grpc 1.45.0-x86_64-linux → 1.46.2-x86_64-linux

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/ssl_cipher.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,1717 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+static constexpr SSL_CIPHER kCiphers[] = {
+    // The RSA ciphers
+    // Cipher 02
+    {
+     SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA,
+     "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA",
+     SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher 0A
+    {
+     SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+     "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA",
+     SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_3DES,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+
+    // New AES ciphersuites
+
+    // Cipher 2F
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+     "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher 35
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+     "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    // PSK cipher suites.
+
+    // Cipher 8C
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher 8D
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    // GCM ciphersuites from RFC 5288
+
+    // Cipher 9C
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher 9D
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384",
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     SSL_kRSA,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
+    },
+
+    // TLS 1.3 suites.
+
+    // Cipher 1301
+    {
+      TLS1_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+      "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
+      TLS1_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+      SSL_kGENERIC,
+      SSL_aGENERIC,
+      SSL_AES128GCM,
+      SSL_AEAD,
+      SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher 1302
+    {
+      TLS1_TXT_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+      "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384",
+      TLS1_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+      SSL_kGENERIC,
+      SSL_aGENERIC,
+      SSL_AES256GCM,
+      SSL_AEAD,
+      SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher 1303
+    {
+      TLS1_TXT_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+      "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256",
+      TLS1_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+      SSL_kGENERIC,
+      SSL_aGENERIC,
+      SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
+      SSL_AEAD,
+      SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher C009
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher C00A
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher C013
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher C014
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    // GCM based TLS v1.2 ciphersuites from RFC 5289
+
+    // Cipher C02B
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_AES128GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher C02C
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384",
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_AES256GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher C02F
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher C030
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384",
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
+    },
+
+    // ECDHE-PSK cipher suites.
+
+    // Cipher C035
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher C036
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
+    },
+
+    // ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suites.
+
+    // Cipher CCA8
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+     "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256",
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher CCA9
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+     "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256",
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aECDSA,
+     SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+    // Cipher CCAB
+    {
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+     "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256",
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+     SSL_kECDHE,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
+    },
+
+};
+
+Span<const SSL_CIPHER> AllCiphers() {
+  return MakeConstSpan(kCiphers, OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kCiphers));
+}
+
+#define CIPHER_ADD 1
+#define CIPHER_KILL 2
+#define CIPHER_DEL 3
+#define CIPHER_ORD 4
+#define CIPHER_SPECIAL 5
+
+typedef struct cipher_order_st {
+  const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+  bool active;
+  bool in_group;
+  struct cipher_order_st *next, *prev;
+} CIPHER_ORDER;
+
+typedef struct cipher_alias_st {
+  // name is the name of the cipher alias.
+  const char *name;
+
+  // The following fields are bitmasks for the corresponding fields on
+  // |SSL_CIPHER|. A cipher matches a cipher alias iff, for each bitmask, the
+  // bit corresponding to the cipher's value is set to 1. If any bitmask is
+  // all zeroes, the alias matches nothing. Use |~0u| for the default value.
+  uint32_t algorithm_mkey;
+  uint32_t algorithm_auth;
+  uint32_t algorithm_enc;
+  uint32_t algorithm_mac;
+
+  // min_version, if non-zero, matches all ciphers which were added in that
+  // particular protocol version.
+  uint16_t min_version;
+} CIPHER_ALIAS;
+
+static const CIPHER_ALIAS kCipherAliases[] = {
+    // "ALL" doesn't include eNULL. It must be explicitly enabled.
+    {"ALL", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+
+    // The "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" rule is omitted. It matches nothing.
+
+    // key exchange aliases
+    // (some of those using only a single bit here combine
+    // multiple key exchange algs according to the RFCs.
+    {"kRSA", SSL_kRSA, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+
+    {"kECDHE", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"kEECDH", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"ECDH", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+
+    {"kPSK", SSL_kPSK, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+
+    // server authentication aliases
+    {"aRSA", ~0u, SSL_aRSA, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"aECDSA", ~0u, SSL_aECDSA, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"ECDSA", ~0u, SSL_aECDSA, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"aPSK", ~0u, SSL_aPSK, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+
+    // aliases combining key exchange and server authentication
+    {"ECDHE", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"EECDH", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"RSA", SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"PSK", SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+
+    // symmetric encryption aliases
+    {"3DES", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_3DES, ~0u, 0},
+    {"AES128", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128 | SSL_AES128GCM, ~0u, 0},
+    {"AES256", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES256 | SSL_AES256GCM, ~0u, 0},
+    {"AES", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES, ~0u, 0},
+    {"AESGCM", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM, ~0u, 0},
+    {"CHACHA20", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, ~0u, 0},
+
+    // MAC aliases
+    {"SHA1", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_SHA1, 0},
+    {"SHA", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_SHA1, 0},
+
+    // Legacy protocol minimum version aliases. "TLSv1" is intentionally the
+    // same as "SSLv3".
