.name)
-        if (!GIT_SAFETY_WRITE_CMDLETS.has(canonical)) return false
-        return element.args.flatMap(a => a.split(',')).some(isDotGitPathPS)
-      }) || getFileRedirections(parsed).some(r => isDotGitPathPS(r.target))
-    if (found) {
-      decisions.push({
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message:
-          'Command writes to .git/ — hooks or config planted there execute on the next git operation.',
-      })
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Decision: path constraints — was step 4.44 (:835-845).
-  // The deny-capable check that was being masked by earlier asks. Returns
-  // 'deny' when an Edit(...) deny rule matches an extracted path (pathValidation
-  // lines ~994, 1088, 1160, 1210), 'ask' for paths outside working dirs, or
-  // 'passthrough'.
-  //
-  // Thread hasCdSubCommand (BashTool compoundCommandHasCd parity): when the
-  // compound contains a cwd-changing cmdlet, checkPathConstraints forces 'ask'
-  // for any statement with path operations — relative paths resolve against the
-  // stale validator cwd, not PowerShell's runtime cwd. This is the architectural
-  // fix for the CWD-desync cluster (findings #3/#21/#27/#28), replacing the
-  // per-auto-allow-site guards with a single gate at the path-resolution layer.
-  const pathResult = checkPathConstraints(
-    input,
-    parsed,
-    toolPermissionContext,
-    hasCdSubCommand,
-  )
-  if (pathResult.behavior !== 'passthrough') {
-    decisions.push(pathResult)
-  }
-
-  // Decision: exact allow (parse-succeeded case) — was step 4.45 (:861-867).
-  // Matches BashTool ordering: sub-command deny → path constraints → exact
-  // allow. Reduce enforces deny > ask > allow, so the exact allow only
-  // surfaces when no deny or ask fired — same as sequential.
-  //
-  // SECURITY: nameType gate — mirrors the parse-failed guard at L696-700.
-  // Input-side stripModulePrefix is unconditional: `scripts\Get-Content`
-  // strips to `Get-Content`, canonicalCommand matches exact allow. Without
-  // this gate, allow enters decisions[] and reduce returns it before step 5
-  // can inspect nameType — PowerShell runs the local .ps1 file. The AST's
-  // nameType for the first command element is authoritative when parse
-  // succeeded; 'application' means a script/executable path, not a cmdlet.
-  // SECURITY: Same argLeaksValue gate as the per-subcommand loop below
-  // (finding #32). Without it, `PowerShell(Write-Output:*)` exact-matches
-  // `Write-Output $env:ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, pushes allow to decisions[], and
-  // reduce returns it before the per-subcommand gate ever runs. The
-  // allSubCommands.every check ensures NO command in the statement leaks
-  // (a single-command exact-allow has one element; a pipeline has several).
-  //
-  // SECURITY: nameType gate must check ALL subcommands, not just [0]
-  // (finding #10). canonicalCommand at L171 collapses `\n` → space, so
-  // `code\n.\build.ps1` (two statements) matches exact rule
-  // `PowerShell(code .\build.ps1)`. Checking only allSubCommands[0] lets the
-  // second statement (nameType=application, a script path) through. Require
-  // EVERY subcommand to have nameType !== 'application'.
-  if (
-    exactMatchResult.behavior === 'allow' &&
-    allSubCommands[0] !== undefined &&
-    allSubCommands.every(
-      sc =>
-        sc.element.nameType !== 'application' &&
-        !argLeaksValue(sc.text, sc.element),
-    )
-  ) {
-    decisions.push(exactMatchResult)
-  }
-
-  // Decision: read-only allowlist — was step 4.5 (:869-885).
-  // Mirrors Bash auto-allow for ls, cat, git status, etc. PowerShell
-  // equivalents: Get-Process, Get-ChildItem, Get-Content, git log, etc.
-  // Reduce places this below sub-command ask rules (ask > allow).
-  if (isReadOnlyCommand(command, parsed)) {
-    decisions.push({
-      behavior: 'allow',
-      updatedInput: input,
-      decisionReason: {
-        type: 'other',
-        reason: 'Command is read-only and safe to execute',
-      },
-    })
-  }
-
-  // Decision: file redirections — was :887-900.
-  // Redirections (>, >>, 2>) write to arbitrary paths. isReadOnlyCommand
-  // already rejects redirections internally so this can't conflict with the
-  // read-only allow above. Reduce places it above checkPermissionMode allow.
-  const fileRedirections = getFileRedirections(parsed)
-  if (fileRedirections.length > 0) {
-    decisions.push({
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      message:
-        'Command contains file redirections that could write to arbitrary paths',
-      suggestions: suggestionForExactCommand(command),
-    })
-  }
-
-  // Decision: mode-specific handling (acceptEdits) — was step 4.7 (:902-906).
