subagent-cli 0.3.0 → 0.3.1

package/src/tools/BashTool/bashPermissions.ts

@@ -1,2621 +0,0 @@
-import { feature } from 'src/_stubs/bun-bundle.js'
-import { APIUserAbortError } from '@anthropic-ai/sdk'
-import type { z } from 'zod/v4'
-import { getFeatureValue_CACHED_MAY_BE_STALE } from '../../services/analytics/growthbook.js'
-import {
-  type AnalyticsMetadata_I_VERIFIED_THIS_IS_NOT_CODE_OR_FILEPATHS,
-  logEvent,
-} from '../../services/analytics/index.js'
-import type { ToolPermissionContext, ToolUseContext } from '../../Tool.js'
-import type { PendingClassifierCheck } from '../../types/permissions.js'
-import { count } from '../../utils/array.js'
-import {
-  checkSemantics,
-  nodeTypeId,
-  type ParseForSecurityResult,
-  parseForSecurityFromAst,
-  type Redirect,
-  type SimpleCommand,
-} from '../../utils/bash/ast.js'
-import {
-  type CommandPrefixResult,
-  extractOutputRedirections,
-  getCommandSubcommandPrefix,
-  splitCommand_DEPRECATED,
-} from '../../utils/bash/commands.js'
-import { parseCommandRaw } from '../../utils/bash/parser.js'
-import { tryParseShellCommand } from '../../utils/bash/shellQuote.js'
-import { getCwd } from '../../utils/cwd.js'
-import { logForDebugging } from '../../utils/debug.js'
-import { isEnvTruthy } from '../../utils/envUtils.js'
-import { AbortError } from '../../utils/errors.js'
-import type {
-  ClassifierBehavior,
-  ClassifierResult,
-} from '../../utils/permissions/bashClassifier.js'
-import {
-  classifyBashCommand,
-  getBashPromptAllowDescriptions,
-  getBashPromptAskDescriptions,
-  getBashPromptDenyDescriptions,
-  isClassifierPermissionsEnabled,
-} from '../../utils/permissions/bashClassifier.js'
-import type {
-  PermissionDecisionReason,
-  PermissionResult,
-} from '../../utils/permissions/PermissionResult.js'
-import type {
-  PermissionRule,
-  PermissionRuleValue,
-} from '../../utils/permissions/PermissionRule.js'
-import { extractRules } from '../../utils/permissions/PermissionUpdate.js'
-import type { PermissionUpdate } from '../../utils/permissions/PermissionUpdateSchema.js'
-import { permissionRuleValueToString } from '../../utils/permissions/permissionRuleParser.js'
-import {
-  createPermissionRequestMessage,
-  getRuleByContentsForTool,
-} from '../../utils/permissions/permissions.js'
-import {
-  parsePermissionRule,
-  type ShellPermissionRule,
-  matchWildcardPattern as sharedMatchWildcardPattern,
-  permissionRuleExtractPrefix as sharedPermissionRuleExtractPrefix,
-  suggestionForExactCommand as sharedSuggestionForExactCommand,
-  suggestionForPrefix as sharedSuggestionForPrefix,
-} from '../../utils/permissions/shellRuleMatching.js'
-import { getPlatform } from '../../utils/platform.js'
-import { SandboxManager } from '../../utils/sandbox/sandbox-adapter.js'
-import { jsonStringify } from '../../utils/slowOperations.js'
-import { windowsPathToPosixPath } from '../../utils/windowsPaths.js'
-import { BashTool } from './BashTool.js'
-import { checkCommandOperatorPermissions } from './bashCommandHelpers.js'
-import {
-  bashCommandIsSafeAsync_DEPRECATED,
-  stripSafeHeredocSubstitutions,
-} from './bashSecurity.js'
-import { checkPermissionMode } from './modeValidation.js'
-import { checkPathConstraints } from './pathValidation.js'
-import { checkSedConstraints } from './sedValidation.js'
-import { shouldUseSandbox } from './shouldUseSandbox.js'
-
-// DCE cliff: Bun's feature() evaluator has a per-function complexity budget.
-// bashToolHasPermission is right at the limit. `import { X as Y }` aliases
-// inside the import block count toward this budget; when they push it over
-// the threshold Bun can no longer prove feature('BASH_CLASSIFIER') is a
-// constant and silently evaluates the ternaries to `false`, dropping every
-// pendingClassifierCheck spread. Keep aliases as top-level const rebindings
-// instead. (See also the comment on checkSemanticsDeny below.)
-const bashCommandIsSafeAsync = bashCommandIsSafeAsync_DEPRECATED
-const splitCommand = splitCommand_DEPRECATED
-
-// Env-var assignment prefix (VAR=value). Shared across three while-loops that
-// skip safe env vars before extracting the command name.
-const ENV_VAR_ASSIGN_RE = /^[A-Za-z_]\w*=/
-
-// CC-643: On complex compound commands, splitCommand_DEPRECATED can produce a
-// very large subcommands array (possible exponential growth; #21405's ReDoS fix
-// may have been incomplete). Each subcommand then runs tree-sitter parse +
-// ~20 validators + logEvent (bashSecurity.ts), and with memoized metadata the
-// resulting microtask chain starves the event loop — REPL freeze at 100% CPU,
-// strace showed /proc/self/stat reads at ~127Hz with no epoll_wait. Fifty is
-// generous: legitimate user commands don't split that wide. Above the cap we
-// fall back to 'ask' (safe default — we can't prove safety, so we prompt).
-export const MAX_SUBCOMMANDS_FOR_SECURITY_CHECK = 50
-
-// GH#11380: Cap the number of per-subcommand rules suggested for compound
-// commands. Beyond this, the "Yes, and don't ask again for X, Y, Z…" label
-// degrades to "similar commands" anyway, and saving 10+ rules from one prompt
-// is more likely noise than intent. Users chaining this many write commands
-// in one && list are rare; they can always approve once and add rules manually.
-export const MAX_SUGGESTED_RULES_FOR_COMPOUND = 5
-
-/**
- * [ANT-ONLY] Log classifier evaluation results for analysis.
- * This helps us understand which classifier rules are being evaluated
- * and how the classifier is deciding on commands.
- */
-function logClassifierResultForAnts(
-  command: string,
-  behavior: ClassifierBehavior,
-  descriptions: string[],
-  result: ClassifierResult,
-): void {
-  if (process.env.USER_TYPE !== 'ant') {
-    return
-  }
-
-  logEvent('tengu_internal_bash_classifier_result', {
-    behavior:
-      behavior as AnalyticsMetadata_I_VERIFIED_THIS_IS_NOT_CODE_OR_FILEPATHS,
-    descriptions: jsonStringify(
-      descriptions,
-    ) as AnalyticsMetadata_I_VERIFIED_THIS_IS_NOT_CODE_OR_FILEPATHS,
-    matches: result.matches,
-    matchedDescription: (result.matchedDescription ??
-      '') as AnalyticsMetadata_I_VERIFIED_THIS_IS_NOT_CODE_OR_FILEPATHS,
-    confidence:
-      result.confidence as AnalyticsMetadata_I_VERIFIED_THIS_IS_NOT_CODE_OR_FILEPATHS,
-    reason:
-      result.reason as AnalyticsMetadata_I_VERIFIED_THIS_IS_NOT_CODE_OR_FILEPATHS,
-    // Note: command contains code/filepaths - this is ANT-ONLY so it's OK
-    command:
-      command as AnalyticsMetadata_I_VERIFIED_THIS_IS_NOT_CODE_OR_FILEPATHS,
-  })
-}
-
-/**
- * Extract a stable command prefix (command + subcommand) from a raw command string.
- * Skips leading env var assignments only if they are in SAFE_ENV_VARS (or
- * ANT_ONLY_SAFE_ENV_VARS for ant users). Returns null if a non-safe env var is
- * encountered (to fall back to exact match), or if the second token doesn't look
- * like a subcommand (lowercase alphanumeric, e.g., "commit", "run").
- *
- * Examples:
- *   'git commit -m "fix typo"' → 'git commit'
- *   'NODE_ENV=prod npm run build' → 'npm run' (NODE_ENV is safe)
- *   'MY_VAR=val npm run build' → null (MY_VAR is not safe)
- *   'ls -la' → null (flag, not a subcommand)
- *   'cat file.txt' → null (filename, not a subcommand)
- *   'chmod 755 file' → null (number, not a subcommand)
- */
-export function getSimpleCommandPrefix(command: string): string | null {
-  const tokens = command.trim().split(/\s+/).filter(Boolean)
-  if (tokens.length === 0) return null
-
-  // Skip env var assignments (VAR=value) at the start, but only if they are
-  // in SAFE_ENV_VARS (or ANT_ONLY_SAFE_ENV_VARS for ant users). If a non-safe
-  // env var is encountered, return null to fall back to exact match. This
-  // prevents generating prefix rules like Bash(npm run:*) that can never match
-  // at allow-rule check time, because stripSafeWrappers only strips safe vars.
-  let i = 0
-  while (i < tokens.length && ENV_VAR_ASSIGN_RE.test(tokens[i]!)) {
-    const varName = tokens[i]!.split('=')[0]!
-    const isAntOnlySafe =
-      process.env.USER_TYPE === 'ant' && ANT_ONLY_SAFE_ENV_VARS.has(varName)
-    if (!SAFE_ENV_VARS.has(varName) && !isAntOnlySafe) {
-      return null
-    }
-    i++
-  }
-
-  const remaining = tokens.slice(i)
-  if (remaining.length < 2) return null
-  const subcmd = remaining[1]!
-  // Second token must look like a subcommand (e.g., "commit", "run", "compose"),
-  // not a flag (-rf), filename (file.txt), path (/tmp), URL, or number (755).
-  if (!/^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(-[a-z0-9]+)*$/.test(subcmd)) return null
-  return remaining.slice(0, 2).join(' ')
-}
-
-// Bare-prefix suggestions like `bash:*` or `sh:*` would allow arbitrary code
-// via `-c`. Wrapper suggestions like `env:*` or `sudo:*` would do the same:
-// `env` is NOT in SAFE_WRAPPER_PATTERNS, so `env bash -c "evil"` survives
-// stripSafeWrappers unchanged and hits the startsWith("env ") check at
-// the prefix-rule matcher. Shell list mirrors DANGEROUS_SHELL_PREFIXES in
-// src/utils/shell/prefix.ts which guarded the old Haiku extractor.
-const BARE_SHELL_PREFIXES = new Set([
-  'sh',
-  'bash',
-  'zsh',
-  'fish',
-  'csh',
-  'tcsh',
-  'ksh',
-  'dash',
-  'cmd',
-  'powershell',
-  'pwsh',
-  // wrappers that exec their args as a command
-  'env',
-  'xargs',
-  // SECURITY: checkSemantics (ast.ts) strips these wrappers to check the
-  // wrapped command. Suggesting `Bash(nice:*)` would be ≈ `Bash(*)` — users
-  // would add it after a prompt, then `nice rm -rf /` passes semantics while
-  // deny/cd+git gates see 'nice' (SAFE_WRAPPER_PATTERNS below didn't strip
-  // bare `nice` until this fix). Block these from ever being suggested.
-  'nice',
-  'stdbuf',
-  'nohup',
-  'timeout',
-  'time',
-  // privilege escalation — sudo:* from `sudo -u foo ...` would auto-approve
-  // any future sudo invocation
-  'sudo',
-  'doas',
-  'pkexec',
-])
-
-/**
- * UI-only fallback: extract the first word alone when getSimpleCommandPrefix
- * declines. In external builds TREE_SITTER_BASH is off, so the async
- * tree-sitter refinement in BashPermissionRequest never fires — without this,
- * pipes and compounds (`python3 file.py 2>&1 | tail -20`) dump into the
- * editable field verbatim.
- *
- * Deliberately not used by suggestionForExactCommand: a backend-suggested
- * `Bash(rm:*)` is too broad to auto-generate, but as an editable starting
- * point it's what users expect (Slack C07VBSHV7EV/p1772670433193449).
- *
- * Reuses the same SAFE_ENV_VARS gate as getSimpleCommandPrefix — a rule like
- * `Bash(python3:*)` can never match `RUN=/path python3 ...` at check time
- * because stripSafeWrappers won't strip RUN.
- */
-export function getFirstWordPrefix(command: string): string | null {
-  const tokens = command.trim().split(/\s+/).filter(Boolean)
-
-  let i = 0
-  while (i < tokens.length && ENV_VAR_ASSIGN_RE.test(tokens[i]!)) {
-    const varName = tokens[i]!.split('=')[0]!
-    const isAntOnlySafe =
-      process.env.USER_TYPE === 'ant' && ANT_ONLY_SAFE_ENV_VARS.has(varName)
-    if (!SAFE_ENV_VARS.has(varName) && !isAntOnlySafe) {
-      return null
-    }
-    i++
-  }
-
-  const cmd = tokens[i]
-  if (!cmd) return null
-  // Same shape check as the subcommand regex in getSimpleCommandPrefix:
-  // rejects paths (./script.sh, /usr/bin/python), flags, numbers, filenames.
