subagent-cli 0.3.0 → 0.3.1

package/src/utils/bash/ast.ts

@@ -1,2679 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * AST-based bash command analysis using tree-sitter.
- *
- * This module replaces the shell-quote + hand-rolled char-walker approach in
- * bashSecurity.ts / commands.ts. Instead of detecting parser differentials
- * one-by-one, we parse with tree-sitter-bash and walk the tree with an
- * EXPLICIT allowlist of node types. Any node type not in the allowlist causes
- * the entire command to be classified as 'too-complex', which means it goes
- * through the normal permission prompt flow.
- *
- * The key design property is FAIL-CLOSED: we never interpret structure we
- * don't understand. If tree-sitter produces a node we haven't explicitly
- * allowlisted, we refuse to extract argv and the caller must ask the user.
- *
- * This is NOT a sandbox. It does not prevent dangerous commands from running.
- * It answers exactly one question: "Can we produce a trustworthy argv[] for
- * each simple command in this string?" If yes, downstream code can match
- * argv[0] against permission rules and flag allowlists. If no, ask the user.
- */
-
-import { SHELL_KEYWORDS } from './bashParser.js'
-import type { Node } from './parser.js'
-import { PARSE_ABORTED, parseCommandRaw } from './parser.js'
-
-export type Redirect = {
-  op: '>' | '>>' | '<' | '<<' | '>&' | '>|' | '<&' | '&>' | '&>>' | '<<<'
-  target: string
-  fd?: number
-}
-
-export type SimpleCommand = {
-  /** argv[0] is the command name, rest are arguments with quotes already resolved */
-  argv: string[]
-  /** Leading VAR=val assignments */
-  envVars: { name: string; value: string }[]
-  /** Output/input redirects */
-  redirects: Redirect[]
-  /** Original source span for this command (for UI display) */
-  text: string
-}
-
-export type ParseForSecurityResult =
-  | { kind: 'simple'; commands: SimpleCommand[] }
-  | { kind: 'too-complex'; reason: string; nodeType?: string }
-  | { kind: 'parse-unavailable' }
-
-/**
- * Structural node types that represent composition of commands. We recurse
- * through these to find the leaf `command` nodes. `program` is the root;
- * `list` is `a && b || c`; `pipeline` is `a | b`; `redirected_statement`
- * wraps a command with its redirects. Semicolon-separated commands appear
- * as direct siblings under `program` (no wrapper node).
- */
-const STRUCTURAL_TYPES = new Set([
-  'program',
-  'list',
-  'pipeline',
-  'redirected_statement',
-])
-
-/**
- * Operator tokens that separate commands. These are leaf nodes that appear
- * between commands in `list`/`pipeline`/`program` and carry no payload.
- */
-const SEPARATOR_TYPES = new Set(['&&', '||', '|', ';', '&', '|&', '\n'])
-
-/**
- * Placeholder string used in outer argv when a $() is recursively extracted.
- * The actual $() output is runtime-determined; the inner command(s) are
- * checked against permission rules separately. Using a placeholder keeps
- * the outer argv clean (no multi-line heredoc bodies polluting path
- * extraction or triggering newline checks).
- */
-const CMDSUB_PLACEHOLDER = '__CMDSUB_OUTPUT__'
-
-/**
- * Placeholder for simple_expansion ($VAR) references to variables set earlier
- * in the same command via variable_assignment. Since we tracked the assignment,
- * we know the var exists and its value is either a static string or
- * __CMDSUB_OUTPUT__ (if set via $()). Either way, safe to substitute.
- */
-const VAR_PLACEHOLDER = '__TRACKED_VAR__'
-
-/**
- * All placeholder strings. Used for defense-in-depth: if a varScope value
- * contains ANY placeholder (exact or embedded), the value is NOT a pure
- * literal and cannot be trusted as a bare argument. Covers composites like
- * `VAR="prefix$(cmd)"` → `"prefix__CMDSUB_OUTPUT__"` — the substring check
- * catches these where exact-match Set.has() would miss.
- *
- * Also catches user-typed literals that collide with placeholder strings:
- * `VAR=__TRACKED_VAR__ && rm $VAR` — treated as non-literal (conservative).
- */
-function containsAnyPlaceholder(value: string): boolean {
-  return value.includes(CMDSUB_PLACEHOLDER) || value.includes(VAR_PLACEHOLDER)
-}
-
-/**
- * Unquoted $VAR in bash undergoes word-splitting (on $IFS: space/tab/NL)
- * and pathname expansion (glob matching on * ? [). Our argv stores a
- * single string — but at runtime bash may produce MULTIPLE args, or paths
- * matched by a glob. A value containing these metacharacters cannot be
- * trusted as a bare arg: `VAR="-rf /" && rm $VAR` → bash runs `rm -rf /`
- * (two args) but our argv would have `['rm', '-rf /']` (one arg). Similarly
- * `VAR="/etc/*" && cat $VAR` → bash expands to all /etc files.
- *
- * Inside double-quotes ("$VAR"), neither splitting nor globbing applies —
- * the value IS a single literal argument.
- */
-const BARE_VAR_UNSAFE_RE = /[ \t\n*?[]/
-
-// stdbuf flag forms — hoisted from the wrapper-stripping while-loop
-const STDBUF_SHORT_SEP_RE = /^-[ioe]$/
-const STDBUF_SHORT_FUSED_RE = /^-[ioe]./
-const STDBUF_LONG_RE = /^--(input|output|error)=/
-
-/**
- * Known-safe environment variables that bash sets automatically. Their values
- * are controlled by the shell/OS, not arbitrary user input. Referencing these
- * via $VAR is safe — the expansion is deterministic and doesn't introduce
- * injection risk. Covers `$HOME`, `$PWD`, `$USER`, `$PATH`, `$SHELL`, etc.
- * Intentionally small: only vars that are always set by bash/login and whose
- * values are paths/names (not arbitrary content).
- */
-const SAFE_ENV_VARS = new Set([
-  'HOME', // user's home directory
-  'PWD', // current working directory (bash maintains)
-  'OLDPWD', // previous directory
-  'USER', // current username
-  'LOGNAME', // login name
-  'SHELL', // user's login shell
-  'PATH', // executable search path
-  'HOSTNAME', // machine hostname
-  'UID', // user id
-  'EUID', // effective user id
-  'PPID', // parent process id
-  'RANDOM', // random number (bash builtin)
-  'SECONDS', // seconds since shell start
-  'LINENO', // current line number
-  'TMPDIR', // temp directory
-  // Special bash variables — always set, values are shell-controlled:
-  'BASH_VERSION', // bash version string
-  'BASHPID', // current bash process id
-  'SHLVL', // shell nesting level
-  'HISTFILE', // history file path
-  'IFS', // field separator (NOTE: only safe INSIDE strings; as bare arg
-  //       $IFS is the classic injection primitive and the insideString
-  //       gate in resolveSimpleExpansion correctly blocks it)
-])
-
-/**
- * Special shell variables ($?, $$, $!, $#, $0-$9). tree-sitter uses
- * `special_variable_name` for these (not `variable_name`). Values are
- * shell-controlled: exit status, PIDs, positional args. Safe to resolve
- * ONLY inside strings (same rationale as SAFE_ENV_VARS — as bare args
- * their value IS the argument and might be a path/flag from $1 etc.).
- *
- * SECURITY: '@' and '*' are NOT in this set. Inside "...", they expand to
- * the positional params — which are EMPTY in a fresh BashTool shell (how we
- * always spawn). Returning VAR_PLACEHOLDER would lie: `git "push$*"` gives
- * argv ['git','push__TRACKED_VAR__'] while bash passes ['git','push']. Deny
- * rule Bash(git push:*) fails on both .text (raw `$*`) AND rebuilt argv
- * (placeholder). With them removed, resolveSimpleExpansion falls through to
- * tooComplex for `$*` / `$@`. `echo "args: $*"` becomes too-complex —
- * acceptable (rare in BashTool usage; `"$@"` even rarer).
- */
-const SPECIAL_VAR_NAMES = new Set([
-  '?', // exit status of last command
-  '$', // current shell PID
-  '!', // last background PID
-  '#', // number of positional params
-  '0', // script name
-  '-', // shell option flags
-])
-
-/**
- * Node types that mean "this command cannot be statically analyzed." These
- * either execute arbitrary code (substitutions, subshells, control flow) or
- * expand to values we can't determine statically (parameter/arithmetic
- * expansion, brace expressions).
- *
- * This set is not exhaustive — it documents KNOWN dangerous types. The real
- * safety property is the allowlist in walkArgument/walkCommand: any type NOT
- * explicitly handled there also triggers too-complex.
- */
-const DANGEROUS_TYPES = new Set([
-  'command_substitution',
-  'process_substitution',
-  'expansion',
-  'simple_expansion',
-  'brace_expression',
-  'subshell',
-  'compound_statement',
-  'for_statement',
-  'while_statement',
-  'until_statement',
-  'if_statement',
-  'case_statement',
-  'function_definition',
-  'test_command',
-  'ansi_c_string',
-  'translated_string',
-  'herestring_redirect',
-  'heredoc_redirect',
-])
-
-/**
- * Numeric IDs for analytics (logEvent doesn't accept strings). Index into
- * DANGEROUS_TYPES. Append new entries at the end to keep IDs stable.
- * 0 = unknown/other, -1 = ERROR (parse failure), -2 = pre-check.
- */
-const DANGEROUS_TYPE_IDS = [...DANGEROUS_TYPES]
-export function nodeTypeId(nodeType: string | undefined): number {
-  if (!nodeType) return -2
-  if (nodeType === 'ERROR') return -1
-  const i = DANGEROUS_TYPE_IDS.indexOf(nodeType)
-  return i >= 0 ? i + 1 : 0
-}
-
-/**
- * Redirect operator tokens → canonical operator. tree-sitter produces these
- * as child nodes of `file_redirect`.
- */
-const REDIRECT_OPS: Record<string, Redirect['op']> = {
-  '>': '>',
-  '>>': '>>',
-  '<': '<',
-  '>&': '>&',
-  '<&': '<&',
-  '>|': '>|',
-  '&>': '&>',
-  '&>>': '&>>',
-  '<<<': '<<<',
-}
-
-/**
- * Brace expansion pattern: {a,b} or {a..b}. Must have , or .. inside
- * braces. We deliberately do NOT try to determine whether the opening brace
- * is backslash-escaped: tree-sitter doesn't unescape backslashes, so
- * distinguishing `\{a,b}` (escaped, literal) from `\\{a,b}` (literal
- * backslash + expansion) would require reimplementing bash quote removal.
- * Reject both — the escaped-brace case is rare and trivially rewritten
- * with single quotes.
- */
-const BRACE_EXPANSION_RE = /\{[^{}\s]*(,|\.\.)[^{}\s]*\}/
-
-/**
- * Control characters that bash silently drops but confuse static analysis.
- * Includes CR (0x0D): tree-sitter treats CR as a word separator but bash's
- * default IFS does not include CR, so tree-sitter and bash disagree on
- * word boundaries.
- */
-// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
-const CONTROL_CHAR_RE = /[\x00-\x08\x0B-\x1F\x7F]/
-
-/**
- * Unicode whitespace beyond ASCII. These render invisibly (or as regular
- * spaces) in terminals so a user reviewing the command can't see them, but
- * bash treats them as literal word characters. Blocks NBSP, zero-width
- * spaces, line/paragraph separators, BOM.
- */
-const UNICODE_WHITESPACE_RE =
-  /[\u00A0\u1680\u2000-\u200B\u2028\u2029\u202F\u205F\u3000\uFEFF]/
-
-/**
- * Backslash immediately before whitespace. bash treats `\ ` as a literal
- * space inside the current word, but tree-sitter returns the raw text with
- * the backslash still present. argv[0] from tree-sitter is `cat\ test`
- * while bash runs `cat test` (with a literal space). Rather than
- * reimplement bash's unescaping rules, we reject these — they're rare in
- * practice and trivial to rewrite with quotes.
- *
- * Also matches `\` before newline (line continuation) when adjacent to a
- * non-whitespace char. `tr\<NL>aceroute` — bash joins to `traceroute`, but
- * tree-sitter splits into two words (differential). When `\<NL>` is preceded
- * by whitespace (e.g. `foo && \<NL>bar`), there's no word to join — both
- * parsers agree, so we allow it.
- */
-const BACKSLASH_WHITESPACE_RE = /\\[ \t]|[^ \t\n\\]\\\n/
-
-/**
- * Zsh dynamic named directory expansion: ~[name]. In zsh this invokes the
- * zsh_directory_name hook, which can run arbitrary code. bash treats it as
- * a literal tilde followed by a glob character class. Since BashTool runs
- * via the user's default shell (often zsh), reject conservatively.
- */
-const ZSH_TILDE_BRACKET_RE = /~\[/
-
-/**
- * Zsh EQUALS expansion: word-initial `=cmd` expands to the absolute path of
- * `cmd` (equivalent to `$(which cmd)`). `=curl evil.com` runs as
- * `/usr/bin/curl evil.com`. tree-sitter parses `=curl` as a literal word, so
- * a `Bash(curl:*)` deny rule matching on base command name won't see `curl`.
- * Only matches word-initial `=` followed by a command-name char — `VAR=val`
- * and `--flag=val` have `=` mid-word and are not expanded by zsh.
- */
-const ZSH_EQUALS_EXPANSION_RE = /(?:^|[\s;&|])=[a-zA-Z_]/
-
-/**
- * Brace character combined with quote characters. Constructions like
- * `{a'}',b}` use quoted braces inside brace expansion context to obfuscate
- * the expansion from regex-based detection. In bash, `{a'}',b}` expands to
- * `a} b` (the quoted `}` becomes literal inside the first alternative).
- * These are hard to analyze correctly and have no legitimate use in
- * commands we'd want to auto-allow.
- *
- * This check runs on a version of the command with `{` masked out of
- * single-quoted and double-quoted spans, so JSON payloads like
- * `curl -d '{"k":"v"}'` don't trigger a false positive. Brace expansion
- * cannot occur inside quotes, so a `{` there can never start an obfuscation
- * pattern. The quote characters themselves stay visible so `{a'}',b}` and
- * `{@'{'0},...}` still match via the outer unquoted `{`.
- */
-const BRACE_WITH_QUOTE_RE = /\{[^}]*['"]/
-
-/**
- * Mask `{` characters that appear inside single- or double-quoted contexts.
- * Uses a single-pass bash-aware quote-state scanner instead of a regex.
