subagent-cli 0.3.0 → 0.3.1

package/src/tools/PowerShellTool/powershellSecurity.ts

@@ -1,1090 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * PowerShell-specific security analysis for command validation.
- *
- * Detects dangerous patterns: code injection, download cradles, privilege
- * escalation, dynamic command names, COM objects, etc.
- *
- * All checks are AST-based. If parsing failed (valid=false), none of the
- * individual checks match and powershellCommandIsSafe returns 'ask'.
- */
-
-import {
-  DANGEROUS_SCRIPT_BLOCK_CMDLETS,
-  FILEPATH_EXECUTION_CMDLETS,
-  MODULE_LOADING_CMDLETS,
-} from '../../utils/powershell/dangerousCmdlets.js'
-import type {
-  ParsedCommandElement,
-  ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-} from '../../utils/powershell/parser.js'
-import {
-  COMMON_ALIASES,
-  commandHasArgAbbreviation,
-  deriveSecurityFlags,
-  getAllCommands,
-  getVariablesByScope,
-  hasCommandNamed,
-} from '../../utils/powershell/parser.js'
-import { isClmAllowedType } from './clmTypes.js'
-
-type PowerShellSecurityResult = {
-  behavior: 'passthrough' | 'ask' | 'allow'
-  message?: string
-}
-
-const POWERSHELL_EXECUTABLES = new Set([
-  'pwsh',
-  'pwsh.exe',
-  'powershell',
-  'powershell.exe',
-])
-
-/**
- * Extracts the base executable name from a command, handling full paths
- * like /usr/bin/pwsh, C:\Windows\...\powershell.exe, or .\pwsh.
- */
-function isPowerShellExecutable(name: string): boolean {
-  const lower = name.toLowerCase()
-  if (POWERSHELL_EXECUTABLES.has(lower)) {
-    return true
-  }
-  // Extract basename from paths (both / and \ separators)
-  const lastSep = Math.max(lower.lastIndexOf('/'), lower.lastIndexOf('\\'))
-  if (lastSep >= 0) {
-    return POWERSHELL_EXECUTABLES.has(lower.slice(lastSep + 1))
-  }
-  return false
-}
-
-/**
- * Alternative parameter-prefix characters that PowerShell accepts as equivalent
- * to ASCII hyphen-minus (U+002D). PowerShell's tokenizer (SpecialCharacters.IsDash)
- * and powershell.exe's CommandLineParameterParser both accept all four dash
- * characters plus Windows PowerShell 5.1's `/` parameter delimiter.
- * Extent.Text preserves the raw character; transformCommandAst uses ce.text for
- * CommandParameterAst elements, so these reach us unchanged.
- */
-const PS_ALT_PARAM_PREFIXES = new Set([
-  '/', // Windows PowerShell 5.1 (powershell.exe, not pwsh 7+)
-  '\u2013', // en-dash
-  '\u2014', // em-dash
-  '\u2015', // horizontal bar
-])
-
-/**
- * Wrapper around commandHasArgAbbreviation that also matches alternative
- * parameter prefixes (`/`, en-dash, em-dash, horizontal-bar). PowerShell's
- * tokenizer (SpecialCharacters.IsDash) accepts these for both powershell.exe
- * args AND cmdlet parameters, so use this for ALL PS param checks — not just
- * pwsh.exe invocations. Previously checkComObject/checkStartProcess/
- * checkDangerousFilePathExecution/checkForEachMemberName used bare
- * commandHasArgAbbreviation, so `Start-Process foo –Verb RunAs` bypassed.
- */
-function psExeHasParamAbbreviation(
-  cmd: ParsedCommandElement,
-  fullParam: string,
-  minPrefix: string,
-): boolean {
-  if (commandHasArgAbbreviation(cmd, fullParam, minPrefix)) {
-    return true
-  }
-  // Normalize alternative prefixes to `-` and re-check. Build a synthetic cmd
-  // with normalized args; commandHasArgAbbreviation handles colon-value split.
-  const normalized: ParsedCommandElement = {
-    ...cmd,
-    args: cmd.args.map(a =>
-      a.length > 0 && PS_ALT_PARAM_PREFIXES.has(a[0]!) ? '-' + a.slice(1) : a,
-    ),
-  }
-  return commandHasArgAbbreviation(normalized, fullParam, minPrefix)
-}
-
-/**
- * Checks if a PowerShell command uses Invoke-Expression or its alias (iex).
- * These are equivalent to eval and can execute arbitrary code.
- */
-function checkInvokeExpression(
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-): PowerShellSecurityResult {
-  if (hasCommandNamed(parsed, 'Invoke-Expression')) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      message:
-        'Command uses Invoke-Expression which can execute arbitrary code',
-    }
-  }
-  return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-}
-
-/**
- * Checks for dynamic command invocation where the command name itself is an
- * expression that cannot be statically resolved.