-  if (!/^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(-[a-z0-9]+)*$/.test(cmd)) return null
-  if (BARE_SHELL_PREFIXES.has(cmd)) return null
-  return cmd
-}
-
-function suggestionForExactCommand(command: string): PermissionUpdate[] {
-  // Heredoc commands contain multi-line content that changes each invocation,
-  // making exact-match rules useless (they'll never match again). Extract a
-  // stable prefix before the heredoc operator and suggest a prefix rule instead.
-  const heredocPrefix = extractPrefixBeforeHeredoc(command)
-  if (heredocPrefix) {
-    return sharedSuggestionForPrefix(BashTool.name, heredocPrefix)
-  }
-
-  // Multiline commands without heredoc also make poor exact-match rules.
-  // Saving the full multiline text can produce patterns containing `:*` in
-  // the middle, which fails permission validation and corrupts the settings
-  // file. Use the first line as a prefix rule instead.
-  if (command.includes('\n')) {
-    const firstLine = command.split('\n')[0]!.trim()
-    if (firstLine) {
-      return sharedSuggestionForPrefix(BashTool.name, firstLine)
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Single-line commands: extract a 2-word prefix for reusable rules.
-  // Without this, exact-match rules are saved that never match future
-  // invocations with different arguments.
-  const prefix = getSimpleCommandPrefix(command)
-  if (prefix) {
-    return sharedSuggestionForPrefix(BashTool.name, prefix)
-  }
-
-  return sharedSuggestionForExactCommand(BashTool.name, command)
-}
-
-/**
- * If the command contains a heredoc (<<), extract the command prefix before it.
- * Returns the first word(s) before the heredoc operator as a stable prefix,
- * or null if the command doesn't contain a heredoc.
- *
- * Examples:
- *   'git commit -m "$(cat <<\'EOF\'\n...\nEOF\n)"' → 'git commit'
- *   'cat <<EOF\nhello\nEOF' → 'cat'
- *   'echo hello' → null (no heredoc)
- */
-function extractPrefixBeforeHeredoc(command: string): string | null {
-  if (!command.includes('<<')) return null
-
-  const idx = command.indexOf('<<')
-  if (idx <= 0) return null
-
-  const before = command.substring(0, idx).trim()
-  if (!before) return null
-
-  const prefix = getSimpleCommandPrefix(before)
-  if (prefix) return prefix
-
-  // Fallback: skip safe env var assignments and take up to 2 tokens.
-  // This preserves flag tokens (e.g., "python3 -c" stays "python3 -c",
-  // not just "python3") and skips safe env var prefixes like "NODE_ENV=test".
-  // If a non-safe env var is encountered, return null to avoid generating
-  // prefix rules that can never match (same rationale as getSimpleCommandPrefix).
-  const tokens = before.split(/\s+/).filter(Boolean)
-  let i = 0
-  while (i < tokens.length && ENV_VAR_ASSIGN_RE.test(tokens[i]!)) {
-    const varName = tokens[i]!.split('=')[0]!
-    const isAntOnlySafe =
-      process.env.USER_TYPE === 'ant' && ANT_ONLY_SAFE_ENV_VARS.has(varName)
-    if (!SAFE_ENV_VARS.has(varName) && !isAntOnlySafe) {
-      return null
-    }
-    i++
-  }
-  if (i >= tokens.length) return null
-  return tokens.slice(i, i + 2).join(' ') || null
-}
-
-function suggestionForPrefix(prefix: string): PermissionUpdate[] {
-  return sharedSuggestionForPrefix(BashTool.name, prefix)
-}
-
-/**
- * Extract prefix from legacy :* syntax (e.g., "npm:*" -> "npm")
- * Delegates to shared implementation.
- */
-export const permissionRuleExtractPrefix = sharedPermissionRuleExtractPrefix
-
-/**
- * Match a command against a wildcard pattern (case-sensitive for Bash).
- * Delegates to shared implementation.
- */
-export function matchWildcardPattern(
-  pattern: string,
-  command: string,
-): boolean {
-  return sharedMatchWildcardPattern(pattern, command)
-}
-
-/**
- * Parse a permission rule into a structured rule object.
- * Delegates to shared implementation.
- */
-export const bashPermissionRule: (
-  permissionRule: string,
-) => ShellPermissionRule = parsePermissionRule
-
-/**
- * Whitelist of environment variables that are safe to strip from commands.
- * These variables CANNOT execute code or load libraries.
- *
- * SECURITY: These must NEVER be added to the whitelist:
- * - PATH, LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, DYLD_* (execution/library loading)
- * - PYTHONPATH, NODE_PATH, CLASSPATH, RUBYLIB (module loading)
- * - GOFLAGS, RUSTFLAGS, NODE_OPTIONS (can contain code execution flags)
- * - HOME, TMPDIR, SHELL, BASH_ENV (affect system behavior)
- */
-const SAFE_ENV_VARS = new Set([
-  // Go - build/runtime settings only
-  'GOEXPERIMENT', // experimental features
-  'GOOS', // target OS
-  'GOARCH', // target architecture
-  'CGO_ENABLED', // enable/disable CGO
-  'GO111MODULE', // module mode
-
-  // Rust - logging/debugging only
-  'RUST_BACKTRACE', // backtrace verbosity
-  'RUST_LOG', // logging filter
-
-  // Node - environment name only (not NODE_OPTIONS!)
-  'NODE_ENV',
-
-  // Python - behavior flags only (not PYTHONPATH!)
-  'PYTHONUNBUFFERED', // disable buffering
-  'PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE', // no .pyc files
-
-  // Pytest - test configuration
-  'PYTEST_DISABLE_PLUGIN_AUTOLOAD', // disable plugin loading
-  'PYTEST_DEBUG', // debug output
-
-  // API keys and authentication
-  'ANTHROPIC_API_KEY', // API authentication
-
-  // Locale and character encoding
-  'LANG', // default locale
-  'LANGUAGE', // language preference list
-  'LC_ALL', // override all locale settings
-  'LC_CTYPE', // character classification
-  'LC_TIME', // time format
-  'CHARSET', // character set preference
-
-  // Terminal and display
-  'TERM', // terminal type
-  'COLORTERM', // color terminal indicator
-  'NO_COLOR', // disable color output (universal standard)
-  'FORCE_COLOR', // force color output
-  'TZ', // timezone
-
-  // Color configuration for various tools
-  'LS_COLORS', // colors for ls (GNU)
-  'LSCOLORS', // colors for ls (BSD/macOS)
-  'GREP_COLOR', // grep match color (deprecated)
-  'GREP_COLORS', // grep color scheme
-  'GCC_COLORS', // GCC diagnostic colors
-
-  // Display formatting
-  'TIME_STYLE', // time display format for ls
-  'BLOCK_SIZE', // block size for du/df
-  'BLOCKSIZE', // alternative block size
-])
-
-/**
- * ANT-ONLY environment variables that are safe to strip from commands.
- * These are only enabled when USER_TYPE === 'ant'.
- *
- * SECURITY: These env vars are stripped before permission-rule matching, which
- * means `DOCKER_HOST=tcp://evil.com docker ps` matches a `Bash(docker ps:*)`
- * rule after stripping. This is INTENTIONALLY ANT-ONLY (gated at line ~380)
- * and MUST NEVER ship to external users. DOCKER_HOST redirects the Docker
- * daemon endpoint — stripping it defeats prefix-based permission restrictions
- * by hiding the network endpoint from the permission check. KUBECONFIG
- * similarly controls which cluster kubectl talks to. These are convenience
- * strippings for internal power users who accept the risk.
- *
- * Based on analysis of 30 days of tengu_internal_bash_tool_use_permission_request events.
- */
-const ANT_ONLY_SAFE_ENV_VARS = new Set([
-  // Kubernetes and container config (config file pointers, not execution)
-  'KUBECONFIG', // kubectl config file path — controls which cluster kubectl uses
-  'DOCKER_HOST', // Docker daemon socket/endpoint — controls which daemon docker talks to
-
-  // Cloud provider project/profile selection (just names/identifiers)
-  'AWS_PROFILE', // AWS profile name selection
-  'CLOUDSDK_CORE_PROJECT', // GCP project ID
-  'CLUSTER', // generic cluster name
-
-  // Anthropic internal cluster selection (just names/identifiers)
-  'COO_CLUSTER', // coo cluster name
-  'COO_CLUSTER_NAME', // coo cluster name (alternate)
-  'COO_NAMESPACE', // coo namespace
-  'COO_LAUNCH_YAML_DRY_RUN', // dry run mode
-
-  // Feature flags (boolean/string flags only)
-  'SKIP_NODE_VERSION_CHECK', // skip version check
-  'EXPECTTEST_ACCEPT', // accept test expectations
-  'CI', // CI environment indicator
-  'GIT_LFS_SKIP_SMUDGE', // skip LFS downloads
-
-  // GPU/Device selection (just device IDs)
-  'CUDA_VISIBLE_DEVICES', // GPU device selection
-  'JAX_PLATFORMS', // JAX platform selection
-
-  // Display/terminal settings
-  'COLUMNS', // terminal width
-  'TMUX', // TMUX socket info
-
-  // Test/debug configuration
-  'POSTGRESQL_VERSION', // postgres version string
-  'FIRESTORE_EMULATOR_HOST', // emulator host:port
-  'HARNESS_QUIET', // quiet mode flag
-  'TEST_CROSSCHECK_LISTS_MATCH_UPDATE', // test update flag
-  'DBT_PER_DEVELOPER_ENVIRONMENTS', // DBT config
-  'STATSIG_FORD_DB_CHECKS', // statsig DB check flag
-
-  // Build configuration
-  'ANT_ENVIRONMENT', // Anthropic environment name
-  'ANT_SERVICE', // Anthropic service name
-  'MONOREPO_ROOT_DIR', // monorepo root path
-
-  // Version selectors
-  'PYENV_VERSION', // Python version selection
-
-  // Credentials (approved subset - these don't change exfil risk)
-  'PGPASSWORD', // Postgres password
-  'GH_TOKEN', // GitHub token
-  'GROWTHBOOK_API_KEY', // self-hosted growthbook
-])
-
-/**
- * Strips full-line comments from a command.
- * This handles cases where Claude adds comments in bash commands, e.g.:
- *   "# Check the logs directory\nls /home/user/logs"
- * Should be stripped to: "ls /home/user/logs"
- *
- * Only strips full-line comments (lines where the entire line is a comment),
- * not inline comments that appear after a command on the same line.
- */
-function stripCommentLines(command: string): string {
-  const lines = command.split('\n')
-  const nonCommentLines = lines.filter(line => {
-    const trimmed = line.trim()
-    // Keep lines that are not empty and don't start with #
-    return trimmed !== '' && !trimmed.startsWith('#')
-  })
-
-  // If all lines were comments/empty, return original
-  if (nonCommentLines.length === 0) {
-    return command
-  }
-
-  return nonCommentLines.join('\n')
-}
-
-export function stripSafeWrappers(command: string): string {
-  // SECURITY: Use [ \t]+ not \s+ — \s matches \n/\r which are command
-  // separators in bash. Matching across a newline would strip the wrapper from
-  // one line and leave a different command on the next line for bash to execute.
-  //
-  // SECURITY: `(?:--[ \t]+)?` consumes the wrapper's own `--` so
-  // `nohup -- rm -- -/../foo` strips to `rm -- -/../foo` (not `-- rm ...`
-  // which would skip path validation with `--` as an unknown baseCmd).
-  const SAFE_WRAPPER_PATTERNS = [
-    // timeout: enumerate GNU long flags — no-value (--foreground,
-    // --preserve-status, --verbose), value-taking in both =fused and
-    // space-separated forms (--kill-after=5, --kill-after 5, --signal=TERM,
-    // --signal TERM). Short: -v (no-arg), -k/-s with separate or fused value.
-    // SECURITY: flag VALUES use allowlist [A-Za-z0-9_.+-] (signals are
-    // TERM/KILL/9, durations are 5/5s/10.5). Previously [^ \t]+ matched
-    // $ ( ) ` | ; & — `timeout -k$(id) 10 ls` stripped to `ls`, matched
-    // Bash(ls:*), while bash expanded $(id) during word splitting BEFORE
-    // timeout ran. Contrast ENV_VAR_PATTERN below which already allowlists.
-    /^timeout[ \t]+(?:(?:--(?:foreground|preserve-status|verbose)|--(?:kill-after|signal)=[A-Za-z0-9_.+-]+|--(?:kill-after|signal)[ \t]+[A-Za-z0-9_.+-]+|-v|-[ks][ \t]+[A-Za-z0-9_.+-]+|-[ks][A-Za-z0-9_.+-]+)[ \t]+)*(?:--[ \t]+)?\d+(?:\.\d+)?[smhd]?[ \t]+/,
-    /^time[ \t]+(?:--[ \t]+)?/,
-    // SECURITY: keep in sync with checkSemantics wrapper-strip (ast.ts
-    // ~:1990-2080) AND stripWrappersFromArgv (pathValidation.ts ~:1260).
