grpc 1.45.0-x86_64-linux → 1.46.2-x86_64-linux

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/handshake_client.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,1986 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <utility>
+
+#include <openssl/aead.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hpke.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+enum ssl_client_hs_state_t {
+  state_start_connect = 0,
+  state_enter_early_data,
+  state_early_reverify_server_certificate,
+  state_read_hello_verify_request,
+  state_read_server_hello,
+  state_tls13,
+  state_read_server_certificate,
+  state_read_certificate_status,
+  state_verify_server_certificate,
+  state_reverify_server_certificate,
+  state_read_server_key_exchange,
+  state_read_certificate_request,
+  state_read_server_hello_done,
+  state_send_client_certificate,
+  state_send_client_key_exchange,
+  state_send_client_certificate_verify,
+  state_send_client_finished,
+  state_finish_flight,
+  state_read_session_ticket,
+  state_process_change_cipher_spec,
+  state_read_server_finished,
+  state_finish_client_handshake,
+  state_done,
+};
+
+// ssl_get_client_disabled sets |*out_mask_a| and |*out_mask_k| to masks of
+// disabled algorithms.
+static void ssl_get_client_disabled(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                    uint32_t *out_mask_a,
+                                    uint32_t *out_mask_k) {
+  *out_mask_a = 0;
+  *out_mask_k = 0;
+
+  // PSK requires a client callback.
+  if (hs->config->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
+    *out_mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+    *out_mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+  }
+}
+
+static bool ssl_write_client_cipher_list(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out,
+                                         ssl_client_hello_type_t type) {
+  const SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  uint32_t mask_a, mask_k;
+  ssl_get_client_disabled(hs, &mask_a, &mask_k);
+
+  CBB child;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &child)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Add a fake cipher suite. See RFC 8701.
+  if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled &&
+      !CBB_add_u16(&child, ssl_get_grease_value(hs, ssl_grease_cipher))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Add TLS 1.3 ciphers. Order ChaCha20-Poly1305 relative to AES-GCM based on
+  // hardware support.
+  if (hs->max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    if (!EVP_has_aes_hardware() &&
+        !CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 & 0xffff)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 & 0xffff) ||
+        !CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 & 0xffff)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    if (EVP_has_aes_hardware() &&
+        !CBB_add_u16(&child, TLS1_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 & 0xffff)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (hs->min_version < TLS1_3_VERSION && type != ssl_client_hello_inner) {
+    bool any_enabled = false;
+    for (const SSL_CIPHER *cipher : SSL_get_ciphers(ssl)) {
+      // Skip disabled ciphers
+      if ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & mask_k) ||
+          (cipher->algorithm_auth & mask_a)) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      if (SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(cipher) > hs->max_version ||
+          SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(cipher) < hs->min_version) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      any_enabled = true;
+      if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id(cipher))) {
+        return false;
+      }
+    }
+
+    // If all ciphers were disabled, return the error to the caller.
+    if (!any_enabled && hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
+    if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return CBB_flush(out);
+}
+
+bool ssl_write_client_hello_without_extensions(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                               CBB *cbb,
+                                               ssl_client_hello_type_t type,
+                                               bool empty_session_id) {
+  const SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  CBB child;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, hs->client_version) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(cbb,
+                     type == ssl_client_hello_inner ? hs->inner_client_random
+                                                    : ssl->s3->client_random,
+                     SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &child)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Do not send a session ID on renegotiation.
+  if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete &&
+      !empty_session_id &&
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&child, hs->session_id, hs->session_id_len)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+    if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &child) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->d1->cookie, ssl->d1->cookie_len)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_write_client_cipher_list(hs, cbb, type) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(cbb, 1 /* one compression method */) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(cbb, 0 /* null compression */)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl_add_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  ScopedCBB cbb;
+  CBB body;
+  ssl_client_hello_type_t type = hs->selected_ech_config
+                                     ? ssl_client_hello_outer
+                                     : ssl_client_hello_unencrypted;
+  bool needs_psk_binder;
+  Array<uint8_t> msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
+      !ssl_write_client_hello_without_extensions(hs, &body, type,
+                                                 /*empty_session_id*/ false) ||
+      !ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(hs, &body, /*out_encoded=*/nullptr,
+                                  &needs_psk_binder, type, CBB_len(&body)) ||
+      !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &msg)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Now that the length prefixes have been computed, fill in the placeholder
+  // PSK binder.
+  if (needs_psk_binder) {
+    // ClientHelloOuter cannot have a PSK binder. Otherwise the
+    // ClientHellOuterAAD computation would break.
+    assert(type != ssl_client_hello_outer);
+    if (!tls13_write_psk_binder(hs, hs->transcript, MakeSpan(msg),
+                                /*out_binder_len=*/0)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return ssl->method->add_message(ssl, std::move(msg));
+}
+
+static bool parse_server_version(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t *out_version,
+                                 uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                 const ParsedServerHello &server_hello) {
+  // If the outer version is not TLS 1.2, use it.
+  // TODO(davidben): This function doesn't quite match the RFC8446 formulation.
+  if (server_hello.legacy_version != TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+    *out_version = server_hello.legacy_version;
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  SSLExtension supported_versions(TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions);
+  CBS extensions = server_hello.extensions;
+  if (!ssl_parse_extensions(&extensions, out_alert, {&supported_versions},
+                            /*ignore_unknown=*/true)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (!supported_versions.present) {
+    *out_version = server_hello.legacy_version;
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBS_get_u16(&supported_versions.data, out_version) ||
+       CBS_len(&supported_versions.data) != 0) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+// should_offer_early_data returns |ssl_early_data_accepted| if |hs| should
+// offer early data, and some other reason code otherwise.