- *
- * PoCs:
- *   & ${function:Invoke-Expression} 'payload'  — VariableExpressionAst
- *   & ('iex','x')[0] 'payload'                 — IndexExpressionAst → 'Other'
- *   & ('i'+'ex') 'payload'                     — BinaryExpressionAst → 'Other'
- *
- * In all cases cmd.name is the literal extent text (e.g. "('iex','x')[0]"),
- * which doesn't match hasCommandNamed('Invoke-Expression'). At runtime
- * PowerShell evaluates the expression to a command name and invokes it.
- *
- * Legitimate command names are ALWAYS StringConstantExpressionAst (mapped to
- * 'StringConstant'): `Get-Process`, `git`, `ls`. Any other element type in
- * name position is dynamic. Rather than denylisting dynamic types (fragile —
- * mapElementType's default case maps unknown AST types to 'Other', which a
- * `=== 'Variable'` check misses), we allowlist 'StringConstant'.
- *
- * elementTypes[0] is the command-name element (transformCommandAst pushes it
- * first, before arg elements). The `!== undefined` guard preserves fail-open
- * when elementTypes is absent (parse-detail unavailable — if parsing failed
- * entirely, valid=false already returns 'ask' earlier in the chain).
- */
-function checkDynamicCommandName(
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-): PowerShellSecurityResult {
-  for (const cmd of getAllCommands(parsed)) {
-    if (cmd.elementType !== 'CommandAst') {
-      continue
-    }
-    const nameElementType = cmd.elementTypes?.[0]
-    if (nameElementType !== undefined && nameElementType !== 'StringConstant') {
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message:
-          'Command name is a dynamic expression which cannot be statically validated',
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-}
-
-/**
- * Checks for encoded command parameters which obscure intent.
- * These are commonly used in malware to bypass security tools.
- */
-function checkEncodedCommand(
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-): PowerShellSecurityResult {
-  for (const cmd of getAllCommands(parsed)) {
-    if (isPowerShellExecutable(cmd.name)) {
-      if (psExeHasParamAbbreviation(cmd, '-encodedcommand', '-e')) {
-        return {
-          behavior: 'ask',
-          message: 'Command uses encoded parameters which obscure intent',
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-}
-
-/**
- * Checks for PowerShell re-invocation (nested pwsh/powershell process).
- *
- * Any PowerShell executable in command position is flagged — not just
- * -Command/-File. Bare `pwsh` receiving stdin (`Get-Content x | pwsh`) or
- * a positional script path executes arbitrary code with none of the explicit
- * flags present. Same unvalidatable-nested-process reasoning as
- * checkStartProcess vector 2: we cannot statically analyze what the child
- * process will run.
- */
-function checkPwshCommandOrFile(
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-): PowerShellSecurityResult {
-  for (const cmd of getAllCommands(parsed)) {
-    if (isPowerShellExecutable(cmd.name)) {
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message:
-          'Command spawns a nested PowerShell process which cannot be validated',
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-}
-
-/**
- * Checks for download cradle patterns - common malware techniques
- * that download and execute remote code.
- *
- * Per-statement: catches piped cradles (`IWR ... | IEX`).
- * Cross-statement: catches split cradles (`$r = IWR ...; IEX $r.Content`).
- * The cross-statement case is already blocked by checkInvokeExpression (which
- * scans all statements), but this check improves the warning message.
- */
-const DOWNLOADER_NAMES = new Set([
-  'invoke-webrequest',
-  'iwr',
-  'invoke-restmethod',
-  'irm',
-  'new-object',
-  'start-bitstransfer', // MITRE T1197
-])
-
-function isDownloader(name: string): boolean {
-  return DOWNLOADER_NAMES.has(name.toLowerCase())
-}
-
-function isIex(name: string): boolean {
-  const lower = name.toLowerCase()
-  return lower === 'invoke-expression' || lower === 'iex'
-}
-
-function checkDownloadCradles(
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-): PowerShellSecurityResult {
-  // Per-statement: piped cradle (IWR ... | IEX)
-  for (const statement of parsed.statements) {
-    const cmds = statement.commands
-    if (cmds.length < 2) {
-      continue
-    }
-    const hasDownloader = cmds.some(cmd => isDownloader(cmd.name))
-    const hasIex = cmds.some(cmd => isIex(cmd.name))
-    if (hasDownloader && hasIex) {
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message: 'Command downloads and executes remote code',
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Cross-statement: split cradle ($r = IWR ...; IEX $r.Content).
-  // No new false positives: if IEX is present, checkInvokeExpression already asks.
-  const all = getAllCommands(parsed)
-  if (all.some(c => isDownloader(c.name)) && all.some(c => isIex(c.name))) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      message: 'Command downloads and executes remote code',
-    }
-  }
-
-  return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-}
-
-/**
- * Checks for standalone download utilities — LOLBAS tools commonly used to
- * fetch payloads. Unlike checkDownloadCradles (which requires download + IEX
- * in-pipeline), this flags the download operation itself.