-    // Previously this pattern REQUIRED `-n N`; checkSemantics already handled
-    // bare `nice` and legacy `-N`. Asymmetry meant checkSemantics exposed the
-    // wrapped command to semantic checks but deny-rule matching and the cd+git
-    // gate saw the wrapper name. `nice rm -rf /` with Bash(rm:*) deny became
-    // ask instead of deny; `cd evil && nice git status` skipped the bare-repo
-    // RCE gate. PR #21503 fixed stripWrappersFromArgv; this was missed.
-    // Now matches: `nice cmd`, `nice -n N cmd`, `nice -N cmd` (all forms
-    // checkSemantics strips).
-    /^nice(?:[ \t]+-n[ \t]+-?\d+|[ \t]+-\d+)?[ \t]+(?:--[ \t]+)?/,
-    // stdbuf: fused short flags only (-o0, -eL). checkSemantics handles more
-    // (space-separated, long --output=MODE), but we fail-closed on those
-    // above so not over-stripping here is safe. Main need: `stdbuf -o0 cmd`.
-    /^stdbuf(?:[ \t]+-[ioe][LN0-9]+)+[ \t]+(?:--[ \t]+)?/,
-    /^nohup[ \t]+(?:--[ \t]+)?/,
-  ] as const
-
-  // Pattern for environment variables:
-  // ^([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)  - Variable name (standard identifier)
-  // =                           - Equals sign
-  // ([A-Za-z0-9_./:-]+)         - Value: alphanumeric + safe punctuation only
-  // [ \t]+                      - Required HORIZONTAL whitespace after value
-  //
-  // SECURITY: Only matches unquoted values with safe characters (no $(), `, $var, ;|&).
-  //
-  // SECURITY: Trailing whitespace MUST be [ \t]+ (horizontal only), NOT \s+.
-  // \s matches \n/\r. If reconstructCommand emits an unquoted newline between
-  // `TZ=UTC` and `echo`, \s+ would match across it and strip `TZ=UTC<NL>`,
-  // leaving `echo curl evil.com` to match Bash(echo:*). But bash treats the
-  // newline as a command separator. Defense-in-depth with needsQuoting fix.
-  const ENV_VAR_PATTERN = /^([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)=([A-Za-z0-9_./:-]+)[ \t]+/
-
-  let stripped = command
-  let previousStripped = ''
-
-  // Phase 1: Strip leading env vars and comments only.
-  // In bash, env var assignments before a command (VAR=val cmd) are genuine
-  // shell-level assignments. These are safe to strip for permission matching.
-  while (stripped !== previousStripped) {
-    previousStripped = stripped
-    stripped = stripCommentLines(stripped)
-
-    const envVarMatch = stripped.match(ENV_VAR_PATTERN)
-    if (envVarMatch) {
-      const varName = envVarMatch[1]!
-      const isAntOnlySafe =
-        process.env.USER_TYPE === 'ant' && ANT_ONLY_SAFE_ENV_VARS.has(varName)
-      if (SAFE_ENV_VARS.has(varName) || isAntOnlySafe) {
-        stripped = stripped.replace(ENV_VAR_PATTERN, '')
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Phase 2: Strip wrapper commands and comments only. Do NOT strip env vars.
-  // Wrapper commands (timeout, time, nice, nohup) use execvp to run their
-  // arguments, so VAR=val after a wrapper is treated as the COMMAND to execute,
-  // not as an env var assignment. Stripping env vars here would create a
-  // mismatch between what the parser sees and what actually executes.
-  // (HackerOne #3543050)
-  previousStripped = ''
-  while (stripped !== previousStripped) {
-    previousStripped = stripped
-    stripped = stripCommentLines(stripped)
-
-    for (const pattern of SAFE_WRAPPER_PATTERNS) {
-      stripped = stripped.replace(pattern, '')
-    }
-  }
-
-  return stripped.trim()
-}
-
-// SECURITY: allowlist for timeout flag VALUES (signals are TERM/KILL/9,
-// durations are 5/5s/10.5). Rejects $ ( ) ` | ; & and newlines that
-// previously matched via [^ \t]+ — `timeout -k$(id) 10 ls` must NOT strip.
-const TIMEOUT_FLAG_VALUE_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9_.+-]+$/
-
-/**
- * Parse timeout's GNU flags (long + short, fused + space-separated) and
- * return the argv index of the DURATION token, or -1 if flags are unparseable.
- * Enumerates: --foreground/--preserve-status/--verbose (no value),
- * --kill-after/--signal (value, both =fused and space-separated), -v (no
- * value), -k/-s (value, both fused and space-separated).
- *
- * Extracted from stripWrappersFromArgv to keep bashToolHasPermission under
- * Bun's feature() DCE complexity threshold — inlining this breaks
- * feature('BASH_CLASSIFIER') evaluation in classifier tests.
- */
-function skipTimeoutFlags(a: readonly string[]): number {
-  let i = 1
-  while (i < a.length) {
-    const arg = a[i]!
-    const next = a[i + 1]
-    if (
-      arg === '--foreground' ||
-      arg === '--preserve-status' ||
-      arg === '--verbose'
-    )
-      i++
-    else if (/^--(?:kill-after|signal)=[A-Za-z0-9_.+-]+$/.test(arg)) i++
-    else if (
-      (arg === '--kill-after' || arg === '--signal') &&
-      next &&
-      TIMEOUT_FLAG_VALUE_RE.test(next)
-    )
-      i += 2
-    else if (arg === '--') {
-      i++
-      break
-    } // end-of-options marker
-    else if (arg.startsWith('--')) return -1
-    else if (arg === '-v') i++
-    else if (
-      (arg === '-k' || arg === '-s') &&
-      next &&
-      TIMEOUT_FLAG_VALUE_RE.test(next)
-    )
-      i += 2
-    else if (/^-[ks][A-Za-z0-9_.+-]+$/.test(arg)) i++
-    else if (arg.startsWith('-')) return -1
-    else break
-  }
-  return i
-}
-
-/**
- * Argv-level counterpart to stripSafeWrappers. Strips the same wrapper
- * commands (timeout, time, nice, nohup) from AST-derived argv. Env vars
- * are already separated into SimpleCommand.envVars so no env-var stripping.
- *
- * KEEP IN SYNC with SAFE_WRAPPER_PATTERNS above — if you add a wrapper
- * there, add it here too.
- */
-export function stripWrappersFromArgv(argv: string[]): string[] {
-  // SECURITY: Consume optional `--` after wrapper options, matching what the
-  // wrapper does. Otherwise `['nohup','--','rm','--','-/../foo']` yields `--`
-  // as baseCmd and skips path validation. See SAFE_WRAPPER_PATTERNS comment.
-  let a = argv
-  for (;;) {
-    if (a[0] === 'time' || a[0] === 'nohup') {
-      a = a.slice(a[1] === '--' ? 2 : 1)
-    } else if (a[0] === 'timeout') {
-      const i = skipTimeoutFlags(a)
-      if (i < 0 || !a[i] || !/^\d+(?:\.\d+)?[smhd]?$/.test(a[i]!)) return a
-      a = a.slice(i + 1)
-    } else if (
-      a[0] === 'nice' &&
-      a[1] === '-n' &&
-      a[2] &&
-      /^-?\d+$/.test(a[2])
-    ) {
-      a = a.slice(a[3] === '--' ? 4 : 3)
-    } else {
-      return a
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Env vars that make a *different binary* run (injection or resolution hijack).
- * Heuristic only — export-&& form bypasses this, and excludedCommands isn't a
- * security boundary anyway.
- */
-export const BINARY_HIJACK_VARS = /^(LD_|DYLD_|PATH$)/
-
-/**
- * Strip ALL leading env var prefixes from a command, regardless of whether the
- * var name is in the safe-list.
- *
- * Used for deny/ask rule matching: when a user denies `claude` or `rm`, the
- * command should stay blocked even if prefixed with arbitrary env vars like
- * `FOO=bar claude`. The safe-list restriction in stripSafeWrappers is correct
- * for allow rules (prevents `DOCKER_HOST=evil docker ps` from auto-matching
- * `Bash(docker ps:*)`), but deny rules must be harder to circumvent.
- *
- * Also used for sandbox.excludedCommands matching (not a security boundary —
- * permission prompts are), with BINARY_HIJACK_VARS as a blocklist.
- *
- * SECURITY: Uses a broader value pattern than stripSafeWrappers. The value
- * pattern excludes only actual shell injection characters ($, backtick, ;, |,
- * &, parens, redirects, quotes, backslash) and whitespace. Characters like
- * =, +, @, ~, , are harmless in unquoted env var assignment position and must
- * be matched to prevent trivial bypass via e.g. `FOO=a=b denied_command`.
- *
- * @param blocklist - optional regex tested against each var name; matching vars
- *   are NOT stripped (and stripping stops there). Omit for deny rules; pass
- *   BINARY_HIJACK_VARS for excludedCommands.
- */
-export function stripAllLeadingEnvVars(
-  command: string,
-  blocklist?: RegExp,
-): string {
-  // Broader value pattern for deny-rule stripping. Handles:
-  //
-  // - Standard assignment (FOO=bar), append (FOO+=bar), array (FOO[0]=bar)
-  // - Single-quoted values: '[^'\n\r]*' — bash suppresses all expansion
-  // - Double-quoted values with backslash escapes: "(?:\\.|[^"$`\\\n\r])*"
-  //   In bash double quotes, only \$, \`, \", \\, and \newline are special.
-  //   Other \x sequences are harmless, so we allow \. inside double quotes.
-  //   We still exclude raw $ and ` (without backslash) to block expansion.
-  // - Unquoted values: excludes shell metacharacters, allows backslash escapes
-  // - Concatenated segments: FOO='x'y"z" — bash concatenates adjacent segments
-  //
-  // SECURITY: Trailing whitespace MUST be [ \t]+ (horizontal only), NOT \s+.
-  //
-  // The outer * matches one atomic unit per iteration: a complete quoted
-  // string, a backslash-escape pair, or a single unquoted safe character.
-  // The inner double-quote alternation (?:...|...)* is bounded by the
-  // closing ", so it cannot interact with the outer * for backtracking.
-  //
-  // Note: $ is excluded from unquoted/double-quoted value classes to block
-  // dangerous forms like $(cmd), ${var}, and $((expr)). This means
-  // FOO=$VAR is not stripped — adding $VAR matching creates ReDoS risk
-  // (CodeQL #671) and $VAR bypasses are low-priority.
-  const ENV_VAR_PATTERN =
-    /^([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*(?:\[[^\]]*\])?)\+?=(?:'[^'\n\r]*'|"(?:\\.|[^"$`\\\n\r])*"|\\.|[^ \t\n\r$`;|&()<>\\\\'"])*[ \t]+/
-
-  let stripped = command
-  let previousStripped = ''
-
-  while (stripped !== previousStripped) {
-    previousStripped = stripped
-    stripped = stripCommentLines(stripped)
-
-    const m = stripped.match(ENV_VAR_PATTERN)
-    if (!m) continue
-    if (blocklist?.test(m[1]!)) break
-    stripped = stripped.slice(m[0].length)
-  }
-
-  return stripped.trim()
-}
-
-function filterRulesByContentsMatchingInput(
-  input: z.infer<typeof BashTool.inputSchema>,
-  rules: Map<string, PermissionRule>,
-  matchMode: 'exact' | 'prefix',
-  {
-    stripAllEnvVars = false,
-    skipCompoundCheck = false,
-  }: { stripAllEnvVars?: boolean; skipCompoundCheck?: boolean } = {},
-): PermissionRule[] {
-  const command = input.command.trim()
-
-  // Strip output redirections for permission matching
-  // This allows rules like Bash(python:*) to match "python script.py > output.txt"
-  // Security validation of redirection targets happens separately in checkPathConstraints
-  const commandWithoutRedirections =
-    extractOutputRedirections(command).commandWithoutRedirections
-
-  // For exact matching, try both the original command (to preserve quotes)
-  // and the command without redirections (to allow rules without redirections to match)
-  // For prefix matching, only use the command without redirections
-  const commandsForMatching =
-    matchMode === 'exact'
-      ? [command, commandWithoutRedirections]
-      : [commandWithoutRedirections]
-
-  // Strip safe wrapper commands (timeout, time, nice, nohup) and env vars for matching
-  // This allows rules like Bash(npm install:*) to match "timeout 10 npm install foo"
-  // or "GOOS=linux go build"
-  const commandsToTry = commandsForMatching.flatMap(cmd => {
-    const strippedCommand = stripSafeWrappers(cmd)
-    return strippedCommand !== cmd ? [cmd, strippedCommand] : [cmd]
-  })
-
-  // SECURITY: For deny/ask rules, also try matching after stripping ALL leading
-  // env var prefixes. This prevents bypass via `FOO=bar denied_command` where
-  // FOO is not in the safe-list. The safe-list restriction in stripSafeWrappers
-  // is intentional for allow rules (see HackerOne #3543050), but deny rules
-  // must be harder to circumvent — a denied command should stay denied
-  // regardless of env var prefixes.
