grpc 1.45.0-x86_64-linux → 1.46.2-x86_64-linux

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/encrypted_client_hello.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,1084 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2021, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <algorithm>
+#include <utility>
+
+#include <openssl/aead.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/curve25519.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/hkdf.h>
+#include <openssl/hpke.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+// ECH reuses the extension code point for the version number.
+static constexpr uint16_t kECHConfigVersion =
+    TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypted_client_hello;
+
+static const decltype(&EVP_hpke_aes_128_gcm) kSupportedAEADs[] = {
+    &EVP_hpke_aes_128_gcm,
+    &EVP_hpke_aes_256_gcm,
+    &EVP_hpke_chacha20_poly1305,
+};
+
+static const EVP_HPKE_AEAD *get_ech_aead(uint16_t aead_id) {
+  for (const auto aead_func : kSupportedAEADs) {
+    const EVP_HPKE_AEAD *aead = aead_func();
+    if (aead_id == EVP_HPKE_AEAD_id(aead)) {
+      return aead;
+    }
+  }
+  return nullptr;
+}
+
+// ssl_client_hello_write_without_extensions serializes |client_hello| into
+// |out|, omitting the length-prefixed extensions. It serializes individual
+// fields, starting with |client_hello->version|, and ignores the
+// |client_hello->client_hello| field. It returns true on success and false on
+// failure.
+static bool ssl_client_hello_write_without_extensions(
+    const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello, CBB *out) {
+  CBB cbb;
+  if (!CBB_add_u16(out, client_hello->version) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(out, client_hello->random, client_hello->random_len) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(out, &cbb) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, client_hello->session_id,
+                     client_hello->session_id_len) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &cbb) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, client_hello->cipher_suites,
+                     client_hello->cipher_suites_len) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(out, &cbb) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, client_hello->compression_methods,
+                     client_hello->compression_methods_len) ||
+      !CBB_flush(out)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool is_valid_client_hello_inner(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                        Span<const uint8_t> body) {
+  // See draft-ietf-tls-esni-13, section 7.1.
+  SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello;
+  CBS extension;
+  if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello, body) ||
+      !ssl_client_hello_get_extension(&client_hello, &extension,
+                                      TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypted_client_hello) ||
+      CBS_len(&extension) != 1 ||  //
+      CBS_data(&extension)[0] != ECH_CLIENT_INNER ||
+      !ssl_client_hello_get_extension(&client_hello, &extension,
+                                      TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_CLIENT_HELLO_INNER);
+    return false;
+  }
+  // Parse supported_versions and reject TLS versions prior to TLS 1.3. Older
+  // versions are incompatible with ECH.
+  CBS versions;
+  if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&extension, &versions) ||
+      CBS_len(&extension) != 0 ||  //
+      CBS_len(&versions) == 0) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+  while (CBS_len(&versions) != 0) {
+    uint16_t version;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16(&versions, &version)) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      return false;
+    }
+    if (version == SSL3_VERSION || version == TLS1_VERSION ||
+        version == TLS1_1_VERSION || version == TLS1_2_VERSION ||
+        version == DTLS1_VERSION || version == DTLS1_2_VERSION) {
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_CLIENT_HELLO_INNER);
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl_decode_client_hello_inner(
+    SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, Array<uint8_t> *out_client_hello_inner,
+    Span<const uint8_t> encoded_client_hello_inner,
+    const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello_outer) {
+  SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello_inner;
+  CBS cbs = encoded_client_hello_inner;
+  if (!ssl_parse_client_hello_with_trailing_data(ssl, &cbs,
+                                                 &client_hello_inner)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+  // The remaining data is padding.
+  uint8_t padding;
+  while (CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &padding)) {
+    if (padding != 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // TLS 1.3 ClientHellos must have extensions, and EncodedClientHelloInners use
+  // ClientHelloOuter's session_id.
+  if (client_hello_inner.extensions_len == 0 ||
+      client_hello_inner.session_id_len != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+  client_hello_inner.session_id = client_hello_outer->session_id;
+  client_hello_inner.session_id_len = client_hello_outer->session_id_len;
+
+  // Begin serializing a message containing the ClientHelloInner in |cbb|.