- *
- * Start-BitsTransfer: always a file transfer (MITRE T1197).
- * certutil -urlcache: classic LOLBAS download. Only flagged with -urlcache;
- * bare `certutil` has many legitimate cert-management uses.
- * bitsadmin /transfer: legacy BITS download (pre-PowerShell).
- */
-function checkDownloadUtilities(
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-): PowerShellSecurityResult {
-  for (const cmd of getAllCommands(parsed)) {
-    const lower = cmd.name.toLowerCase()
-    // Start-BitsTransfer is purpose-built for file transfer — no safe variant.
-    if (lower === 'start-bitstransfer') {
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message: 'Command downloads files via BITS transfer',
-      }
-    }
-    // certutil / certutil.exe — only when -urlcache is present. certutil has
-    // many non-download uses (cert store queries, encoding, etc.).
-    // certutil.exe accepts both -urlcache and /urlcache per standard Windows
-    // utility convention — check both forms (bitsadmin below does the same).
-    if (lower === 'certutil' || lower === 'certutil.exe') {
-      const hasUrlcache = cmd.args.some(a => {
-        const la = a.toLowerCase()
-        return la === '-urlcache' || la === '/urlcache'
-      })
-      if (hasUrlcache) {
-        return {
-          behavior: 'ask',
-          message: 'Command uses certutil to download from a URL',
-        }
-      }
-    }
-    // bitsadmin /transfer — legacy BITS CLI, same threat as Start-BitsTransfer.
-    if (lower === 'bitsadmin' || lower === 'bitsadmin.exe') {
-      if (cmd.args.some(a => a.toLowerCase() === '/transfer')) {
-        return {
-          behavior: 'ask',
-          message: 'Command downloads files via BITS transfer',
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-}
-
-/**
- * Checks for Add-Type usage which compiles and loads .NET code at runtime.
- * This can be used to execute arbitrary compiled code.
- */
-function checkAddType(
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-): PowerShellSecurityResult {
-  if (hasCommandNamed(parsed, 'Add-Type')) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      message: 'Command compiles and loads .NET code',
-    }
-  }
-  return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-}
-
-/**
- * Checks for New-Object -ComObject. COM objects like WScript.Shell,
- * Shell.Application, MMC20.Application, Schedule.Service, Msxml2.XMLHTTP
- * have their own execution/download capabilities — no IEX required.
- *
- * We can't enumerate all dangerous ProgIDs, so flag any -ComObject. Object
- * creation alone is inert, but the prompt should warn the user that COM
- * instantiation is an execution primitive. Method invocation on the result
- * (.Run(), .Exec()) is separately caught by checkMemberInvocations.
- */
-function checkComObject(
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-): PowerShellSecurityResult {
-  for (const cmd of getAllCommands(parsed)) {
-    if (cmd.name.toLowerCase() !== 'new-object') {
-      continue
-    }
-    // -ComObject min abbrev is -com (New-Object params: -TypeName, -ComObject,
-    // -ArgumentList, -Property, -Strict; -co is ambiguous in PS5.1 due to
-    // common params like -Confirm, so use -com).
-    if (psExeHasParamAbbreviation(cmd, '-comobject', '-com')) {
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message:
-          'Command instantiates a COM object which may have execution capabilities',
-      }
-    }
-    // SECURITY: checkTypeLiterals only sees [bracket] syntax from
-    // parsed.typeLiterals. `New-Object System.Net.WebClient` passes the type
-    // as a STRING ARG (StringConstantExpressionAst), not a TypeExpressionAst,
-    // so CLM never fires. Extract -TypeName (named, colon-bound, or
-    // positional-0) and run through isClmAllowedType. Closes attackVectors D4.
-    let typeName: string | undefined
-    for (let i = 0; i < cmd.args.length; i++) {
-      const a = cmd.args[i]!
-      const lower = a.toLowerCase()
-      // -TypeName abbrev: -t is unambiguous (no other New-Object -t* params).
-      // Handle colon-bound form first: -TypeName:Foo.Bar
-      if (lower.startsWith('-t') && lower.includes(':')) {
-        const colonIdx = a.indexOf(':')
-        const paramPart = lower.slice(0, colonIdx)
-        if ('-typename'.startsWith(paramPart)) {
-          typeName = a.slice(colonIdx + 1)
-          break
-        }
-      }
-      // Space-separated form: -TypeName Foo.Bar
-      if (
-        lower.startsWith('-t') &&
-        '-typename'.startsWith(lower) &&
-        cmd.args[i + 1] !== undefined
-      ) {
-        typeName = cmd.args[i + 1]
-        break
-      }
-    }
-    // Positional-0 binds to -TypeName (NetParameterSet default). Named params
-    // (-Strict, -ArgumentList, -Property, -ComObject) may appear before the
-    // positional TypeName, so scan past them to find the first non-consumed arg.