- *
- * A naive regex (`/'[^']*'/g`) mis-detects spans when a `'` appears inside
- * a double-quoted string: for `echo "it's" {a'}',b}`, it matches from the
- * `'` in `it's` across to the `'` in `{a'}`, masking the unquoted `{` and
- * producing a false negative. The scanner tracks actual bash quote state:
- * `'` toggles single-quote only in unquoted context; `"` toggles
- * double-quote only outside single quotes; `\` escapes the next char in
- * unquoted context and escapes `"` / `\\` inside double quotes.
- *
- * Brace expansion is impossible in both quote contexts, so masking `{` in
- * either is safe. Secondary defense: BRACE_EXPANSION_RE in walkArgument.
- */
-function maskBracesInQuotedContexts(cmd: string): string {
-  // Fast path: no `{` → nothing to mask. Skips the char-by-char scan for
-  // the >90% of commands with no braces (`ls -la`, `git status`, etc).
-  if (!cmd.includes('{')) return cmd
-  const out: string[] = []
-  let inSingle = false
-  let inDouble = false
-  let i = 0
-  while (i < cmd.length) {
-    const c = cmd[i]!
-    if (inSingle) {
-      // Bash single quotes: no escapes, `'` always terminates.
-      if (c === "'") inSingle = false
-      out.push(c === '{' ? ' ' : c)
-      i++
-    } else if (inDouble) {
-      // Bash double quotes: `\` escapes `"` and `\` (also `$`, backtick,
-      // newline — but those don't affect quote state so we let them pass).
-      if (c === '\\' && (cmd[i + 1] === '"' || cmd[i + 1] === '\\')) {
-        out.push(c, cmd[i + 1]!)
-        i += 2
-      } else {
-        if (c === '"') inDouble = false
-        out.push(c === '{' ? ' ' : c)
-        i++
-      }
-    } else {
-      // Unquoted: `\` escapes any next char.
-      if (c === '\\' && i + 1 < cmd.length) {
-        out.push(c, cmd[i + 1]!)
-        i += 2
-      } else {
-        if (c === "'") inSingle = true
-        else if (c === '"') inDouble = true
-        out.push(c)
-        i++
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  return out.join('')
-}
-
-const DOLLAR = String.fromCharCode(0x24)
-
-/**
- * Parse a bash command string and extract a flat list of simple commands.
- * Returns 'too-complex' if the command uses any shell feature we can't
- * statically analyze. Returns 'parse-unavailable' if tree-sitter WASM isn't
- * loaded — caller should fall back to conservative behavior.
- */
-export async function parseForSecurity(
-  cmd: string,
-): Promise<ParseForSecurityResult> {
-  // parseCommandRaw('') returns null (falsy check), so short-circuit here.
-  // Don't use .trim() — it strips Unicode whitespace (\u00a0 etc.) which the
-  // pre-checks in parseForSecurityFromAst need to see and reject.
-  if (cmd === '') return { kind: 'simple', commands: [] }
-  const root = await parseCommandRaw(cmd)
-  return root === null
-    ? { kind: 'parse-unavailable' }
-    : parseForSecurityFromAst(cmd, root)
-}
-
-/**
- * Same as parseForSecurity but takes a pre-parsed AST root so callers that
- * need the tree for other purposes can parse once and share. Pre-checks
- * still run on `cmd` — they catch tree-sitter/bash differentials that a
- * successful parse doesn't.
- */
-export function parseForSecurityFromAst(
-  cmd: string,
-  root: Node | typeof PARSE_ABORTED,
-): ParseForSecurityResult {
-  // Pre-checks: characters that cause tree-sitter and bash to disagree on
-  // word boundaries. These run before tree-sitter because they're the known
-  // tree-sitter/bash differentials. Everything after this point trusts
-  // tree-sitter's tokenization.
-  if (CONTROL_CHAR_RE.test(cmd)) {
-    return { kind: 'too-complex', reason: 'Contains control characters' }
-  }
-  if (UNICODE_WHITESPACE_RE.test(cmd)) {
-    return { kind: 'too-complex', reason: 'Contains Unicode whitespace' }
-  }
-  if (BACKSLASH_WHITESPACE_RE.test(cmd)) {
-    return {
-      kind: 'too-complex',
-      reason: 'Contains backslash-escaped whitespace',
-    }
-  }
-  if (ZSH_TILDE_BRACKET_RE.test(cmd)) {
-    return {
-      kind: 'too-complex',
-      reason: 'Contains zsh ~[ dynamic directory syntax',
-    }
-  }
-  if (ZSH_EQUALS_EXPANSION_RE.test(cmd)) {
-    return {
-      kind: 'too-complex',
-      reason: 'Contains zsh =cmd equals expansion',
-    }
-  }
-  if (BRACE_WITH_QUOTE_RE.test(maskBracesInQuotedContexts(cmd))) {
-    return {
-      kind: 'too-complex',
-      reason: 'Contains brace with quote character (expansion obfuscation)',
-    }
-  }
-
-  const trimmed = cmd.trim()
-  if (trimmed === '') {
-    return { kind: 'simple', commands: [] }
-  }
-
-  if (root === PARSE_ABORTED) {
-    // SECURITY: module loaded but parse aborted (timeout / node budget /
-    // panic). Adversarially triggerable — `(( a[0][0]... ))` with ~2800
-    // subscripts hits PARSE_TIMEOUT_MICROS under the 10K length limit.
-    // Previously indistinguishable from module-not-loaded → routed to
-    // legacy (parse-unavailable), which lacks EVAL_LIKE_BUILTINS — `trap`,
-    // `enable`, `hash` leaked with Bash(*). Fail closed: too-complex → ask.
-    return {
-      kind: 'too-complex',
-      reason:
-        'Parser aborted (timeout or resource limit) — possible adversarial input',
-      nodeType: 'PARSE_ABORT',
-    }
-  }
-
-  return walkProgram(root)
-}
-
-function walkProgram(root: Node): ParseForSecurityResult {
-  // ERROR-node check folded into collectCommands — any unhandled node type
-  // (including ERROR) falls through to tooComplex() in the default branch.
-  // Avoids a separate full-tree walk for error detection.
-  const commands: SimpleCommand[] = []
-  // Track variables assigned earlier in the same command. When a
-  // simple_expansion ($VAR) references a tracked var, we can substitute
-  // a placeholder instead of returning too-complex. Enables patterns like
-  // `NOW=$(date) && jq --arg now "$NOW" ...` — $NOW is known to be the
-  // $(date) output (already extracted as inner command).
-  const varScope = new Map<string, string>()
-  const err = collectCommands(root, commands, varScope)
-  if (err) return err
-  return { kind: 'simple', commands }
-}
-
-/**
- * Recursively collect leaf `command` nodes from a structural wrapper node.
- * Returns an error result on any disallowed node type, or null on success.
- */
-function collectCommands(
-  node: Node,
-  commands: SimpleCommand[],
-  varScope: Map<string, string>,
-): ParseForSecurityResult | null {
-  if (node.type === 'command') {
-    // Pass `commands` as the innerCommands accumulator — any $() extracted
-    // during walkCommand gets appended alongside the outer command.
-    const result = walkCommand(node, [], commands, varScope)
-    if (result.kind !== 'simple') return result
-    commands.push(...result.commands)
-    return null
-  }
-
-  if (node.type === 'redirected_statement') {
-    return walkRedirectedStatement(node, commands, varScope)
-  }
-
-  if (node.type === 'comment') {
-    return null
-  }
-
-  if (STRUCTURAL_TYPES.has(node.type)) {
-    // SECURITY: `||`, `|`, `|&`, `&` must NOT carry varScope linearly. In bash:
-    //   `||` RHS runs conditionally → vars set there MAY not be set
-    //   `|`/`|&` stages run in subshells → vars set there are NEVER visible after
-    //   `&` LHS runs in a background subshell → same as above
-    // Flag-omission attack: `true || FLAG=--dry-run && cmd $FLAG` — bash skips
-    // the `||` RHS (FLAG unset → $FLAG empty), runs `cmd` WITHOUT --dry-run.
-    // With linear scope, our argv has ['cmd','--dry-run'] → looks SAFE → bypass.
-    //
-    // Fix: snapshot incoming scope at entry. After these separators, reset to
-    // the snapshot — vars set in clauses between separators don't leak. `scope`
-    // for clauses BETWEEN `&&`/`;` chains shares state (common `VAR=x && cmd
-    // $VAR`). `scope` crosses `||`/`|`/`&` as the pre-structure snapshot only.
-    //
-    // `&&` and `;` DO carry scope: `VAR=x && cmd $VAR` is sequential, VAR is set.
-    //
-    // NOTE: `scope` and `varScope` diverge after the first `||`/`|`/`&`. The
-    // caller's varScope is only mutated for the `&&`/`;` prefix — this is
-    // conservative (vars set in `A && B | C && D` leak A+B into caller, not
-    // C+D) but safe.
-    //
-    // Efficiency: snapshot is only needed if we hit `||`/`|`/`|&`/`&`. For
-    // the dominant case (`ls`, `git status` — no such separators), skip the
-    // Map alloc via a cheap pre-scan. For `pipeline`, node.type already tells
-    // us stages are subshells — copy once at entry, no snapshot needed (each
-    // reset uses the entry copy pattern via varScope, which is untouched).
-    const isPipeline = node.type === 'pipeline'
-    let needsSnapshot = false
-    if (!isPipeline) {
-      for (const c of node.children) {
-        if (c && (c.type === '||' || c.type === '&')) {
-          needsSnapshot = true
-          break
-        }
-      }
-    }
-    const snapshot = needsSnapshot ? new Map(varScope) : null
-    // For `pipeline`, ALL stages run in subshells — start with a copy so
-    // nothing mutates caller's scope. For `list`/`program`, the `&&`/`;`
-    // chain mutates caller's scope (sequential); fork only on `||`/`&`.
-    let scope = isPipeline ? new Map(varScope) : varScope
-    for (const child of node.children) {
-      if (!child) continue
-      if (SEPARATOR_TYPES.has(child.type)) {
-        if (
-          child.type === '||' ||
-          child.type === '|' ||
-          child.type === '|&' ||
-          child.type === '&'
-        ) {
-          // For pipeline: varScope is untouched (we started with a copy).
-          // For list/program: snapshot is non-null (pre-scan set it).
-          // `|`/`|&` only appear under `pipeline` nodes; `||`/`&` under list.
-          scope = new Map(snapshot ?? varScope)
-        }
-        continue
-      }
-      const err = collectCommands(child, commands, scope)
-      if (err) return err
-    }
-    return null
-  }
-
-  if (node.type === 'negated_command') {
-    // `! cmd` inverts exit code only — doesn't execute code or affect
-    // argv. Recurse into the wrapped command. Common in CI: `! grep err`,
-    // `! test -f lock`, `! git diff --quiet`.
-    for (const child of node.children) {
-      if (!child) continue
-      if (child.type === '!') continue
-      return collectCommands(child, commands, varScope)
-    }
-    return null
-  }
-
-  if (node.type === 'declaration_command') {
-    // `export`/`local`/`readonly`/`declare`/`typeset`. tree-sitter emits
-    // these as declaration_command, not command, so they previously fell
-    // through to tooComplex. Values are validated via walkVariableAssignment:
-    // `$()` in the value is recursively extracted (inner command pushed to
-    // commands[], outer argv gets CMDSUB_PLACEHOLDER); other disallowed
-    // expansions still reject via walkArgument. argv[0] is the builtin name so
-    // `Bash(export:*)` rules match.
-    const argv: string[] = []
-    for (const child of node.children) {
-      if (!child) continue
-      switch (child.type) {
-        case 'export':
-        case 'local':
-        case 'readonly':
-        case 'declare':
-        case 'typeset':
-          argv.push(child.text)
-          break
-        case 'word':
-        case 'number':
-        case 'raw_string':
-        case 'string':
-        case 'concatenation': {
-          // Flags (`declare -r`), quoted names (`export "FOO=bar"`), numbers
-          // (`declare -i 42`). Mirrors walkCommand's argv handling — before
-          // this, `export "FOO=bar"` hit tooComplex on the `string` child.
-          // walkArgument validates each (expansions still reject).
-          const arg = walkArgument(child, commands, varScope)
-          if (typeof arg !== 'string') return arg
-          // SECURITY: declare/typeset/local flags that change assignment
-          // semantics break our static model. -n (nameref): `declare -n X=Y`
-          // then `$X` dereferences to $Y's VALUE — varScope stores 'Y'
-          // (target NAME), argv[0] shows 'Y' while bash runs whatever $Y
-          // holds. -i (integer): `declare -i X='a[$(cmd)]'` arithmetically
-          // evaluates the RHS at assignment time, running $(cmd) even from
-          // a single-quoted raw_string (same primitive walkArithmetic
-          // guards in $((…))). -a/-A (array): subscript arithmetic on
-          // assignment. -r/-x/-g/-p/-f/-F are inert. Check the resolved
-          // arg (not child.text) so `\-n` and quoted `-n` are caught.
-          // Scope to declare/typeset/local only: `export -n` means "remove
-          // export attribute" (not nameref), and export/readonly don't
-          // accept -i; readonly -a/-A rejects subscripted args as invalid
-          // identifiers so subscript-arith doesn't fire.
-          if (
-            (argv[0] === 'declare' ||
-              argv[0] === 'typeset' ||
-              argv[0] === 'local') &&
-            /^-[a-zA-Z]*[niaA]/.test(arg)
-          ) {
-            return {
-              kind: 'too-complex',
-              reason: `declare flag ${arg} changes assignment semantics (nameref/integer/array)`,
-              nodeType: 'declaration_command',
-            }
-          }
-          // SECURITY: bare positional assignment with a subscript also
-          // evaluates — no -a/-i flag needed. `declare 'x[$(id)]=val'`
-          // implicitly creates an array element, arithmetically evaluating
-          // the subscript and running $(id). tree-sitter delivers the
-          // single-quoted form as a raw_string leaf so walkArgument sees
-          // only the literal text. Scoped to declare/typeset/local:
-          // export/readonly reject `[` in identifiers before eval.
-          if (
-            (argv[0] === 'declare' ||
-              argv[0] === 'typeset' ||
-              argv[0] === 'local') &&
-            arg[0] !== '-' &&
-            /^[^=]*\[/.test(arg)
-          ) {
-            return {
-              kind: 'too-complex',
-              reason: `declare positional '${arg}' contains array subscript — bash evaluates $(cmd) in subscripts`,
-              nodeType: 'declaration_command',
-            }
-          }
-          argv.push(arg)
-          break
-        }
-        case 'variable_assignment': {
-          const ev = walkVariableAssignment(child, commands, varScope)
-          if ('kind' in ev) return ev
-          // export/declare assignments populate the scope so later $VAR refs resolve.