-  // checkPermissionMode only returns 'allow' | 'passthrough'.
-  const modeResult = checkPermissionMode(input, parsed, toolPermissionContext)
-  if (modeResult.behavior !== 'passthrough') {
-    decisions.push(modeResult)
-  }
-
-  // REDUCE: deny > ask > allow > passthrough. First of each behavior type
-  // wins (preserves step-order messaging for single-check cases). If nothing
-  // decided, fall through to step 5 per-sub-command approval collection.
-  const deniedDecision = decisions.find(d => d.behavior === 'deny')
-  if (deniedDecision !== undefined) {
-    return deniedDecision
-  }
-  const askDecision = decisions.find(d => d.behavior === 'ask')
-  if (askDecision !== undefined) {
-    return askDecision
-  }
-  const allowDecision = decisions.find(d => d.behavior === 'allow')
-  if (allowDecision !== undefined) {
-    return allowDecision
-  }
-
-  // 5. Pipeline/statement splitting: check each sub-command independently.
-  // This prevents a prefix rule like "Get-Process:*" from silently allowing
-  // piped commands like "Get-Process | Stop-Process -Force".
-  // Note: deny rules are already checked above (4.4), so this loop handles
-  // ask rules, explicit allow rules, and read-only allowlist fallback.
-
-  // Filter out safe output cmdlets (Format-Table, etc.) — they were checked
-  // for deny rules in step 4.4 but shouldn't need independent approval here.
-  // Also filter out cd/Set-Location to CWD (model habit, Bash parity).
-  const subCommands = allSubCommands.filter(({ element, isSafeOutput }) => {
-    if (isSafeOutput) {
-      return false
-    }
-    // SECURITY: nameType gate — sixth location. Filtering out of the approval
-    // list is a form of auto-allow. scripts\\Set-Location . would match below
-    // (stripped name 'Set-Location', arg '.' → CWD) and be silently dropped,
-    // then scripts\\Set-Location.ps1 executes with no prompt. Keep 'application'
-    // commands in the list so they reach isAllowlistedCommand (which rejects them).
-    if (element.nameType === 'application') {
-      return true
-    }
-    const canonical = resolveToCanonical(element.name)
-    if (canonical === 'set-location' && element.args.length > 0) {
-      // SECURITY: use PS_TOKENIZER_DASH_CHARS, not ASCII-only startsWith('-').
-      // `Set-Location –Path .` (en-dash) would otherwise treat `–Path` as the
-      // target, resolve it against cwd (mismatch), and keep the command in the
-      // approval list — correct. But `Set-Location –LiteralPath evil` with
-      // en-dash would find `–LiteralPath` as "target", mismatch cwd, stay in
-      // list — also correct. The risk is the inverse: a Unicode-dash parameter
-      // being treated as the positional target. Use the tokenizer dash set.
-      const target = element.args.find(
-        a => a.length === 0 || !PS_TOKENIZER_DASH_CHARS.has(a[0]!),
-      )
-      if (target && resolve(getCwd(), target) === getCwd()) {
-        return false
-      }
-    }
-    return true
-  })
-
-  // Note: cd+git compound guard already ran at step 4.42. If we reach here,
-  // either there's no cd or no git in the compound.
-
-  const subCommandsNeedingApproval: string[] = []
-  // Statements whose sub-commands were PUSHED to subCommandsNeedingApproval
-  // in the step-5 loop below. The fail-closed gate (after the loop) only
-  // pushes statements NOT tracked here — prevents duplicate suggestions where
-  // both "Get-Process" (sub-command) AND "$x = Get-Process" (full statement)
-  // appear.
-  //
-  // SECURITY: track on PUSH only, not on loop entry.
-  // If a statement's only sub-commands `continue` via user allow rules
-  // (L1113), marking it seen at loop-entry would make the fail-closed gate
-  // skip it — auto-allowing invisible non-CommandAst content like bare
-  // `$env:SECRET` inside control flow. Example attack: user approves
-  // Get-Process, then `if ($true) { Get-Process; $env:SECRET }` — Get-Process
-  // is allow-ruled (continue, no push), $env:SECRET is VariableExpressionAst
-  // (not a sub-command), statement marked seen → gate skips → auto-allow →
-  // secret leaks. Tracking on push only: statement stays unseen → gate fires
-  // → ask.