-  //
-  // We iteratively apply both stripping operations to all candidates until no
-  // new candidates are produced (fixed-point). This handles interleaved patterns
-  // like `nohup FOO=bar timeout 5 claude` where:
-  //   1. stripSafeWrappers strips `nohup` → `FOO=bar timeout 5 claude`
-  //   2. stripAllLeadingEnvVars strips `FOO=bar` → `timeout 5 claude`
-  //   3. stripSafeWrappers strips `timeout 5` → `claude` (deny match)
-  //
-  // Without iteration, single-pass compositions miss multi-layer interleaving.
-  if (stripAllEnvVars) {
-    const seen = new Set(commandsToTry)
-    let startIdx = 0
-
-    // Iterate until no new candidates are produced (fixed-point)
-    while (startIdx < commandsToTry.length) {
-      const endIdx = commandsToTry.length
-      for (let i = startIdx; i < endIdx; i++) {
-        const cmd = commandsToTry[i]
-        if (!cmd) {
-          continue
-        }
-        // Try stripping env vars
-        const envStripped = stripAllLeadingEnvVars(cmd)
-        if (!seen.has(envStripped)) {
-          commandsToTry.push(envStripped)
-          seen.add(envStripped)
-        }
-        // Try stripping safe wrappers
-        const wrapperStripped = stripSafeWrappers(cmd)
-        if (!seen.has(wrapperStripped)) {
-          commandsToTry.push(wrapperStripped)
-          seen.add(wrapperStripped)
-        }
-      }
-      startIdx = endIdx
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Precompute compound-command status for each candidate to avoid re-parsing
-  // inside the rule filter loop (which would scale splitCommand calls with
-  // rules.length × commandsToTry.length). The compound check only applies to
-  // prefix/wildcard matching in 'prefix' mode, and only for allow rules.
-  // SECURITY: deny/ask rules must match compound commands so they can't be
-  // bypassed by wrapping a denied command in a compound expression.
-  const isCompoundCommand = new Map<string, boolean>()
-  if (matchMode === 'prefix' && !skipCompoundCheck) {
-    for (const cmd of commandsToTry) {
-      if (!isCompoundCommand.has(cmd)) {
-        isCompoundCommand.set(cmd, splitCommand(cmd).length > 1)
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  return Array.from(rules.entries())
-    .filter(([ruleContent]) => {
-      const bashRule = bashPermissionRule(ruleContent)
-
-      return commandsToTry.some(cmdToMatch => {
-        switch (bashRule.type) {
-          case 'exact':
-            return bashRule.command === cmdToMatch
-          case 'prefix':
-            switch (matchMode) {
-              // In 'exact' mode, only return true if the command exactly matches the prefix rule
-              case 'exact':
-                return bashRule.prefix === cmdToMatch
-              case 'prefix': {
-                // SECURITY: Don't allow prefix rules to match compound commands.
-                // e.g., Bash(cd:*) must NOT match "cd /path && python3 evil.py".
-                // In the normal flow commands are split before reaching here, but
-                // shell escaping can defeat the first splitCommand pass — e.g.,
-                //   cd src\&\& python3 hello.py  →  splitCommand  →  ["cd src&& python3 hello.py"]
-                // which then looks like a single command that starts with "cd ".
-                // Re-splitting the candidate here catches those cases.
-                if (isCompoundCommand.get(cmdToMatch)) {
-                  return false
-                }
-                // Ensure word boundary: prefix must be followed by space or end of string
-                // This prevents "ls:*" from matching "lsof" or "lsattr"
-                if (cmdToMatch === bashRule.prefix) {
-                  return true
-                }
-                if (cmdToMatch.startsWith(bashRule.prefix + ' ')) {
-                  return true
-                }
-                // Also match "xargs <prefix>" for bare xargs with no flags.
-                // This allows Bash(grep:*) to match "xargs grep pattern",
-                // and deny rules like Bash(rm:*) to block "xargs rm file".
-                // Natural word-boundary: "xargs -n1 grep" does NOT start with
-                // "xargs grep " so flagged xargs invocations are not matched.
-                const xargsPrefix = 'xargs ' + bashRule.prefix
-                if (cmdToMatch === xargsPrefix) {
-                  return true
-                }
-                return cmdToMatch.startsWith(xargsPrefix + ' ')
-              }
-            }
-            break
-          case 'wildcard':
-            // SECURITY FIX: In exact match mode, wildcards must NOT match because we're
-            // checking the full unparsed command. Wildcard matching on unparsed commands
-            // allows "foo *" to match "foo arg && curl evil.com" since .* matches operators.
-            // Wildcards should only match after splitting into individual subcommands.
-            if (matchMode === 'exact') {
-              return false
-            }
-            // SECURITY: Same as for prefix rules, don't allow wildcard rules to match
-            // compound commands in prefix mode. e.g., Bash(cd *) must not match
-            // "cd /path && python3 evil.py" even though "cd *" pattern would match it.
-            if (isCompoundCommand.get(cmdToMatch)) {
-              return false
-            }
-            // In prefix mode (after splitting), wildcards can safely match subcommands
-            return matchWildcardPattern(bashRule.pattern, cmdToMatch)
-        }
-      })
-    })
-    .map(([, rule]) => rule)
-}
-
-function matchingRulesForInput(
-  input: z.infer<typeof BashTool.inputSchema>,
-  toolPermissionContext: ToolPermissionContext,
-  matchMode: 'exact' | 'prefix',
-  { skipCompoundCheck = false }: { skipCompoundCheck?: boolean } = {},
-) {
-  const denyRuleByContents = getRuleByContentsForTool(
-    toolPermissionContext,
-    BashTool,
-    'deny',
-  )
-  // SECURITY: Deny/ask rules use aggressive env var stripping so that
-  // `FOO=bar denied_command` still matches a deny rule for `denied_command`.
-  const matchingDenyRules = filterRulesByContentsMatchingInput(
-    input,
-    denyRuleByContents,
-    matchMode,
-    { stripAllEnvVars: true, skipCompoundCheck: true },
-  )
-
-  const askRuleByContents = getRuleByContentsForTool(
-    toolPermissionContext,
-    BashTool,
-    'ask',
-  )
-  const matchingAskRules = filterRulesByContentsMatchingInput(
-    input,
-    askRuleByContents,
-    matchMode,
-    { stripAllEnvVars: true, skipCompoundCheck: true },
-  )
-
-  const allowRuleByContents = getRuleByContentsForTool(
-    toolPermissionContext,
-    BashTool,
-    'allow',
-  )
-  const matchingAllowRules = filterRulesByContentsMatchingInput(
-    input,
-    allowRuleByContents,
-    matchMode,
-    { skipCompoundCheck },
-  )
-
-  return {
-    matchingDenyRules,
-    matchingAskRules,
-    matchingAllowRules,
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Checks if the subcommand is an exact match for a permission rule
- */
-export const bashToolCheckExactMatchPermission = (
-  input: z.infer<typeof BashTool.inputSchema>,
-  toolPermissionContext: ToolPermissionContext,
-): PermissionResult => {
-  const command = input.command.trim()
-  const { matchingDenyRules, matchingAskRules, matchingAllowRules } =
-    matchingRulesForInput(input, toolPermissionContext, 'exact')
-
-  // 1. Deny if exact command was denied
-  if (matchingDenyRules[0] !== undefined) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'deny',
-      message: `Permission to use ${BashTool.name} with command ${command} has been denied.`,
-      decisionReason: {
-        type: 'rule',
-        rule: matchingDenyRules[0],
-      },
-    }
-  }
-
-  // 2. Ask if exact command was in ask rules
-  if (matchingAskRules[0] !== undefined) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      message: createPermissionRequestMessage(BashTool.name),
-      decisionReason: {
-        type: 'rule',
-        rule: matchingAskRules[0],
-      },
-    }
-  }
-
-  // 3. Allow if exact command was allowed
-  if (matchingAllowRules[0] !== undefined) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'allow',
-      updatedInput: input,
-      decisionReason: {
-        type: 'rule',
-        rule: matchingAllowRules[0],
-      },
-    }
-  }
-
-  // 4. Otherwise, passthrough
-  const decisionReason = {
-    type: 'other' as const,
-    reason: 'This command requires approval',
-  }
-  return {
-    behavior: 'passthrough',
-    message: createPermissionRequestMessage(BashTool.name, decisionReason),
-    decisionReason,
-    // Suggest exact match rule to user
-    // this may be overridden by prefix suggestions in `checkCommandAndSuggestRules()`
-    suggestions: suggestionForExactCommand(command),
-  }
-}
-
-export const bashToolCheckPermission = (
-  input: z.infer<typeof BashTool.inputSchema>,
-  toolPermissionContext: ToolPermissionContext,
-  compoundCommandHasCd?: boolean,
-  astCommand?: SimpleCommand,
-): PermissionResult => {
-  const command = input.command.trim()
-
-  // 1. Check exact match first
-  const exactMatchResult = bashToolCheckExactMatchPermission(
-    input,
-    toolPermissionContext,
-  )
-
-  // 1a. Deny/ask if exact command has a rule
-  if (
-    exactMatchResult.behavior === 'deny' ||
-    exactMatchResult.behavior === 'ask'
-  ) {
-    return exactMatchResult
-  }
-
-  // 2. Find all matching rules (prefix or exact)
-  // SECURITY FIX: Check Bash deny/ask rules BEFORE path constraints to prevent bypass
-  // via absolute paths outside the project directory (HackerOne report)
-  // When AST-parsed, the subcommand is already atomic — skip the legacy
-  // splitCommand re-check that misparses mid-word # as compound.
-  const { matchingDenyRules, matchingAskRules, matchingAllowRules } =
-    matchingRulesForInput(input, toolPermissionContext, 'prefix', {
-      skipCompoundCheck: astCommand !== undefined,
-    })
-
-  // 2a. Deny if command has a deny rule
-  if (matchingDenyRules[0] !== undefined) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'deny',
-      message: `Permission to use ${BashTool.name} with command ${command} has been denied.`,
-      decisionReason: {
-        type: 'rule',
-        rule: matchingDenyRules[0],
-      },
-    }
-  }
-
-  // 2b. Ask if command has an ask rule
-  if (matchingAskRules[0] !== undefined) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      message: createPermissionRequestMessage(BashTool.name),
-      decisionReason: {
-        type: 'rule',
-        rule: matchingAskRules[0],
-      },
-    }
-  }
-
-  // 3. Check path constraints
-  // This check comes after deny/ask rules so explicit rules take precedence.
-  // SECURITY: When AST-derived argv is available for this subcommand, pass
-  // it through so checkPathConstraints uses it directly instead of re-parsing
-  // with shell-quote (which has a single-quote backslash bug that causes
-  // parseCommandArguments to return [] and silently skip path validation).
-  const pathResult = checkPathConstraints(
-    input,
-    getCwd(),
-    toolPermissionContext,
-    compoundCommandHasCd,
-    astCommand?.redirects,
-    astCommand ? [astCommand] : undefined,
-  )
-  if (pathResult.behavior !== 'passthrough') {
-    return pathResult
-  }
-
-  // 4. Allow if command had an exact match allow
-  if (exactMatchResult.behavior === 'allow') {
-    return exactMatchResult
-  }
-
-  // 5. Allow if command has an allow rule
-  if (matchingAllowRules[0] !== undefined) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'allow',
-      updatedInput: input,
-      decisionReason: {
-        type: 'rule',
-        rule: matchingAllowRules[0],
-      },
-    }
-  }
-
-  // 5b. Check sed constraints (blocks dangerous sed operations before mode auto-allow)
-  const sedConstraintResult = checkSedConstraints(input, toolPermissionContext)
-  if (sedConstraintResult.behavior !== 'passthrough') {
-    return sedConstraintResult
-  }
-
-  // 6. Check for mode-specific permission handling
-  const modeResult = checkPermissionMode(input, toolPermissionContext)
-  if (modeResult.behavior !== 'passthrough') {
-    return modeResult
-  }
-
-  // 7. Check read-only rules
-  if (BashTool.isReadOnly(input)) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'allow',
-      updatedInput: input,
-      decisionReason: {
-        type: 'other',
-        reason: 'Read-only command is allowed',
-      },
-    }
-  }
-
-  // 8. Passthrough since no rules match, will trigger permission prompt
-  const decisionReason = {
-    type: 'other' as const,
-    reason: 'This command requires approval',
-  }
-  return {
-    behavior: 'passthrough',
-    message: createPermissionRequestMessage(BashTool.name, decisionReason),
-    decisionReason,
-    // Suggest exact match rule to user
-    // this may be overridden by prefix suggestions in `checkCommandAndSuggestRules()`
-    suggestions: suggestionForExactCommand(command),
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Processes an individual subcommand and applies prefix checks & suggestions
- */
-export async function checkCommandAndSuggestRules(
-  input: z.infer<typeof BashTool.inputSchema>,
-  toolPermissionContext: ToolPermissionContext,
-  commandPrefixResult: CommandPrefixResult | null | undefined,
-  compoundCommandHasCd?: boolean,
-  astParseSucceeded?: boolean,
-): Promise<PermissionResult> {
-  // 1. Check exact match first
-  const exactMatchResult = bashToolCheckExactMatchPermission(
-    input,
-    toolPermissionContext,
-  )
-  if (exactMatchResult.behavior !== 'passthrough') {
-    return exactMatchResult
-  }
-
-  // 2. Check the command prefix
-  const permissionResult = bashToolCheckPermission(
-    input,
-    toolPermissionContext,
-    compoundCommandHasCd,
-  )
-  // 2a. Deny/ask if command was explictly denied/asked
-  if (
-    permissionResult.behavior === 'deny' ||
-    permissionResult.behavior === 'ask'
-  ) {
-    return permissionResult
-  }
-
-  // 3. Ask for permission if command injection is detected. Skip when the
-  // AST parse already succeeded — tree-sitter has verified there are no
-  // hidden substitutions or structural tricks, so the legacy regex-based
-  // validators (backslash-escaped operators, etc.) would only add FPs.