-          applyVarToScope(varScope, ev)
-          argv.push(`${ev.name}=${ev.value}`)
-          break
-        }
-        case 'variable_name':
-          // `export FOO` — bare name, no assignment.
-          argv.push(child.text)
-          break
-        default:
-          return tooComplex(child)
-      }
-    }
-    commands.push({ argv, envVars: [], redirects: [], text: node.text })
-    return null
-  }
-
-  if (node.type === 'variable_assignment') {
-    // Bare `VAR=value` at statement level (not a command env prefix).
-    // Sets a shell variable — no code execution, no filesystem I/O.
-    // The value is validated via walkVariableAssignment → walkArgument,
-    // so `VAR=$(evil)` still recursively extracts/rejects based on the
-    // inner command. Does NOT push to commands — a bare assignment needs
-    // no permission rule (it's inert). Common pattern: `VAR=x && cmd`
-    // where cmd references $VAR. ~35% of too-complex in top-5k ant cmds.
-    const ev = walkVariableAssignment(node, commands, varScope)
-    if ('kind' in ev) return ev
-    // Populate scope so later `$VAR` references resolve.
-    applyVarToScope(varScope, ev)
-    return null
-  }
-
-  if (node.type === 'for_statement') {
-    // `for VAR in WORD...; do BODY; done` — iterate BODY once per word.
-    // Body commands extracted once; every iteration runs the same commands.
-    //
-    // SECURITY: Loop var is ALWAYS treated as unknown-value (VAR_PLACEHOLDER).
-    // Even "static" iteration words can be:
-    //  - Absolute paths: `for i in /etc/passwd; do rm $i; done` — body argv
-    //    would have placeholder, path validation never sees /etc/passwd.
-    //  - Globs: `for i in /etc/*; do rm $i; done` — `/etc/*` is a static word
-    //    at parse time but bash expands it at runtime.
-    //  - Flags: `for i in -rf /; do rm $i; done` — flag smuggling.
-    //
-    // VAR_PLACEHOLDER means bare `$i` in body → too-complex. Only
-    // string-embedding (`echo "item: $i"`) stays simple. This reverts some
-    // of the too-complex→simple rescues in the original PR — each one was a
-    // potential path-validation bypass.
-    let loopVar: string | null = null
-    let doGroup: Node | null = null
-    for (const child of node.children) {
-      if (!child) continue
-      if (child.type === 'variable_name') {
-        loopVar = child.text
-      } else if (child.type === 'do_group') {
-        doGroup = child
-      } else if (
-        child.type === 'for' ||
-        child.type === 'in' ||
-        child.type === 'select' ||
-        child.type === ';'
-      ) {
-        continue // structural tokens
-      } else if (child.type === 'command_substitution') {
-        // `for i in $(seq 1 3)` — inner cmd IS extracted and rule-checked.
-        const err = collectCommandSubstitution(child, commands, varScope)
-        if (err) return err
-      } else {
-        // Iteration values — validated via walkArgument. Value discarded:
-        // body argv gets VAR_PLACEHOLDER regardless of the iteration words,
-        // and bare `$i` in body → too-complex (see SECURITY comment above).
-        // We still validate to reject e.g. `for i in $(cmd); do ...; done`
-        // where the iteration word itself is a disallowed expansion.
-        const arg = walkArgument(child, commands, varScope)
-        if (typeof arg !== 'string') return arg
-      }
-    }
-    if (loopVar === null || doGroup === null) return tooComplex(node)
-    // SECURITY: `for PS4 in '$(id)'; do set -x; :; done` sets PS4 directly
-    // via varScope.set below — walkVariableAssignment's PS4/IFS checks never
-    // fire. Trace-time RCE (PS4) or word-split bypass (IFS). No legit use.
-    if (loopVar === 'PS4' || loopVar === 'IFS') {
-      return {
-        kind: 'too-complex',
-        reason: `${loopVar} as loop variable bypasses assignment validation`,
-        nodeType: 'for_statement',
-      }
-    }
-    // SECURITY: Body uses a scope COPY — vars assigned inside the loop
-    // body don't leak to commands after `done`. The loop var itself is
-    // set in the REAL scope (bash semantics: $i still set after loop)
-    // and copied into the body scope. ALWAYS VAR_PLACEHOLDER — see above.
-    varScope.set(loopVar, VAR_PLACEHOLDER)
-    const bodyScope = new Map(varScope)
-    for (const c of doGroup.children) {
-      if (!c) continue
-      if (c.type === 'do' || c.type === 'done' || c.type === ';') continue
-      const err = collectCommands(c, commands, bodyScope)
-      if (err) return err
-    }
-    return null
-  }
-
-  if (node.type === 'if_statement' || node.type === 'while_statement') {
-    // `if COND; then BODY; [elif...; else...;] fi`
-    // `while COND; do BODY; done`
-    // Extract condition command(s) + all branch/body commands. All get
-    // checked against permission rules. `while read VAR` tracks VAR so
-    // body can reference $VAR.
-    //
-    // SECURITY: Branch bodies use scope COPIES — vars assigned inside a
-    // conditional branch (which may not execute) must not leak to commands
-    // after fi/done. `if false; then T=safe; fi && rm $T` must reject $T.
-    // Condition commands use the REAL varScope (they always run for the
-    // check, so assignments there are unconditional — e.g., `while read V`
-    // tracking must persist to the body copy).
-    //
-    // tree-sitter if_statement children: if, COND..., then, THEN-BODY...,
-    // [elif_clause...], [else_clause], fi. We distinguish condition from
-    // then-body by tracking whether we've seen the `then` token.
-    let seenThen = false
-    for (const child of node.children) {
-      if (!child) continue
-      if (
-        child.type === 'if' ||
-        child.type === 'fi' ||
-        child.type === 'else' ||
-        child.type === 'elif' ||
-        child.type === 'while' ||
-        child.type === 'until' ||
-        child.type === ';'
-      ) {
-        continue
-      }
-      if (child.type === 'then') {
-        seenThen = true
-        continue
-      }
-      if (child.type === 'do_group') {
-        // while body: recurse with scope COPY (body assignments don't leak
-        // past done). The COPY contains any `read VAR` tracking from the
-        // condition (already in real varScope at this point).
-        const bodyScope = new Map(varScope)
-        for (const c of child.children) {
-          if (!c) continue
-          if (c.type === 'do' || c.type === 'done' || c.type === ';') continue
-          const err = collectCommands(c, commands, bodyScope)
-          if (err) return err
-        }
-        continue
-      }
-      if (child.type === 'elif_clause' || child.type === 'else_clause') {
-        // elif_clause: elif, cond, ;, then, body... / else_clause: else, body...
-        // Scope COPY — elif/else branch assignments don't leak past fi.
-        const branchScope = new Map(varScope)
-        for (const c of child.children) {
-          if (!c) continue
-          if (
-            c.type === 'elif' ||
-            c.type === 'else' ||
-            c.type === 'then' ||
-            c.type === ';'
-          ) {
-            continue
-          }
-          const err = collectCommands(c, commands, branchScope)
-          if (err) return err
-        }
-        continue
-      }
-      // Condition (seenThen=false) or then-body (seenThen=true).
-      // Condition uses REAL varScope (always runs). Then-body uses a COPY.
-      // Special-case `while read VAR`: after condition `read VAR` is
-      // collected, track VAR in the REAL scope so the body COPY inherits it.
-      const targetScope = seenThen ? new Map(varScope) : varScope
-      const before = commands.length
-      const err = collectCommands(child, commands, targetScope)
-      if (err) return err
-      // If condition included `read VAR...`, track vars in REAL scope.
-      // read var value is UNKNOWN (stdin input) → use VAR_PLACEHOLDER
-      // (unknown-value sentinel, string-only).
-      if (!seenThen) {
-        for (let i = before; i < commands.length; i++) {
-          const c = commands[i]
-          if (c?.argv[0] === 'read') {
-            for (const a of c.argv.slice(1)) {
-              // Skip flags (-r, -d, etc.); track bare identifier args as var names.
-              if (!a.startsWith('-') && /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$/.test(a)) {
-                // SECURITY: commands[] is a flat accumulator. `true || read
-                // VAR` in the condition: the list handler correctly uses a
-                // scope COPY for the ||-RHS (may not run), but `read VAR`
-                // IS still pushed to commands[] — we can't tell it was
-                // scope-isolated from here. Same for `echo | read VAR`
-                // (pipeline, subshell in bash) and `(read VAR)` (subshell).
-                // Overwriting a tracked literal with VAR_PLACEHOLDER hides
-                // path traversal: `VAR=../../etc/passwd && if true || read
-                // VAR; then cat "/tmp/$VAR"; fi` — parser would see
-                // /tmp/__TRACKED_VAR__, bash reads /etc/passwd. Fail closed
-                // when a tracked literal would be overwritten. Safe case
-                // (no prior value or already a placeholder) → proceed.
-                const existing = varScope.get(a)
-                if (
-                  existing !== undefined &&
-                  !containsAnyPlaceholder(existing)
-                ) {
-                  return {
-                    kind: 'too-complex',
-                    reason: `'read ${a}' in condition may not execute (||/pipeline/subshell); cannot prove it overwrites tracked literal '${existing}'`,
-                    nodeType: 'if_statement',
-                  }
-                }
-                varScope.set(a, VAR_PLACEHOLDER)
-              }
-            }
-          }
-        }
-      }
-    }
-    return null
-  }
-
-  if (node.type === 'subshell') {
-    // `(cmd1; cmd2)` — run commands in a subshell. Inner commands ARE
-    // executed, so extract them for permission checking. Subshell has
-    // isolated scope: vars set inside don't leak out. Use a COPY of
-    // varScope (outer vars visible, inner changes discarded).
-    const innerScope = new Map(varScope)
-    for (const child of node.children) {
-      if (!child) continue
-      if (child.type === '(' || child.type === ')') continue
-      const err = collectCommands(child, commands, innerScope)
-      if (err) return err
-    }
-    return null
-  }
-
-  if (node.type === 'test_command') {
-    // `[[ EXPR ]]` or `[ EXPR ]` — conditional test. Evaluates to true/false
-    // based on file tests (-f, -d), string comparisons (==, !=), etc.
-    // No code execution (no command_substitution inside — that would be a
-    // child and we'd recurse into it via walkArgument and reject it).
-    // Push as a synthetic command with argv[0]='[[' so permission rules
-    // can match — `Bash([[ :*)` would be unusual but legal.
-    // Walk arguments to validate (no cmdsub/expansion inside operands).
-    const argv: string[] = ['[[']
-    for (const child of node.children) {
-      if (!child) continue
-      if (child.type === '[[' || child.type === ']]') continue
-      if (child.type === '[' || child.type === ']') continue
-      // Recurse into test expression structure: unary_expression,
-      // binary_expression, parenthesized_expression, negated_expression.
-      // The leaves are test_operator (-f, -d, ==) and operand words.
-      const err = walkTestExpr(child, argv, commands, varScope)
-      if (err) return err
-    }
-    commands.push({ argv, envVars: [], redirects: [], text: node.text })
-    return null
-  }
-
-  if (node.type === 'unset_command') {
-    // `unset FOO BAR`, `unset -f func`. Safe: only removes shell
-    // variables/functions from the current shell — no code execution, no
-    // filesystem I/O. tree-sitter emits a dedicated node type so it
-    // previously fell through to tooComplex. Children: `unset` keyword,
-    // `variable_name` for each name, `word` for flags like `-f`/`-v`.
-    const argv: string[] = []
-    for (const child of node.children) {
-      if (!child) continue
-      switch (child.type) {
-        case 'unset':
-          argv.push(child.text)
-          break
-        case 'variable_name':
-          argv.push(child.text)
-          // SECURITY: unset removes the var from bash's scope. Remove from
-          // varScope so subsequent `$VAR` references correctly reject.
-          // `VAR=safe && unset VAR && rm $VAR` must NOT resolve $VAR.
-          varScope.delete(child.text)
-          break
-        case 'word': {
-          const arg = walkArgument(child, commands, varScope)
-          if (typeof arg !== 'string') return arg
-          argv.push(arg)
-          break
-        }
-        default:
-          return tooComplex(child)
-      }
-    }
-    commands.push({ argv, envVars: [], redirects: [], text: node.text })
-    return null
-  }
-
-  return tooComplex(node)
-}
-
-/**
- * Recursively walk a test_command expression tree (unary/binary/negated/
- * parenthesized expressions). Leaves are test_operator tokens and operands
- * (word/string/number/etc). Operands are validated via walkArgument.
- */
-function walkTestExpr(
-  node: Node,
-  argv: string[],
-  innerCommands: SimpleCommand[],
-  varScope: Map<string, string>,
-): ParseForSecurityResult | null {
-  switch (node.type) {
-    case 'unary_expression':
-    case 'binary_expression':
-    case 'negated_expression':
-    case 'parenthesized_expression': {
-      for (const c of node.children) {
-        if (!c) continue
-        const err = walkTestExpr(c, argv, innerCommands, varScope)
-        if (err) return err
-      }
-      return null
-    }
-    case 'test_operator':
-    case '!':
-    case '(':
-    case ')':
-    case '&&':
-    case '||':
-    case '==':
-    case '=':
-    case '!=':
-    case '<':
-    case '>':
-    case '=~':
-      argv.push(node.text)
-      return null
-    case 'regex':
-    case 'extglob_pattern':
-      // RHS of =~ or ==/!= in [[ ]]. Pattern text only — no code execution.
-      // Parser emits these as leaf nodes with no children (any $(...) or ${...}
-      // inside the pattern is a sibling, not a child, and is walked separately).
-      argv.push(node.text)
-      return null
-    default: {
-      // Operand — word, string, number, etc. Validate via walkArgument.
-      const arg = walkArgument(node, innerCommands, varScope)
-      if (typeof arg !== 'string') return arg
-      argv.push(arg)
-      return null
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * A `redirected_statement` wraps a command (or pipeline) plus one or more
- * `file_redirect`/`heredoc_redirect` nodes. Extract redirects, walk the
- * inner command, attach redirects to the LAST command (the one whose output
- * is being redirected).