-  const statementsSeenInLoop = new Set<
-    ParsedPowerShellCommand['statements'][number]
-  >()
-
-  for (const { text: subCmd, element, statement } of subCommands) {
-    // Check deny rules FIRST - user explicit rules take precedence over allowlist
-    const subInput = { command: subCmd }
-    const subResult = powershellToolCheckPermission(
-      subInput,
-      toolPermissionContext,
-    )
-
-    if (subResult.behavior === 'deny') {
-      return {
-        behavior: 'deny',
-        message: `Permission to use ${POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME} with command ${command} has been denied.`,
-        decisionReason: subResult.decisionReason,
-      }
-    }
-
-    if (subResult.behavior === 'ask') {
-      if (statement !== null) {
-        statementsSeenInLoop.add(statement)
-      }
-      subCommandsNeedingApproval.push(subCmd)
-      continue
-    }
-
-    // Explicitly allowed by a user rule — BUT NOT for applications/scripts.
-    // SECURITY: INPUT-side stripModulePrefix is unconditional, so
-    // `scripts\Get-Content /etc/shadow` strips to 'Get-Content' and matches
-    // an allow rule `Get-Content:*`. Without the nameType guard, continue
-    // skips all checks and the local script runs. nameType is classified from
-    // the RAW name pre-strip — `scripts\Get-Content` → 'application' (has `\`).
-    // Module-qualified cmdlets also classify 'application' — fail-safe over-fire.
-    // An application should NEVER be auto-allowed by a cmdlet allow rule.
-    if (
-      subResult.behavior === 'allow' &&
-      element.nameType !== 'application' &&
-      !hasSymlinkCreate
-    ) {
-      // SECURITY: User allow rule asserts the cmdlet is safe, NOT that
-      // arbitrary variable expansion through it is safe. A user who allows
-      // PowerShell(Write-Output:*) did not intend to auto-allow
-      // `Write-Output $env:ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`. Apply the same argLeaksValue
-      // gate that protects the built-in allowlist path below — rejects
-      // Variable/Other/ScriptBlock/SubExpression elementTypes and colon-bound
-      // expression children. (security finding #32)
-      //
-      // SECURITY: Also skip when the compound contains a symlink-creating
-      // command (finding — symlink+read gap). New-Item -ItemType SymbolicLink
-      // can redirect subsequent reads to arbitrary paths. The built-in
-      // allowlist path (below) and acceptEdits path both gate on
-      // !hasSymlinkCreate; the user-rule path must too.
-      if (argLeaksValue(subCmd, element)) {
-        if (statement !== null) {
-          statementsSeenInLoop.add(statement)
-        }
-        subCommandsNeedingApproval.push(subCmd)
-        continue
-      }
-      continue
-    }
-    if (subResult.behavior === 'allow') {
-      // nameType === 'application' with a matching allow rule: the rule was
-      // written for a cmdlet, but this is a script/executable masquerading.
-      // Don't continue; fall through to approval (NOT deny — the user may
-      // actually want to run `scripts\Get-Content` and will see a prompt).
-      if (statement !== null) {
-        statementsSeenInLoop.add(statement)
-      }
-      subCommandsNeedingApproval.push(subCmd)
-      continue
-    }
-
-    // SECURITY: fail-closed gate. Do NOT take the allowlist shortcut unless
-    // the parent statement is a PipelineAst where every element is a
-    // CommandAst. This subsumes the previous hasExpressionSource check
-    // (expression sources are one way a statement fails the gate) and also
-    // rejects assignments, chain operators, control flow, and any future
-    // AST type by construction. Examples this blocks:
-    //   'env:SECRET_API_KEY' | Get-Content  — CommandExpressionAst element
-    //   $x = Get-Process                   — AssignmentStatementAst
-    //   Get-Process && Get-Service         — PipelineChainAst
-    // Explicit user allow rules (above) run before this gate but apply their
-    // own argLeaksValue check; both paths now gate argument elementTypes.
-    //
-    // SECURITY: Also skip when the compound contains a cwd-changing cmdlet
-    // (finding #27 — cd+read gap). isAllowlistedCommand validates Get-Content
-    // in isolation, but `Set-Location ~; Get-Content ./.ssh/id_rsa` runs
-    // Get-Content from ~, not from the validator's cwd. Path validation saw
-    // /project/.ssh/id_rsa; runtime reads ~/.ssh/id_rsa. Same gate as the
-    // checkPermissionMode call below and the checkPathConstraints threading.
-    if (
-      statement !== null &&
-      !hasCdSubCommand &&
-      !hasSymlinkCreate &&
-      isProvablySafeStatement(statement) &&
-      isAllowlistedCommand(element, subCmd)
-    ) {
-      continue
-    }
-
-    // Check per-sub-command acceptEdits mode (BashTool parity).
-    // Delegate to checkPermissionMode on a single-statement AST so that ALL
-    // of its guards apply: expression pipeline sources (non-CommandAst elements),
-    // security flags (subexpressions, script blocks, assignments, splatting, etc.),
-    // and the ACCEPT_EDITS_ALLOWED_CMDLETS allowlist. This keeps one source of
-    // truth for what makes a statement safe in acceptEdits mode — any future
-    // hardening of checkPermissionMode automatically applies here.