+  ScopedCBB cbb;
+  CBB body, extensions_cbb;
+  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
+      !ssl_client_hello_write_without_extensions(&client_hello_inner, &body) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &extensions_cbb)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  auto inner_extensions = MakeConstSpan(client_hello_inner.extensions,
+                                        client_hello_inner.extensions_len);
+  CBS ext_list_wrapper;
+  if (!ssl_client_hello_get_extension(&client_hello_inner, &ext_list_wrapper,
+                                      TLSEXT_TYPE_ech_outer_extensions)) {
+    // No ech_outer_extensions. Copy everything.
+    if (!CBB_add_bytes(&extensions_cbb, inner_extensions.data(),
+                       inner_extensions.size())) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return false;
+    }
+  } else {
+    const size_t offset = CBS_data(&ext_list_wrapper) - inner_extensions.data();
+    auto inner_extensions_before =
+        inner_extensions.subspan(0, offset - 4 /* extension header */);
+    auto inner_extensions_after =
+        inner_extensions.subspan(offset + CBS_len(&ext_list_wrapper));
+    if (!CBB_add_bytes(&extensions_cbb, inner_extensions_before.data(),
+                       inner_extensions_before.size())) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    // Expand ech_outer_extensions. See draft-ietf-tls-esni-13, Appendix B.
+    CBS ext_list;
+    if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&ext_list_wrapper, &ext_list) ||
+        CBS_len(&ext_list) == 0 || CBS_len(&ext_list_wrapper) != 0) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      return false;
+    }
+    CBS outer_extensions;
+    CBS_init(&outer_extensions, client_hello_outer->extensions,
+             client_hello_outer->extensions_len);
+    while (CBS_len(&ext_list) != 0) {
+      // Find the next extension to copy.
+      uint16_t want;
+      if (!CBS_get_u16(&ext_list, &want)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return false;
+      }
+      // Seek to |want| in |outer_extensions|. |ext_list| is required to match
+      // ClientHelloOuter in order.
+      uint16_t found;
+      CBS ext_body;
+      do {
+        if (CBS_len(&outer_extensions) == 0) {
+          *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OUTER_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND);
+          return false;
+        }
+        if (!CBS_get_u16(&outer_extensions, &found) ||
+            !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&outer_extensions, &ext_body)) {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+          return false;
+        }
+      } while (found != want);
+      // Copy the extension.
+      if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions_cbb, found) ||
+          !CBB_add_u16(&extensions_cbb, CBS_len(&ext_body)) ||
+          !CBB_add_bytes(&extensions_cbb, CBS_data(&ext_body),
+                         CBS_len(&ext_body))) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return false;
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (!CBB_add_bytes(&extensions_cbb, inner_extensions_after.data(),
+                       inner_extensions_after.size())) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  if (!CBB_flush(&body)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (!is_valid_client_hello_inner(
+          ssl, out_alert, MakeConstSpan(CBB_data(&body), CBB_len(&body)))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb.get(), out_client_hello_inner)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl_client_hello_decrypt(EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke_ctx, Array<uint8_t> *out,
+                              bool *out_is_decrypt_error,
+                              const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello_outer,
+                              Span<const uint8_t> payload) {
+  *out_is_decrypt_error = false;
+
+  // The ClientHelloOuterAAD is |client_hello_outer| with |payload| (which must
+  // point within |client_hello_outer->extensions|) replaced with zeros. See
+  // draft-ietf-tls-esni-13, section 5.2.
+  Array<uint8_t> aad;
+  if (!aad.CopyFrom(MakeConstSpan(client_hello_outer->client_hello,
+                                  client_hello_outer->client_hello_len))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // We assert with |uintptr_t| because the comparison would be UB if they
+  // didn't alias.
+  assert(reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(client_hello_outer->extensions) <=
+         reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(payload.data()));
+  assert(reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(client_hello_outer->extensions +
+                                     client_hello_outer->extensions_len) >=
+         reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(payload.data() + payload.size()));
+  Span<uint8_t> payload_aad = MakeSpan(aad).subspan(
+      payload.data() - client_hello_outer->client_hello, payload.size());
+  OPENSSL_memset(payload_aad.data(), 0, payload_aad.size());
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+  // In fuzzer mode, disable encryption to improve coverage. We reserve a short
+  // input to signal decryption failure, so the fuzzer can explore fallback to
+  // ClientHelloOuter.