-  if (
-    !astParseSucceeded &&
-    !isEnvTruthy(process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_COMMAND_INJECTION_CHECK)
-  ) {
-    const safetyResult = await bashCommandIsSafeAsync(input.command)
-
-    if (safetyResult.behavior !== 'passthrough') {
-      const decisionReason: PermissionDecisionReason = {
-        type: 'other' as const,
-        reason:
-          safetyResult.behavior === 'ask' && safetyResult.message
-            ? safetyResult.message
-            : 'This command contains patterns that could pose security risks and requires approval',
-      }
-
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message: createPermissionRequestMessage(BashTool.name, decisionReason),
-        decisionReason,
-        suggestions: [], // Don't suggest saving a potentially dangerous command
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // 4. Allow if command was allowed
-  if (permissionResult.behavior === 'allow') {
-    return permissionResult
-  }
-
-  // 5. Suggest prefix if available, otherwise exact command
-  const suggestedUpdates = commandPrefixResult?.commandPrefix
-    ? suggestionForPrefix(commandPrefixResult.commandPrefix)
-    : suggestionForExactCommand(input.command)
-
-  return {
-    ...permissionResult,
-    suggestions: suggestedUpdates,
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Checks if a command should be auto-allowed when sandboxed.
- * Returns early if there are explicit deny/ask rules that should be respected.
- *
- * NOTE: This function should only be called when sandboxing and auto-allow are enabled.
- *
- * @param input - The bash tool input
- * @param toolPermissionContext - The permission context
- * @returns PermissionResult with:
- *   - deny/ask if explicit rule exists (exact or prefix)
- *   - allow if no explicit rules (sandbox auto-allow applies)
- *   - passthrough should not occur since we're in auto-allow mode
- */
-function checkSandboxAutoAllow(
-  input: z.infer<typeof BashTool.inputSchema>,
-  toolPermissionContext: ToolPermissionContext,
-): PermissionResult {
-  const command = input.command.trim()
-
-  // Check for explicit deny/ask rules on the full command (exact + prefix)
-  const { matchingDenyRules, matchingAskRules } = matchingRulesForInput(
-    input,
-    toolPermissionContext,
-    'prefix',
-  )
-
-  // Return immediately if there's an explicit deny rule on the full command
-  if (matchingDenyRules[0] !== undefined) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'deny',
-      message: `Permission to use ${BashTool.name} with command ${command} has been denied.`,
-      decisionReason: {
-        type: 'rule',
-        rule: matchingDenyRules[0],
-      },
-    }
-  }
-
-  // SECURITY: For compound commands, check each subcommand against deny/ask
-  // rules. Prefix rules like Bash(rm:*) won't match the full compound command
-  // (e.g., "echo hello && rm -rf /" doesn't start with "rm"), so we must
-  // check each subcommand individually.
-  // IMPORTANT: Subcommand deny checks must run BEFORE full-command ask returns.
-  // Otherwise a wildcard ask rule matching the full command (e.g., Bash(*echo*))
-  // would return 'ask' before a prefix deny rule on a subcommand (e.g., Bash(rm:*))
-  // gets checked, downgrading a deny to an ask.
-  const subcommands = splitCommand(command)
-  if (subcommands.length > 1) {
-    let firstAskRule: PermissionRule | undefined
-    for (const sub of subcommands) {
-      const subResult = matchingRulesForInput(
-        { command: sub },
-        toolPermissionContext,
-        'prefix',
-      )
-      // Deny takes priority — return immediately
-      if (subResult.matchingDenyRules[0] !== undefined) {
-        return {
-          behavior: 'deny',
-          message: `Permission to use ${BashTool.name} with command ${command} has been denied.`,
-          decisionReason: {
-            type: 'rule',
-            rule: subResult.matchingDenyRules[0],
-          },
-        }
-      }
-      // Stash first ask match; don't return yet (deny across all subs takes priority)
-      firstAskRule ??= subResult.matchingAskRules[0]
-    }
-    if (firstAskRule) {
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        message: createPermissionRequestMessage(BashTool.name),
-        decisionReason: {
-          type: 'rule',
-          rule: firstAskRule,
-        },
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Full-command ask check (after all deny sources have been exhausted)
-  if (matchingAskRules[0] !== undefined) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      message: createPermissionRequestMessage(BashTool.name),
-      decisionReason: {
-        type: 'rule',
-        rule: matchingAskRules[0],
-      },
-    }
-  }
-  // No explicit rules, so auto-allow with sandbox
-
-  return {
-    behavior: 'allow',
-    updatedInput: input,
-    decisionReason: {
-      type: 'other',
-      reason: 'Auto-allowed with sandbox (autoAllowBashIfSandboxed enabled)',
-    },
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Filter out `cd ${cwd}` prefix subcommands, keeping astCommands aligned.
- * Extracted to keep bashToolHasPermission under Bun's feature() DCE
- * complexity threshold — inlining this breaks pendingClassifierCheck
- * attachment in ~10 classifier tests.
- */
-function filterCdCwdSubcommands(
-  rawSubcommands: string[],
-  astCommands: SimpleCommand[] | undefined,
-  cwd: string,
-  cwdMingw: string,
-): { subcommands: string[]; astCommandsByIdx: (SimpleCommand | undefined)[] } {
-  const subcommands: string[] = []
-  const astCommandsByIdx: (SimpleCommand | undefined)[] = []
-  for (let i = 0; i < rawSubcommands.length; i++) {
-    const cmd = rawSubcommands[i]!
-    if (cmd === `cd ${cwd}` || cmd === `cd ${cwdMingw}`) continue
-    subcommands.push(cmd)
-    astCommandsByIdx.push(astCommands?.[i])
-  }
-  return { subcommands, astCommandsByIdx }
-}
-
-/**
- * Early-exit deny enforcement for the AST too-complex and checkSemantics
- * paths. Returns the exact-match result if non-passthrough (deny/ask/allow),
- * then checks prefix/wildcard deny rules. Returns null if neither matched,
- * meaning the caller should fall through to ask. Extracted to keep
- * bashToolHasPermission under Bun's feature() DCE complexity threshold.
- */
-function checkEarlyExitDeny(
-  input: z.infer<typeof BashTool.inputSchema>,
-  toolPermissionContext: ToolPermissionContext,
-): PermissionResult | null {
-  const exactMatchResult = bashToolCheckExactMatchPermission(
-    input,
-    toolPermissionContext,
-  )
-  if (exactMatchResult.behavior !== 'passthrough') {
-    return exactMatchResult
-  }
-  const denyMatch = matchingRulesForInput(
-    input,
-    toolPermissionContext,
-    'prefix',
-  ).matchingDenyRules[0]
-  if (denyMatch !== undefined) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'deny',
-      message: `Permission to use ${BashTool.name} with command ${input.command} has been denied.`,
-      decisionReason: { type: 'rule', rule: denyMatch },
-    }
-  }
-  return null
-}
-
-/**
- * checkSemantics-path deny enforcement. Calls checkEarlyExitDeny (exact-match
- * + full-command prefix deny), then checks each individual SimpleCommand .text
- * span against prefix deny rules. The per-subcommand check is needed because
- * filterRulesByContentsMatchingInput has a compound-command guard
- * (splitCommand().length > 1 → prefix rules return false) that defeats
- * `Bash(eval:*)` matching against a full pipeline like `echo foo | eval rm`.
- * Each SimpleCommand span is a single command, so the guard doesn't fire.
- *
- * Separate helper (not folded into checkEarlyExitDeny or inlined at the call
- * site) because bashToolHasPermission is tight against Bun's feature() DCE
- * complexity threshold — adding even ~5 lines there breaks
- * feature('BASH_CLASSIFIER') evaluation and drops pendingClassifierCheck.
- */
-function checkSemanticsDeny(
-  input: z.infer<typeof BashTool.inputSchema>,
-  toolPermissionContext: ToolPermissionContext,
-  commands: readonly { text: string }[],
-): PermissionResult | null {
-  const fullCmd = checkEarlyExitDeny(input, toolPermissionContext)
-  if (fullCmd !== null) return fullCmd
-  for (const cmd of commands) {
-    const subDeny = matchingRulesForInput(
-      { ...input, command: cmd.text },
-      toolPermissionContext,
-      'prefix',
-    ).matchingDenyRules[0]
-    if (subDeny !== undefined) {
-      return {
-        behavior: 'deny',
-        message: `Permission to use ${BashTool.name} with command ${input.command} has been denied.`,
-        decisionReason: { type: 'rule', rule: subDeny },
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  return null
-}
-
-/**
- * Builds the pending classifier check metadata if classifier is enabled and has allow descriptions.
- * Returns undefined if classifier is disabled, in auto mode, or no allow descriptions exist.
- */
-function buildPendingClassifierCheck(
-  command: string,
-  toolPermissionContext: ToolPermissionContext,
-): { command: string; cwd: string; descriptions: string[] } | undefined {
-  if (!isClassifierPermissionsEnabled()) {
-    return undefined
-  }
-  // Skip in auto mode - auto mode classifier handles all permission decisions
-  if (feature('TRANSCRIPT_CLASSIFIER') && toolPermissionContext.mode === 'auto')
-    return undefined
-  if (toolPermissionContext.mode === 'bypassPermissions') return undefined
-
-  const allowDescriptions = getBashPromptAllowDescriptions(
-    toolPermissionContext,
-  )
-  if (allowDescriptions.length === 0) return undefined
-
-  return {
-    command,
-    cwd: getCwd(),
-    descriptions: allowDescriptions,
-  }
-}
-
-const speculativeChecks = new Map<string, Promise<ClassifierResult>>()
-
-/**
- * Start a speculative bash allow classifier check early, so it runs in
- * parallel with pre-tool hooks, deny/ask classifiers, and permission dialog setup.
- * The result can be consumed later by executeAsyncClassifierCheck via
- * consumeSpeculativeClassifierCheck.
- */
-export function peekSpeculativeClassifierCheck(
-  command: string,
-): Promise<ClassifierResult> | undefined {
-  return speculativeChecks.get(command)
-}
-
-export function startSpeculativeClassifierCheck(
-  command: string,
-  toolPermissionContext: ToolPermissionContext,
-  signal: AbortSignal,
-  isNonInteractiveSession: boolean,
-): boolean {
-  // Same guards as buildPendingClassifierCheck
-  if (!isClassifierPermissionsEnabled()) return false
-  if (feature('TRANSCRIPT_CLASSIFIER') && toolPermissionContext.mode === 'auto')
-    return false
-  if (toolPermissionContext.mode === 'bypassPermissions') return false
-  const allowDescriptions = getBashPromptAllowDescriptions(
-    toolPermissionContext,
-  )
-  if (allowDescriptions.length === 0) return false
-
-  const cwd = getCwd()
-  const promise = classifyBashCommand(
-    command,
-    cwd,
-    allowDescriptions,
-    'allow',
-    signal,
-    isNonInteractiveSession,
-  )
-  // Prevent unhandled rejection if the signal aborts before this promise is consumed.
-  // The original promise (which may reject) is still stored in the Map for consumers to await.
-  promise.catch(() => {})
-  speculativeChecks.set(command, promise)
-  return true
-}
-
-/**
- * Consume a speculative classifier check result for the given command.
- * Returns the promise if one exists (and removes it from the map), or undefined.
- */
-export function consumeSpeculativeClassifierCheck(
-  command: string,
-): Promise<ClassifierResult> | undefined {
-  const promise = speculativeChecks.get(command)
-  if (promise) {
-    speculativeChecks.delete(command)
-  }
-  return promise
-}
-
-export function clearSpeculativeChecks(): void {
-  speculativeChecks.clear()
-}
-
-/**
- * Await a pending classifier check and return a PermissionDecisionReason if
- * high-confidence allow, or undefined otherwise.
- *
- * Used by swarm agents (both tmux and in-process) to gate permission
- * forwarding: run the classifier first, and only escalate to the leader
- * if the classifier doesn't auto-approve.