-    if (typeName === undefined) {
-      // New-Object named params that consume a following value argument
-      const VALUE_PARAMS = new Set(['-argumentlist', '-comobject', '-property'])
-      // Switch params (no value argument)
-      const SWITCH_PARAMS = new Set(['-strict'])
-      for (let i = 0; i < cmd.args.length; i++) {
-        const a = cmd.args[i]!
-        if (a.startsWith('-')) {
-          const lower = a.toLowerCase()
-          // Skip -TypeName variants (already handled by named-param loop above)
-          if (lower.startsWith('-t') && '-typename'.startsWith(lower)) {
-            i++ // skip value
-            continue
-          }
-          // Colon-bound form: -Param:Value (single token, no skip needed)
-          if (lower.includes(':')) continue
-          if (SWITCH_PARAMS.has(lower)) continue
-          if (VALUE_PARAMS.has(lower)) {
-            i++ // skip value
-            continue
-          }
-          // Unknown param — skip conservatively
-          continue
-        }
-        // First non-dash arg is the positional TypeName
-        typeName = a
-        break
-      }
-    }
-    if (typeName !== undefined && !isClmAllowedType(typeName)) {
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message: `New-Object instantiates .NET type '${typeName}' outside the ConstrainedLanguage allowlist`,
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-}
-
-/**
- * Checks for DANGEROUS_SCRIPT_BLOCK_CMDLETS invoked with -FilePath (or
- * -LiteralPath). These run a script file — arbitrary code execution with no
- * ScriptBlockAst in the tree.
- *
- * checkScriptBlockInjection only fires when hasScriptBlocks is true. With
- * -FilePath there is no ScriptBlockAst, so DANGEROUS_SCRIPT_BLOCK_CMDLETS is
- * never consulted. This check closes that gap for the -FilePath vector.
- *
- * Cmdlets in DANGEROUS_SCRIPT_BLOCK_CMDLETS that accept -FilePath:
- *   Invoke-Command   -FilePath             (icm alias via COMMON_ALIASES)
- *   Start-Job        -FilePath, -LiteralPath
- *   Start-ThreadJob  -FilePath
- *   Register-ScheduledJob -FilePath
- * The *-PSSession and Register-*Event entries do not accept -FilePath.
- *
- * -f is unambiguous for -FilePath on all four (no other -f* params).
- * -l is unambiguous for -LiteralPath on Start-Job; harmless no-op on the
- * others (no -l* params to collide with).
- */
-
-function checkDangerousFilePathExecution(
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-): PowerShellSecurityResult {
-  for (const cmd of getAllCommands(parsed)) {
-    const lower = cmd.name.toLowerCase()
-    const resolved = COMMON_ALIASES[lower]?.toLowerCase() ?? lower
-    if (!FILEPATH_EXECUTION_CMDLETS.has(resolved)) {
-      continue
-    }
-    if (
-      psExeHasParamAbbreviation(cmd, '-filepath', '-f') ||
-      psExeHasParamAbbreviation(cmd, '-literalpath', '-l')
-    ) {
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message: `${cmd.name} -FilePath executes an arbitrary script file`,
-      }
-    }
-    // Positional binding: `Start-Job script.ps1` binds position-0 to
-    // -FilePath via FilePathParameterSet resolution (ScriptBlock args select
-    // ScriptBlockParameterSet instead). Same pattern as checkForEachMemberName:
-    // any non-dash StringConstant is a potential -FilePath. Over-flagging
-    // (e.g., `Start-Job -Name foo` where `foo` is StringConstant) is fail-safe.
-    for (let i = 0; i < cmd.args.length; i++) {
-      const argType = cmd.elementTypes?.[i + 1]
-      const arg = cmd.args[i]
-      if (argType === 'StringConstant' && arg && !arg.startsWith('-')) {
-        return {
-          behavior: 'ask',
-          message: `${cmd.name} with positional string argument binds to -FilePath and executes a script file`,
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-}
-
-/**
- * Checks for ForEach-Object -MemberName. Invokes a method by string name on
- * every piped object — semantically equivalent to `| % { $_.Method() }` but
- * without any ScriptBlockAst or InvokeMemberExpressionAst in the tree.
- *
- * PoC: `Get-Process | ForEach-Object -MemberName Kill` → kills all processes.
- * checkScriptBlockInjection misses it (no script block); checkMemberInvocations
- * misses it (no .Method() syntax). Aliases `%` and `foreach` resolve via
- * COMMON_ALIASES.
- */
-function checkForEachMemberName(
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-): PowerShellSecurityResult {
-  for (const cmd of getAllCommands(parsed)) {
-    const lower = cmd.name.toLowerCase()
-    const resolved = COMMON_ALIASES[lower]?.toLowerCase() ?? lower
-    if (resolved !== 'foreach-object') {
-      continue
-    }
-    // ForEach-Object params starting with -m: only -MemberName. -m is unambiguous.