+  const uint8_t kBadPayload[] = {0xff};
+  if (payload == kBadPayload) {
+    *out_is_decrypt_error = true;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (!out->CopyFrom(payload)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+#else
+  // Attempt to decrypt into |out|.
+  if (!out->Init(payload.size())) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return false;
+  }
+  size_t len;
+  if (!EVP_HPKE_CTX_open(hpke_ctx, out->data(), &len, out->size(),
+                         payload.data(), payload.size(), aad.data(),
+                         aad.size())) {
+    *out_is_decrypt_error = true;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+    return false;
+  }
+  out->Shrink(len);
+#endif
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool is_hex_component(Span<const uint8_t> in) {
+  if (in.size() < 2 || in[0] != '0' || (in[1] != 'x' && in[1] != 'X')) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  for (uint8_t b : in.subspan(2)) {
+    if (!('0' <= b && b <= '9') && !('a' <= b && b <= 'f') &&
+        !('A' <= b && b <= 'F')) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool is_decimal_component(Span<const uint8_t> in) {
+  if (in.empty()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  for (uint8_t b : in) {
+    if (!('0' <= b && b <= '9')) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl_is_valid_ech_public_name(Span<const uint8_t> public_name) {
+  // See draft-ietf-tls-esni-13, Section 4 and RFC 5890, Section 2.3.1. The
+  // public name must be a dot-separated sequence of LDH labels and not begin or
+  // end with a dot.
+  auto remaining = public_name;
+  if (remaining.empty()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  Span<const uint8_t> last;
+  while (!remaining.empty()) {
+    // Find the next dot-separated component.
+    auto dot = std::find(remaining.begin(), remaining.end(), '.');
+    Span<const uint8_t> component;
+    if (dot == remaining.end()) {
+      component = remaining;
+      last = component;
+      remaining = Span<const uint8_t>();
+    } else {
+      component = remaining.subspan(0, dot - remaining.begin());
+      // Skip the dot.
+      remaining = remaining.subspan(dot - remaining.begin() + 1);
+      if (remaining.empty()) {
+        // Trailing dots are not allowed.
+        return false;
+      }
+    }
+    // |component| must be a valid LDH label. Checking for empty components also
+    // rejects leading dots.
+    if (component.empty() || component.size() > 63 ||
+        component.front() == '-' || component.back() == '-') {
+      return false;
+    }
+    for (uint8_t c : component) {
+      if (!('a' <= c && c <= 'z') && !('A' <= c && c <= 'Z') &&
+          !('0' <= c && c <= '9') && c != '-') {
+        return false;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // The WHATWG URL parser additionally does not allow any DNS names that end in
+  // a numeric component. See:
+  // https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-host-parser
+  // https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#ends-in-a-number-checker
+  //
+  // The WHATWG parser is formulated in terms of parsing decimal, octal, and
+  // hex, along with a separate ASCII digits check. The ASCII digits check
+  // subsumes the decimal and octal check, so we only need to check two cases.
+  return !is_hex_component(last) && !is_decimal_component(last);
+}
+
+static bool parse_ech_config(CBS *cbs, ECHConfig *out, bool *out_supported,
+                             bool all_extensions_mandatory) {
+  uint16_t version;
+  CBS orig = *cbs;
+  CBS contents;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16(cbs, &version) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &contents)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (version != kECHConfigVersion) {
+    *out_supported = false;
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // Make a copy of the ECHConfig and parse from it, so the results alias into
+  // the saved copy.
+  if (!out->raw.CopyFrom(
+          MakeConstSpan(CBS_data(&orig), CBS_len(&orig) - CBS_len(cbs)))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  CBS ech_config(out->raw);
+  CBS public_name, public_key, cipher_suites, extensions;
+  if (!CBS_skip(&ech_config, 2) || // version
+      !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&ech_config, &contents) ||
+      !CBS_get_u8(&contents, &out->config_id) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(&contents, &out->kem_id) ||
+      !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &public_key) ||
+      CBS_len(&public_key) == 0 ||
+      !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &cipher_suites) ||
+      CBS_len(&cipher_suites) == 0 || CBS_len(&cipher_suites) % 4 != 0 ||
+      !CBS_get_u8(&contents, &out->maximum_name_length) ||
+      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &public_name) ||
+      CBS_len(&public_name) == 0 ||
+      !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &extensions) ||
+      CBS_len(&contents) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_is_valid_ech_public_name(public_name)) {
+    // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/275): The draft says ECHConfigs with
+    // invalid public names should be ignored, but LDH syntax failures are
+    // unambiguously invalid.