- */
-function walkRedirectedStatement(
-  node: Node,
-  commands: SimpleCommand[],
-  varScope: Map<string, string>,
-): ParseForSecurityResult | null {
-  const redirects: Redirect[] = []
-  let innerCommand: Node | null = null
-
-  for (const child of node.children) {
-    if (!child) continue
-    if (child.type === 'file_redirect') {
-      // Thread `commands` so $() in redirect targets (e.g., `> $(mktemp)`)
-      // extracts the inner command for permission checking.
-      const r = walkFileRedirect(child, commands, varScope)
-      if ('kind' in r) return r
-      redirects.push(r)
-    } else if (child.type === 'heredoc_redirect') {
-      const r = walkHeredocRedirect(child)
-      if (r) return r
-    } else if (
-      child.type === 'command' ||
-      child.type === 'pipeline' ||
-      child.type === 'list' ||
-      child.type === 'negated_command' ||
-      child.type === 'declaration_command' ||
-      child.type === 'unset_command'
-    ) {
-      innerCommand = child
-    } else {
-      return tooComplex(child)
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (!innerCommand) {
-    // `> file` alone is valid bash (truncates file). Represent as a command
-    // with empty argv so downstream sees the write.
-    commands.push({ argv: [], envVars: [], redirects, text: node.text })
-    return null
-  }
-
-  const before = commands.length
-  const err = collectCommands(innerCommand, commands, varScope)
-  if (err) return err
-  if (commands.length > before && redirects.length > 0) {
-    const last = commands[commands.length - 1]
-    if (last) last.redirects.push(...redirects)
-  }
-  return null
-}
-
-/**
- * Extract operator + target from a `file_redirect` node. The target must be
- * a static word or string.
- */
-function walkFileRedirect(
-  node: Node,
-  innerCommands: SimpleCommand[],
-  varScope: Map<string, string>,
-): Redirect | ParseForSecurityResult {
-  let op: Redirect['op'] | null = null
-  let target: string | null = null
-  let fd: number | undefined
-
-  for (const child of node.children) {
-    if (!child) continue
-    if (child.type === 'file_descriptor') {
-      fd = Number(child.text)
-    } else if (child.type in REDIRECT_OPS) {
-      op = REDIRECT_OPS[child.type] ?? null
-    } else if (child.type === 'word' || child.type === 'number') {
-      // SECURITY: `number` nodes can contain expansion children via the
-      // `NN#<expansion>` arithmetic-base grammar quirk — same issue as
-      // walkArgument's number case. `> 10#$(cmd)` runs cmd at runtime.
-      // Plain word/number nodes have zero children.
-      if (child.children.length > 0) return tooComplex(child)
-      // Symmetry with walkArgument (~608): `echo foo > {a,b}` is an
-      // ambiguous redirect in bash. tree-sitter actually emits a
-      // `concatenation` node for brace targets (caught by the default
-      // branch below), but check `word` text too for defense-in-depth.
-      if (BRACE_EXPANSION_RE.test(child.text)) return tooComplex(child)
-      // Unescape backslash sequences — same as walkArgument. Bash quote
-      // removal turns `\X` → `X`. Without this, `cat < /proc/self/\environ`
-      // stores target `/proc/self/\environ` which evades PROC_ENVIRON_RE,
-      // but bash reads /proc/self/environ.
-      target = child.text.replace(/\\(.)/g, '$1')
-    } else if (child.type === 'raw_string') {
-      target = stripRawString(child.text)
-    } else if (child.type === 'string') {
-      const s = walkString(child, innerCommands, varScope)
-      if (typeof s !== 'string') return s
-      target = s
-    } else if (child.type === 'concatenation') {
-      // `echo > "foo"bar` — tree-sitter produces a concatenation of string +
-      // word children. walkArgument already validates concatenation (rejects
-      // expansions, checks brace syntax) and returns the joined text.
-      const s = walkArgument(child, innerCommands, varScope)
-      if (typeof s !== 'string') return s
-      target = s
-    } else {
-      return tooComplex(child)
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (!op || target === null) {
-    return {
-      kind: 'too-complex',
-      reason: 'Unrecognized redirect shape',
-      nodeType: node.type,
-    }
-  }
-  return { op, target, fd }
-}
-
-/**
- * Heredoc redirect. Only quoted-delimiter heredocs (<<'EOF') are safe —
- * their bodies are literal text. Unquoted-delimiter heredocs (<<EOF)
- * undergo full parameter/command/arithmetic expansion in the body.
- *
- * SECURITY: tree-sitter-bash has a grammar gap — backticks (`...`) inside
- * an unquoted heredoc body are NOT parsed as command_substitution nodes
- * (body.children is empty, backticks are in body.text). But bash DOES
- * execute them. We cannot safely relax the quoted-delimiter requirement
- * by checking body children for expansion nodes — we'd miss backtick
- * substitution. Keep rejecting all unquoted heredocs. Users should use
- * <<'EOF' to get a literal body, which the model already prefers.
- */
-function walkHeredocRedirect(node: Node): ParseForSecurityResult | null {
-  let startText: string | null = null
-  let body: Node | null = null
-
-  for (const child of node.children) {
-    if (!child) continue
-    if (child.type === 'heredoc_start') startText = child.text
-    else if (child.type === 'heredoc_body') body = child
-    else if (
-      child.type === '<<' ||
-      child.type === '<<-' ||
-      child.type === 'heredoc_end' ||
-      child.type === 'file_descriptor'
-    ) {
-      // expected structural tokens — safe to skip. file_descriptor
-      // covers fd-prefixed heredocs (`cat 3<<'EOF'`) — walkFileRedirect
-      // already treats it as a benign structural token.
-    } else {
-      // SECURITY: tree-sitter places pipeline / command / file_redirect /
-      // && / etc. as children of heredoc_redirect when they follow the
-      // delimiter on the same line (e.g. `ls <<'EOF' | rm x`). Previously
-      // these were silently skipped, hiding the piped command from
-      // permission checks. Fail closed like every other walker.
-      return tooComplex(child)
-    }
-  }
-
-  const isQuoted =
-    startText !== null &&
-    ((startText.startsWith("'") && startText.endsWith("'")) ||
-      (startText.startsWith('"') && startText.endsWith('"')) ||
-      startText.startsWith('\\'))
-
-  if (!isQuoted) {
-    return {
-      kind: 'too-complex',
-      reason: 'Heredoc with unquoted delimiter undergoes shell expansion',
-      nodeType: 'heredoc_redirect',
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (body) {
-    for (const child of body.children) {
-      if (!child) continue
-      if (child.type !== 'heredoc_content') {
-        return tooComplex(child)
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  return null
-}
-
-/**
- * Here-string redirect (`<<< content`). The content becomes stdin — not
- * argv, not a path. Safe when content is a literal word, raw_string, or
- * string with no expansions. Reject when content contains $()/${}/$VAR —
- * those execute arbitrary code or inject runtime values.
- *
- * Reuses walkArgument for content validation: it already rejects
- * command_substitution, expansion, and (for strings) simple_expansion
- * unless the var is tracked/safe. The result string is discarded — we only
- * care that it's statically resolvable.
- *
- * NOTE: `VAR=$(cmd) && cat <<< "$VAR"` would be safe in principle (inner
- * cmd is extracted separately, herestring content is stdin) but is
- * currently rejected conservatively — walkString's solo-placeholder guard
- * fires because it has no awareness of herestring vs argv context.
- */
-function walkHerestringRedirect(
-  node: Node,
-  innerCommands: SimpleCommand[],
-  varScope: Map<string, string>,
-): ParseForSecurityResult | null {
-  for (const child of node.children) {
-    if (!child) continue
-    if (child.type === '<<<') continue
-    // Content node: reuse walkArgument. It returns a string on success
-    // (which we discard — content is stdin, irrelevant to permissions) or
-    // a too-complex result on failure (expansion found, unresolvable var).
-    const content = walkArgument(child, innerCommands, varScope)
-    if (typeof content !== 'string') return content
-    // Herestring content is discarded (not in argv/envVars/redirects) but
-    // remains in .text via raw node.text. Scan it here so checkSemantics's
-    // NEWLINE_HASH invariant (bashPermissions.ts relies on it) still holds.
-    if (NEWLINE_HASH_RE.test(content)) return tooComplex(child)
-  }
-  return null
-}
-
-/**
- * Walk a `command` node and extract argv. Children appear in order:
- * [variable_assignment...] command_name [argument...] [file_redirect...]
- * Any child type not explicitly handled triggers too-complex.
- */
-function walkCommand(
-  node: Node,
-  extraRedirects: Redirect[],
-  innerCommands: SimpleCommand[],
-  varScope: Map<string, string>,
-): ParseForSecurityResult {
-  const argv: string[] = []
-  const envVars: { name: string; value: string }[] = []
-  const redirects: Redirect[] = [...extraRedirects]
-
-  for (const child of node.children) {
-    if (!child) continue
-
-    switch (child.type) {
-      case 'variable_assignment': {
-        const ev = walkVariableAssignment(child, innerCommands, varScope)
-        if ('kind' in ev) return ev
-        // SECURITY: Env-prefix assignments (`VAR=x cmd`) are command-local in
-        // bash — VAR is only visible to `cmd` as an env var, NOT to
-        // subsequent commands. Do NOT add to global varScope — that would
-        // let `VAR=safe cmd1 && rm $VAR` resolve $VAR when bash has unset it.
-        envVars.push({ name: ev.name, value: ev.value })
-        break
-      }
-      case 'command_name': {
-        const arg = walkArgument(
-          child.children[0] ?? child,
-          innerCommands,
-          varScope,
-        )
-        if (typeof arg !== 'string') return arg
-        argv.push(arg)
-        break
-      }
-      case 'word':
-      case 'number':
-      case 'raw_string':
-      case 'string':
-      case 'concatenation':
-      case 'arithmetic_expansion': {
-        const arg = walkArgument(child, innerCommands, varScope)
-        if (typeof arg !== 'string') return arg
-        argv.push(arg)
-        break
-      }
-      // NOTE: command_substitution as a BARE argument (not inside a string)
-      // is intentionally NOT handled here — the $() output IS the argument,
-      // and for path-sensitive commands (cd, rm, chmod) the placeholder would
-      // hide the real path from downstream checks. `cd $(echo /etc)` must
-      // stay too-complex so the path-check can't be bypassed. $() inside
-      // strings ("Timer: $(date)") is handled in walkString where the output
-      // is embedded in a longer string (safer).
-      case 'simple_expansion': {
-        // Bare `$VAR` as an argument. Tracked static vars return the ACTUAL
-        // value (e.g. VAR=/etc → '/etc'). Values with IFS/glob chars or
-        // placeholders reject. See resolveSimpleExpansion.
-        const v = resolveSimpleExpansion(child, varScope, false)
-        if (typeof v !== 'string') return v
-        argv.push(v)
-        break
-      }
-      case 'file_redirect': {
-        const r = walkFileRedirect(child, innerCommands, varScope)
-        if ('kind' in r) return r
-        redirects.push(r)
-        break
-      }
-      case 'herestring_redirect': {
-        // `cmd <<< "content"` — content is stdin, not argv. Validate it's
-        // literal (no expansion); discard the content string.
-        const err = walkHerestringRedirect(child, innerCommands, varScope)
-        if (err) return err
-        break
-      }
-      default:
-        return tooComplex(child)
-    }
-  }
-
-  // .text is the raw source span. Downstream (bashToolCheckPermission →
-  // splitCommand_DEPRECATED) re-tokenizes it via shell-quote. Normally .text
-  // is used unchanged — but if we resolved a $VAR into argv, .text diverges
-  // (has raw `$VAR`) and downstream RULE MATCHING would miss deny rules.
-  //
-  // SECURITY: `SUB=push && git $SUB --force` with `Bash(git push:*)` deny:
-  //   argv = ['git', 'push', '--force']  ← correct, path validation sees 'push'
-  //   .text = 'git $SUB --force'         ← deny rule 'git push:*' doesn't match
-  //
-  // Detection: any `$<identifier>` in node.text means a simple_expansion was
-  // resolved (or we'd have returned too-complex). This catches $VAR at any
-  // position — command_name, word, string interior, concatenation part.
-  // `$(...)` doesn't match (paren, not identifier start). `'$VAR'` in single
-  // quotes: tree-sitter's .text includes the quotes, so a naive check would
-  // FP on `echo '$VAR'`. But single-quoted $ is LITERAL in bash — argv has
-  // the literal `$VAR` string, so rebuilding from argv produces `'$VAR'`
-  // anyway (shell-escape wraps it). Same net .text. No rule-matching error.
-  //
-  // Rebuild .text from argv. Shell-escape each arg: single-quote wrap with
-  // `'\''` for embedded single quotes. Empty string, metacharacters, and
-  // placeholders all get quoted. Downstream shell-quote re-parse is correct.
-  //
-  // NOTE: This does NOT include redirects/envVars in the rebuilt .text —
-  // walkFileRedirect rejects simple_expansion, and envVars aren't used for
-  // rule matching. If either changes, this rebuild must include them.
-  //
-  // SECURITY: also rebuild when node.text contains a newline. Line
-  // continuations `<space>\<LF>` are invisible to argv (tree-sitter collapses
-  // them) but preserved in node.text. `timeout 5 \<LF>curl evil.com` → argv
-  // is correct, but raw .text → stripSafeWrappers matches `timeout 5 ` (the
-  // space before \), leaving `\<LF>curl evil.com` — Bash(curl:*) deny doesn't
-  // prefix-match. Rebuilt .text joins argv with ' ' → no newlines →
-  // stripSafeWrappers works. Also covers heredoc-body leakage.
-  const text =
-    /\$[A-Za-z_]/.test(node.text) || node.text.includes('\n')
-      ? argv
-          .map(a =>
-            a === '' || /["'\\ \t\n$`;|&<>(){}*?[\]~#]/.test(a)
-              ? `'${a.replace(/'/g, "'\\''")}'`
-              : a,
-          )
-          .join(' ')
-      : node.text
-  return {
-    kind: 'simple',
-    commands: [{ argv, envVars, redirects, text }],
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Recurse into a command_substitution node's inner command(s). If the inner
- * command(s) parse cleanly (simple), add them to the innerCommands
- * accumulator and return null (success). If the inner command is itself
- * too-complex (e.g., nested arith expansion, process sub), return the error.
- * This enables recursive permission checking: `echo $(git rev-parse HEAD)`
- * extracts BOTH `echo $(git rev-parse HEAD)` (outer) AND `git rev-parse HEAD`
- * (inner) — permission rules must match BOTH for the whole command to allow.