+static ssl_early_data_reason_t should_offer_early_data(
+    const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  const SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  assert(!ssl->server);
+  if (!ssl->enable_early_data) {
+    return ssl_early_data_disabled;
+  }
+
+  if (hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    // We discard inapplicable sessions, so this is redundant with the session
+    // checks below, but reporting that TLS 1.3 was disabled is more useful.
+    return ssl_early_data_protocol_version;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->session == nullptr) {
+    return ssl_early_data_no_session_offered;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl_session_protocol_version(ssl->session.get()) < TLS1_3_VERSION ||
+      ssl->session->ticket_max_early_data == 0) {
+    return ssl_early_data_unsupported_for_session;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl->session->early_alpn.empty()) {
+    if (!ssl_is_alpn_protocol_allowed(hs, ssl->session->early_alpn)) {
+      // Avoid reporting a confusing value in |SSL_get0_alpn_selected|.
+      return ssl_early_data_alpn_mismatch;
+    }
+
+    // If the previous connection negotiated ALPS, only offer 0-RTT when the
+    // local are settings are consistent with what we'd offer for this
+    // connection.
+    if (ssl->session->has_application_settings) {
+      Span<const uint8_t> settings;
+      if (!ssl_get_local_application_settings(hs, &settings,
+                                              ssl->session->early_alpn) ||
+          settings != ssl->session->local_application_settings) {
+        return ssl_early_data_alps_mismatch;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Early data has not yet been accepted, but we use it as a success code.
+  return ssl_early_data_accepted;
+}
+
+void ssl_done_writing_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  hs->ech_client_outer.Reset();
+  hs->cookie.Reset();
+  hs->key_share_bytes.Reset();
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_start_connect(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+  ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
+  // |session_reused| must be reset in case this is a renegotiation.
+  ssl->s3->session_reused = false;
+
+  // Freeze the version range.
+  if (!ssl_get_version_range(hs, &hs->min_version, &hs->max_version)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t ech_enc[EVP_HPKE_MAX_ENC_LENGTH];
+  size_t ech_enc_len;
+  if (!ssl_select_ech_config(hs, ech_enc, &ech_enc_len)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // Always advertise the ClientHello version from the original maximum version,
+  // even on renegotiation. The static RSA key exchange uses this field, and
+  // some servers fail when it changes across handshakes.
+  if (SSL_is_dtls(hs->ssl)) {
+    hs->client_version =
+        hs->max_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? DTLS1_2_VERSION : DTLS1_VERSION;
+  } else {
+    hs->client_version =
+        hs->max_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? TLS1_2_VERSION : hs->max_version;
+  }
+
+  // If the configured session has expired or is not usable, drop it. We also do
+  // not offer sessions on renegotiation.
+  if (ssl->session != nullptr) {
+    if (ssl->session->is_server ||
+        !ssl_supports_version(hs, ssl->session->ssl_version) ||
+        // Do not offer TLS 1.2 sessions with ECH. ClientHelloInner does not
+        // offer TLS 1.2, and the cleartext session ID may leak the server
+        // identity.
+        (hs->selected_ech_config &&
+         ssl_session_protocol_version(ssl->session.get()) < TLS1_3_VERSION) ||
+        !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(ssl->session.get()) ||
+        !ssl_session_is_time_valid(ssl, ssl->session.get()) ||
+        (ssl->quic_method != nullptr) != ssl->session->is_quic ||
+        ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
+      ssl_set_session(ssl, nullptr);
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!RAND_bytes(ssl->s3->client_random, sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random))) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+  if (hs->selected_ech_config &&
+      !RAND_bytes(hs->inner_client_random, sizeof(hs->inner_client_random))) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // Never send a session ID in QUIC. QUIC uses TLS 1.3 at a minimum and
+  // disables TLS 1.3 middlebox compatibility mode.
+  if (ssl->quic_method == nullptr) {
+    const bool has_id_session = ssl->session != nullptr &&
+                                ssl->session->session_id_length > 0 &&
+                                ssl->session->ticket.empty();
+    const bool has_ticket_session =
+        ssl->session != nullptr && !ssl->session->ticket.empty();
+    if (has_id_session) {
+      hs->session_id_len = ssl->session->session_id_length;
+      OPENSSL_memcpy(hs->session_id, ssl->session->session_id,
+                     hs->session_id_len);
+    } else if (has_ticket_session || hs->max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+      // Send a random session ID. TLS 1.3 always sends one, and TLS 1.2 session
+      // tickets require a placeholder value to signal resumption.
+      hs->session_id_len = sizeof(hs->session_id);
+      if (!RAND_bytes(hs->session_id, hs->session_id_len)) {
+        return ssl_hs_error;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  ssl_early_data_reason_t reason = should_offer_early_data(hs);
+  if (reason != ssl_early_data_accepted) {
+    ssl->s3->early_data_reason = reason;
+  } else {
+    hs->early_data_offered = true;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_setup_key_shares(hs, /*override_group_id=*/0) ||
+      !ssl_setup_extension_permutation(hs) ||
+      !ssl_encrypt_client_hello(hs, MakeConstSpan(ech_enc, ech_enc_len)) ||
+      !ssl_add_client_hello(hs)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  hs->state = state_enter_early_data;
+  return ssl_hs_flush;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_enter_early_data(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+  if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+    hs->state = state_read_hello_verify_request;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  if (!hs->early_data_offered) {
+    hs->state = state_read_server_hello;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->SetVersionIfNullCipher(ssl->session->ssl_version);
+  if (!ssl->method->add_change_cipher_spec(ssl)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (!tls13_init_early_key_schedule(hs, ssl->session.get()) ||
+      !tls13_derive_early_secret(hs)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // Stash the early data session, so connection properties may be queried out
+  // of it.