-    if (psExeHasParamAbbreviation(cmd, '-membername', '-m')) {
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message:
-          'ForEach-Object -MemberName invokes methods by string name which cannot be validated',
-      }
-    }
-    // PS7+: `ForEach-Object Kill` binds a positional string arg to
-    // -MemberName via MemberSet parameter-set resolution (ScriptBlock args
-    // select ScriptBlockSet instead). Scan ALL args — `-Verbose Kill` or
-    // `-ErrorAction Stop Kill` still binds Kill positionally. Any non-dash
-    // StringConstant is a potential -MemberName; over-flagging is fail-safe.
-    for (let i = 0; i < cmd.args.length; i++) {
-      const argType = cmd.elementTypes?.[i + 1]
-      const arg = cmd.args[i]
-      if (argType === 'StringConstant' && arg && !arg.startsWith('-')) {
-        return {
-          behavior: 'ask',
-          message:
-            'ForEach-Object with positional string argument binds to -MemberName and invokes methods by name',
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-}
-
-/**
- * Checks for dangerous Start-Process patterns.
- *
- * Two vectors:
- * 1. `-Verb RunAs` — privilege escalation (UAC prompt).
- * 2. Launching a PowerShell executable — nested invocation.
- * `Start-Process pwsh -ArgumentList "-e <b64>"` evades
- * checkEncodedCommand/checkPwshCommandOrFile because cmd.name is
- * `Start-Process`, not `pwsh`. The `-e` lives inside the -ArgumentList
- * string value and is never parsed as a param on the outer command.
- * Rather than parse -ArgumentList contents (fragile — it's an opaque
- * string or array), flag any Start-Process whose target is a PS
- * executable: the nested invocation is unvalidatable by construction.
- */
-function checkStartProcess(
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-): PowerShellSecurityResult {
-  for (const cmd of getAllCommands(parsed)) {
-    const lower = cmd.name.toLowerCase()
-    if (lower !== 'start-process' && lower !== 'saps' && lower !== 'start') {
-      continue
-    }
-    // Vector 1: -Verb RunAs (space or colon syntax).
-    // Space syntax: psExeHasParamAbbreviation finds -Verb/-v, then scan args
-    // for a bare 'runas' token.
-    if (
-      psExeHasParamAbbreviation(cmd, '-Verb', '-v') &&
-      cmd.args.some(a => a.toLowerCase() === 'runas')
-    ) {
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message: 'Command requests elevated privileges',
-      }
-    }
-    // Colon syntax — two layers:
-    // (a) Structural: PR #23554 added children[] for colon-bound param args.
-    //     children[i] = [{type, text}] for the bound value. Check if any
-    //     -v*-prefixed param has a child whose text normalizes (strip
-    //     quotes/backtick/whitespace) to 'runas'. Robust against arbitrary
-    //     quoting the regex can't anticipate.
-    // (b) Regex fallback: for parsed output without children[] or as
-    //     defense-in-depth. -Verb:'RunAs', -Verb:"RunAs", -Verb:`runas all
-    //     bypassed the old /...:runas$/ pattern because the quote/tick broke
-    //     the match.
-    if (cmd.children) {
-      for (let i = 0; i < cmd.args.length; i++) {
-        // Strip backticks before matching param name (bug #14): -V`erb:RunAs
-        const argClean = cmd.args[i]!.replace(/`/g, '')
-        if (!/^[-\u2013\u2014\u2015/]v[a-z]*:/i.test(argClean)) continue
-        const kids = cmd.children[i]
-        if (!kids) continue
-        for (const child of kids) {
-          if (child.text.replace(/['"`\s]/g, '').toLowerCase() === 'runas') {
-            return {
-              behavior: 'ask',
-              message: 'Command requests elevated privileges',
-            }
-          }
-        }
-      }
-    }
-    if (
-      cmd.args.some(a => {
-        // Strip backticks before matching (bug #14 / review nit #2)
-        const clean = a.replace(/`/g, '')
-        return /^[-\u2013\u2014\u2015/]v[a-z]*:['"` ]*runas['"` ]*$/i.test(
-          clean,
-        )
-      })
-    ) {
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message: 'Command requests elevated privileges',
-      }
-    }
-    // Vector 2: Start-Process targeting a PowerShell executable.
-    // Target is either the first positional arg or the value after -FilePath.
-    // Scan all args — any PS-executable token present is treated as the launch
-    // target. Known false-positive: path-valued params (-WorkingDirectory,
-    // -RedirectStandard*) whose basename is pwsh/powershell —
-    // isPowerShellExecutable extracts basenames from paths, so
-    // `-WorkingDirectory C:\projects\pwsh` triggers. Accepted trade-off:
-    // Start-Process is not in CMDLET_ALLOWLIST (always prompts regardless),
-    // result is ask not reject, and correctly parsing Start-Process parameter
-    // binding is fragile. Strip quotes the parser may have preserved.