- */
-function collectCommandSubstitution(
-  csNode: Node,
-  innerCommands: SimpleCommand[],
-  varScope: Map<string, string>,
-): ParseForSecurityResult | null {
-  // Vars set BEFORE the $() are visible inside (bash subshell semantics),
-  // but vars set INSIDE don't leak out. Pass a COPY of the outer scope so
-  // inner assignments don't mutate the outer map.
-  const innerScope = new Map(varScope)
-  // command_substitution children: `$(` or `` ` ``, inner statement(s), `)`
-  for (const child of csNode.children) {
-    if (!child) continue
-    if (child.type === '$(' || child.type === '`' || child.type === ')') {
-      continue
-    }
-    const err = collectCommands(child, innerCommands, innerScope)
-    if (err) return err
-  }
-  return null
-}
-
-/**
- * Convert an argument node to its literal string value. Quotes are resolved.
- * This function implements the argument-position allowlist.
- */
-function walkArgument(
-  node: Node | null,
-  innerCommands: SimpleCommand[],
-  varScope: Map<string, string>,
-): string | ParseForSecurityResult {
-  if (!node) {
-    return { kind: 'too-complex', reason: 'Null argument node' }
-  }
-
-  switch (node.type) {
-    case 'word': {
-      // Unescape backslash sequences. In unquoted context, bash's quote
-      // removal turns `\X` → `X` for any character X. tree-sitter preserves
-      // the raw text. Required for checkSemantics: `\eval` must match
-      // EVAL_LIKE_BUILTINS, `\zmodload` must match ZSH_DANGEROUS_BUILTINS.
-      // Also makes argv accurate: `find -exec {} \;` → argv has `;` not
-      // `\;`. (Deny-rule matching on .text already worked via downstream
-      // splitCommand_DEPRECATED unescaping — see walkCommand comment.) `\<whitespace>`
-      // is already rejected by BACKSLASH_WHITESPACE_RE.
-      if (BRACE_EXPANSION_RE.test(node.text)) {
-        return {
-          kind: 'too-complex',
-          reason: 'Word contains brace expansion syntax',
-          nodeType: 'word',
-        }
-      }
-      return node.text.replace(/\\(.)/g, '$1')
-    }
-
-    case 'number':
-      // SECURITY: tree-sitter-bash parses `NN#<expansion>` (arithmetic base
-      // syntax) as a `number` node with the expansion as a CHILD. `10#$(cmd)`
-      // is a number node whose .text is the full literal but whose child is a
-      // command_substitution — bash runs the substitution. .text on a node
-      // with children would smuggle the expansion past permission checks.
-      // Plain numbers (`10`, `16#ff`) have zero children.
-      if (node.children.length > 0) {
-        return {
-          kind: 'too-complex',
-          reason: 'Number node contains expansion (NN# arithmetic base syntax)',
-          nodeType: node.children[0]?.type,
-        }
-      }
-      return node.text
-
-    case 'raw_string':
-      return stripRawString(node.text)
-
-    case 'string':
-      return walkString(node, innerCommands, varScope)
-
-    case 'concatenation': {
-      if (BRACE_EXPANSION_RE.test(node.text)) {
-        return {
-          kind: 'too-complex',
-          reason: 'Brace expansion',
-          nodeType: 'concatenation',
-        }
-      }
-      let result = ''
-      for (const child of node.children) {
-        if (!child) continue
-        const part = walkArgument(child, innerCommands, varScope)
-        if (typeof part !== 'string') return part
-        result += part
-      }
-      return result
-    }
-
-    case 'arithmetic_expansion': {
-      const err = walkArithmetic(node)
-      if (err) return err
-      return node.text
-    }
-
-    case 'simple_expansion': {
-      // `$VAR` inside a concatenation (e.g., `prefix$VAR`). Same rules
-      // as the bare case in walkCommand: must be tracked or SAFE_ENV_VARS.
-      // inside-concatenation counts as bare arg (the whole concat IS the arg)
-      return resolveSimpleExpansion(node, varScope, false)
-    }
-
-    // NOTE: command_substitution at arg position (bare or inside concatenation)
-    // is intentionally NOT handled — the output is/becomes-part-of a positional
-    // argument which might be a path or flag. `rm $(foo)` or `rm $(foo)bar`
-    // would hide the real path behind the placeholder. Only $() inside a
-    // `string` node (walkString) is extracted, since the output is embedded
-    // in a longer string rather than BEING the argument.
-
-    default:
-      return tooComplex(node)
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Extract literal content from a double-quoted string node. A `string` node's
- * children are `"` delimiters, `string_content` literals, and possibly
- * expansion nodes.
- *
- * tree-sitter quirk: literal newlines inside double quotes are NOT included
- * in `string_content` node text. bash preserves them. For `"a\nb"`,
- * tree-sitter produces two `string_content` children (`"a"`, `"b"`) with the
- * newline in neither. For `"\n#"`, it produces ONE child (`"#"`) with the
- * leading newline eaten. Concatenating children therefore loses newlines.
- *
- * Fix: track child `startIndex` and insert one `\n` per index gap. The gap
- * between children IS the dropped newline(s). This makes the argv value
- * match what bash actually sees.
- */
-function walkString(
-  node: Node,
-  innerCommands: SimpleCommand[],
-  varScope: Map<string, string>,
-): string | ParseForSecurityResult {
-  let result = ''
-  let cursor = -1
-  // SECURITY: Track whether the string contains a runtime-unknown
-  // placeholder ($() output or unknown-value tracked var) vs any literal
-  // content. A string that is ONLY a placeholder (`"$(cmd)"`, `"$VAR"`
-  // where VAR holds an unknown sentinel) produces an argv element that IS
-  // the placeholder — which downstream path validation resolves as a
-  // relative filename within cwd, bypassing the check. `cd "$(echo /etc)"`
-  // would pass validation but runtime-cd into /etc. We reject
-  // solo-placeholder strings; placeholders mixed with literal content
-  // (`"prefix: $(cmd)"`) are safe — runtime value can't equal a bare path.
-  let sawDynamicPlaceholder = false
-  let sawLiteralContent = false
-  for (const child of node.children) {
-    if (!child) continue
-    // Index gap between this child and the previous one = dropped newline(s).
-    // Ignore the gap before the first non-delimiter child (cursor === -1).
-    // Skip gap-fill for `"` delimiters: a gap before the closing `"` is the
-    // tree-sitter whitespace-only-string quirk (space/tab, not newline) — let
-    // the Fix C check below catch it as too-complex instead of mis-filling
-    // with `\n` and diverging from bash.
-    if (cursor !== -1 && child.startIndex > cursor && child.type !== '"') {
-      result += '\n'.repeat(child.startIndex - cursor)
-      sawLiteralContent = true
-    }
-    cursor = child.endIndex
-    switch (child.type) {
-      case '"':
-        // Reset cursor after opening quote so the gap between `"` and the
-        // first content child is captured.
-        cursor = child.endIndex
-        break
-      case 'string_content':
-        // Bash double-quote escape rules (NOT the generic /\\(.)/g used for
-        // unquoted words in walkArgument): inside "...", a backslash only
-        // escapes $ ` " \ — other sequences like \n stay literal. So
-        // `"fix \"bug\""` → `fix "bug"`, but `"a\nb"` → `a\nb` (backslash
-        // kept). tree-sitter preserves the raw escapes in .text; we resolve
-        // them here so argv matches what bash actually passes.
-        result += child.text.replace(/\\([$`"\\])/g, '$1')
-        sawLiteralContent = true
-        break
-      case DOLLAR:
-        // A bare dollar sign before closing quote or a non-name char is
-        // literal in bash. tree-sitter emits it as a standalone node.
-        result += DOLLAR
-        sawLiteralContent = true
-        break
-      case 'command_substitution': {
-        // Carve-out: `$(cat <<'EOF' ... EOF)` is safe. The quoted-delimiter
-        // heredoc body is literal (no expansion), and `cat` just prints it.
-        // The substitution result is therefore a known static string. This
-        // pattern is the idiomatic way to pass multi-line content to tools
-        // like `gh pr create --body`. We replace the substitution with a
-        // placeholder argv value — the actual content doesn't matter for
-        // permission checking, only that it IS static.
-        const heredocBody = extractSafeCatHeredoc(child)
-        if (heredocBody === 'DANGEROUS') return tooComplex(child)
-        if (heredocBody !== null) {
-          // SECURITY: the body IS the substitution result. Previously we
-          // dropped it → `rm "$(cat <<'EOF'\n/etc/passwd\nEOF)"` produced
-          // argv ['rm',''] while bash runs `rm /etc/passwd`. validatePath('')
-          // resolves to cwd → allowed. Every path-constrained command
-          // bypassed via this. Now: append the body (trailing LF trimmed —
-          // bash $() strips trailing newlines).
-          //
-          // Tradeoff: bodies with internal newlines are multi-line text
-          // (markdown, scripts) which cannot be valid paths — safe to drop
-          // to avoid NEWLINE_HASH_RE false positives on `## Summary`. A
-          // single-line body (like `/etc/passwd`) MUST go into argv so
-          // downstream path validation sees the real target.
-          const trimmed = heredocBody.replace(/\n+$/, '')
-          if (trimmed.includes('\n')) {
-            sawLiteralContent = true
-            break
-          }
-          result += trimmed
-          sawLiteralContent = true
-          break
-        }
-        // General $() inside "...": recurse into inner command(s). If they
-        // parse cleanly, they become additional subcommands that the
-        // permission system must match rules against. The outer argv gets
-        // the original $() text as placeholder (runtime-determined value).
-        // `echo "SHA: $(git rev-parse HEAD)"` → extracts BOTH
-        // `echo "SHA: $(...)"` AND `git rev-parse HEAD` — both must match
-        // permission rules. ~27% of too-complex in top-5k ant cmds.
-        const err = collectCommandSubstitution(child, innerCommands, varScope)
-        if (err) return err
-        result += CMDSUB_PLACEHOLDER
-        sawDynamicPlaceholder = true
-        break
-      }
-      case 'simple_expansion': {
-        // `$VAR` inside "...". Tracked/safe vars resolve; untracked reject.
-        const v = resolveSimpleExpansion(child, varScope, true)
-        if (typeof v !== 'string') return v
-        // VAR_PLACEHOLDER = runtime-unknown (loop var, read var, $() output,
-        // SAFE_ENV_VARS, special vars). Any other string = actual literal
-        // value from a tracked static var (e.g. VAR=/tmp → v='/tmp').
-        if (v === VAR_PLACEHOLDER) sawDynamicPlaceholder = true
-        else sawLiteralContent = true
-        result += v
-        break
-      }
-      case 'arithmetic_expansion': {
-        const err = walkArithmetic(child)
-        if (err) return err
-        result += child.text
-        // Validated to be literal-numeric — static content.
-        sawLiteralContent = true
-        break
-      }
-      default:
-        // expansion (${...}) inside "..."
-        return tooComplex(child)
-    }
-  }
-  // SECURITY: Reject solo-placeholder strings. `"$(cmd)"` or `"$VAR"` (where
-  // VAR holds an unknown value) would produce an argv element that IS the
-  // placeholder — which bypasses downstream path validation (validatePath
-  // resolves placeholders as relative filenames within cwd). Only allow
-  // placeholders embedded alongside literal content (`"prefix: $(cmd)"`).
-  if (sawDynamicPlaceholder && !sawLiteralContent) {
-    return tooComplex(node)
-  }
-  // SECURITY: tree-sitter-bash quirk — a double-quoted string containing
-  // ONLY whitespace (` "`, `" "`, `"\t"`) produces NO string_content child;
-  // the whitespace is attributed to the closing `"` node's text. Our loop
-  // only adds to `result` from string_content/expansion children, so we'd
-  // return "" when bash sees " ". Detect: we saw no content children
-  // (both flags false — neither literal nor placeholder added) but the
-  // source span is longer than bare `""`. Genuine `""` has text.length==2.
-  // `"$V"` with V="" doesn't hit this — the simple_expansion child sets
-  // sawLiteralContent via the `else` branch even when v is empty.
-  if (!sawLiteralContent && !sawDynamicPlaceholder && node.text.length > 2) {
-    return tooComplex(node)
-  }
-  return result
-}
-
-/**
- * Safe leaf nodes inside arithmetic expansion: integer literals (decimal,
- * hex, octal, bash base#digits) and operator/paren tokens. Anything else at
- * leaf position (notably variable_name that isn't a numeric literal) rejects.
- */
-const ARITH_LEAF_RE =
-  /^(?:[0-9]+|0[xX][0-9a-fA-F]+|[0-9]+#[0-9a-zA-Z]+|[-+*/%^&|~!<>=?:(),]+|<<|>>|\*\*|&&|\|\||[<>=!]=|\$\(\(|\)\))$/
-
-/**
- * Recursively validate an arithmetic_expansion node. Allows only literal
- * numeric expressions — no variables, no substitutions. Returns null if
- * safe, or a too-complex result if not.
- *
- * Variables are rejected because bash arithmetic recursively evaluates
- * variable values: if x='a[$(cmd)]' then $((x)) executes cmd. See
- * https://www.vidarholen.net/contents/blog/?p=716 (arithmetic injection).
- *
- * When safe, the caller puts the full `$((…))` span into argv as a literal
- * string. bash will expand it to an integer at runtime; the static string
- * won't match any sensitive path/deny patterns.
- */
-function walkArithmetic(node: Node): ParseForSecurityResult | null {
-  for (const child of node.children) {
-    if (!child) continue
-    if (child.children.length === 0) {
-      if (!ARITH_LEAF_RE.test(child.text)) {
-        return {
-          kind: 'too-complex',
-          reason: `Arithmetic expansion references variable or non-literal: ${child.text}`,
-          nodeType: 'arithmetic_expansion',
-        }
-      }
-      continue
-    }
-    switch (child.type) {
-      case 'binary_expression':
-      case 'unary_expression':
-      case 'ternary_expression':
-      case 'parenthesized_expression': {
-        const err = walkArithmetic(child)
-        if (err) return err
-        break
-      }
-      default:
-        return tooComplex(child)
-    }
-  }
-  return null
-}
-
-/**
- * Check if a command_substitution node is exactly `$(cat <<'DELIM'...DELIM)`
- * and return the heredoc body if so. Any deviation (extra args to cat,
- * unquoted delimiter, additional commands) returns null.