+    *out_supported = false;
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  out->public_key = public_key;
+  out->public_name = public_name;
+  // This function does not ensure |out->kem_id| and |out->cipher_suites| use
+  // supported algorithms. The caller must do this.
+  out->cipher_suites = cipher_suites;
+
+  bool has_unknown_mandatory_extension = false;
+  while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) {
+    uint16_t type;
+    CBS body;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
+        !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &body)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      return false;
+    }
+    // We currently do not support any extensions.
+    if (type & 0x8000 || all_extensions_mandatory) {
+      // Extension numbers with the high bit set are mandatory. Continue parsing
+      // to enforce syntax, but we will ultimately ignore this ECHConfig as a
+      // client and reject it as a server.
+      has_unknown_mandatory_extension = true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  *out_supported = !has_unknown_mandatory_extension;
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ECHServerConfig::Init(Span<const uint8_t> ech_config,
+                           const EVP_HPKE_KEY *key, bool is_retry_config) {
+  is_retry_config_ = is_retry_config;
+
+  // Parse the ECHConfig, rejecting all unsupported parameters and extensions.
+  // Unlike most server options, ECH's server configuration is serialized and
+  // configured in both the server and DNS. If the caller configures an
+  // unsupported parameter, this is a deployment error. To catch these errors,
+  // we fail early.
+  CBS cbs = ech_config;
+  bool supported;
+  if (!parse_ech_config(&cbs, &ech_config_, &supported,
+                        /*all_extensions_mandatory=*/true)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (!supported) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ECH_SERVER_CONFIG);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  CBS cipher_suites = ech_config_.cipher_suites;
+  while (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) {
+    uint16_t kdf_id, aead_id;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16(&cipher_suites, &kdf_id) ||
+        !CBS_get_u16(&cipher_suites, &aead_id)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      return false;
+    }
+    // The server promises to support every option in the ECHConfig, so reject
+    // any unsupported cipher suites.
+    if (kdf_id != EVP_HPKE_HKDF_SHA256 || get_ech_aead(aead_id) == nullptr) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ECH_SERVER_CONFIG);
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Check the public key in the ECHConfig matches |key|.
+  uint8_t expected_public_key[EVP_HPKE_MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH];
+  size_t expected_public_key_len;
+  if (!EVP_HPKE_KEY_public_key(key, expected_public_key,
+                               &expected_public_key_len,
+                               sizeof(expected_public_key))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (ech_config_.kem_id != EVP_HPKE_KEM_id(EVP_HPKE_KEY_kem(key)) ||
+      MakeConstSpan(expected_public_key, expected_public_key_len) !=
+          ech_config_.public_key) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ECH_SERVER_CONFIG_AND_PRIVATE_KEY_MISMATCH);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (!EVP_HPKE_KEY_copy(key_.get(), key)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ECHServerConfig::SetupContext(EVP_HPKE_CTX *ctx, uint16_t kdf_id,
+                                   uint16_t aead_id,
+                                   Span<const uint8_t> enc) const {
+  // Check the cipher suite is supported by this ECHServerConfig.