-    for (const arg of cmd.args) {
-      const stripped = arg.replace(/^['"]|['"]$/g, '')
-      if (isPowerShellExecutable(stripped)) {
-        return {
-          behavior: 'ask',
-          message:
-            'Start-Process launches a nested PowerShell process which cannot be validated',
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-}
-
-/**
- * Cmdlets where script blocks are safe (filtering/output cmdlets).
- * Script blocks piped to these are just predicates or projections, not arbitrary execution.
- */
-const SAFE_SCRIPT_BLOCK_CMDLETS = new Set([
-  'where-object',
-  'sort-object',
-  'select-object',
-  'group-object',
-  'format-table',
-  'format-list',
-  'format-wide',
-  'format-custom',
-  // NOT foreach-object — its block is arbitrary script, not a predicate.
-  // getAllCommands recurses so commands inside the block ARE checked, but
-  // non-command AST nodes (AssignmentStatementAst etc.) are invisible to it.
-  // See powershellPermissions.ts step-5 hasScriptBlocks guard.
-])
-
-/**
- * Checks for script block injection patterns where script blocks
- * appear in suspicious contexts that could execute arbitrary code.
- *
- * Script blocks used with safe filtering/output cmdlets (Where-Object,
- * Sort-Object, Select-Object, Group-Object) are allowed.
- * Script blocks used with dangerous cmdlets (Invoke-Command, Invoke-Expression,
- * Start-Job, etc.) are flagged.
- */
-function checkScriptBlockInjection(
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-): PowerShellSecurityResult {
-  const security = deriveSecurityFlags(parsed)
-  if (!security.hasScriptBlocks) {
-    return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-  }
-
-  // Check all commands in the parsed result. If any command is in the
-  // dangerous set, flag it. If all commands with script blocks are in
-  // the safe set (or the allowlist), allow it.
-  for (const cmd of getAllCommands(parsed)) {
-    const lower = cmd.name.toLowerCase()
-    if (DANGEROUS_SCRIPT_BLOCK_CMDLETS.has(lower)) {
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message:
-          'Command contains script block with dangerous cmdlet that may execute arbitrary code',
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Check if all commands are either safe script block consumers or don't use script blocks
-  const allCommandsSafe = getAllCommands(parsed).every(cmd => {
-    const lower = cmd.name.toLowerCase()
-    // Safe filtering/output cmdlets
-    if (SAFE_SCRIPT_BLOCK_CMDLETS.has(lower)) {
-      return true
-    }
-    // Resolve aliases
-    const alias = COMMON_ALIASES[lower]
-    if (alias && SAFE_SCRIPT_BLOCK_CMDLETS.has(alias.toLowerCase())) {
-      return true
-    }
-    // Unknown command with script blocks present — flag as potentially dangerous
-    return false
-  })
-
-  if (allCommandsSafe) {
-    return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-  }
-
-  return {
-    behavior: 'ask',
-    message: 'Command contains script block that may execute arbitrary code',
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * AST-only check: Detects subexpressions $() which can hide command execution.
- */
-function checkSubExpressions(
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-): PowerShellSecurityResult {
-  if (deriveSecurityFlags(parsed).hasSubExpressions) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      message: 'Command contains subexpressions $()',
-    }
-  }
-  return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-}
-
-/**
- * AST-only check: Detects expandable strings (double-quoted) with embedded
- * expressions like "$env:PATH" or "$(dangerous-command)". These can hide
- * command execution or variable interpolation inside string literals.
- */
-function checkExpandableStrings(
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-): PowerShellSecurityResult {
-  if (deriveSecurityFlags(parsed).hasExpandableStrings) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      message: 'Command contains expandable strings with embedded expressions',
-    }
-  }
-  return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-}
-
-/**
- * AST-only check: Detects splatting (@variable) which can obscure arguments.
- */
-function checkSplatting(
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-): PowerShellSecurityResult {
-  if (deriveSecurityFlags(parsed).hasSplatting) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      message: 'Command uses splatting (@variable)',
-    }
-  }
-  return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-}
-
-/**
- * AST-only check: Detects stop-parsing token (--%) which prevents further parsing.
- */
-function checkStopParsing(
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-): PowerShellSecurityResult {
-  if (deriveSecurityFlags(parsed).hasStopParsing) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      message: 'Command uses stop-parsing token (--%)',
-    }
-  }
-  return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-}
-
-/**
- * AST-only check: Detects .NET method invocations which can access system APIs.