+  hs->early_session = UpRef(ssl->session);
+  hs->state = state_early_reverify_server_certificate;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_early_reverify_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  if (hs->ssl->ctx->reverify_on_resume) {
+    // Don't send an alert on error. The alert be in early data, which the
+    // server may not accept anyway. It would also be a mismatch between QUIC
+    // and TCP because the QUIC early keys are deferred below.
+    //
+    // TODO(davidben): The client behavior should be to verify the certificate
+    // before deciding whether to offer the session and, if invalid, decline to
+    // send the session.
+    switch (ssl_reverify_peer_cert(hs, /*send_alert=*/false)) {
+      case ssl_verify_ok:
+        break;
+      case ssl_verify_invalid:
+        return ssl_hs_error;
+      case ssl_verify_retry:
+        hs->state = state_early_reverify_server_certificate;
+        return ssl_hs_certificate_verify;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Defer releasing the 0-RTT key to after certificate reverification, so the
+  // QUIC implementation does not accidentally write data too early.
+  if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(hs->ssl, ssl_encryption_early_data, evp_aead_seal,
+                             hs->early_session.get(),
+                             hs->early_traffic_secret())) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  hs->in_early_data = true;
+  hs->can_early_write = true;
+  hs->state = state_read_server_hello;
+  return ssl_hs_early_return;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_hello_verify_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+  assert(SSL_is_dtls(ssl));
+
+  // When implementing DTLS 1.3, we need to handle the interactions between
+  // HelloVerifyRequest, DTLS 1.3's HelloVerifyRequest removal, and ECH.
+  assert(hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION);
+
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_read_message;
+  }
+
+  if (msg.type != DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
+    hs->state = state_read_server_hello;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  CBS hello_verify_request = msg.body, cookie;
+  uint16_t server_version;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16(&hello_verify_request, &server_version) ||
+      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&hello_verify_request, &cookie) ||
+      CBS_len(&cookie) > sizeof(ssl->d1->cookie) ||
+      CBS_len(&hello_verify_request) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->d1->cookie, CBS_data(&cookie), CBS_len(&cookie));
+  ssl->d1->cookie_len = CBS_len(&cookie);
+
+  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+
+  // DTLS resets the handshake buffer after HelloVerifyRequest.
+  if (!hs->transcript.Init()) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_add_client_hello(hs)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  hs->state = state_read_server_hello;
+  return ssl_hs_flush;
+}
+
+bool ssl_parse_server_hello(ParsedServerHello *out, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                            const SSLMessage &msg) {
+  if (msg.type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    return false;
+  }
+  out->raw = msg.raw;
+  CBS body = msg.body;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16(&body, &out->legacy_version) ||
+      !CBS_get_bytes(&body, &out->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &out->session_id) ||
+      CBS_len(&out->session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(&body, &out->cipher_suite) ||
+      !CBS_get_u8(&body, &out->compression_method)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return false;
+  }
+  // In TLS 1.2 and below, empty extensions blocks may be omitted. In TLS 1.3,
+  // ServerHellos always have extensions, so this can be applied generically.
+  CBS_init(&out->extensions, nullptr, 0);
+  if ((CBS_len(&body) != 0 &&
+       !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &out->extensions)) ||
+      CBS_len(&body) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_read_server_hello;
+  }
+
+  ParsedServerHello server_hello;
+  uint16_t server_version;
+  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+  if (!ssl_parse_server_hello(&server_hello, &alert, msg) ||
+      !parse_server_version(hs, &server_version, &alert, server_hello)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_supports_version(hs, server_version)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  assert(ssl->s3->have_version == ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
+  if (!ssl->s3->have_version) {
+    ssl->version = server_version;
+    // At this point, the connection's version is known and ssl->version is
+    // fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version.
+    ssl->s3->have_version = true;
+    ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->SetVersionIfNullCipher(ssl->version);
+  } else if (server_version != ssl->version) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    hs->state = state_tls13;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  // Clear some TLS 1.3 state that no longer needs to be retained.
+  hs->key_shares[0].reset();
+  hs->key_shares[1].reset();
+  ssl_done_writing_client_hello(hs);
+
+  // A TLS 1.2 server would not know to skip the early data we offered. Report
+  // an error code sooner. The caller may use this error code to implement the
+  // fallback described in RFC 8446 appendix D.3.
+  if (hs->early_data_offered) {
+    // Disconnect early writes. This ensures subsequent |SSL_write| calls query
+    // the handshake which, in turn, will replay the error code rather than fail
+    // at the |write_shutdown| check. See https://crbug.com/1078515.
+    // TODO(davidben): Should all handshake errors do this? What about record
+    // decryption failures?
+    hs->can_early_write = false;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_ON_EARLY_DATA);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // TLS 1.2 handshakes cannot accept ECH.
+  if (hs->selected_ech_config) {
+    ssl->s3->ech_status = ssl_ech_rejected;
+  }
+
+  // Copy over the server random.
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->server_random, CBS_data(&server_hello.random),
+                 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+
+  // Enforce the TLS 1.3 anti-downgrade feature.