- */
-export async function awaitClassifierAutoApproval(
-  pendingCheck: PendingClassifierCheck,
-  signal: AbortSignal,
-  isNonInteractiveSession: boolean,
-): Promise<PermissionDecisionReason | undefined> {
-  const { command, cwd, descriptions } = pendingCheck
-  const speculativeResult = consumeSpeculativeClassifierCheck(command)
-  const classifierResult = speculativeResult
-    ? await speculativeResult
-    : await classifyBashCommand(
-        command,
-        cwd,
-        descriptions,
-        'allow',
-        signal,
-        isNonInteractiveSession,
-      )
-
-  logClassifierResultForAnts(command, 'allow', descriptions, classifierResult)
-
-  if (
-    feature('BASH_CLASSIFIER') &&
-    classifierResult.matches &&
-    classifierResult.confidence === 'high'
-  ) {
-    return {
-      type: 'classifier',
-      classifier: 'bash_allow',
-      reason: `Allowed by prompt rule: "${classifierResult.matchedDescription}"`,
-    }
-  }
-  return undefined
-}
-
-type AsyncClassifierCheckCallbacks = {
-  shouldContinue: () => boolean
-  onAllow: (decisionReason: PermissionDecisionReason) => void
-  onComplete?: () => void
-}
-
-/**
- * Execute the bash allow classifier check asynchronously.
- * This runs in the background while the permission prompt is shown.
- * If the classifier allows with high confidence and the user hasn't interacted, auto-approves.
- *
- * @param pendingCheck - Classifier check metadata from bashToolHasPermission
- * @param signal - Abort signal
- * @param isNonInteractiveSession - Whether this is a non-interactive session
- * @param callbacks - Callbacks to check if we should continue and handle approval
- */
-export async function executeAsyncClassifierCheck(
-  pendingCheck: { command: string; cwd: string; descriptions: string[] },
-  signal: AbortSignal,
-  isNonInteractiveSession: boolean,
-  callbacks: AsyncClassifierCheckCallbacks,
-): Promise<void> {
-  const { command, cwd, descriptions } = pendingCheck
-  const speculativeResult = consumeSpeculativeClassifierCheck(command)
-
-  let classifierResult: ClassifierResult
-  try {
-    classifierResult = speculativeResult
-      ? await speculativeResult
-      : await classifyBashCommand(
-          command,
-          cwd,
-          descriptions,
-          'allow',
-          signal,
-          isNonInteractiveSession,
-        )
-  } catch (error: unknown) {
-    // When the coordinator session is cancelled, the abort signal fires and the
-    // classifier API call rejects with APIUserAbortError. This is expected and
-    // should not surface as an unhandled promise rejection.
-    if (error instanceof APIUserAbortError || error instanceof AbortError) {
-      callbacks.onComplete?.()
-      return
-    }
-    callbacks.onComplete?.()
-    throw error
-  }
-
-  logClassifierResultForAnts(command, 'allow', descriptions, classifierResult)
-
-  // Don't auto-approve if user already made a decision or has interacted
-  // with the permission dialog (e.g., arrow keys, tab, typing)
-  if (!callbacks.shouldContinue()) return
-
-  if (
-    feature('BASH_CLASSIFIER') &&
-    classifierResult.matches &&
-    classifierResult.confidence === 'high'
-  ) {
-    callbacks.onAllow({
-      type: 'classifier',
-      classifier: 'bash_allow',
-      reason: `Allowed by prompt rule: "${classifierResult.matchedDescription}"`,
-    })
-  } else {
-    // No match — notify so the checking indicator is cleared
-    callbacks.onComplete?.()
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * The main implementation to check if we need to ask for user permission to call BashTool with a given input
- */
-export async function bashToolHasPermission(
-  input: z.infer<typeof BashTool.inputSchema>,
-  context: ToolUseContext,
-  getCommandSubcommandPrefixFn = getCommandSubcommandPrefix,
-): Promise<PermissionResult> {
-  let appState = context.getAppState()
-
-  // 0. AST-based security parse. This replaces both tryParseShellCommand
-  // (the shell-quote pre-check) and the bashCommandIsSafe misparsing gate.
-  // tree-sitter produces either a clean SimpleCommand[] (quotes resolved,
-  // no hidden substitutions) or 'too-complex' — which is exactly the signal
-  // we need to decide whether splitCommand's output can be trusted.
-  //
-  // When tree-sitter WASM is unavailable OR the injection check is disabled
-  // via env var, we fall back to the old path (legacy gate at ~1370 runs).
-  const injectionCheckDisabled = isEnvTruthy(
-    process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_COMMAND_INJECTION_CHECK,
-  )
-  // GrowthBook killswitch for shadow mode — when off, skip the native parse
-  // entirely. Computed once; feature() must stay inline in the ternary below.
-  const shadowEnabled = feature('TREE_SITTER_BASH_SHADOW')
-    ? getFeatureValue_CACHED_MAY_BE_STALE('tengu_birch_trellis', true)
-    : false
-  // Parse once here; the resulting AST feeds both parseForSecurityFromAst
-  // and bashToolCheckCommandOperatorPermissions.
-  let astRoot = injectionCheckDisabled
-    ? null
-    : feature('TREE_SITTER_BASH_SHADOW') && !shadowEnabled
-      ? null
-      : await parseCommandRaw(input.command)
-  let astResult: ParseForSecurityResult = astRoot
-    ? parseForSecurityFromAst(input.command, astRoot)
-    : { kind: 'parse-unavailable' }
-  let astSubcommands: string[] | null = null
-  let astRedirects: Redirect[] | undefined
-  let astCommands: SimpleCommand[] | undefined
-  let shadowLegacySubs: string[] | undefined
-
-  // Shadow-test tree-sitter: record its verdict, then force parse-unavailable
-  // so the legacy path stays authoritative. parseCommand stays gated on
-  // TREE_SITTER_BASH (not SHADOW) so legacy internals remain pure regex.
-  // One event per bash call captures both divergence AND unavailability
-  // reasons; module-load failures are separately covered by the
-  // session-scoped tengu_tree_sitter_load event.
-  if (feature('TREE_SITTER_BASH_SHADOW')) {
-    const available = astResult.kind !== 'parse-unavailable'
-    let tooComplex = false
-    let semanticFail = false
-    let subsDiffer = false
-    if (available) {
-      tooComplex = astResult.kind === 'too-complex'
-      semanticFail =
-        astResult.kind === 'simple' && !checkSemantics(astResult.commands).ok
-      const tsSubs =
-        astResult.kind === 'simple'
-          ? astResult.commands.map(c => c.text)
-          : undefined
-      const legacySubs = splitCommand(input.command)
-      shadowLegacySubs = legacySubs
-      subsDiffer =
-        tsSubs !== undefined &&
-        (tsSubs.length !== legacySubs.length ||
-          tsSubs.some((s, i) => s !== legacySubs[i]))
-    }
-    logEvent('tengu_tree_sitter_shadow', {
-      available,
-      astTooComplex: tooComplex,
-      astSemanticFail: semanticFail,
-      subsDiffer,
-      injectionCheckDisabled,
-      killswitchOff: !shadowEnabled,
-      cmdOverLength: input.command.length > 10000,
-    })
-    // Always force legacy — shadow mode is observational only.
-    astResult = { kind: 'parse-unavailable' }
-    astRoot = null
-  }
-
-  if (astResult.kind === 'too-complex') {
-    // Parse succeeded but found structure we can't statically analyze
-    // (command substitution, expansion, control flow, parser differential).
-    // Respect exact-match deny/ask/allow, then prefix/wildcard deny. Only
-    // fall through to ask if no deny matched — don't downgrade deny to ask.
-    const earlyExit = checkEarlyExitDeny(input, appState.toolPermissionContext)
-    if (earlyExit !== null) return earlyExit
-    const decisionReason: PermissionDecisionReason = {
-      type: 'other' as const,
-      reason: astResult.reason,
-    }
-    logEvent('tengu_bash_ast_too_complex', {
-      nodeTypeId: nodeTypeId(astResult.nodeType),
-    })
-    return {
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      decisionReason,
-      message: createPermissionRequestMessage(BashTool.name, decisionReason),
-      suggestions: [],
-      ...(feature('BASH_CLASSIFIER')
-        ? {
-            pendingClassifierCheck: buildPendingClassifierCheck(
-              input.command,
-              appState.toolPermissionContext,
-            ),
-          }
-        : {}),
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (astResult.kind === 'simple') {
-    // Clean parse: check semantic-level concerns (zsh builtins, eval, etc.)
-    // that tokenize fine but are dangerous by name.
-    const sem = checkSemantics(astResult.commands)
-    if (!sem.ok) {
-      // Same deny-rule enforcement as the too-complex path: a user with
-      // `Bash(eval:*)` deny expects `eval "rm"` blocked, not downgraded.
-      const earlyExit = checkSemanticsDeny(
-        input,
-        appState.toolPermissionContext,
-        astResult.commands,
-      )
-      if (earlyExit !== null) return earlyExit
-      const decisionReason: PermissionDecisionReason = {
-        type: 'other' as const,
-        reason: sem.reason,
-      }
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        decisionReason,
-        message: createPermissionRequestMessage(BashTool.name, decisionReason),
-        suggestions: [],
-      }
-    }
-    // Stash the tokenized subcommands for use below. Downstream code (rule
-    // matching, path extraction, cd detection) still operates on strings, so
-    // we pass the original source span for each SimpleCommand. Downstream
-    // processing (stripSafeWrappers, parseCommandArguments) re-tokenizes
-    // these spans — that re-tokenization has known bugs (stripCommentLines
-    // mishandles newlines inside quotes), but checkSemantics already caught
-    // any argv element containing a newline, so those bugs can't bite here.
-    // Migrating downstream to operate on argv directly is a later commit.
-    astSubcommands = astResult.commands.map(c => c.text)
-    astRedirects = astResult.commands.flatMap(c => c.redirects)
-    astCommands = astResult.commands
-  }
-
-  // Legacy shell-quote pre-check. Only reached on 'parse-unavailable'
-  // (tree-sitter not loaded OR TREE_SITTER_BASH feature gated off). Falls
-  // through to the full legacy path below.
-  if (astResult.kind === 'parse-unavailable') {
-    logForDebugging(
-      'bashToolHasPermission: tree-sitter unavailable, using legacy shell-quote path',
-    )
-    const parseResult = tryParseShellCommand(input.command)
-    if (!parseResult.success) {
-      const decisionReason = {
-        type: 'other' as const,
-        reason: `Command contains malformed syntax that cannot be parsed: ${parseResult.error}`,
-      }
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        decisionReason,
-        message: createPermissionRequestMessage(BashTool.name, decisionReason),
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Check sandbox auto-allow (which respects explicit deny/ask rules)
-  // Only call this if sandboxing and auto-allow are both enabled
-  if (
-    SandboxManager.isSandboxingEnabled() &&
-    SandboxManager.isAutoAllowBashIfSandboxedEnabled() &&
-    shouldUseSandbox(input)
-  ) {
-    const sandboxAutoAllowResult = checkSandboxAutoAllow(
-      input,
-      appState.toolPermissionContext,
-    )
-    if (sandboxAutoAllowResult.behavior !== 'passthrough') {
-      return sandboxAutoAllowResult
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Check exact match first
-  const exactMatchResult = bashToolCheckExactMatchPermission(
-    input,
-    appState.toolPermissionContext,
-  )
-
-  // Exact command was denied
-  if (exactMatchResult.behavior === 'deny') {
-    return exactMatchResult
-  }
-
-  // Check Bash prompt deny and ask rules in parallel (both use Haiku).
-  // Deny takes precedence over ask, and both take precedence over allow rules.
-  // Skip when in auto mode - auto mode classifier handles all permission decisions
-  if (
-    isClassifierPermissionsEnabled() &&
-    !(
-      feature('TRANSCRIPT_CLASSIFIER') &&
-      appState.toolPermissionContext.mode === 'auto'
-    )
-  ) {
-    const denyDescriptions = getBashPromptDenyDescriptions(
-      appState.toolPermissionContext,
-    )
-    const askDescriptions = getBashPromptAskDescriptions(
-      appState.toolPermissionContext,
-    )
-    const hasDeny = denyDescriptions.length > 0
-    const hasAsk = askDescriptions.length > 0
-
-    if (hasDeny || hasAsk) {
-      const [denyResult, askResult] = await Promise.all([
-        hasDeny
-          ? classifyBashCommand(
-              input.command,
-              getCwd(),
-              denyDescriptions,
-              'deny',
-              context.abortController.signal,
-              context.options.isNonInteractiveSession,
-            )
-          : null,
-        hasAsk
-          ? classifyBashCommand(
-              input.command,
-              getCwd(),
-              askDescriptions,
-              'ask',
-              context.abortController.signal,
-              context.options.isNonInteractiveSession,
-            )
-          : null,
-      ])
-
-      if (context.abortController.signal.aborted) {
-        throw new AbortError()
-      }
-
-      if (denyResult) {
-        logClassifierResultForAnts(
-          input.command,
-          'deny',
-          denyDescriptions,
-          denyResult,
-        )
-      }
-      if (askResult) {
-        logClassifierResultForAnts(
-          input.command,
-          'ask',
-          askDescriptions,
-          askResult,
-        )
-      }
-
-      // Deny takes precedence
-      if (denyResult?.matches && denyResult.confidence === 'high') {
-        return {
-          behavior: 'deny',
-          message: `Denied by Bash prompt rule: "${denyResult.matchedDescription}"`,
-          decisionReason: {
-            type: 'other',
-            reason: `Denied by Bash prompt rule: "${denyResult.matchedDescription}"`,
-          },
-        }
-      }
-
-      if (askResult?.matches && askResult.confidence === 'high') {
-        // Skip the Haiku call — the UI computes the prefix locally
-        // and lets the user edit it. Still call the injected function
-        // when tests override it.