+    {"SSLv3", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, SSL3_VERSION},
+    {"TLSv1", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, SSL3_VERSION},
+    {"TLSv1.2", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, TLS1_2_VERSION},
+
+    // Legacy strength classes.
+    {"HIGH", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+    {"FIPS", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
+
+    // Temporary no-op aliases corresponding to removed SHA-2 legacy CBC
+    // ciphers. These should be removed after 2018-05-14.
+    {"SHA256", 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+    {"SHA384", 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+};
+
+static const size_t kCipherAliasesLen = OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kCipherAliases);
+
+bool ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(const EVP_AEAD **out_aead,
+                             size_t *out_mac_secret_len,
+                             size_t *out_fixed_iv_len, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher,
+                             uint16_t version, bool is_dtls) {
+  *out_aead = NULL;
+  *out_mac_secret_len = 0;
+  *out_fixed_iv_len = 0;
+
+  const bool is_tls12 = version == TLS1_2_VERSION && !is_dtls;
+  const bool is_tls13 = version == TLS1_3_VERSION && !is_dtls;
+
+  if (cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD) {
+    if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128GCM) {
+      if (is_tls12) {
+        *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_tls12();
+      } else if (is_tls13) {
+        *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_tls13();
+      } else {
+        *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm();
+      }
+      *out_fixed_iv_len = 4;
+    } else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256GCM) {
+      if (is_tls12) {
+        *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_tls12();
+      } else if (is_tls13) {
+        *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_tls13();
+      } else {
+        *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm();
+      }
+      *out_fixed_iv_len = 4;
+    } else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) {
+      *out_aead = EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305();
+      *out_fixed_iv_len = 12;
+    } else {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    // In TLS 1.3, the iv_len is equal to the AEAD nonce length whereas the code
+    // above computes the TLS 1.2 construction.
+    if (version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+      *out_fixed_iv_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(*out_aead);
+    }
+  } else if (cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1) {
+    if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) {
+      *out_aead = EVP_aead_null_sha1_tls();
+    } else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_3DES) {
+      if (version == TLS1_VERSION) {
+        *out_aead = EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv();
+        *out_fixed_iv_len = 8;
+      } else {
+        *out_aead = EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls();
+      }
+    } else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128) {
+      if (version == TLS1_VERSION) {
+        *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv();
+        *out_fixed_iv_len = 16;
+      } else {
+        *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls();
+      }
+    } else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256) {
+      if (version == TLS1_VERSION) {
+        *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv();
+        *out_fixed_iv_len = 16;
+      } else {
+        *out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls();
+      }
+    } else {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    *out_mac_secret_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+  } else {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *ssl_get_handshake_digest(uint16_t version,
+                                       const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  switch (cipher->algorithm_prf) {
+    case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT:
+      return version >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_md5_sha1();
+    case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256:
+      return EVP_sha256();
+    case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384:
+      return EVP_sha384();
+    default:
+      assert(0);
+      return NULL;
+  }
+}
+
+static bool is_cipher_list_separator(char c, bool is_strict) {
+  if (c == ':') {
+    return true;
+  }
+  return !is_strict && (c == ' ' || c == ';' || c == ',');
+}
+
+// rule_equals returns whether the NUL-terminated string |rule| is equal to the
+// |buf_len| bytes at |buf|.
+static bool rule_equals(const char *rule, const char *buf, size_t buf_len) {
+  // |strncmp| alone only checks that |buf| is a prefix of |rule|.