+  if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete &&
+      ssl_supports_version(hs, TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
+    static_assert(
+        sizeof(kTLS12DowngradeRandom) == sizeof(kTLS13DowngradeRandom),
+        "downgrade signals have different size");
+    static_assert(
+        sizeof(kJDK11DowngradeRandom) == sizeof(kTLS13DowngradeRandom),
+        "downgrade signals have different size");
+    auto suffix =
+        MakeConstSpan(ssl->s3->server_random, sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random))
+            .subspan(SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - sizeof(kTLS13DowngradeRandom));
+    if (suffix == kTLS12DowngradeRandom || suffix == kTLS13DowngradeRandom ||
+        suffix == kJDK11DowngradeRandom) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TLS13_DOWNGRADE);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // The cipher must be allowed in the selected version and enabled.
+  const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(server_hello.cipher_suite);
+  uint32_t mask_a, mask_k;
+  ssl_get_client_disabled(hs, &mask_a, &mask_k);
+  if (cipher == nullptr ||
+      (cipher->algorithm_mkey & mask_k) ||
+      (cipher->algorithm_auth & mask_a) ||
+      SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(cipher) > ssl_protocol_version(ssl) ||
+      SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(cipher) < ssl_protocol_version(ssl) ||
+      !sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(ssl), nullptr, cipher)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  hs->new_cipher = cipher;
+
+  if (hs->session_id_len != 0 &&
+      CBS_mem_equal(&server_hello.session_id, hs->session_id,
+                    hs->session_id_len)) {
+    // Echoing the ClientHello session ID in TLS 1.2, whether from the session
+    // or a synthetic one, indicates resumption. If there was no session (or if
+    // the session was only offered in ECH ClientHelloInner), this was the
+    // TLS 1.3 compatibility mode session ID. As we know this is not a session
+    // the server knows about, any server resuming it is in error. Reject the
+    // first connection deterministicly, rather than installing an invalid
+    // session into the session cache. https://crbug.com/796910
+    if (ssl->session == nullptr || ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_rejected) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_ECHOED_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+    if (ssl->session->ssl_version != ssl->version) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_VERSION_NOT_RETURNED);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+    if (ssl->session->cipher != hs->new_cipher) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+    if (!ssl_session_is_context_valid(hs, ssl->session.get())) {
+      // This is actually a client application bug.
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL,
+                        SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+    // We never offer sessions on renegotiation.
+    assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
+    ssl->s3->session_reused = true;
+  } else {
+    // The session wasn't resumed. Create a fresh SSL_SESSION to fill out.
+    ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
+    if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs)) {
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+    // Note: session_id could be empty.
+    hs->new_session->session_id_length = CBS_len(&server_hello.session_id);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(hs->new_session->session_id,
+                   CBS_data(&server_hello.session_id),
+                   CBS_len(&server_hello.session_id));
+    hs->new_session->cipher = hs->new_cipher;
+  }
+
+  // Now that the cipher is known, initialize the handshake hash and hash the
+  // ServerHello.
+  if (!hs->transcript.InitHash(ssl_protocol_version(ssl), hs->new_cipher) ||
+      !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // If doing a full handshake, the server may request a client certificate
+  // which requires hashing the handshake transcript. Otherwise, the handshake
+  // buffer may be released.
+  if (ssl->session != NULL ||
+      !ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
+    hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
+  }
+
+  // Only the NULL compression algorithm is supported.
+  if (server_hello.compression_method != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(hs, &server_hello.extensions)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->session != NULL &&
+      hs->extended_master_secret != ssl->session->extended_master_secret) {
+    if (ssl->session->extended_master_secret) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION);
+    } else {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_NON_EMS_SESSION_WITH_EMS_EXTENSION);
+    }
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+
+  if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+    if (ssl->ctx->reverify_on_resume &&
+        ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
+      hs->state = state_reverify_server_certificate;
+    } else {
+      hs->state = state_read_session_ticket;
+    }
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  hs->state = state_read_server_certificate;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_tls13(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  enum ssl_hs_wait_t wait = tls13_client_handshake(hs);
+  if (wait == ssl_hs_ok) {
+    hs->state = state_finish_client_handshake;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  return wait;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+  if (!ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
+    hs->state = state_read_certificate_status;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_read_message;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) ||
+      !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  CBS body = msg.body;
+  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+  if (!ssl_parse_cert_chain(&alert, &hs->new_session->certs, &hs->peer_pubkey,
+                            NULL, &body, ssl->ctx->pool)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs.get()) == 0 ||
+      CBS_len(&body) != 0 ||
+      !ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_cache_objects(hs->new_session.get())) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_check_leaf_certificate(
+          hs, hs->peer_pubkey.get(),
+          sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(hs->new_session->certs.get(), 0))) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+
+  hs->state = state_read_certificate_status;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_certificate_status(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+  if (!hs->certificate_status_expected) {
+    hs->state = state_verify_server_certificate;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_read_message;
+  }
+
+  if (msg.type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
+    // A server may send status_request in ServerHello and then change its mind
+    // about sending CertificateStatus.
+    hs->state = state_verify_server_certificate;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  CBS certificate_status = msg.body, ocsp_response;
+  uint8_t status_type;
+  if (!CBS_get_u8(&certificate_status, &status_type) ||
+      status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp ||
+      !CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_status, &ocsp_response) ||
+      CBS_len(&ocsp_response) == 0 ||
+      CBS_len(&certificate_status) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  hs->new_session->ocsp_response.reset(
+      CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&ocsp_response, ssl->ctx->pool));
+  if (hs->new_session->ocsp_response == nullptr) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+
+  hs->state = state_verify_server_certificate;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_verify_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  if (!ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
+    hs->state = state_read_server_key_exchange;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  switch (ssl_verify_peer_cert(hs)) {
+    case ssl_verify_ok:
+      break;
+    case ssl_verify_invalid:
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    case ssl_verify_retry:
+      hs->state = state_verify_server_certificate;
+      return ssl_hs_certificate_verify;
+  }
+
+  hs->state = state_read_server_key_exchange;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_reverify_server_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  assert(hs->ssl->ctx->reverify_on_resume);
+
+  switch (ssl_reverify_peer_cert(hs, /*send_alert=*/true)) {
+    case ssl_verify_ok:
+      break;
+    case ssl_verify_invalid:
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    case ssl_verify_retry:
+      hs->state = state_reverify_server_certificate;
+      return ssl_hs_certificate_verify;
+  }
+
+  hs->state = state_read_session_ticket;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_read_message;
+  }
+
+  if (msg.type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+    // Some ciphers (pure PSK) have an optional ServerKeyExchange message.