- *
- * tree-sitter structure:
- *   command_substitution
- *     $(
- *     redirected_statement
- *       command → command_name → word "cat"    (exactly one child)
- *       heredoc_redirect
- *         <<
- *         heredoc_start 'DELIM'                (quoted)
- *         heredoc_body                         (pure heredoc_content)
- *         heredoc_end
- *     )
- */
-function extractSafeCatHeredoc(subNode: Node): string | 'DANGEROUS' | null {
-  // Expect exactly: $( + one redirected_statement + )
-  let stmt: Node | null = null
-  for (const child of subNode.children) {
-    if (!child) continue
-    if (child.type === '$(' || child.type === ')') continue
-    if (child.type === 'redirected_statement' && stmt === null) {
-      stmt = child
-    } else {
-      return null
-    }
-  }
-  if (!stmt) return null
-
-  // redirected_statement must be: command(cat) + heredoc_redirect (quoted)
-  let sawCat = false
-  let body: string | null = null
-  for (const child of stmt.children) {
-    if (!child) continue
-    if (child.type === 'command') {
-      // Must be bare `cat` — no args, no env vars
-      const cmdChildren = child.children.filter(c => c)
-      if (cmdChildren.length !== 1) return null
-      const nameNode = cmdChildren[0]
-      if (nameNode?.type !== 'command_name' || nameNode.text !== 'cat') {
-        return null
-      }
-      sawCat = true
-    } else if (child.type === 'heredoc_redirect') {
-      // Reuse the existing validator: quoted delimiter, body is pure text.
-      // walkHeredocRedirect returns null on success, non-null on rejection.
-      if (walkHeredocRedirect(child) !== null) return null
-      for (const hc of child.children) {
-        if (hc?.type === 'heredoc_body') body = hc.text
-      }
-    } else {
-      return null
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (!sawCat || body === null) return null
-  // SECURITY: the heredoc body becomes the outer command's argv value via
-  // substitution, so a body like `/proc/self/environ` is semantically
-  // `cat /proc/self/environ`. checkSemantics never sees the body (we drop it
-  // at the walkString call site to avoid newline+# FPs). Returning `null`
-  // here would fall through to collectCommandSubstitution in walkString,
-  // which would extract the inner `cat` via walkHeredocRedirect (body text
-  // not inspected there) — effectively bypassing this check. Return a
-  // distinct sentinel so the caller can reject instead of falling through.
-  if (PROC_ENVIRON_RE.test(body)) return 'DANGEROUS'
-  // Same for jq system(): checkSemantics checks argv but never sees the
-  // heredoc body. Check unconditionally (we don't know the outer command).
-  if (/\bsystem\s*\(/.test(body)) return 'DANGEROUS'
-  return body
-}
-
-function walkVariableAssignment(
-  node: Node,
-  innerCommands: SimpleCommand[],
-  varScope: Map<string, string>,
-): { name: string; value: string; isAppend: boolean } | ParseForSecurityResult {
-  let name: string | null = null
-  let value = ''
-  let isAppend = false
-
-  for (const child of node.children) {
-    if (!child) continue
-    if (child.type === 'variable_name') {
-      name = child.text
-    } else if (child.type === '=' || child.type === '+=') {
-      // `PATH+=":/new"` — tree-sitter emits `+=` as a distinct operator
-      // node. Without this case it falls through to walkArgument below
-      // → tooComplex on unknown type `+=`.
-      isAppend = child.type === '+='
-      continue
-    } else if (child.type === 'command_substitution') {
-      // $() as the variable's value. The output becomes a STRING stored in
-      // the variable — it's NOT a positional argument (no path/flag concern).
-      // `VAR=$(date)` runs `date`, stores output. `VAR=$(rm -rf /)` runs
-      // `rm` — the inner command IS checked against permission rules, so
-      // `rm` must match a rule. The variable just holds whatever `rm` prints.
-      const err = collectCommandSubstitution(child, innerCommands, varScope)
-      if (err) return err
-      value = CMDSUB_PLACEHOLDER
-    } else if (child.type === 'simple_expansion') {
-      // `VAR=$OTHER` — assignment RHS does NOT word-split or glob-expand
-      // in bash (unlike command arguments). So `A="a b"; B=$A` sets B to
-      // the literal "a b". Resolve as if inside a string (insideString=true)
-      // so BARE_VAR_UNSAFE_RE doesn't over-reject. The resulting value may
-      // contain spaces/globs — if B is later used as a bare arg, THAT use
-      // will correctly reject via BARE_VAR_UNSAFE_RE.
-      const v = resolveSimpleExpansion(child, varScope, true)
-      if (typeof v !== 'string') return v
-      // If v is VAR_PLACEHOLDER (OTHER holds unknown), store it — combined
-      // with containsAnyPlaceholder in the caller to treat as unknown.
-      value = v
-    } else {
-      const v = walkArgument(child, innerCommands, varScope)
-      if (typeof v !== 'string') return v
-      value = v
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (name === null) {
-    return {
-      kind: 'too-complex',
-      reason: 'Variable assignment without name',
-      nodeType: 'variable_assignment',
-    }
-  }
-  // SECURITY: tree-sitter-bash accepts invalid var names (e.g. `1VAR=value`)
-  // as variable_assignment. Bash only recognizes [A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]* —
-  // anything else is run as a COMMAND. `1VAR=value` → bash tries to execute
-  // `1VAR=value` from PATH. We must not treat it as an inert assignment.
-  if (!/^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$/.test(name)) {
-    return {
-      kind: 'too-complex',
-      reason: `Invalid variable name (bash treats as command): ${name}`,
-      nodeType: 'variable_assignment',
-    }
-  }
-  // SECURITY: Setting IFS changes word-splitting behavior for subsequent
-  // unquoted $VAR expansions. `IFS=: && VAR=a:b && rm $VAR` → bash splits
-  // on `:` → `rm a b`. Our BARE_VAR_UNSAFE_RE only checks default IFS
-  // chars (space/tab/NL) — we can't model custom IFS. Reject.
-  if (name === 'IFS') {
-    return {
-      kind: 'too-complex',
-      reason: 'IFS assignment changes word-splitting — cannot model statically',
-      nodeType: 'variable_assignment',
-    }
-  }
-  // SECURITY: PS4 is expanded via promptvars (default on) on every command
-  // traced after `set -x`. A raw_string value containing $(cmd) or `cmd`
-  // executes at trace time: `PS4='$(id)' && set -x && :` runs id, but our
-  // argv is only [["set","-x"],[":"]] — the payload is invisible to
-  // permission checks. PS0-3 and PROMPT_COMMAND are not expanded in
-  // non-interactive shells (BashTool).
-  //
-  // ALLOWLIST, not blocklist. 5 rounds of bypass patches taught us that a
-  // value-dependent blocklist is structurally fragile:
-  //   - `+=` effective-value computation diverges from bash in multiple
-  //     scope-model gaps: `||` reset, env-prefix chain (PS4='' && PS4='$'
-  //     PS4+='(id)' cmd reads stale parent value), subshell.
-  //   - bash's decode_prompt_string runs BEFORE promptvars, so `\044(id)`
-  //     (octal for `$`) becomes `$(id)` at trace time — any literal-char
-  //     check must model prompt-escape decoding exactly.
-  //   - assignment paths exist outside walkVariableAssignment (for_statement
-  //     sets loopVar directly, see that handler's PS4 check).
-  //
-  // Policy: (1) reject += outright — no scope-tracking dependency; user can
-  // combine into one PS4=... (2) reject placeholders — runtime unknowable.
-  // (3) allowlist remaining value: ${identifier} refs (value-read only, safe)
-  // plus [A-Za-z0-9 _+:.\/=[\]-]. No bare `$` (blocks split primitive), no
-  // `\` (blocks octal \044/\140), no backtick, no parens. Covers all known
-  // encoding vectors and future ones — anything off the allowlist fails.
-  // Legit `PS4='+${BASH_SOURCE}:${LINENO}: '` still passes.
-  if (name === 'PS4') {
-    if (isAppend) {
-      return {
-        kind: 'too-complex',
-        reason:
-          'PS4 += cannot be statically verified — combine into a single PS4= assignment',
-        nodeType: 'variable_assignment',
-      }
-    }
-    if (containsAnyPlaceholder(value)) {
-      return {
-        kind: 'too-complex',
-        reason: 'PS4 value derived from cmdsub/variable — runtime unknowable',
-        nodeType: 'variable_assignment',
-      }
-    }
-    if (
-      !/^[A-Za-z0-9 _+:./=[\]-]*$/.test(
-        value.replace(/\$\{[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*\}/g, ''),
-      )
-    ) {
-      return {
-        kind: 'too-complex',
-        reason:
-          'PS4 value outside safe charset — only ${VAR} refs and [A-Za-z0-9 _+:.=/[]-] allowed',
-        nodeType: 'variable_assignment',
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  // SECURITY: Tilde expansion in assignment RHS. `VAR=~/x` (unquoted) →
-  // bash expands `~` at ASSIGNMENT time → VAR='/home/user/x'. We see the
-  // literal `~/x`. Later `cd $VAR` → our argv `['cd','~/x']`, bash runs
-  // `cd /home/user/x`. Tilde expansion also happens after `=` and `:` in
-  // assignment values (e.g. PATH=~/bin:~/sbin). We can't model it — reject
-  // any value containing `~` that isn't already quoted-literal (where bash
-  // doesn't expand). Conservative: any `~` in value → reject.
-  if (value.includes('~')) {
-    return {
-      kind: 'too-complex',
-      reason: 'Tilde in assignment value — bash may expand at assignment time',
-      nodeType: 'variable_assignment',
-    }
-  }
-  return { name, value, isAppend }
-}
-
-/**
- * Resolve a `simple_expansion` ($VAR) node. Returns VAR_PLACEHOLDER if
- * resolvable, too-complex otherwise.
- *
- * @param insideString true when $VAR is inside a `string` node ("...$VAR...")
- *   rather than a bare/concatenation argument. SAFE_ENV_VARS and unknown-value
- *   tracked vars are only allowed inside strings — as bare args their runtime
- *   value IS the argument and we don't know it statically.
- *   `cd $HOME/../x` would hide the real path behind the placeholder;
- *   `echo "Home: $HOME"` just embeds text in a string. Tracked vars holding
- *   STATIC strings (VAR=literal) are allowed in both positions since their
- *   value IS known.
- */
-function resolveSimpleExpansion(
-  node: Node,
-  varScope: Map<string, string>,
-  insideString: boolean,
-): string | ParseForSecurityResult {
-  let varName: string | null = null
-  let isSpecial = false
-  for (const c of node.children) {
-    if (c?.type === 'variable_name') {
-      varName = c.text
-      break
-    }
-    if (c?.type === 'special_variable_name') {
-      varName = c.text
-      isSpecial = true
-      break
-    }
-  }
-  if (varName === null) return tooComplex(node)
-  // Tracked vars: check stored value. Literal strings (VAR=/tmp) are
-  // returned DIRECTLY so downstream path validation sees the real path.
-  // Non-literal values (containing any placeholder — loop vars, $() output,
-  // read vars, composites like `VAR="prefix$(cmd)"`) are ONLY safe inside
-  // strings; as bare args they'd hide the runtime path/flag from validation.
-  //
-  // SECURITY: Returning the actual trackedValue (not a placeholder) is the
-  // critical fix. `VAR=/etc && rm $VAR` → argv ['rm', '/etc'] → validatePath
-  // correctly rejects. Previously returned a placeholder → validatePath saw
-  // '__LOOP_STATIC__', resolved as cwd-relative → PASSED → bypass.
-  const trackedValue = varScope.get(varName)
-  if (trackedValue !== undefined) {
-    if (containsAnyPlaceholder(trackedValue)) {
-      // Non-literal: bare → reject, inside string → VAR_PLACEHOLDER
-      // (walkString's solo-placeholder gate rejects `"$VAR"` alone).
-      if (!insideString) return tooComplex(node)
-      return VAR_PLACEHOLDER
-    }
-    // Pure literal (e.g. '/tmp', 'foo') — return it directly. Downstream
-    // path validation / checkSemantics operate on the REAL value.
-    //
-    // SECURITY: For BARE args (not inside a string), bash word-splits on
-    // $IFS and glob-expands the result. `VAR="-rf /" && rm $VAR` → bash
-    // runs `rm -rf /` (two args); `VAR="/etc/*" && cat $VAR` → expands to
-    // all files. Reject values containing IFS/glob chars unless in "...".
-    //
-    // SECURITY: Empty value as bare arg. Bash word-splitting on "" produces
-    // ZERO fields — the expansion disappears. `V="" && $V eval x` → bash
-    // runs `eval x` (our argv would be ["","eval","x"] with name="" —
-    // every EVAL_LIKE/ZSH/keyword check misses). `V="" && ls $V /etc` →
-    // bash runs `ls /etc`, our argv has a phantom "" shifting positions.
-    // Inside "...": `"$V"` → bash produces one empty-string arg → our ""
-    // is correct, keep allowing.
-    if (!insideString) {
-      if (trackedValue === '') return tooComplex(node)
-      if (BARE_VAR_UNSAFE_RE.test(trackedValue)) return tooComplex(node)
-    }
-    return trackedValue
-  }
-  // SAFE_ENV_VARS + special vars ($?, $$, $@, $1, etc.): value unknown
-  // (shell-controlled). Only safe when embedded in a string, NOT as a
-  // bare argument to a path-sensitive command.
-  if (insideString) {
-    if (SAFE_ENV_VARS.has(varName)) return VAR_PLACEHOLDER
-    if (
-      isSpecial &&
-      (SPECIAL_VAR_NAMES.has(varName) || /^[0-9]+$/.test(varName))
-    ) {
-      return VAR_PLACEHOLDER
-    }
-  }
-  return tooComplex(node)
-}
-
-/**
- * Apply a variable assignment to the scope, handling `+=` append semantics.
- * SECURITY: If EITHER side (existing value or appended value) contains a
- * placeholder, the result is non-literal — store VAR_PLACEHOLDER so later
- * $VAR correctly rejects as bare arg.
- * `VAR=/etc && VAR+=$(cmd)` must not leave VAR looking static.