+  return strncmp(rule, buf, buf_len) == 0 && rule[buf_len] == '\0';
+}
+
+static void ll_append_tail(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
+                           CIPHER_ORDER **tail) {
+  if (curr == *tail) {
+    return;
+  }
+  if (curr == *head) {
+    *head = curr->next;
+  }
+  if (curr->prev != NULL) {
+    curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+  }
+  if (curr->next != NULL) {
+    curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
+  }
+  (*tail)->next = curr;
+  curr->prev = *tail;
+  curr->next = NULL;
+  *tail = curr;
+}
+
+static void ll_append_head(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
+                           CIPHER_ORDER **tail) {
+  if (curr == *head) {
+    return;
+  }
+  if (curr == *tail) {
+    *tail = curr->prev;
+  }
+  if (curr->next != NULL) {
+    curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
+  }
+  if (curr->prev != NULL) {
+    curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+  }
+  (*head)->prev = curr;
+  curr->next = *head;
+  curr->prev = NULL;
+  *head = curr;
+}
+
+static bool ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(Array<CIPHER_ORDER> *out_co_list,
+                                       CIPHER_ORDER **out_head,
+                                       CIPHER_ORDER **out_tail) {
+  Array<CIPHER_ORDER> co_list;
+  if (!co_list.Init(OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kCiphers))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  size_t co_list_num = 0;
+  for (const SSL_CIPHER &cipher : kCiphers) {
+    // TLS 1.3 ciphers do not participate in this mechanism.
+    if (cipher.algorithm_mkey != SSL_kGENERIC) {
+      co_list[co_list_num].cipher = &cipher;
+      co_list[co_list_num].next = NULL;
+      co_list[co_list_num].prev = NULL;
+      co_list[co_list_num].active = false;
+      co_list[co_list_num].in_group = false;
+      co_list_num++;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Prepare linked list from list entries.
+  if (co_list_num > 0) {
+    co_list[0].prev = NULL;
+
+    if (co_list_num > 1) {
+      co_list[0].next = &co_list[1];
+
+      for (size_t i = 1; i < co_list_num - 1; i++) {
+        co_list[i].prev = &co_list[i - 1];
+        co_list[i].next = &co_list[i + 1];
+      }
+
+      co_list[co_list_num - 1].prev = &co_list[co_list_num - 2];
+    }
+
+    co_list[co_list_num - 1].next = NULL;
+
+    *out_head = &co_list[0];
+    *out_tail = &co_list[co_list_num - 1];
+  } else {
+    *out_head = nullptr;
+    *out_tail = nullptr;
+  }
+  *out_co_list = std::move(co_list);
+  return true;
+}
+
+SSLCipherPreferenceList::~SSLCipherPreferenceList() {
+  OPENSSL_free(in_group_flags);
+}
+
+bool SSLCipherPreferenceList::Init(UniquePtr<STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)> ciphers_arg,
+                                   Span<const bool> in_group_flags_arg) {
+  if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers_arg.get()) != in_group_flags_arg.size()) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  Array<bool> copy;
+  if (!copy.CopyFrom(in_group_flags_arg)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  ciphers = std::move(ciphers_arg);
+  size_t unused_len;
+  copy.Release(&in_group_flags, &unused_len);
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool SSLCipherPreferenceList::Init(const SSLCipherPreferenceList& other) {
+  size_t size = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(other.ciphers.get());
+  Span<const bool> other_flags(other.in_group_flags, size);
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)> other_ciphers(sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(
+      other.ciphers.get()));
+  if (!other_ciphers) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return Init(std::move(other_ciphers), other_flags);
+}
+
+void SSLCipherPreferenceList::Remove(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  size_t index;
+  if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(ciphers.get(), &index, cipher)) {
+    return;
+  }
+  if (!in_group_flags[index] /* last element of group */ && index > 0) {
+    in_group_flags[index-1] = false;
+  }
+  for (size_t i = index; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers.get()) - 1; ++i) {
+    in_group_flags[i] = in_group_flags[i+1];
+  }
+  sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(ciphers.get(), index);
+}
+
+// ssl_cipher_apply_rule applies the rule type |rule| to ciphers matching its
+// parameters in the linked list from |*head_p| to |*tail_p|. It writes the new
+// head and tail of the list to |*head_p| and |*tail_p|, respectively.
+//
+// - If |cipher_id| is non-zero, only that cipher is selected.
+// - Otherwise, if |strength_bits| is non-negative, it selects ciphers
+//   of that strength.
+// - Otherwise, it selects ciphers that match each bitmasks in |alg_*| and
+//   |min_version|.
+static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(
+    uint32_t cipher_id, uint32_t alg_mkey, uint32_t alg_auth,
+    uint32_t alg_enc, uint32_t alg_mac, uint16_t min_version, int rule,
+    int strength_bits, bool in_group, CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+    CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) {
+  CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *next, *last;
+  const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
+  bool reverse = false;
+
+  if (cipher_id == 0 && strength_bits == -1 && min_version == 0 &&
+      (alg_mkey == 0 || alg_auth == 0 || alg_enc == 0 || alg_mac == 0)) {
+    // The rule matches nothing, so bail early.