+    if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(hs->new_cipher)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    hs->state = state_read_certificate_request;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  uint32_t alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+  uint32_t alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+  CBS server_key_exchange = msg.body;
+  if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
+    CBS psk_identity_hint;
+
+    // Each of the PSK key exchanges begins with a psk_identity_hint.
+    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange,
+                                     &psk_identity_hint)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    // Store the PSK identity hint for the ClientKeyExchange. Assume that the
+    // maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum
+    // length of a PSK identity. Also do not allow NULL characters; identities
+    // are saved as C strings.
+    //
+    // TODO(davidben): Should invalid hints be ignored? It's a hint rather than
+    // a specific identity.
+    if (CBS_len(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN ||
+        CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity_hint)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    // Save non-empty identity hints as a C string. Empty identity hints we
+    // treat as missing. Plain PSK makes it possible to send either no hint
+    // (omit ServerKeyExchange) or an empty hint, while ECDHE_PSK can only spell
+    // empty hint. Having different capabilities is odd, so we interpret empty
+    // and missing as identical.
+    char *raw = nullptr;
+    if (CBS_len(&psk_identity_hint) != 0 &&
+        !CBS_strdup(&psk_identity_hint, &raw)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+    hs->peer_psk_identity_hint.reset(raw);
+  }
+
+  if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
+    // Parse the server parameters.
+    uint8_t group_type;
+    uint16_t group_id;
+    CBS point;
+    if (!CBS_get_u8(&server_key_exchange, &group_type) ||
+        group_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE ||
+        !CBS_get_u16(&server_key_exchange, &group_id) ||
+        !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &point)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+    hs->new_session->group_id = group_id;
+
+    // Ensure the group is consistent with preferences.
+    if (!tls1_check_group_id(hs, group_id)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    // Initialize ECDH and save the peer public key for later.
+    hs->key_shares[0] = SSLKeyShare::Create(group_id);
+    if (!hs->key_shares[0] ||
+        !hs->peer_key.CopyFrom(point)) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // At this point, |server_key_exchange| contains the signature, if any, while
+  // |msg.body| contains the entire message. From that, derive a CBS containing
+  // just the parameter.
+  CBS parameter;
+  CBS_init(&parameter, CBS_data(&msg.body),
+           CBS_len(&msg.body) - CBS_len(&server_key_exchange));
+
+  // ServerKeyExchange should be signed by the server's public key.
+  if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
+    uint16_t signature_algorithm = 0;
+    if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+      if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_key_exchange, &signature_algorithm)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+        ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return ssl_hs_error;
+      }
+      uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(hs, &alert, signature_algorithm)) {
+        ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+        return ssl_hs_error;
+      }
+      hs->new_session->peer_signature_algorithm = signature_algorithm;
+    } else if (!tls1_get_legacy_signature_algorithm(&signature_algorithm,
+                                                    hs->peer_pubkey.get())) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    // The last field in |server_key_exchange| is the signature.
+    CBS signature;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &signature) ||
+        CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) != 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    ScopedCBB transcript;
+    Array<uint8_t> transcript_data;
+    if (!CBB_init(transcript.get(),
+                  2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + CBS_len(&parameter)) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(transcript.get(), ssl->s3->client_random,
+                       SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(transcript.get(), ssl->s3->server_random,
+                       SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(transcript.get(), CBS_data(&parameter),
+                       CBS_len(&parameter)) ||
+        !CBBFinishArray(transcript.get(), &transcript_data)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    if (!ssl_public_key_verify(ssl, signature, signature_algorithm,
+                               hs->peer_pubkey.get(), transcript_data)) {
+      // bad signature
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  } else {
+    // PSK ciphers are the only supported certificate-less ciphers.
+    assert(alg_a == SSL_aPSK);
+
+    if (CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) > 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+  hs->state = state_read_certificate_request;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_certificate_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+  if (!ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
+    hs->state = state_read_server_hello_done;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_read_message;
+  }
+
+  if (msg.type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) {
+    // If we get here we don't need the handshake buffer as we won't be doing
+    // client auth.
+    hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
+    hs->state = state_read_server_hello_done;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) ||
+      !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // Get the certificate types.
+  CBS body = msg.body, certificate_types;
+  if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &certificate_types)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (!hs->certificate_types.CopyFrom(certificate_types)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+    CBS supported_signature_algorithms;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &supported_signature_algorithms) ||
+        !tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(hs, &supported_signature_algorithms)) {
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> ca_names =
+      ssl_parse_client_CA_list(ssl, &alert, &body);
+  if (!ca_names) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (CBS_len(&body) != 0) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  hs->cert_request = true;
+  hs->ca_names = std::move(ca_names);
+  ssl->ctx->x509_method->hs_flush_cached_ca_names(hs);
+
+  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+  hs->state = state_read_server_hello_done;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello_done(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_read_message;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) ||
+      !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // ServerHelloDone is empty.
+  if (CBS_len(&msg.body) != 0) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // ServerHelloDone should be the end of the flight.