- */
-function applyVarToScope(
-  varScope: Map<string, string>,
-  ev: { name: string; value: string; isAppend: boolean },
-): void {
-  const existing = varScope.get(ev.name) ?? ''
-  const combined = ev.isAppend ? existing + ev.value : ev.value
-  varScope.set(
-    ev.name,
-    containsAnyPlaceholder(combined) ? VAR_PLACEHOLDER : combined,
-  )
-}
-
-function stripRawString(text: string): string {
-  return text.slice(1, -1)
-}
-
-function tooComplex(node: Node): ParseForSecurityResult {
-  const reason =
-    node.type === 'ERROR'
-      ? 'Parse error'
-      : DANGEROUS_TYPES.has(node.type)
-        ? `Contains ${node.type}`
-        : `Unhandled node type: ${node.type}`
-  return { kind: 'too-complex', reason, nodeType: node.type }
-}
-
-// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-// Post-argv semantic checks
-//
-// Everything above answers "can we tokenize?". Everything below answers
-// "is the resulting argv dangerous in ways that don't involve parsing?".
-// These are checks on argv[0] or argv content that the old bashSecurity.ts
-// validators performed but which have nothing to do with parser
-// differentials. They're here (not in bashSecurity.ts) because they operate
-// on SimpleCommand and need to run for every extracted command.
-// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-/**
- * Zsh module builtins. These are not binaries on PATH — they're zsh
- * internals loaded via zmodload. Since BashTool runs via the user's default
- * shell (often zsh), and these parse as plain `command` nodes with no
- * distinguishing syntax, we can only catch them by name.
- */
-const ZSH_DANGEROUS_BUILTINS = new Set([
-  'zmodload',
-  'emulate',
-  'sysopen',
-  'sysread',
-  'syswrite',
-  'sysseek',
-  'zpty',
-  'ztcp',
-  'zsocket',
-  'zf_rm',
-  'zf_mv',
-  'zf_ln',
-  'zf_chmod',
-  'zf_chown',
-  'zf_mkdir',
-  'zf_rmdir',
-  'zf_chgrp',
-])
-
-/**
- * Shell builtins that evaluate their arguments as code or otherwise escape
- * the argv abstraction. A command like `eval "rm -rf /"` has argv
- * ['eval', 'rm -rf /'] which looks inert to flag validation but executes
- * the string. Treat these the same as command substitution.
- */
-const EVAL_LIKE_BUILTINS = new Set([
-  'eval',
-  'source',
-  '.',
-  'exec',
-  'command',
-  'builtin',
-  'fc',
-  // `coproc rm -rf /` spawns rm as a coprocess. tree-sitter parses it as
-  // a plain command with argv[0]='coproc', so permission rules and path
-  // validation would check 'coproc' not 'rm'.
-  'coproc',
-  // Zsh precommand modifiers: `noglob cmd args` runs cmd with globbing off.
-  // They parse as ordinary commands (noglob is argv[0], the real command is
-  // argv[1]) so permission matching against argv[0] would see 'noglob', not
-  // the wrapped command.
-  'noglob',
-  'nocorrect',
-  // `trap 'cmd' SIGNAL` — cmd runs as shell code on signal/exit. EXIT fires
-  // at end of every BashTool invocation, so this is guaranteed execution.
-  'trap',
-  // `enable -f /path/lib.so name` — dlopen arbitrary .so as a builtin.
-  // Native code execution.
-  'enable',
-  // `mapfile -C callback -c N` / `readarray -C callback` — callback runs as
-  // shell code every N input lines.
-  'mapfile',
-  'readarray',
-  // `hash -p /path cmd` — poisons bash's command-lookup cache. Subsequent
-  // `cmd` in the same command resolves to /path instead of PATH lookup.
-  'hash',
-  // `bind -x '"key":cmd'` / `complete -C cmd` — interactive-only callbacks
-  // but still code-string arguments. Low impact in non-interactive BashTool
-  // shells, blocked for consistency. `compgen -C cmd` is NOT interactive-only:
-  // it immediately executes the -C argument to generate completions.
-  'bind',
-  'complete',
-  'compgen',
-  // `alias name='cmd'` — aliases not expanded in non-interactive bash by
-  // default, but `shopt -s expand_aliases` enables them. Also blocked as
-  // defense-in-depth (alias followed by name use in same command).
-  'alias',
-  // `let EXPR` arithmetically evaluates EXPR — identical to $(( EXPR )).
-  // Array subscripts in the expression expand $(cmd) at eval time even when
-  // the argument arrived single-quoted: `let 'x=a[$(id)]'` executes id.
-  // tree-sitter sees the raw_string as an opaque leaf. Same primitive
-  // walkArithmetic guards, but `let` is a plain command node.
-  'let',
-])
-
-/**
- * Builtins that re-parse a NAME operand internally and arithmetically
- * evaluate `arr[EXPR]` subscripts — including $(cmd) in the subscript —
- * even when the argv element arrived from a single-quoted raw_string.
- * `test -v 'a[$(id)]'` → tree-sitter sees an opaque leaf, bash runs id.
- * Maps: builtin name → set of flags whose next argument is a NAME.
- */
-const SUBSCRIPT_EVAL_FLAGS: Record<string, Set<string>> = {
-  test: new Set(['-v', '-R']),
-  '[': new Set(['-v', '-R']),
-  '[[': new Set(['-v', '-R']),
-  printf: new Set(['-v']),
-  read: new Set(['-a']),
-  unset: new Set(['-v']),
-  // bash 5.1+: `wait -p VAR [id...]` stores the waited PID into VAR. When VAR
-  // is `arr[EXPR]`, bash arithmetically evaluates the subscript — running
-  // $(cmd) even from a single-quoted raw_string. Verified bash 5.3.9:
-  // `: & wait -p 'a[$(id)]' %1` executes id.
-  wait: new Set(['-p']),
-}
-
-/**
- * `[[ ARG1 OP ARG2 ]]` where OP is an arithmetic comparison. bash manual:
- * "When used with [[, Arg1 and Arg2 are evaluated as arithmetic
- * expressions." Arithmetic evaluation recursively expands array subscripts,
- * so `[[ 'a[$(id)]' -eq 0 ]]` executes `id` even though tree-sitter sees
- * the operand as an opaque raw_string leaf. Unlike -v/-R (unary, NAME after
- * flag), these are binary — the subscript can appear on EITHER side, so
- * SUBSCRIPT_EVAL_FLAGS's "next arg" logic is insufficient.
- * `[` / `test` are not vulnerable (bash errors with "integer expression
- * expected"), but the test_command handler normalizes argv[0]='[[' for
- * both forms, so they get this check too — mild over-blocking, safe side.
- */
-const TEST_ARITH_CMP_OPS = new Set(['-eq', '-ne', '-lt', '-le', '-gt', '-ge'])
-
-/**
- * Builtins where EVERY non-flag positional argument is a NAME that bash
- * re-parses and arithmetically evaluates subscripts on — no flag required.
- * `read 'a[$(id)]'` executes id: each positional is a variable name to
- * assign into, and `arr[EXPR]` is valid syntax there. `unset NAME...` is
- * the same (though tree-sitter's unset_command handler currently rejects
- * raw_string children before reaching here — this is defense-in-depth).
- * NOT printf (positional args are FORMAT/data), NOT test/[ (operands are
- * values, only -v/-R take a NAME). declare/typeset/local handled in
- * declaration_command since they never reach here as plain commands.
- */
-const BARE_SUBSCRIPT_NAME_BUILTINS = new Set(['read', 'unset'])
-
-/**
- * `read` flags whose NEXT argument is data (prompt/delimiter/count/fd),
- * not a NAME. `read -p '[foo] ' var` must not trip on the `[` in the
- * prompt string. `-a` is intentionally absent — its operand IS a NAME.
- */
-const READ_DATA_FLAGS = new Set(['-p', '-d', '-n', '-N', '-t', '-u', '-i'])
-
-// SHELL_KEYWORDS imported from bashParser.ts — shell reserved words can never
-// be legitimate argv[0]; if they appear, the parser mis-parsed a compound
-// command. Reject to avoid nonsense argv reaching downstream.
-
-// Use `.*` not `[^/]*` — Linux resolves `..` in procfs, so
-// `/proc/self/../self/environ` works and must be caught.
-const PROC_ENVIRON_RE = /\/proc\/.*\/environ/
-
-/**
- * Newline followed by `#` in an argv element, env var value, or redirect target.
- * Downstream stripSafeWrappers re-tokenizes .text line-by-line and treats `#`
- * after a newline as a comment, hiding arguments that follow.
- */
-const NEWLINE_HASH_RE = /\n[ \t]*#/
-
-export type SemanticCheckResult = { ok: true } | { ok: false; reason: string }
-
-/**
- * Post-argv semantic checks. Run after parseForSecurity returns 'simple' to
- * catch commands that tokenize fine but are dangerous by name or argument
- * content. Returns the first failure or {ok: true}.
- */
-export function checkSemantics(commands: SimpleCommand[]): SemanticCheckResult {
-  for (const cmd of commands) {
-    // Strip safe wrapper commands (nohup, time, timeout N, nice -n N) so
-    // `nohup eval "..."` and `timeout 5 jq 'system(...)'` are checked
-    // against the wrapped command, not the wrapper. Inlined here to avoid
-    // circular import with bashPermissions.ts.
-    let a = cmd.argv
-    for (;;) {
-      if (a[0] === 'time' || a[0] === 'nohup') {
-        a = a.slice(1)
-      } else if (a[0] === 'timeout') {
-        // `timeout 5`, `timeout 5s`, `timeout 5.5`, plus optional GNU flags
-        // preceding the duration. Long: --foreground, --kill-after=N,
-        // --signal=SIG, --preserve-status. Short: -k DUR, -s SIG, -v (also
-        // fused: -k5, -sTERM).
-        // SECURITY (SAST Mar 2026): the previous loop only skipped `--long`
-        // flags, so `timeout -k 5 10 eval ...` broke out with name='timeout'
-        // and the wrapped eval was never checked. Now handle known short
-        // flags AND fail closed on any unrecognized flag — an unknown flag
-        // means we can't locate the wrapped command, so we must not silently
-        // fall through to name='timeout'.
-        let i = 1
-        while (i < a.length) {
-          const arg = a[i]!
-          if (
-            arg === '--foreground' ||
-            arg === '--preserve-status' ||
-            arg === '--verbose'
-          ) {
-            i++ // known no-value long flags
-          } else if (/^--(?:kill-after|signal)=[A-Za-z0-9_.+-]+$/.test(arg)) {
-            i++ // --kill-after=5, --signal=TERM (value fused with =)
-          } else if (
-            (arg === '--kill-after' || arg === '--signal') &&
-            a[i + 1] &&
-            /^[A-Za-z0-9_.+-]+$/.test(a[i + 1]!)
-          ) {
-            i += 2 // --kill-after 5, --signal TERM (space-separated)
-          } else if (arg.startsWith('--')) {
-            // Unknown long flag, OR --kill-after/--signal with non-allowlisted
-            // value (e.g. placeholder from $() substitution). Fail closed.
-            return {
-              ok: false,
-              reason: `timeout with ${arg} flag cannot be statically analyzed`,
-            }
-          } else if (arg === '-v') {
-            i++ // --verbose, no argument
-          } else if (
-            (arg === '-k' || arg === '-s') &&
-            a[i + 1] &&
-            /^[A-Za-z0-9_.+-]+$/.test(a[i + 1]!)
-          ) {
-            i += 2 // -k DURATION / -s SIGNAL — separate value
-          } else if (/^-[ks][A-Za-z0-9_.+-]+$/.test(arg)) {
-            i++ // fused: -k5, -sTERM
-          } else if (arg.startsWith('-')) {
-            // Unknown flag OR -k/-s with non-allowlisted value — can't locate
-            // wrapped cmd. Reject, don't fall through to name='timeout'.
-            return {
-              ok: false,
-              reason: `timeout with ${arg} flag cannot be statically analyzed`,
-            }
-          } else {
-            break // non-flag — should be the duration
-          }
-        }
-        if (a[i] && /^\d+(?:\.\d+)?[smhd]?$/.test(a[i]!)) {
-          a = a.slice(i + 1)
-        } else if (a[i]) {
-          // SECURITY (PR #21503 round 3): a[i] exists but doesn't match our
-          // duration regex. GNU timeout parses via xstrtod() (libc strtod) and
-          // accepts `.5`, `+5`, `5e-1`, `inf`, `infinity`, hex floats — none
-          // of which match `/^\d+(\.\d+)?[smhd]?$/`. Empirically verified:
-          // `timeout .5 echo ok` works. Previously this branch `break`ed
-          // (fail-OPEN) so `timeout .5 eval "id"` with `Bash(timeout:*)` left
-          // name='timeout' and eval was never checked. Now fail CLOSED —
-          // consistent with the unknown-FLAG handling above (lines ~1895,1912).
-          return {
-            ok: false,
-            reason: `timeout duration '${a[i]}' cannot be statically analyzed`,
-          }
-        } else {
-          break // no more args — `timeout` alone, inert
-        }
-      } else if (a[0] === 'nice') {
-        // `nice cmd`, `nice -n N cmd`, `nice -N cmd` (legacy). All run cmd
-        // at a lower priority. argv[0] check must see the wrapped cmd.
-        if (a[1] === '-n' && a[2] && /^-?\d+$/.test(a[2])) {
-          a = a.slice(3)
-        } else if (a[1] && /^-\d+$/.test(a[1])) {
-          a = a.slice(2) // `nice -10 cmd`
-        } else if (a[1] && /[$(`]/.test(a[1])) {
-          // SECURITY: walkArgument returns node.text for arithmetic_expansion,
-          // so `nice $((0-5)) jq ...` has a[1]='$((0-5))'. Bash expands it to
-          // '-5' (legacy nice syntax) and execs jq; we'd slice(1) here and
-          // set name='$((0-5))' which skips the jq system() check entirely.
-          // Fail closed — mirrors the timeout-duration fail-closed above.
-          return {
-            ok: false,
-            reason: `nice argument '${a[1]}' contains expansion — cannot statically determine wrapped command`,
-          }
-        } else {
-          a = a.slice(1) // bare `nice cmd`
-        }
-      } else if (a[0] === 'env') {
-        // `env [VAR=val...] [-i] [-0] [-v] [-u NAME...] cmd args` runs cmd.
-        // argv[0] check must see cmd, not env. Skip known-safe forms only.
-        // SECURITY: -S splits a string into argv (mini-shell) — must reject.
-        // -C/-P change cwd/PATH — wrapped cmd runs elsewhere, reject.
-        // Any OTHER flag → reject (fail-closed, not fail-open to name='env').
-        let i = 1
-        while (i < a.length) {
-          const arg = a[i]!