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) {
+    // needed to maintain sorting between currently deleted ciphers
+    reverse = true;
+  }
+
+  head = *head_p;
+  tail = *tail_p;
+
+  if (reverse) {
+    next = tail;
+    last = head;
+  } else {
+    next = head;
+    last = tail;
+  }
+
+  curr = NULL;
+  for (;;) {
+    if (curr == last) {
+      break;
+    }
+
+    curr = next;
+    if (curr == NULL) {
+      break;
+    }
+
+    next = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next;
+    cp = curr->cipher;
+
+    // Selection criteria is either a specific cipher, the value of
+    // |strength_bits|, or the algorithms used.
+    if (cipher_id != 0) {
+      if (cipher_id != cp->id) {
+        continue;
+      }
+    } else if (strength_bits >= 0) {
+      if (strength_bits != SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(cp, NULL)) {
+        continue;
+      }
+    } else {
+      if (!(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey) ||
+          !(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth) ||
+          !(alg_enc & cp->algorithm_enc) ||
+          !(alg_mac & cp->algorithm_mac) ||
+          (min_version != 0 && SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(cp) != min_version) ||
+          // The NULL cipher must be selected explicitly.
+          cp->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) {
+        continue;
+      }
+    }
+
+    // add the cipher if it has not been added yet.
+    if (rule == CIPHER_ADD) {
+      // reverse == false
+      if (!curr->active) {
+        ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
+        curr->active = true;
+        curr->in_group = in_group;
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Move the added cipher to this location
+    else if (rule == CIPHER_ORD) {
+      // reverse == false
+      if (curr->active) {
+        ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
+        curr->in_group = false;
+      }
+    } else if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) {
+      // reverse == true
+      if (curr->active) {
+        // most recently deleted ciphersuites get best positions
+        // for any future CIPHER_ADD (note that the CIPHER_DEL loop
+        // works in reverse to maintain the order)
+        ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail);
+        curr->active = false;
+        curr->in_group = false;
+      }
+    } else if (rule == CIPHER_KILL) {
+      // reverse == false
+      if (head == curr) {
+        head = curr->next;
+      } else {
+        curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+      }
+
+      if (tail == curr) {
+        tail = curr->prev;
+      }
+      curr->active = false;
+      if (curr->next != NULL) {
+        curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
+      }
+      if (curr->prev != NULL) {
+        curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+      }
+      curr->next = NULL;
+      curr->prev = NULL;
+    }
+  }
+
+  *head_p = head;
+  *tail_p = tail;
+}
+
+static bool ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+                                     CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) {
+  // This routine sorts the ciphers with descending strength. The sorting must
+  // keep the pre-sorted sequence, so we apply the normal sorting routine as
+  // '+' movement to the end of the list.
+  int max_strength_bits = 0;
+  CIPHER_ORDER *curr = *head_p;
+  while (curr != NULL) {
+    if (curr->active &&
+        SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(curr->cipher, NULL) > max_strength_bits) {
+      max_strength_bits = SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(curr->cipher, NULL);
+    }
+    curr = curr->next;
+  }
+
+  Array<int> number_uses;
+  if (!number_uses.Init(max_strength_bits + 1)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_memset(number_uses.data(), 0, (max_strength_bits + 1) * sizeof(int));
+
+  // Now find the strength_bits values actually used.
+  curr = *head_p;
+  while (curr != NULL) {
+    if (curr->active) {
+      number_uses[SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(curr->cipher, NULL)]++;
+    }
+    curr = curr->next;
+  }
+
+  // Go through the list of used strength_bits values in descending order.