+  if (ssl->method->has_unprocessed_handshake_data(ssl)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESS_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+  hs->state = state_send_client_certificate;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+  // The peer didn't request a certificate.
+  if (!hs->cert_request) {
+    hs->state = state_send_client_key_exchange;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_rejected) {
+    // Do not send client certificates on ECH reject. We have not authenticated
+    // the server for the name that can learn the certificate.
+    SSL_certs_clear(ssl);
+  } else if (hs->config->cert->cert_cb != nullptr) {
+    // Call cert_cb to update the certificate.
+    int rv = hs->config->cert->cert_cb(ssl, hs->config->cert->cert_cb_arg);
+    if (rv == 0) {
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+    if (rv < 0) {
+      hs->state = state_send_client_certificate;
+      return ssl_hs_x509_lookup;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_has_certificate(hs)) {
+    // Without a client certificate, the handshake buffer may be released.
+    hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_on_certificate_selected(hs) ||
+      !ssl_output_cert_chain(hs)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+
+  hs->state = state_send_client_key_exchange;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static_assert(sizeof(size_t) >= sizeof(unsigned),
+              "size_t is smaller than unsigned");
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  ScopedCBB cbb;
+  CBB body;
+  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
+                                 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  Array<uint8_t> pms;
+  uint32_t alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+  uint32_t alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+  if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
+    const CRYPTO_BUFFER *leaf =
+        sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(hs->new_session->certs.get(), 0);
+    CBS leaf_cbs;
+    CRYPTO_BUFFER_init_CBS(leaf, &leaf_cbs);
+
+    // Check the key usage matches the cipher suite. We do this unconditionally
+    // for non-RSA certificates. In particular, it's needed to distinguish ECDH
+    // certificates, which we do not support, from ECDSA certificates.
+    // Historically, we have not checked RSA key usages, so it is controlled by
+    // a flag for now. See https://crbug.com/795089.
+    ssl_key_usage_t intended_use = (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
+                                       ? key_usage_encipherment
+                                       : key_usage_digital_signature;
+    if (hs->config->enforce_rsa_key_usage ||
+        EVP_PKEY_id(hs->peer_pubkey.get()) != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+      if (!ssl_cert_check_key_usage(&leaf_cbs, intended_use)) {
+        return ssl_hs_error;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key.
+  unsigned psk_len = 0;
+  uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
+  if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
+    if (hs->config->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
+    OPENSSL_memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
+    psk_len = hs->config->psk_client_callback(
+        ssl, hs->peer_psk_identity_hint.get(), identity, sizeof(identity), psk,
+        sizeof(psk));
+    if (psk_len == 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+    assert(psk_len <= PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN);
+
+    hs->new_session->psk_identity.reset(OPENSSL_strdup(identity));
+    if (hs->new_session->psk_identity == nullptr) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    // Write out psk_identity.
+    CBB child;
+    if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&child, (const uint8_t *)identity,
+                       OPENSSL_strnlen(identity, sizeof(identity))) ||
+        !CBB_flush(&body)) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Depending on the key exchange method, compute |pms|.
+  if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+    if (!pms.Init(SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(hs->peer_pubkey.get());
+    if (rsa == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    pms[0] = hs->client_version >> 8;
+    pms[1] = hs->client_version & 0xff;
+    if (!RAND_bytes(&pms[2], SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH - 2)) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    CBB enc_pms;
+    uint8_t *ptr;
+    size_t enc_pms_len;
+    if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &enc_pms) ||
+        !CBB_reserve(&enc_pms, &ptr, RSA_size(rsa)) ||
+        !RSA_encrypt(rsa, &enc_pms_len, ptr, RSA_size(rsa), pms.data(),
+                     pms.size(), RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) ||
+        !CBB_did_write(&enc_pms, enc_pms_len) ||
+        !CBB_flush(&body)) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
+    // Generate a keypair and serialize the public half.
+    CBB child;
+    if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child)) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    // Compute the premaster.
+    uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    if (!hs->key_shares[0]->Accept(&child, &pms, &alert, hs->peer_key)) {
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+    if (!CBB_flush(&body)) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+
+    // The key exchange state may now be discarded.
+    hs->key_shares[0].reset();
+    hs->key_shares[1].reset();
+    hs->peer_key.Reset();
+  } else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+    // For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as
+    // the pre-shared key.
+    if (!pms.Init(psk_len)) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_memset(pms.data(), 0, pms.size());
+  } else {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // For a PSK cipher suite, other_secret is combined with the pre-shared
+  // key.
+  if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
+    ScopedCBB pms_cbb;
+    CBB child;
+    if (!CBB_init(pms_cbb.get(), 2 + psk_len + 2 + pms.size()) ||
+        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(pms_cbb.get(), &child) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&child, pms.data(), pms.size()) ||
+        !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(pms_cbb.get(), &child) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) ||
+        !CBBFinishArray(pms_cbb.get(), &pms)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // The message must be added to the finished hash before calculating the
+  // master secret.
+  if (!ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  hs->new_session->secret_length =
+      tls1_generate_master_secret(hs, hs->new_session->secret, pms);
+  if (hs->new_session->secret_length == 0) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+  hs->new_session->extended_master_secret = hs->extended_master_secret;
+
+  hs->state = state_send_client_certificate_verify;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+  if (!hs->cert_request || !ssl_has_certificate(hs)) {
+    hs->state = state_send_client_finished;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  assert(ssl_has_private_key(hs));
+  ScopedCBB cbb;
+  CBB body, child;
+  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
+                                 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  uint16_t signature_algorithm;
+  if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(hs, &signature_algorithm)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+    // Write out the digest type in TLS 1.2.