-        let suggestions: PermissionUpdate[]
-        if (getCommandSubcommandPrefixFn === getCommandSubcommandPrefix) {
-          suggestions = suggestionForExactCommand(input.command)
-        } else {
-          const commandPrefixResult = await getCommandSubcommandPrefixFn(
-            input.command,
-            context.abortController.signal,
-            context.options.isNonInteractiveSession,
-          )
-          if (context.abortController.signal.aborted) {
-            throw new AbortError()
-          }
-          suggestions = commandPrefixResult?.commandPrefix
-            ? suggestionForPrefix(commandPrefixResult.commandPrefix)
-            : suggestionForExactCommand(input.command)
-        }
-        return {
-          behavior: 'ask',
-          message: createPermissionRequestMessage(BashTool.name),
-          decisionReason: {
-            type: 'other',
-            reason: `Required by Bash prompt rule: "${askResult.matchedDescription}"`,
-          },
-          suggestions,
-          ...(feature('BASH_CLASSIFIER')
-            ? {
-                pendingClassifierCheck: buildPendingClassifierCheck(
-                  input.command,
-                  appState.toolPermissionContext,
-                ),
-              }
-            : {}),
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Check for non-subcommand Bash operators like `>`, `|`, etc.
-  // This must happen before dangerous path checks so that piped commands
-  // are handled by the operator logic (which generates "multiple operations" messages)
-  const commandOperatorResult = await checkCommandOperatorPermissions(
-    input,
-    (i: z.infer<typeof BashTool.inputSchema>) =>
-      bashToolHasPermission(i, context, getCommandSubcommandPrefixFn),
-    { isNormalizedCdCommand, isNormalizedGitCommand },
-    astRoot,
-  )
-  if (commandOperatorResult.behavior !== 'passthrough') {
-    // SECURITY FIX: When pipe segment processing returns 'allow', we must still validate
-    // the ORIGINAL command. The pipe segment processing strips redirections before
-    // checking each segment, so commands like:
-    //   echo 'x' | xargs printf '%s' >> /tmp/file
-    // would have both segments allowed (echo and xargs printf) but the >> redirection
-    // would bypass validation. We must check:
-    // 1. Path constraints for output redirections
-    // 2. Command safety for dangerous patterns (backticks, etc.) in redirect targets
-    if (commandOperatorResult.behavior === 'allow') {
-      // Check for dangerous patterns (backticks, $(), etc.) in the original command
-      // This catches cases like: echo x | xargs echo > `pwd`/evil.txt
-      // where the backtick is in the redirect target (stripped from segments)
-      // Gate on AST: when astSubcommands is non-null, tree-sitter already
-      // validated structure (backticks/$() in redirect targets would have
-      // returned too-complex). Matches gating at ~1481, ~1706, ~1755.
-      // Avoids FP: `find -exec {} \; | grep x` tripping on backslash-;.
-      // bashCommandIsSafe runs the full legacy regex battery (~20 patterns) —
-      // only call it when we'll actually use the result.
-      const safetyResult =
-        astSubcommands === null
-          ? await bashCommandIsSafeAsync(input.command)
-          : null
-      if (
-        safetyResult !== null &&
-        safetyResult.behavior !== 'passthrough' &&
-        safetyResult.behavior !== 'allow'
-      ) {
-        // Attach pending classifier check - may auto-approve before user responds
-        appState = context.getAppState()
-        return {
-          behavior: 'ask',
-          message: createPermissionRequestMessage(BashTool.name, {
-            type: 'other',
-            reason:
-              safetyResult.message ??
-              'Command contains patterns that require approval',
-          }),
-          decisionReason: {
-            type: 'other',
-            reason:
-              safetyResult.message ??
-              'Command contains patterns that require approval',
-          },
-          ...(feature('BASH_CLASSIFIER')
-            ? {
-                pendingClassifierCheck: buildPendingClassifierCheck(
-                  input.command,
-                  appState.toolPermissionContext,
-                ),
-              }
-            : {}),
-        }
-      }
-
-      appState = context.getAppState()
-      // SECURITY: Compute compoundCommandHasCd from the full command, NOT
-      // hardcode false. The pipe-handling path previously passed `false` here,
-      // disabling the cd+redirect check at pathValidation.ts:821. Appending
-      // `| echo done` to `cd .claude && echo x > settings.json` routed through
-      // this path with compoundCommandHasCd=false, letting the redirect write
-      // to .claude/settings.json without the cd+redirect block firing.
-      const pathResult = checkPathConstraints(
-        input,
-        getCwd(),
-        appState.toolPermissionContext,
-        commandHasAnyCd(input.command),
-        astRedirects,
-        astCommands,
-      )
-      if (pathResult.behavior !== 'passthrough') {
-        return pathResult
-      }
-    }
-
-    // When pipe segments return 'ask' (individual segments not allowed by rules),
-    // attach pending classifier check - may auto-approve before user responds.
-    if (commandOperatorResult.behavior === 'ask') {
-      appState = context.getAppState()
-      return {
-        ...commandOperatorResult,
-        ...(feature('BASH_CLASSIFIER')
-          ? {
-              pendingClassifierCheck: buildPendingClassifierCheck(
-                input.command,
-                appState.toolPermissionContext,
-              ),
-            }
-          : {}),
-      }
-    }
-
-    return commandOperatorResult
-  }
-
-  // SECURITY: Legacy misparsing gate. Only runs when the tree-sitter module
-  // is not loaded. Timeout/abort is fail-closed via too-complex (returned
-  // early above), not routed here. When the AST parse succeeded,
-  // astSubcommands is non-null and we've already validated structure; this
-  // block is skipped entirely. The AST's 'too-complex' result subsumes
-  // everything isBashSecurityCheckForMisparsing covered — both answer the
-  // same question: "can splitCommand be trusted on this input?"
-  if (
-    astSubcommands === null &&
-    !isEnvTruthy(process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_COMMAND_INJECTION_CHECK)
-  ) {
-    const originalCommandSafetyResult = await bashCommandIsSafeAsync(
-      input.command,
-    )
-    if (
-      originalCommandSafetyResult.behavior === 'ask' &&
-      originalCommandSafetyResult.isBashSecurityCheckForMisparsing
-    ) {
-      // Compound commands with safe heredoc patterns ($(cat <<'EOF'...EOF))
-      // trigger the $() check on the unsplit command. Strip the safe heredocs
-      // and re-check the remainder — if other misparsing patterns exist
-      // (e.g. backslash-escaped operators), they must still block.
-      const remainder = stripSafeHeredocSubstitutions(input.command)
-      const remainderResult =
-        remainder !== null ? await bashCommandIsSafeAsync(remainder) : null
-      if (
-        remainder === null ||
-        (remainderResult?.behavior === 'ask' &&
-          remainderResult.isBashSecurityCheckForMisparsing)
-      ) {
-        // Allow if the exact command has an explicit allow permission — the user
-        // made a conscious choice to permit this specific command.
-        appState = context.getAppState()
-        const exactMatchResult = bashToolCheckExactMatchPermission(
-          input,
-          appState.toolPermissionContext,
-        )
-        if (exactMatchResult.behavior === 'allow') {
-          return exactMatchResult
-        }
-        // Attach pending classifier check - may auto-approve before user responds
-        const decisionReason: PermissionDecisionReason = {
-          type: 'other' as const,
-          reason: originalCommandSafetyResult.message,
-        }
-        return {
-          behavior: 'ask',
-          message: createPermissionRequestMessage(
-            BashTool.name,
-            decisionReason,
-          ),
-          decisionReason,
-          suggestions: [], // Don't suggest saving a potentially dangerous command
-          ...(feature('BASH_CLASSIFIER')
-            ? {
-                pendingClassifierCheck: buildPendingClassifierCheck(
-                  input.command,
-                  appState.toolPermissionContext,
-                ),
-              }
-            : {}),
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Split into subcommands. Prefer the AST-extracted spans; fall back to
-  // splitCommand only when tree-sitter was unavailable. The cd-cwd filter
-  // strips the `cd ${cwd}` prefix that models like to prepend.
-  const cwd = getCwd()
-  const cwdMingw =
-    getPlatform() === 'windows' ? windowsPathToPosixPath(cwd) : cwd
-  const rawSubcommands =
-    astSubcommands ?? shadowLegacySubs ?? splitCommand(input.command)
-  const { subcommands, astCommandsByIdx } = filterCdCwdSubcommands(
-    rawSubcommands,
-    astCommands,
-    cwd,
-    cwdMingw,
-  )
-
-  // CC-643: Cap subcommand fanout. Only the legacy splitCommand path can
-  // explode — the AST path returns a bounded list (astSubcommands !== null)
-  // or short-circuits to 'too-complex' for structures it can't represent.
-  if (
-    astSubcommands === null &&
-    subcommands.length > MAX_SUBCOMMANDS_FOR_SECURITY_CHECK
-  ) {
-    logForDebugging(
-      `bashPermissions: ${subcommands.length} subcommands exceeds cap (${MAX_SUBCOMMANDS_FOR_SECURITY_CHECK}) — returning ask`,
-      { level: 'debug' },
-    )
-    const decisionReason = {
-      type: 'other' as const,
-      reason: `Command splits into ${subcommands.length} subcommands, too many to safety-check individually`,
-    }
-    return {
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      message: createPermissionRequestMessage(BashTool.name, decisionReason),
-      decisionReason,
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Ask if there are multiple `cd` commands
-  const cdCommands = subcommands.filter(subCommand =>
-    isNormalizedCdCommand(subCommand),
-  )
-  if (cdCommands.length > 1) {
-    const decisionReason = {
-      type: 'other' as const,
-      reason:
-        'Multiple directory changes in one command require approval for clarity',
-    }
-    return {
-      behavior: 'ask',
-      decisionReason,
-      message: createPermissionRequestMessage(BashTool.name, decisionReason),
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Track if compound command contains cd for security validation
-  // This prevents bypassing path checks via: cd .claude/ && mv test.txt settings.json
-  const compoundCommandHasCd = cdCommands.length > 0
-
-  // SECURITY: Block compound commands that have both cd AND git
-  // This prevents sandbox escape via: cd /malicious/dir && git status
-  // where the malicious directory contains a bare git repo with core.fsmonitor.
-  // This check must happen HERE (before subcommand-level permission checks)
-  // because bashToolCheckPermission checks each subcommand independently via
-  // BashTool.isReadOnly(), which would re-derive compoundCommandHasCd=false
-  // from just "git status" alone, bypassing the readOnlyValidation.ts check.
-  if (compoundCommandHasCd) {
-    const hasGitCommand = subcommands.some(cmd =>
-      isNormalizedGitCommand(cmd.trim()),
-    )
-    if (hasGitCommand) {
-      const decisionReason = {
-        type: 'other' as const,
-        reason:
-          'Compound commands with cd and git require approval to prevent bare repository attacks',
-      }
-      return {
-        behavior: 'ask',
-        decisionReason,
-        message: createPermissionRequestMessage(BashTool.name, decisionReason),
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  appState = context.getAppState() // re-compute the latest in case the user hit shift+tab
-
-  // SECURITY FIX: Check Bash deny/ask rules BEFORE path constraints
-  // This ensures that explicit deny rules like Bash(ls:*) take precedence over
-  // path constraint checks that return 'ask' for paths outside the project.
-  // Without this ordering, absolute paths outside the project (e.g., ls /home)
-  // would bypass deny rules because checkPathConstraints would return 'ask' first.
-  //
-  // Note: bashToolCheckPermission calls checkPathConstraints internally, which handles
-  // output redirection validation on each subcommand. However, since splitCommand strips
-  // redirections before we get here, we MUST validate output redirections on the ORIGINAL
-  // command AFTER checking deny rules but BEFORE returning results.
-  const subcommandPermissionDecisions = subcommands.map((command, i) =>
-    bashToolCheckPermission(
-      { command },
-      appState.toolPermissionContext,
-      compoundCommandHasCd,
-      astCommandsByIdx[i],
-    ),
-  )
-
-  // Deny if any subcommands are denied
-  const deniedSubresult = subcommandPermissionDecisions.find(
-    _ => _.behavior === 'deny',
-  )
-  if (deniedSubresult !== undefined) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'deny',
-      message: `Permission to use ${BashTool.name} with command ${input.command} has been denied.`,
-      decisionReason: {
-        type: 'subcommandResults',
-        reasons: new Map(
-          subcommandPermissionDecisions.map((result, i) => [
-            subcommands[i]!,
-            result,
-          ]),
-        ),
-      },
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Validate output redirections on the ORIGINAL command (before splitCommand stripped them)
-  // This must happen AFTER checking deny rules but BEFORE returning results.
-  // Output redirections like "> /etc/passwd" are stripped by splitCommand, so the per-subcommand
-  // checkPathConstraints calls won't see them. We validate them here on the original input.