+  for (int i = max_strength_bits; i >= 0; i--) {
+    if (number_uses[i] > 0) {
+      ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i, false, head_p,
+                            tail_p);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
+                                       CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+                                       CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p, bool strict) {
+  uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac;
+  uint16_t min_version;
+  const char *l, *buf;
+  int rule;
+  bool multi, skip_rule, in_group = false, has_group = false;
+  size_t j, buf_len;
+  uint32_t cipher_id;
+  char ch;
+
+  l = rule_str;
+  for (;;) {
+    ch = *l;
+
+    if (ch == '\0') {
+      break;  // done
+    }
+
+    if (in_group) {
+      if (ch == ']') {
+        if (*tail_p) {
+          (*tail_p)->in_group = false;
+        }
+        in_group = false;
+        l++;
+        continue;
+      }
+
+      if (ch == '|') {
+        rule = CIPHER_ADD;
+        l++;
+        continue;
+      } else if (!(ch >= 'a' && ch <= 'z') && !(ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'Z') &&
+                 !(ch >= '0' && ch <= '9')) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_OPERATOR_IN_GROUP);
+        return false;
+      } else {
+        rule = CIPHER_ADD;
+      }
+    } else if (ch == '-') {
+      rule = CIPHER_DEL;
+      l++;
+    } else if (ch == '+') {
+      rule = CIPHER_ORD;
+      l++;
+    } else if (ch == '!') {
+      rule = CIPHER_KILL;
+      l++;
+    } else if (ch == '@') {
+      rule = CIPHER_SPECIAL;
+      l++;
+    } else if (ch == '[') {
+      assert(!in_group);
+      in_group = true;
+      has_group = true;
+      l++;
+      continue;
+    } else {
+      rule = CIPHER_ADD;
+    }
+
+    // If preference groups are enabled, the only legal operator is +.
+    // Otherwise the in_group bits will get mixed up.
+    if (has_group && rule != CIPHER_ADD) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MIXED_SPECIAL_OPERATOR_WITH_GROUPS);
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    if (is_cipher_list_separator(ch, strict)) {
+      l++;
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    multi = false;
+    cipher_id = 0;
+    alg_mkey = ~0u;
+    alg_auth = ~0u;
+    alg_enc = ~0u;
+    alg_mac = ~0u;
+    min_version = 0;
+    skip_rule = false;
+
+    for (;;) {
+      ch = *l;
+      buf = l;
+      buf_len = 0;
+      while ((ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'Z') || (ch >= '0' && ch <= '9') ||
+             (ch >= 'a' && ch <= 'z') || ch == '-' || ch == '.' || ch == '_') {
+        ch = *(++l);
+        buf_len++;
+      }
+
+      if (buf_len == 0) {
+        // We hit something we cannot deal with, it is no command or separator
+        // nor alphanumeric, so we call this an error.
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+        return false;
+      }
+
+      if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) {
+        break;
+      }
+
+      // Look for a matching exact cipher. These aren't allowed in multipart
+      // rules.
+      if (!multi && ch != '+') {
+        for (j = 0; j < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kCiphers); j++) {
+          const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = &kCiphers[j];
+          if (rule_equals(cipher->name, buf, buf_len) ||
+              rule_equals(cipher->standard_name, buf, buf_len)) {
+            cipher_id = cipher->id;
+            break;
+          }
+        }
+      }
+      if (cipher_id == 0) {
+        // If not an exact cipher, look for a matching cipher alias.
+        for (j = 0; j < kCipherAliasesLen; j++) {
+          if (rule_equals(kCipherAliases[j].name, buf, buf_len)) {
+            alg_mkey &= kCipherAliases[j].algorithm_mkey;
+            alg_auth &= kCipherAliases[j].algorithm_auth;
+            alg_enc &= kCipherAliases[j].algorithm_enc;
+            alg_mac &= kCipherAliases[j].algorithm_mac;
+
+            if (min_version != 0 &&
+                min_version != kCipherAliases[j].min_version) {
+              skip_rule = true;
+            } else {
+              min_version = kCipherAliases[j].min_version;
+            }
+            break;
+          }
+        }
+        if (j == kCipherAliasesLen) {
+          skip_rule = true;
+          if (strict) {
+            OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+            return false;
+          }
+        }
+      }
+
+      // Check for a multipart rule.
+      if (ch != '+') {
+        break;
+      }
+      l++;
+      multi = true;
+    }
+
+    // Ok, we have the rule, now apply it.
+    if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) {
+      if (buf_len != 8 || strncmp(buf, "STRENGTH", 8) != 0) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+        return false;
+      }
+      if (!ssl_cipher_strength_sort(head_p, tail_p)) {
+        return false;
+      }
+
+      // We do not support any "multi" options together with "@", so throw away
+      // the rest of the command, if any left, until end or ':' is found.
+      while (*l != '\0' && !is_cipher_list_separator(*l, strict)) {
+        l++;
+      }
+    } else if (!skip_rule) {
+      ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac,
+                            min_version, rule, -1, in_group, head_p, tail_p);
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (in_group) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl_create_cipher_list(UniquePtr<SSLCipherPreferenceList> *out_cipher_list,
+                            const char *rule_str, bool strict) {
+  // Return with error if nothing to do.
+  if (rule_str == NULL || out_cipher_list == NULL) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Now we have to collect the available ciphers from the compiled in ciphers.
+  // We cannot get more than the number compiled in, so it is used for
+  // allocation.