+    if (!CBB_add_u16(&body, signature_algorithm)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Set aside space for the signature.
+  const size_t max_sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(hs->local_pubkey.get());
+  uint8_t *ptr;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
+      !CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  size_t sig_len = max_sig_len;
+  switch (ssl_private_key_sign(hs, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len,
+                               signature_algorithm,
+                               hs->transcript.buffer())) {
+    case ssl_private_key_success:
+      break;
+    case ssl_private_key_failure:
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    case ssl_private_key_retry:
+      hs->state = state_send_client_certificate_verify;
+      return ssl_hs_private_key_operation;
+  }
+
+  if (!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len) ||
+      !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  // The handshake buffer is no longer necessary.
+  hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
+
+  hs->state = state_send_client_finished;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  hs->can_release_private_key = true;
+  if (!ssl->method->add_change_cipher_spec(ssl) ||
+      !tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, evp_aead_seal)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (hs->next_proto_neg_seen) {
+    static const uint8_t kZero[32] = {0};
+    size_t padding_len =
+        32 - ((ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated.size() + 2) % 32);
+
+    ScopedCBB cbb;
+    CBB body, child;
+    if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) ||
+        !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated.data(),
+                       ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated.size()) ||
+        !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&child, kZero, padding_len) ||
+        !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (hs->channel_id_negotiated) {
+    ScopedCBB cbb;
+    CBB body;
+    if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CHANNEL_ID) ||
+        !tls1_write_channel_id(hs, &body) ||
+        !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_send_finished(hs)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  hs->state = state_finish_flight;
+  return ssl_hs_flush;
+}
+
+static bool can_false_start(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  const SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+  // False Start bypasses the Finished check's downgrade protection. This can
+  // enable attacks where we send data under weaker settings than supported
+  // (e.g. the Logjam attack). Thus we require TLS 1.2 with an ECDHE+AEAD
+  // cipher, our strongest settings before TLS 1.3.
+  //
+  // Now that TLS 1.3 exists, we would like to avoid similar attacks between
+  // TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3, but there are too many TLS 1.2 deployments to
+  // sacrifice False Start on them. Instead, we rely on the ServerHello.random
+  // downgrade signal, which we unconditionally enforce.
+  if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl) ||
+      SSL_version(ssl) != TLS1_2_VERSION ||
+      hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kECDHE ||
+      hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // If ECH was rejected, disable False Start. We run the handshake to
+  // completion, including the Finished downgrade check, to authenticate the
+  // recovery flow.
+  if (ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_rejected) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Additionally require ALPN or NPN by default.
+  //
+  // TODO(davidben): Can this constraint be relaxed globally now that cipher
+  // suite requirements have been tightened?
+  if (!ssl->ctx->false_start_allowed_without_alpn &&
+      ssl->s3->alpn_selected.empty() &&
+      ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated.empty()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_finish_flight(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+    hs->state = state_finish_client_handshake;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  // This is a full handshake. If it involves ChannelID, then record the
+  // handshake hashes at this point in the session so that any resumption of
+  // this session with ChannelID can sign those hashes.
+  if (!tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(hs)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  hs->state = state_read_session_ticket;
+
+  if ((SSL_get_mode(ssl) & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START) &&
+      can_false_start(hs) &&
+      // No False Start on renegotiation (would complicate the state machine).
+      !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
+    hs->in_false_start = true;
+    hs->can_early_write = true;
+    return ssl_hs_early_return;
+  }
+
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_session_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+
+  if (!hs->ticket_expected) {
+    hs->state = state_process_change_cipher_spec;
+    return ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec;
+  }
+
+  SSLMessage msg;
+  if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_read_message;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) ||
+      !ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  CBS new_session_ticket = msg.body, ticket;
+  uint32_t ticket_lifetime_hint;
+  if (!CBS_get_u32(&new_session_ticket, &ticket_lifetime_hint) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&new_session_ticket, &ticket) ||
+      CBS_len(&new_session_ticket) != 0) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  if (CBS_len(&ticket) == 0) {
+    // RFC 5077 allows a server to change its mind and send no ticket after
+    // negotiating the extension. The value of |ticket_expected| is checked in
+    // |ssl_update_cache| so is cleared here to avoid an unnecessary update.
+    hs->ticket_expected = false;
+    ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+    hs->state = state_process_change_cipher_spec;
+    return ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->session != nullptr) {
+    // The server is sending a new ticket for an existing session. Sessions are
+    // immutable once established, so duplicate all but the ticket of the
+    // existing session.
+    assert(!hs->new_session);
+    hs->new_session =
+        SSL_SESSION_dup(ssl->session.get(), SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH);
+    if (!hs->new_session) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // |ticket_lifetime_hint| is measured from when the ticket was issued.
+  ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, hs->new_session.get());
+
+  if (!hs->new_session->ticket.CopyFrom(ticket)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+  hs->new_session->ticket_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
+
+  // Historically, OpenSSL filled in fake session IDs for ticket-based sessions.
+  // TODO(davidben): Are external callers relying on this? Try removing this.
+  SHA256(CBS_data(&ticket), CBS_len(&ticket), hs->new_session->session_id);
+  hs->new_session->session_id_length = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+
+  ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
+  hs->state = state_process_change_cipher_spec;
+  return ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(hs, evp_aead_open)) {
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  hs->state = state_read_server_finished;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  enum ssl_hs_wait_t wait = ssl_get_finished(hs);
+  if (wait != ssl_hs_ok) {
+    return wait;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+    hs->state = state_send_client_finished;
+    return ssl_hs_ok;
+  }
+
+  hs->state = state_finish_client_handshake;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_finish_client_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_rejected) {
+    // Release the retry configs.