-    //
-    // Pass parsed.variables (not []) so splatting from any statement in the
-    // compound command is visible. Conservative: if we can't tell which statement
-    // a splatted variable affects, assume it affects all of them.
-    //
-    // SECURITY: Skip this auto-allow path when the compound contains a
-    // cwd-changing command (Set-Location/Push-Location/Pop-Location). The
-    // synthetic single-statement AST strips compound context, so
-    // checkPermissionMode cannot see the cd in other statements. Without this
-    // gate, `Set-Location ./.claude; Set-Content ./settings.json '...'` would
-    // pass: Set-Content is checked in isolation, matches ACCEPT_EDITS_ALLOWED_CMDLETS,
-    // and auto-allows — but PowerShell runs it from the changed cwd, writing to
-    // .claude/settings.json (a Claude config file the path validator didn't check).
-    // This matches BashTool's compoundCommandHasCd guard.
-    if (statement !== null && !hasCdSubCommand && !hasSymlinkCreate) {
-      const subModeResult = checkPermissionMode(
-        { command: subCmd },
-        {
-          valid: true,
-          errors: [],
-          variables: parsed.variables,
-          hasStopParsing: parsed.hasStopParsing,
-          originalCommand: subCmd,
-          statements: [statement],
-        },
-        toolPermissionContext,
-      )
-      if (subModeResult.behavior === 'allow') {
-        continue
-      }
-    }
-
-    // Not allowlisted, no mode auto-allow, and no explicit rule — needs approval
-    if (statement !== null) {
-      statementsSeenInLoop.add(statement)
-    }
-    subCommandsNeedingApproval.push(subCmd)
-  }
-
-  // SECURITY: fail-closed gate (second half). The step-5 loop above only
-  // iterates sub-commands that getSubCommandsForPermissionCheck surfaced
-  // AND survived the safe-output filter. Statements that produce zero
-  // CommandAst sub-commands (bare $env:SECRET) or whose only sub-commands
-  // were filtered as safe-output ($env:X | Out-String) never enter the loop.
-  // Without this, they silently auto-allow on empty subCommandsNeedingApproval.
-  //
-  // Only push statements NOT tracked above: if the loop PUSHED any
-  // sub-command from a statement, the user will see a prompt. Pushing the
-  // statement text too creates a duplicate suggestion where accepting the
-  // sub-command rule does not prevent re-prompting.
-  // If all sub-commands `continue`d (allow-ruled / allowlisted / mode-allowed)
-  // the statement is NOT tracked and the gate re-checks it below — this is
-  // the fail-closed property.
-  for (const stmt of parsed.statements) {
-    if (!isProvablySafeStatement(stmt) && !statementsSeenInLoop.has(stmt)) {
-      subCommandsNeedingApproval.push(stmt.text)
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (subCommandsNeedingApproval.length === 0) {
-    // SECURITY: empty-list auto-allow is only safe when there's nothing
-    // unverifiable. If the pipeline has script blocks, every safe-output
-    // cmdlet was filtered at :1032, but the block content wasn't verified —
-    // non-command AST nodes (AssignmentStatementAst etc.) are invisible to
-    // getAllCommands. `Where-Object {$true} | Sort-Object {$env:PATH='evil'}`
-    // would auto-allow here. hasAssignments is top-level-only (parser.ts:1385)
-    // so it doesn't catch nested assignments either. Prompt instead.
-    if (deriveSecurityFlags(parsed).hasScriptBlocks) {
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message: createPermissionRequestMessage(POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME),
-        decisionReason: {
-          type: 'other',
-          reason:
-            'Pipeline consists of output-formatting cmdlets with script blocks — block content cannot be verified',
-        },
-      }
-    }
-    return {
-      behavior: 'allow',
-      updatedInput: input,
-      decisionReason: {
-        type: 'other',
-        reason: 'All pipeline commands are individually allowed',
-      },
-    }
-  }
-
-  // 6. Some sub-commands need approval — build suggestions
-  const decisionReason = {
-    type: 'other' as const,
-    reason: 'This command requires approval',
-  }
-
-  const pendingSuggestions: PermissionUpdate[] = []
-  for (const subCmd of subCommandsNeedingApproval) {
-    pendingSuggestions.push(...suggestionForExactCommand(subCmd))
-  }
-
-  return {
-    behavior: 'passthrough',
-    message: createPermissionRequestMessage(
-      POWERSHELL_TOOL_NAME,
-      decisionReason,
-    ),
-    decisionReason,
-    suggestions: pendingSuggestions,
-  }
-}