- */
-function checkMemberInvocations(
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-): PowerShellSecurityResult {
-  if (deriveSecurityFlags(parsed).hasMemberInvocations) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      message: 'Command invokes .NET methods',
-    }
-  }
-  return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-}
-
-/**
- * AST-only check: type literals outside Microsoft's ConstrainedLanguage
- * allowlist. CLM blocks all .NET type access except ~90 primitives/attributes
- * Microsoft considers safe for untrusted code. We trust that list as the
- * "safe" boundary — anything outside it (Reflection.Assembly, IO.Pipes,
- * Diagnostics.Process, InteropServices.Marshal, etc.) can access system APIs
- * that compromise the permission model.
- *
- * Runs AFTER checkMemberInvocations: that broadly flags any ::Method / .Method()
- * call; this check is the more specific "which types" signal. Both fire on
- * [Reflection.Assembly]::Load; CLM gives the precise message. Pure type casts
- * like [int]$x have no member invocation and only hit this check.
- */
-function checkTypeLiterals(
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-): PowerShellSecurityResult {
-  for (const t of parsed.typeLiterals ?? []) {
-    if (!isClmAllowedType(t)) {
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message: `Command uses .NET type [${t}] outside the ConstrainedLanguage allowlist`,
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-}
-
-/**
- * Invoke-Item (alias ii) opens a file with its default handler (ShellExecute
- * on Windows, open/xdg-open on Unix). On an .exe/.ps1/.bat/.cmd this is RCE.
- * Bug 008: ii is in no blocklist; passthrough prompt doesn't explain the
- * exec hazard. Always ask — there is no safe variant (even opening .txt may
- * invoke a user-configured handler that accepts arguments).
- */
-function checkInvokeItem(
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-): PowerShellSecurityResult {
-  for (const cmd of getAllCommands(parsed)) {
-    const lower = cmd.name.toLowerCase()
-    if (lower === 'invoke-item' || lower === 'ii') {
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message:
-          'Invoke-Item opens files with the default handler (ShellExecute). On executable files this runs arbitrary code.',
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-}
-
-/**
- * Scheduled-task persistence primitives. Register-ScheduledJob was blocked
- * (DANGEROUS_SCRIPT_BLOCK_CMDLETS); the newer Register-ScheduledTask cmdlet
- * and legacy schtasks.exe /create were not. Persistence that survives the
- * session with no explanatory prompt.
- */
-const SCHEDULED_TASK_CMDLETS = new Set([
-  'register-scheduledtask',
-  'new-scheduledtask',
-  'new-scheduledtaskaction',
-  'set-scheduledtask',
-])
-
-function checkScheduledTask(
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-): PowerShellSecurityResult {
-  for (const cmd of getAllCommands(parsed)) {
-    const lower = cmd.name.toLowerCase()
-    if (SCHEDULED_TASK_CMDLETS.has(lower)) {
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message: `${cmd.name} creates or modifies a scheduled task (persistence primitive)`,
-      }
-    }
-    if (lower === 'schtasks' || lower === 'schtasks.exe') {
-      if (
-        cmd.args.some(a => {
-          const la = a.toLowerCase()
-          return (
-            la === '/create' ||
-            la === '/change' ||
-            la === '-create' ||
-            la === '-change'
-          )
-        })
-      ) {
-        return {
-          behavior: 'ask',
-          message:
-            'schtasks with create/change modifies scheduled tasks (persistence primitive)',
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-}
-
-/**
- * AST-only check: Detects environment variable manipulation via Set-Item/New-Item on env: scope.
- */
-const ENV_WRITE_CMDLETS = new Set([
-  'set-item',
-  'si',
-  'new-item',
-  'ni',
-  'remove-item',
-  'ri',
-  'del',
-  'rm',
-  'rd',
-  'rmdir',
-  'erase',
-  'clear-item',
-  'cli',
-  'set-content',
-  // 'sc' omitted — collides with sc.exe on PS Core 7+, see COMMON_ALIASES note
-  'add-content',
-  'ac',
-])
-
-function checkEnvVarManipulation(
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-): PowerShellSecurityResult {
-  const envVars = getVariablesByScope(parsed, 'env')
-  if (envVars.length === 0) {
-    return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-  }
-  // Check if any command is a write cmdlet
-  for (const cmd of getAllCommands(parsed)) {
-    if (ENV_WRITE_CMDLETS.has(cmd.name.toLowerCase())) {
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message: 'Command modifies environment variables',
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  // Also flag if there are assignments involving env vars
-  if (deriveSecurityFlags(parsed).hasAssignments && envVars.length > 0) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      message: 'Command modifies environment variables',
-    }
-  }
-  return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-}
-
-/**
- * Module-loading cmdlets execute a .psm1's top-level script body (Import-Module)
- * or download from arbitrary repositories (Install-Module, Save-Module). A
- * wildcard allow rule like `Import-Module:*` would let an attacker-supplied
- * .psm1 execute with the user's privileges — same risk as Invoke-Expression.