-          if (arg.includes('=') && !arg.startsWith('-')) {
-            i++ // VAR=val assignment
-          } else if (arg === '-i' || arg === '-0' || arg === '-v') {
-            i++ // flags with no argument
-          } else if (arg === '-u' && a[i + 1]) {
-            i += 2 // -u NAME unsets; takes one arg
-          } else if (arg.startsWith('-')) {
-            // -S (argv splitter), -C (altwd), -P (altpath), --anything,
-            // or unknown flag. Can't model — reject the whole command.
-            return {
-              ok: false,
-              reason: `env with ${arg} flag cannot be statically analyzed`,
-            }
-          } else {
-            break // the wrapped command
-          }
-        }
-        if (i < a.length) {
-          a = a.slice(i)
-        } else {
-          break // `env` alone (no wrapped cmd) — inert, name='env'
-        }
-      } else if (a[0] === 'stdbuf') {
-        // `stdbuf -o0 cmd` (fused), `stdbuf -o 0 cmd` (space-separated),
-        // multiple flags (`stdbuf -o0 -eL cmd`), long forms (`--output=0`).
-        // SECURITY: previous handling only stripped ONE flag and fell through
-        // to slice(2) for anything unrecognized, so `stdbuf --output 0 eval`
-        // → ['0','eval',...] → name='0' hid eval. Now iterate all known flag
-        // forms and fail closed on any unknown flag.
-        let i = 1
-        while (i < a.length) {
-          const arg = a[i]!
-          if (STDBUF_SHORT_SEP_RE.test(arg) && a[i + 1]) {
-            i += 2 // -o MODE (space-separated)
-          } else if (STDBUF_SHORT_FUSED_RE.test(arg)) {
-            i++ // -o0 (fused)
-          } else if (STDBUF_LONG_RE.test(arg)) {
-            i++ // --output=MODE (fused long)
-          } else if (arg.startsWith('-')) {
-            // --output MODE (space-separated long) or unknown flag. GNU
-            // stdbuf long options use `=` syntax, but getopt_long also
-            // accepts space-separated — we can't enumerate safely, reject.
-            return {
-              ok: false,
-              reason: `stdbuf with ${arg} flag cannot be statically analyzed`,
-            }
-          } else {
-            break // the wrapped command
-          }
-        }
-        if (i > 1 && i < a.length) {
-          a = a.slice(i)
-        } else {
-          break // `stdbuf` with no flags or no wrapped cmd — inert
-        }
-      } else {
-        break
-      }
-    }
-    const name = a[0]
-    if (name === undefined) continue
-
-    // SECURITY: Empty command name. Quoted empty (`"" cmd`) is harmless —
-    // bash tries to exec "" and fails with "command not found". But an
-    // UNQUOTED empty expansion at command position (`V="" && $V cmd`) is a
-    // bypass: bash drops the empty field and runs `cmd` as argv[0], while
-    // our name="" skips every builtin check below. resolveSimpleExpansion
-    // rejects the $V case; this catches any other path to empty argv[0]
-    // (concatenation of empties, walkString whitespace-quirk, future bugs).
-    if (name === '') {
-      return {
-        ok: false,
-        reason: 'Empty command name — argv[0] may not reflect what bash runs',
-      }
-    }
-
-    // Defense-in-depth: argv[0] should never be a placeholder after the
-    // var-tracking fix (static vars return real value, unknown vars reject).
-    // But if a bug upstream ever lets one through, catch it here — a
-    // placeholder-as-command-name means runtime-determined command → unsafe.
-    if (name.includes(CMDSUB_PLACEHOLDER) || name.includes(VAR_PLACEHOLDER)) {
-      return {
-        ok: false,
-        reason: 'Command name is runtime-determined (placeholder argv[0])',
-      }
-    }
-
-    // argv[0] starts with an operator/flag: this is a fragment, not a
-    // command. Likely a line-continuation leak or a mistake.
-    if (name.startsWith('-') || name.startsWith('|') || name.startsWith('&')) {
-      return {
-        ok: false,
-        reason: 'Command appears to be an incomplete fragment',
-      }
-    }
-
-    // SECURITY: builtins that re-parse a NAME operand internally. bash
-    // arithmetically evaluates `arr[EXPR]` in NAME position, running $(cmd)
-    // in the subscript even when the argv element arrived from a
-    // single-quoted raw_string (opaque leaf to tree-sitter). Two forms:
-    // separate (`printf -v NAME`) and fused (`printf -vNAME`, getopt-style).
-    // `printf '[%s]' x` stays safe — `[` in format string, not after `-v`.
-    const dangerFlags = SUBSCRIPT_EVAL_FLAGS[name]
-    if (dangerFlags !== undefined) {
-      for (let i = 1; i < a.length; i++) {
-        const arg = a[i]!
-        // Separate form: `-v` then NAME in next arg.
-        if (dangerFlags.has(arg) && a[i + 1]?.includes('[')) {
-          return {
-            ok: false,
-            reason: `'${name} ${arg}' operand contains array subscript — bash evaluates $(cmd) in subscripts`,
-          }
-        }
-        // Combined short flags: `-ra` is bash shorthand for `-r -a`.
-        // Check if any danger flag character appears in a combined flag
-        // string. The danger flag's NAME operand is the next argument.
-        if (
-          arg.length > 2 &&
-          arg[0] === '-' &&
-          arg[1] !== '-' &&
-          !arg.includes('[')
-        ) {
-          for (const flag of dangerFlags) {
-            if (flag.length === 2 && arg.includes(flag[1]!)) {
-              if (a[i + 1]?.includes('[')) {
-                return {
-                  ok: false,
-                  reason: `'${name} ${flag}' (combined in '${arg}') operand contains array subscript — bash evaluates $(cmd) in subscripts`,
-                }
-              }
-            }
-          }
-        }
-        // Fused form: `-vNAME` in one arg. Only short-option flags fuse
-        // (getopt), so check -v/-a/-R. `[[` uses test_operator nodes only.
-        for (const flag of dangerFlags) {
-          if (
-            flag.length === 2 &&
-            arg.startsWith(flag) &&
-            arg.length > 2 &&
-            arg.includes('[')
-          ) {
-            return {
-              ok: false,
-              reason: `'${name} ${flag}' (fused) operand contains array subscript — bash evaluates $(cmd) in subscripts`,
-            }
-          }
-        }
-      }
-    }
-
-    // SECURITY: `[[ ARG OP ARG ]]` arithmetic comparison. bash evaluates
-    // BOTH operands as arithmetic expressions, recursively expanding
-    // `arr[$(cmd)]` subscripts even from single-quoted raw_string. Check
-    // the operand adjacent to each arith-cmp operator on BOTH sides —
-    // SUBSCRIPT_EVAL_FLAGS's "flag then next-arg" pattern can't express
-    // "either side of a binary op". String comparisons (==/!=/=~) do NOT
-    // trigger arithmetic eval — `[[ 'a[x]' == y ]]` is a literal string cmp.
-    if (name === '[[') {
-      // i starts at 2: a[0]='[[' (contains '['), a[1] is the first real
-      // operand. A binary op can't appear before index 2.
-      for (let i = 2; i < a.length; i++) {
-        if (!TEST_ARITH_CMP_OPS.has(a[i]!)) continue
-        if (a[i - 1]?.includes('[') || a[i + 1]?.includes('[')) {
-          return {
-            ok: false,
-            reason: `'[[ ... ${a[i]} ... ]]' operand contains array subscript — bash arithmetically evaluates $(cmd) in subscripts`,
-          }
-        }
-      }
-    }
-
-    // SECURITY: `read`/`unset` treat EVERY bare positional as a NAME —
-    // no flag needed. `read 'a[$(id)]' <<< data` executes id even though
-    // argv[1] arrived from a single-quoted raw_string and no -a flag is
-    // present. Same primitive as SUBSCRIPT_EVAL_FLAGS but the trigger is
-    // positional, not flag-gated. Skip operands of read's data-taking
-    // flags (-p PROMPT etc.) to avoid blocking `read -p '[foo] ' var`.
-    if (BARE_SUBSCRIPT_NAME_BUILTINS.has(name)) {
-      let skipNext = false
-      for (let i = 1; i < a.length; i++) {
-        const arg = a[i]!
-        if (skipNext) {
-          skipNext = false
-          continue
-        }
-        if (arg[0] === '-') {
-          if (name === 'read') {
-            if (READ_DATA_FLAGS.has(arg)) {
-              skipNext = true
-            } else if (arg.length > 2 && arg[1] !== '-') {
-              // Combined short flag like `-rp`. Getopt-style: first
-              // data-flag char consumes rest-of-arg as its operand
-              // (`-p[foo]` → prompt=`[foo]`), or next-arg if last
-              // (`-rp '[foo]'` → prompt=`[foo]`). So skipNext iff a
-              // data-flag char appears at the END after only no-arg
-              // flags like `-r`/`-s`.
-              for (let j = 1; j < arg.length; j++) {
-                if (READ_DATA_FLAGS.has('-' + arg[j])) {
-                  if (j === arg.length - 1) skipNext = true
-                  break
-                }
-              }
-            }
-          }
-          continue
-        }
-        if (arg.includes('[')) {
-          return {
-            ok: false,
-            reason: `'${name}' positional NAME '${arg}' contains array subscript — bash evaluates $(cmd) in subscripts`,
-          }
-        }
-      }
-    }
-
-    // SECURITY: Shell reserved keywords as argv[0] indicate a tree-sitter
-    // mis-parse. `! for i in a; do :; done` parses as `command "for i in a"`
-    // + `command "do :"` + `command "done"` — tree-sitter fails to recognize
-    // `for` after `!` as a compound command start. Reject: keywords can never
-    // be legitimate command names, and argv like ['do','false'] is nonsense.
-    if (SHELL_KEYWORDS.has(name)) {
-      return {
-        ok: false,
-        reason: `Shell keyword '${name}' as command name — tree-sitter mis-parse`,
-      }
-    }
-
-    // Check argv (not .text) to catch both single-quote (`'\n#'`) and
-    // double-quote (`"\n#"`) variants. Env vars and redirects are also
-    // part of the .text span so the same downstream bug applies.
-    // Heredoc bodies are excluded from argv so markdown `##` headers
-    // don't trigger this.
-    // TODO: remove once downstream path validation operates on argv.
-    for (const arg of cmd.argv) {
-      if (arg.includes('\n') && NEWLINE_HASH_RE.test(arg)) {
-        return {
-          ok: false,
-          reason:
-            'Newline followed by # inside a quoted argument can hide arguments from path validation',
-        }
-      }
-    }
-    for (const ev of cmd.envVars) {
-      if (ev.value.includes('\n') && NEWLINE_HASH_RE.test(ev.value)) {
-        return {
-          ok: false,
-          reason:
-            'Newline followed by # inside an env var value can hide arguments from path validation',
-        }
-      }
-    }
-    for (const r of cmd.redirects) {
-      if (r.target.includes('\n') && NEWLINE_HASH_RE.test(r.target)) {
-        return {
-          ok: false,
-          reason:
-            'Newline followed by # inside a redirect target can hide arguments from path validation',
-        }
-      }
-    }
-
-    // jq's system() built-in executes arbitrary shell commands, and flags
-    // like --from-file can read arbitrary files into jq variables. On the
-    // legacy path these are caught by validateJqCommand in bashSecurity.ts,
-    // but that validator is gated behind `astSubcommands === null` and
-    // never runs when the AST parse succeeds. Mirror the checks here so
-    // the AST path has the same defence.
-    if (name === 'jq') {
-      for (const arg of a) {
-        if (/\bsystem\s*\(/.test(arg)) {
-          return {
-            ok: false,
-            reason:
-              'jq command contains system() function which executes arbitrary commands',
-          }
-        }
-      }
-      if (
-        a.some(arg =>
-          /^(?:-[fL](?:$|[^A-Za-z])|--(?:from-file|rawfile|slurpfile|library-path)(?:$|=))/.test(
-            arg,
-          ),
-        )
-      ) {
-        return {
-          ok: false,
-          reason:
-            'jq command contains dangerous flags that could execute code or read arbitrary files',
-        }
-      }
-    }
-
-    if (ZSH_DANGEROUS_BUILTINS.has(name)) {
-      return {
-        ok: false,
-        reason: `Zsh builtin '${name}' can bypass security checks`,
-      }
-    }
-
-    if (EVAL_LIKE_BUILTINS.has(name)) {
-      // `command -v foo` / `command -V foo` are POSIX existence checks that
-      // only print paths — they never execute argv[1]. Bare `command foo`
-      // does bypass function/alias lookup (the concern), so keep blocking it.
-      if (name === 'command' && (a[1] === '-v' || a[1] === '-V')) {
-        // fall through to remaining checks
-      } else if (
-        name === 'fc' &&
-        !a.slice(1).some(arg => /^-[^-]*[es]/.test(arg))
-      ) {
-        // `fc -l`, `fc -ln` list history — safe. `fc -e ed` invokes an
-        // editor then executes. `fc -s [pat=rep]` RE-EXECUTES the last
-        // matching command (optionally with substitution) — as dangerous
-        // as eval. Block any short-opt containing `e` or `s`.
-        // to avoid introducing FPs for `fc -l` (list history).
-      } else if (
-        name === 'compgen' &&
-        !a.slice(1).some(arg => /^-[^-]*[CFW]/.test(arg))
-      ) {
-        // `compgen -c/-f/-v` only list completions — safe. `compgen -C cmd`
-        // immediately executes cmd; `-F func` calls a shell function; `-W list`
-        // word-expands its argument (including $(cmd) even from single-quoted
-        // raw_string). Block any short-opt containing C/F/W (case-sensitive:
-        // -c/-f are safe).
-      } else {
-        return {
-          ok: false,
-          reason: `'${name}' evaluates arguments as shell code`,
-        }
-      }
-    }
-
-    // /proc/*/environ exposes env vars (including secrets) of other processes.
-    // Check argv and redirect targets — `cat /proc/self/environ` and
-    // `cat < /proc/self/environ` both read it.
-    for (const arg of cmd.argv) {
-      if (arg.includes('/proc/') && PROC_ENVIRON_RE.test(arg)) {
-        return {
-          ok: false,
-          reason: 'Accesses /proc/*/environ which may expose secrets',
-        }
-      }
-    }
-    for (const r of cmd.redirects) {
-      if (r.target.includes('/proc/') && PROC_ENVIRON_RE.test(r.target)) {
-        return {
-          ok: false,
-          reason: 'Accesses /proc/*/environ which may expose secrets',
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  return { ok: true }
-}