+  Array<CIPHER_ORDER> co_list;
+  CIPHER_ORDER *head = nullptr, *tail = nullptr;
+  if (!ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(&co_list, &head, &tail)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Now arrange all ciphers by preference:
+  // TODO(davidben): Compute this order once and copy it.
+
+  // Everything else being equal, prefer ECDHE_ECDSA and ECDHE_RSA over other
+  // key exchange mechanisms
+  ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
+                        false, &head, &tail);
+  ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, false,
+                        &head, &tail);
+  ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, false, &head,
+                        &tail);
+
+  // Order the bulk ciphers. First the preferred AEAD ciphers. We prefer
+  // CHACHA20 unless there is hardware support for fast and constant-time
+  // AES_GCM. Of the two CHACHA20 variants, the new one is preferred over the
+  // old one.
+  if (EVP_has_aes_hardware()) {
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128GCM, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
+                          false, &head, &tail);
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES256GCM, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
+                          false, &head, &tail);
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD,
+                          -1, false, &head, &tail);
+  } else {
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD,
+                          -1, false, &head, &tail);
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128GCM, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
+                          false, &head, &tail);
+    ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES256GCM, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
+                          false, &head, &tail);
+  }
+
+  // Then the legacy non-AEAD ciphers: AES_128_CBC, AES_256_CBC,
+  // 3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA.
+  ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, false,
+                        &head, &tail);
+  ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES256, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, false,
+                        &head, &tail);
+  ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_3DES, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, false,
+                        &head, &tail);
+
+  // Temporarily enable everything else for sorting
+  ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, false, &head,
+                        &tail);
+
+  // Move ciphers without forward secrecy to the end.
+  ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kPSK), ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ORD,
+                        -1, false, &head, &tail);
+
+  // Now disable everything (maintaining the ordering!)
+  ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, false, &head,
+                        &tail);
+
+  // If the rule_string begins with DEFAULT, apply the default rule before
+  // using the (possibly available) additional rules.
+  const char *rule_p = rule_str;
+  if (strncmp(rule_str, "DEFAULT", 7) == 0) {
+    if (!ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, &head, &tail,
+                                    strict)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    rule_p += 7;
+    if (*rule_p == ':') {
+      rule_p++;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (*rule_p != '\0' &&
+      !ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(rule_p, &head, &tail, strict)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Allocate new "cipherstack" for the result, return with error
+  // if we cannot get one.
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)> cipherstack(sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null());
+  Array<bool> in_group_flags;
+  if (cipherstack == nullptr ||
+      !in_group_flags.Init(OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kCiphers))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // The cipher selection for the list is done. The ciphers are added
+  // to the resulting precedence to the STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER).
+  size_t num_in_group_flags = 0;
+  for (CIPHER_ORDER *curr = head; curr != NULL; curr = curr->next) {
+    if (curr->active) {
+      if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack.get(), curr->cipher)) {
+        return false;
+      }
+      in_group_flags[num_in_group_flags++] = curr->in_group;
+    }
+  }
+
+  UniquePtr<SSLCipherPreferenceList> pref_list =
+      MakeUnique<SSLCipherPreferenceList>();
+  if (!pref_list ||
+      !pref_list->Init(
+          std::move(cipherstack),
+          MakeConstSpan(in_group_flags).subspan(0, num_in_group_flags))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  *out_cipher_list = std::move(pref_list);
+
+  // Configuring an empty cipher list is an error but still updates the
+  // output.
+  if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num((*out_cipher_list)->ciphers.get()) == 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+uint32_t ssl_cipher_auth_mask_for_key(const EVP_PKEY *key) {
+  switch (EVP_PKEY_id(key)) {
+    case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+      return SSL_aRSA;
+    case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+    case EVP_PKEY_ED25519:
+      // Ed25519 keys in TLS 1.2 repurpose the ECDSA ciphers.
+      return SSL_aECDSA;
+    default:
+      return 0;
+  }
+}
+
+bool ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return (cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT) != 0;
+}
+
+bool ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  // Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchanges require a ServerKeyExchange. It is
+  // optional or omitted in all others.
+  return (cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kECDHE) != 0;
+}
+
+size_t ssl_cipher_get_record_split_len(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  size_t block_size;
+  switch (cipher->algorithm_enc) {
+    case SSL_3DES:
+      block_size = 8;
+      break;
+    case SSL_AES128:
+    case SSL_AES256:
+      block_size = 16;
+      break;
+    default:
+      return 0;
+  }
+
+  // All supported TLS 1.0 ciphers use SHA-1.