+    hs->ech_authenticated_reject = true;
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ECH_REQUIRED);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ECH_REJECTED);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
+
+  ssl->method->on_handshake_complete(ssl);
+
+  // Note TLS 1.2 resumptions with ticket renewal have both |ssl->session| (the
+  // resumed session) and |hs->new_session| (the session with the new ticket).
+  bool has_new_session = hs->new_session != nullptr;
+  if (has_new_session) {
+    // When False Start is enabled, the handshake reports completion early. The
+    // caller may then have passed the (then unresuable) |hs->new_session| to
+    // another thread via |SSL_get0_session| for resumption. To avoid potential
+    // race conditions in such callers, we duplicate the session before
+    // clearing |not_resumable|.
+    ssl->s3->established_session =
+        SSL_SESSION_dup(hs->new_session.get(), SSL_SESSION_DUP_ALL);
+    if (!ssl->s3->established_session) {
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+    // Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption.
+    if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
+      ssl->s3->established_session->not_resumable = false;
+    }
+
+    hs->new_session.reset();
+  } else {
+    assert(ssl->session != nullptr);
+    ssl->s3->established_session = UpRef(ssl->session);
+  }
+
+  hs->handshake_finalized = true;
+  ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = true;
+  if (has_new_session) {
+    ssl_update_cache(ssl);
+  }
+
+  hs->state = state_done;
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_client_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  while (hs->state != state_done) {
+    enum ssl_hs_wait_t ret = ssl_hs_error;
+    enum ssl_client_hs_state_t state =
+        static_cast<enum ssl_client_hs_state_t>(hs->state);
+    switch (state) {
+      case state_start_connect:
+        ret = do_start_connect(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_enter_early_data:
+        ret = do_enter_early_data(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_early_reverify_server_certificate:
+        ret = do_early_reverify_server_certificate(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_read_hello_verify_request:
+        ret = do_read_hello_verify_request(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_read_server_hello:
+        ret = do_read_server_hello(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_tls13:
+        ret = do_tls13(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_read_server_certificate:
+        ret = do_read_server_certificate(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_read_certificate_status:
+        ret = do_read_certificate_status(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_verify_server_certificate:
+        ret = do_verify_server_certificate(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_reverify_server_certificate:
+        ret = do_reverify_server_certificate(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_read_server_key_exchange:
+        ret = do_read_server_key_exchange(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_read_certificate_request:
+        ret = do_read_certificate_request(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_read_server_hello_done:
+        ret = do_read_server_hello_done(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_send_client_certificate:
+        ret = do_send_client_certificate(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_send_client_key_exchange:
+        ret = do_send_client_key_exchange(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_send_client_certificate_verify:
+        ret = do_send_client_certificate_verify(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_send_client_finished:
+        ret = do_send_client_finished(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_finish_flight:
+        ret = do_finish_flight(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_read_session_ticket:
+        ret = do_read_session_ticket(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_process_change_cipher_spec:
+        ret = do_process_change_cipher_spec(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_read_server_finished:
+        ret = do_read_server_finished(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_finish_client_handshake:
+        ret = do_finish_client_handshake(hs);
+        break;
+      case state_done:
+        ret = ssl_hs_ok;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    if (hs->state != state) {
+      ssl_do_info_callback(hs->ssl, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
+    }
+
+    if (ret != ssl_hs_ok) {
+      return ret;
+    }
+  }
+
+  ssl_do_info_callback(hs->ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
+  return ssl_hs_ok;
+}
+
+const char *ssl_client_handshake_state(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  enum ssl_client_hs_state_t state =
+      static_cast<enum ssl_client_hs_state_t>(hs->state);
+  switch (state) {
+    case state_start_connect:
+      return "TLS client start_connect";
+    case state_enter_early_data:
+      return "TLS client enter_early_data";
+    case state_early_reverify_server_certificate:
+      return "TLS client early_reverify_server_certificate";
+    case state_read_hello_verify_request:
+      return "TLS client read_hello_verify_request";
+    case state_read_server_hello:
+      return "TLS client read_server_hello";
+    case state_tls13:
+      return tls13_client_handshake_state(hs);
+    case state_read_server_certificate:
+      return "TLS client read_server_certificate";
+    case state_read_certificate_status:
+      return "TLS client read_certificate_status";
+    case state_verify_server_certificate:
+      return "TLS client verify_server_certificate";
+    case state_reverify_server_certificate:
+      return "TLS client reverify_server_certificate";
+    case state_read_server_key_exchange:
+      return "TLS client read_server_key_exchange";
+    case state_read_certificate_request:
+      return "TLS client read_certificate_request";
+    case state_read_server_hello_done:
+      return "TLS client read_server_hello_done";
+    case state_send_client_certificate:
+      return "TLS client send_client_certificate";
+    case state_send_client_key_exchange:
+      return "TLS client send_client_key_exchange";
+    case state_send_client_certificate_verify:
+      return "TLS client send_client_certificate_verify";
+    case state_send_client_finished:
+      return "TLS client send_client_finished";
+    case state_finish_flight:
+      return "TLS client finish_flight";
+    case state_read_session_ticket:
+      return "TLS client read_session_ticket";
+    case state_process_change_cipher_spec:
+      return "TLS client process_change_cipher_spec";
+    case state_read_server_finished:
+      return "TLS client read_server_finished";
+    case state_finish_client_handshake:
+      return "TLS client finish_client_handshake";
+    case state_done:
+      return "TLS client done";
+  }
+
+  return "TLS client unknown";
+}
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END