- *
- * NEVER_SUGGEST (dangerousCmdlets.ts) derives from this list so the UI
- * never offers these as wildcard suggestions, but users can still manually
- * write allow rules. This check ensures the permission engine independently
- * gates these cmdlets.
- */
-
-function checkModuleLoading(
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-): PowerShellSecurityResult {
-  for (const cmd of getAllCommands(parsed)) {
-    const lower = cmd.name.toLowerCase()
-    if (MODULE_LOADING_CMDLETS.has(lower)) {
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message:
-          'Command loads, installs, or downloads a PowerShell module or script, which can execute arbitrary code',
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-}
-
-/**
- * Set-Alias/New-Alias can hijack future command resolution: after
- * `Set-Alias Get-Content Invoke-Expression`, any later `Get-Content $x`
- * executes arbitrary code. Set-Variable/New-Variable can poison
- * `$PSDefaultParameterValues` (e.g., `Set-Variable PSDefaultParameterValues
- * @{'*:Path'='/etc/passwd'}`) which alters every subsequent cmdlet's behavior.
- * Neither effect can be validated statically — we'd need to track all future
- * command resolutions in the session. Always ask.
- */
-const RUNTIME_STATE_CMDLETS = new Set([
-  'set-alias',
-  'sal',
-  'new-alias',
-  'nal',
-  'set-variable',
-  'sv',
-  'new-variable',
-  'nv',
-])
-
-function checkRuntimeStateManipulation(
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-): PowerShellSecurityResult {
-  for (const cmd of getAllCommands(parsed)) {
-    // Strip module qualifier: `Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility\Set-Alias` → `set-alias`
-    const raw = cmd.name.toLowerCase()
-    const lower = raw.includes('\\')
-      ? raw.slice(raw.lastIndexOf('\\') + 1)
-      : raw
-    if (RUNTIME_STATE_CMDLETS.has(lower)) {
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message:
-          'Command creates or modifies an alias or variable that can affect future command resolution',
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-}
-
-/**
- * Invoke-WmiMethod / Invoke-CimMethod are Start-Process equivalents via WMI.
- * `Invoke-WmiMethod -Class Win32_Process -Name Create -ArgumentList "cmd /c ..."`
- * spawns an arbitrary process, bypassing checkStartProcess entirely. No narrow
- * safe usage exists — -Class and -MethodName accept arbitrary strings, so
- * gating on Win32_Process specifically would miss -Class $x or other process-
- * spawning WMI classes. Returns ask on any invocation. (security finding #34)
- */
-const WMI_SPAWN_CMDLETS = new Set([
-  'invoke-wmimethod',
-  'iwmi',
-  'invoke-cimmethod',
-])
-
-function checkWmiProcessSpawn(
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-): PowerShellSecurityResult {
-  for (const cmd of getAllCommands(parsed)) {
-    const lower = cmd.name.toLowerCase()
-    if (WMI_SPAWN_CMDLETS.has(lower)) {
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message: `${cmd.name} can spawn arbitrary processes via WMI/CIM (Win32_Process Create)`,
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-}
-
-/**
- * Main entry point for PowerShell security validation.
- * Checks a PowerShell command against known dangerous patterns.
- *
- * All checks are AST-based. If the AST parse failed (parsed.valid === false),
- * none of the individual checks will match and we return 'ask' as a safe default.
- *
- * @param command - The PowerShell command to validate (unused, kept for API compat)
- * @param parsed - Parsed AST from PowerShell's native parser (required)
- * @returns Security result indicating whether the command is safe
- */
-export function powershellCommandIsSafe(
-  _command: string,
-  parsed: ParsedPowerShellCommand,
-): PowerShellSecurityResult {
-  // If the AST parse failed, we cannot determine safety -- ask the user
-  if (!parsed.valid) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      message: 'Could not parse command for security analysis',
-    }
-  }
-
-  const validators = [
-    checkInvokeExpression,
-    checkDynamicCommandName,
-    checkEncodedCommand,
-    checkPwshCommandOrFile,
-    checkDownloadCradles,
-    checkDownloadUtilities,
-    checkAddType,
-    checkComObject,
-    checkDangerousFilePathExecution,
-    checkInvokeItem,
-    checkScheduledTask,
-    checkForEachMemberName,
-    checkStartProcess,
-    checkScriptBlockInjection,
-    checkSubExpressions,
-    checkExpandableStrings,
-    checkSplatting,
-    checkStopParsing,
-    checkMemberInvocations,
-    checkTypeLiterals,
-    checkEnvVarManipulation,
-    checkModuleLoading,
-    checkRuntimeStateManipulation,
-    checkWmiProcessSpawn,
-  ]
-
-  for (const validator of validators) {
-    const result = validator(parsed)
-    if (result.behavior === 'ask') {
-      return result
-    }
-  }
-
-  // All checks passed
-  return { behavior: 'passthrough' }
-}