+  assert(cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1);
+  size_t ret = 1 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+  ret += block_size - (ret % block_size);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+static constexpr int ssl_cipher_id_cmp_inner(const SSL_CIPHER *a,
+                                             const SSL_CIPHER *b) {
+  // C++11's constexpr functions must have a body consisting of just a
+  // return-statement.
+  return (a->id > b->id) ? 1 : ((a->id < b->id) ? -1 : 0);
+}
+
+static int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b) {
+  return ssl_cipher_id_cmp_inner(reinterpret_cast<const SSL_CIPHER *>(in_a),
+                                 reinterpret_cast<const SSL_CIPHER *>(in_b));
+}
+
+template <typename T, size_t N>
+static constexpr size_t countof(T const (&)[N]) {
+  return N;
+}
+
+template <typename T, size_t I>
+static constexpr int check_order(const T (&arr)[I], size_t N) {
+  // C++11's constexpr functions must have a body consisting of just a
+  // return-statement.
+  return N > 1 ? ((ssl_cipher_id_cmp_inner(&arr[N - 2], &arr[N - 1]) < 0)
+                      ? check_order(arr, N - 1)
+                      : 0)
+               : 1;
+}
+
+static_assert(check_order(kCiphers, countof(kCiphers)) == 1,
+              "Ciphers are not sorted, bsearch won't work");
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_cipher_by_value(uint16_t value) {
+  SSL_CIPHER c;
+
+  c.id = 0x03000000L | value;
+  return reinterpret_cast<const SSL_CIPHER *>(bsearch(
+      &c, kCiphers, OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kCiphers), sizeof(SSL_CIPHER),
+      ssl_cipher_id_cmp));
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) { return cipher->id; }
+
+uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  // All OpenSSL cipher IDs are prefaced with 0x03. Historically this referred
+  // to SSLv2 vs SSLv3.
+  assert((cipher->id & 0xff000000) == 0x03000000);
+  return static_cast<uint16_t>(cipher->id);
+}
+
+uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_value(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id(cipher);
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_is_aead(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return (cipher->algorithm_mac & SSL_AEAD) != 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  switch (cipher->algorithm_enc) {
+    case SSL_eNULL:
+      return NID_undef;
+    case SSL_3DES:
+      return NID_des_ede3_cbc;
+    case SSL_AES128:
+      return NID_aes_128_cbc;
+    case SSL_AES256:
+      return NID_aes_256_cbc;
+    case SSL_AES128GCM:
+      return NID_aes_128_gcm;
+    case SSL_AES256GCM:
+      return NID_aes_256_gcm;
+    case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
+      return NID_chacha20_poly1305;
+  }
+  assert(0);
+  return NID_undef;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  switch (cipher->algorithm_mac) {
+    case SSL_AEAD:
+      return NID_undef;
+    case SSL_SHA1:
+      return NID_sha1;
+  }
+  assert(0);
+  return NID_undef;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  switch (cipher->algorithm_mkey) {
+    case SSL_kRSA:
+      return NID_kx_rsa;
+    case SSL_kECDHE:
+      return NID_kx_ecdhe;
+    case SSL_kPSK:
+      return NID_kx_psk;
+    case SSL_kGENERIC:
+      return NID_kx_any;
+  }
+  assert(0);
+  return NID_undef;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  switch (cipher->algorithm_auth) {
+    case SSL_aRSA:
+      return NID_auth_rsa;
+    case SSL_aECDSA:
+      return NID_auth_ecdsa;
+    case SSL_aPSK:
+      return NID_auth_psk;
+    case SSL_aGENERIC:
+      return NID_auth_any;
+  }
+  assert(0);
+  return NID_undef;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_prf_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  switch (cipher->algorithm_prf) {
+    case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT:
+      return NID_md5_sha1;
+    case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256:
+      return NID_sha256;
+    case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384:
+      return NID_sha384;
+  }
+  assert(0);
+  return NID_undef;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_is_block_cipher(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return (cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) == 0 &&
+      cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD;
+}
+
+uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  if (cipher->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kGENERIC ||
+      cipher->algorithm_auth == SSL_aGENERIC) {
+    return TLS1_3_VERSION;
+  }
+
+  if (cipher->algorithm_prf != SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT) {
+    // Cipher suites before TLS 1.2 use the default PRF, while all those added
+    // afterwards specify a particular hash.