-  // SECURITY: When AST data is available, pass AST-derived redirects so
-  // checkPathConstraints uses them directly instead of re-parsing with
-  // shell-quote (which has a known single-quote backslash misparsing bug
-  // that can silently hide redirect operators).
-  const pathResult = checkPathConstraints(
-    input,
-    getCwd(),
-    appState.toolPermissionContext,
-    compoundCommandHasCd,
-    astRedirects,
-    astCommands,
-  )
-  if (pathResult.behavior === 'deny') {
-    return pathResult
-  }
-
-  const askSubresult = subcommandPermissionDecisions.find(
-    _ => _.behavior === 'ask',
-  )
-  const nonAllowCount = count(
-    subcommandPermissionDecisions,
-    _ => _.behavior !== 'allow',
-  )
-
-  // SECURITY (GH#28784): Only short-circuit on a path-constraint 'ask' when no
-  // subcommand independently produced an 'ask'. checkPathConstraints re-runs the
-  // path-command loop on the full input, so `cd <outside-project> && python3 foo.py`
-  // produces an ask with ONLY a Read(<dir>/**) suggestion — the UI renders it as
-  // "Yes, allow reading from <dir>/" and picking that option silently approves
-  // python3. When a subcommand has its own ask (e.g. the cd subcommand's own
-  // path-constraint ask), fall through: either the askSubresult short-circuit
-  // below fires (single non-allow subcommand) or the merge flow collects Bash
-  // rule suggestions for every non-allow subcommand. The per-subcommand
-  // checkPathConstraints call inside bashToolCheckPermission already captures
-  // the Read rule for the cd target in that path.
-  //
-  // When no subcommand asked (all allow, or all passthrough like `printf > file`),
-  // pathResult IS the only ask — return it so redirection checks surface.
-  if (pathResult.behavior === 'ask' && askSubresult === undefined) {
-    return pathResult
-  }
-
-  // Ask if any subcommands require approval (e.g., ls/cd outside boundaries).
-  // Only short-circuit when exactly ONE subcommand needs approval — if multiple
-  // do (e.g. cd-outside-project ask + python3 passthrough), fall through to the
-  // merge flow so the prompt surfaces Bash rule suggestions for all of them
-  // instead of only the first ask's Read rule (GH#28784).
-  if (askSubresult !== undefined && nonAllowCount === 1) {
-    return {
-      ...askSubresult,
-      ...(feature('BASH_CLASSIFIER')
-        ? {
-            pendingClassifierCheck: buildPendingClassifierCheck(
-              input.command,
-              appState.toolPermissionContext,
-            ),
-          }
-        : {}),
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Allow if exact command was allowed
-  if (exactMatchResult.behavior === 'allow') {
-    return exactMatchResult
-  }
-
-  // If all subcommands are allowed via exact or prefix match, allow the
-  // command — but only if no command injection is possible. When the AST
-  // parse succeeded, each subcommand is already known-safe (no hidden
-  // substitutions, no structural tricks); the per-subcommand re-check is
-  // redundant. When on the legacy path, re-run bashCommandIsSafeAsync per sub.
-  let hasPossibleCommandInjection = false
-  if (
-    astSubcommands === null &&
-    !isEnvTruthy(process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_COMMAND_INJECTION_CHECK)
-  ) {
-    // CC-643: Batch divergence telemetry into a single logEvent. The per-sub
-    // logEvent was the hot-path syscall driver (each call → /proc/self/stat
-    // via process.memoryUsage()). Aggregate count preserves the signal.
-    let divergenceCount = 0
-    const onDivergence = () => {
-      divergenceCount++
-    }
-    const results = await Promise.all(
-      subcommands.map(c => bashCommandIsSafeAsync(c, onDivergence)),
-    )
-    hasPossibleCommandInjection = results.some(
-      r => r.behavior !== 'passthrough',
-    )
-    if (divergenceCount > 0) {
-      logEvent('tengu_tree_sitter_security_divergence', {
-        quoteContextDivergence: true,
-        count: divergenceCount,
-      })
-    }
-  }
-  if (
-    subcommandPermissionDecisions.every(_ => _.behavior === 'allow') &&
-    !hasPossibleCommandInjection
-  ) {
-    return {
-      behavior: 'allow',
-      updatedInput: input,
-      decisionReason: {
-        type: 'subcommandResults',
-        reasons: new Map(
-          subcommandPermissionDecisions.map((result, i) => [
-            subcommands[i]!,
-            result,
-          ]),
-        ),
-      },
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Query Haiku for command prefixes
-  // Skip the Haiku call — the UI computes the prefix locally and
-  // lets the user edit it. Still call when a custom fn is injected (tests).
-  let commandSubcommandPrefix: Awaited<
-    ReturnType<typeof getCommandSubcommandPrefixFn>
-  > = null
-  if (getCommandSubcommandPrefixFn !== getCommandSubcommandPrefix) {
-    commandSubcommandPrefix = await getCommandSubcommandPrefixFn(
-      input.command,
-      context.abortController.signal,
-      context.options.isNonInteractiveSession,
-    )
-    if (context.abortController.signal.aborted) {
-      throw new AbortError()
-    }
-  }
-
-  // If there is only one command, no need to process subcommands
-  appState = context.getAppState() // re-compute the latest in case the user hit shift+tab
-  if (subcommands.length === 1) {
-    const result = await checkCommandAndSuggestRules(
-      { command: subcommands[0]! },
-      appState.toolPermissionContext,
-      commandSubcommandPrefix,
-      compoundCommandHasCd,
-      astSubcommands !== null,
-    )
-    // If command wasn't allowed, attach pending classifier check.
-    // At this point, 'ask' can only come from bashCommandIsSafe (security check inside
-    // checkCommandAndSuggestRules), NOT from explicit ask rules - those were already
-    // filtered out at step 13 (askSubresult check). The classifier can bypass security.
-    if (result.behavior === 'ask' || result.behavior === 'passthrough') {
-      return {
-        ...result,
-        ...(feature('BASH_CLASSIFIER')
-          ? {
-              pendingClassifierCheck: buildPendingClassifierCheck(
-                input.command,
-                appState.toolPermissionContext,
-              ),
-            }
-          : {}),
-      }
-    }
-    return result
-  }
-
-  // Check subcommand permission results
-  const subcommandResults: Map<string, PermissionResult> = new Map()
-  for (const subcommand of subcommands) {
-    subcommandResults.set(
-      subcommand,
-      await checkCommandAndSuggestRules(
-        {
-          // Pass through input params like `sandbox`
-          ...input,
-          command: subcommand,
-        },
-        appState.toolPermissionContext,
-        commandSubcommandPrefix?.subcommandPrefixes.get(subcommand),
-        compoundCommandHasCd,
-        astSubcommands !== null,
-      ),
-    )
-  }
-
-  // Allow if all subcommands are allowed
-  // Note that this is different than 6b because we are checking the command injection results.
-  if (
-    subcommands.every(subcommand => {
-      const permissionResult = subcommandResults.get(subcommand)
-      return permissionResult?.behavior === 'allow'
-    })
-  ) {
-    // Keep subcommandResults as PermissionResult for decisionReason
-    return {
-      behavior: 'allow',
-      updatedInput: input,
-      decisionReason: {
-        type: 'subcommandResults',
-        reasons: subcommandResults,
-      },
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Otherwise, ask for permission
-  const collectedRules: Map<string, PermissionRuleValue> = new Map()
-
-  for (const [subcommand, permissionResult] of subcommandResults) {
-    if (
-      permissionResult.behavior === 'ask' ||
-      permissionResult.behavior === 'passthrough'
-    ) {
-      const updates =
-        'suggestions' in permissionResult
-          ? permissionResult.suggestions
-          : undefined
-
-      const rules = extractRules(updates)
-      for (const rule of rules) {
-        // Use string representation as key for deduplication
-        const ruleKey = permissionRuleValueToString(rule)
-        collectedRules.set(ruleKey, rule)
-      }
-
-      // GH#28784 follow-up: security-check asks (compound-cd+write, process
-      // substitution, etc.) carry no suggestions. In a compound command like
-      // `cd ~/out && rm -rf x`, that means only cd's Read rule gets collected
-      // and the UI labels the prompt "Yes, allow reading from <dir>/" — never
-      // mentioning rm. Synthesize a Bash(exact) rule so the UI shows the
-      // chained command. Skip explicit ask rules (decisionReason.type 'rule')
-      // where the user deliberately wants to review each time.
-      if (
-        permissionResult.behavior === 'ask' &&
-        rules.length === 0 &&
-        permissionResult.decisionReason?.type !== 'rule'
-      ) {
-        for (const rule of extractRules(
-          suggestionForExactCommand(subcommand),
-        )) {
-          const ruleKey = permissionRuleValueToString(rule)
-          collectedRules.set(ruleKey, rule)
-        }
-      }
-      // Note: We only collect rules, not other update types like mode changes
-      // This is appropriate for bash subcommands which primarily need rule suggestions
-    }
-  }
-
-  const decisionReason = {
-    type: 'subcommandResults' as const,
-    reasons: subcommandResults,
-  }
-
-  // GH#11380: Cap at MAX_SUGGESTED_RULES_FOR_COMPOUND. Map preserves insertion
-  // order (subcommand order), so slicing keeps the leftmost N.
-  const cappedRules = Array.from(collectedRules.values()).slice(
-    0,
-    MAX_SUGGESTED_RULES_FOR_COMPOUND,
-  )
-  const suggestedUpdates: PermissionUpdate[] | undefined =
-    cappedRules.length > 0
-      ? [
-          {
-            type: 'addRules',
-            rules: cappedRules,
-            behavior: 'allow',
-            destination: 'localSettings',
-          },
-        ]
-      : undefined
-
-  // Attach pending classifier check - may auto-approve before user responds.
-  // Behavior is 'ask' if any subcommand was 'ask' (e.g., path constraint or ask
-  // rule) — before the GH#28784 fix, ask subresults always short-circuited above
-  // so this path only saw 'passthrough' subcommands and hardcoded that.
-  return {
-    behavior: askSubresult !== undefined ? 'ask' : 'passthrough',
-    message: createPermissionRequestMessage(BashTool.name, decisionReason),
-    decisionReason,
-    suggestions: suggestedUpdates,
-    ...(feature('BASH_CLASSIFIER')
-      ? {
-          pendingClassifierCheck: buildPendingClassifierCheck(
-            input.command,
-            appState.toolPermissionContext,
-          ),
-        }
-      : {}),
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Checks if a subcommand is a git command after normalizing away safe wrappers
- * (env vars, timeout, etc.) and shell quotes.
- *
- * SECURITY: Must normalize before matching to prevent bypasses like:
- *   'git' status    — shell quotes hide the command from a naive regex
- *   NO_COLOR=1 git status — env var prefix hides the command
- */
-export function isNormalizedGitCommand(command: string): boolean {
-  // Fast path: catch the most common case before any parsing
-  if (command.startsWith('git ') || command === 'git') {
-    return true
-  }
-  const stripped = stripSafeWrappers(command)
-  const parsed = tryParseShellCommand(stripped)
-  if (parsed.success && parsed.tokens.length > 0) {
-    // Direct git command
-    if (parsed.tokens[0] === 'git') {
-      return true
-    }
-    // "xargs git ..." — xargs runs git in the current directory,
-    // so it must be treated as a git command for cd+git security checks.
-    // This matches the xargs prefix handling in filterRulesByContentsMatchingInput.
-    if (parsed.tokens[0] === 'xargs' && parsed.tokens.includes('git')) {
-      return true
-    }
-    return false
-  }
-  return /^git(?:\s|$)/.test(stripped)
-}
-
-/**
- * Checks if a subcommand is a cd command after normalizing away safe wrappers
- * (env vars, timeout, etc.) and shell quotes.
- *
- * SECURITY: Must normalize before matching to prevent bypasses like:
- *   FORCE_COLOR=1 cd sub — env var prefix hides the cd from a naive /^cd / regex
- *   This mirrors isNormalizedGitCommand to ensure symmetric normalization.
- *
- * Also matches pushd/popd — they change cwd just like cd, so
- *   pushd /tmp/bare-repo && git status
- * must trigger the same cd+git guard. Mirrors PowerShell's
- * DIRECTORY_CHANGE_ALIASES (src/utils/powershell/parser.ts).
- */
-export function isNormalizedCdCommand(command: string): boolean {
-  const stripped = stripSafeWrappers(command)
-  const parsed = tryParseShellCommand(stripped)
-  if (parsed.success && parsed.tokens.length > 0) {
-    const cmd = parsed.tokens[0]
-    return cmd === 'cd' || cmd === 'pushd' || cmd === 'popd'
-  }
-  return /^(?:cd|pushd|popd)(?:\s|$)/.test(stripped)
-}
-
-/**
- * Checks if a compound command contains any cd command,
- * using normalized detection that handles env var prefixes and shell quotes.
- */
-export function commandHasAnyCd(command: string): boolean {
-  return splitCommand(command).some(subcmd =>
-    isNormalizedCdCommand(subcmd.trim()),
-  )
-}