+    return TLS1_2_VERSION;
+  }
+  return SSL3_VERSION;
+}
+
+uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  if (cipher->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kGENERIC ||
+      cipher->algorithm_auth == SSL_aGENERIC) {
+    return TLS1_3_VERSION;
+  }
+  return TLS1_2_VERSION;
+}
+
+// return the actual cipher being used
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  if (cipher != NULL) {
+    return cipher->name;
+  }
+
+  return "(NONE)";
+}
+
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return cipher->standard_name;
+}
+
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  if (cipher == NULL) {
+    return "";
+  }
+
+  switch (cipher->algorithm_mkey) {
+    case SSL_kRSA:
+      return "RSA";
+
+    case SSL_kECDHE:
+      switch (cipher->algorithm_auth) {
+        case SSL_aECDSA:
+          return "ECDHE_ECDSA";
+        case SSL_aRSA:
+          return "ECDHE_RSA";
+        case SSL_aPSK:
+          return "ECDHE_PSK";
+        default:
+          assert(0);
+          return "UNKNOWN";
+      }
+
+    case SSL_kPSK:
+      assert(cipher->algorithm_auth == SSL_aPSK);
+      return "PSK";
+
+    case SSL_kGENERIC:
+      assert(cipher->algorithm_auth == SSL_aGENERIC);
+      return "GENERIC";
+
+    default:
+      assert(0);
+      return "UNKNOWN";
+  }
+}
+
+char *SSL_CIPHER_get_rfc_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  if (cipher == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  return OPENSSL_strdup(SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(cipher));
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, int *out_alg_bits) {
+  if (cipher == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int alg_bits, strength_bits;
+  switch (cipher->algorithm_enc) {
+    case SSL_AES128:
+    case SSL_AES128GCM:
+      alg_bits = 128;
+      strength_bits = 128;
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_AES256:
+    case SSL_AES256GCM:
+    case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
+      alg_bits = 256;
+      strength_bits = 256;
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_3DES:
+      alg_bits = 168;
+      strength_bits = 112;
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_eNULL:
+      alg_bits = 0;
+      strength_bits = 0;
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      assert(0);
+      alg_bits = 0;
+      strength_bits = 0;
+  }
+
+  if (out_alg_bits != NULL) {
+    *out_alg_bits = alg_bits;
+  }
+  return strength_bits;
+}
+
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf,
+                                   int len) {
+  const char *kx, *au, *enc, *mac;
+  uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac;
+
+  alg_mkey = cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+  alg_auth = cipher->algorithm_auth;
+  alg_enc = cipher->algorithm_enc;
+  alg_mac = cipher->algorithm_mac;
+
+  switch (alg_mkey) {
+    case SSL_kRSA:
+      kx = "RSA";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_kECDHE:
+      kx = "ECDH";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_kPSK:
+      kx = "PSK";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_kGENERIC:
+      kx = "GENERIC";
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      kx = "unknown";
+  }
+
+  switch (alg_auth) {
+    case SSL_aRSA:
+      au = "RSA";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_aECDSA:
+      au = "ECDSA";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_aPSK:
+      au = "PSK";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_aGENERIC:
+      au = "GENERIC";
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      au = "unknown";
+      break;
+  }
+
+  switch (alg_enc) {
+    case SSL_3DES:
+      enc = "3DES(168)";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_AES128:
+      enc = "AES(128)";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_AES256:
+      enc = "AES(256)";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_AES128GCM:
+      enc = "AESGCM(128)";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_AES256GCM:
+      enc = "AESGCM(256)";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
+      enc = "ChaCha20-Poly1305";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_eNULL:
+      enc="None";
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      enc = "unknown";
+      break;
+  }
+
+  switch (alg_mac) {
+    case SSL_SHA1:
+      mac = "SHA1";
+      break;
+
+    case SSL_AEAD:
+      mac = "AEAD";
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      mac = "unknown";
+      break;
+  }
+
+  if (buf == NULL) {
+    len = 128;
+    buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+    if (buf == NULL) {
+      return NULL;
+    }
+  } else if (len < 128) {
+    return "Buffer too small";
+  }
+
+  BIO_snprintf(buf, len, "%-23s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s\n",
+               cipher->name, kx, au, enc, mac);
+  return buf;
+}
+
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return "TLSv1/SSLv3";
+}
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void) { return NULL; }
+
+int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm) { return 1; }
+
+const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp) { return NULL; }
+
+const char *SSL_COMP_get0_name(const SSL_COMP *comp) { return comp->name; }
+
+int SSL_COMP_get_id(const SSL_COMP *comp) { return comp->id; }
+
+void SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods(void) {}