+  CBS cbs(ech_config_.cipher_suites);
+  bool cipher_ok = false;
+  while (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+    uint16_t supported_kdf_id, supported_aead_id;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &supported_kdf_id) ||
+        !CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &supported_aead_id)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    if (kdf_id == supported_kdf_id && aead_id == supported_aead_id) {
+      cipher_ok = true;
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+  if (!cipher_ok) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  static const uint8_t kInfoLabel[] = "tls ech";
+  ScopedCBB info_cbb;
+  if (!CBB_init(info_cbb.get(), sizeof(kInfoLabel) + ech_config_.raw.size()) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(info_cbb.get(), kInfoLabel,
+                     sizeof(kInfoLabel) /* includes trailing NUL */) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(info_cbb.get(), ech_config_.raw.data(),
+                     ech_config_.raw.size())) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  assert(kdf_id == EVP_HPKE_HKDF_SHA256);
+  assert(get_ech_aead(aead_id) != NULL);
+  return EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_recipient(
+      ctx, key_.get(), EVP_hpke_hkdf_sha256(), get_ech_aead(aead_id), enc.data(),
+      enc.size(), CBB_data(info_cbb.get()), CBB_len(info_cbb.get()));
+}
+
+bool ssl_is_valid_ech_config_list(Span<const uint8_t> ech_config_list) {
+  CBS cbs = ech_config_list, child;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &child) ||  //
+      CBS_len(&child) == 0 ||                        //
+      CBS_len(&cbs) > 0) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  while (CBS_len(&child) > 0) {
+    ECHConfig ech_config;
+    bool supported;
+    if (!parse_ech_config(&child, &ech_config, &supported,
+                          /*all_extensions_mandatory=*/false)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool select_ech_cipher_suite(const EVP_HPKE_KDF **out_kdf,
+                                    const EVP_HPKE_AEAD **out_aead,
+                                    Span<const uint8_t> cipher_suites) {
+  const bool has_aes_hardware = EVP_has_aes_hardware();
+  const EVP_HPKE_AEAD *aead = nullptr;
+  CBS cbs = cipher_suites;
+  while (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+    uint16_t kdf_id, aead_id;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &kdf_id) ||  //
+        !CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &aead_id)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    // Pick the first common cipher suite, but prefer ChaCha20-Poly1305 if we
+    // don't have AES hardware.
+    const EVP_HPKE_AEAD *candidate = get_ech_aead(aead_id);
+    if (kdf_id != EVP_HPKE_HKDF_SHA256 || candidate == nullptr) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (aead == nullptr ||
+        (!has_aes_hardware && aead_id == EVP_HPKE_CHACHA20_POLY1305)) {
+      aead = candidate;
+    }
+  }
+  if (aead == nullptr) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  *out_kdf = EVP_hpke_hkdf_sha256();
+  *out_aead = aead;
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl_select_ech_config(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<uint8_t> out_enc,
+                           size_t *out_enc_len) {
+  *out_enc_len = 0;
+  if (hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    // ECH requires TLS 1.3.
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (!hs->config->client_ech_config_list.empty()) {
+    CBS cbs = MakeConstSpan(hs->config->client_ech_config_list);
+    CBS child;
+    if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &child) ||  //
+        CBS_len(&child) == 0 ||                        //
+        CBS_len(&cbs) > 0) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    // Look for the first ECHConfig with supported parameters.
+    while (CBS_len(&child) > 0) {
+      ECHConfig ech_config;
+      bool supported;
+      if (!parse_ech_config(&child, &ech_config, &supported,
+                            /*all_extensions_mandatory=*/false)) {
+        return false;
+      }
+      const EVP_HPKE_KEM *kem = EVP_hpke_x25519_hkdf_sha256();
+      const EVP_HPKE_KDF *kdf;
+      const EVP_HPKE_AEAD *aead;
+      if (supported &&  //
+          ech_config.kem_id == EVP_HPKE_DHKEM_X25519_HKDF_SHA256 &&
+          select_ech_cipher_suite(&kdf, &aead, ech_config.cipher_suites)) {
+        ScopedCBB info;
+        static const uint8_t kInfoLabel[] = "tls ech";  // includes trailing NUL
+        if (!CBB_init(info.get(), sizeof(kInfoLabel) + ech_config.raw.size()) ||
+            !CBB_add_bytes(info.get(), kInfoLabel, sizeof(kInfoLabel)) ||
+            !CBB_add_bytes(info.get(), ech_config.raw.data(),
+                           ech_config.raw.size())) {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+          return false;
+        }
+
+        if (!EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_sender(
+                hs->ech_hpke_ctx.get(), out_enc.data(), out_enc_len,
+                out_enc.size(), kem, kdf, aead, ech_config.public_key.data(),
+                ech_config.public_key.size(), CBB_data(info.get()),
+                CBB_len(info.get())) ||
+            !hs->inner_transcript.Init()) {
+          return false;
+        }
+
+        hs->selected_ech_config = MakeUnique<ECHConfig>(std::move(ech_config));
+        return hs->selected_ech_config != nullptr;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static size_t aead_overhead(const EVP_HPKE_AEAD *aead) {
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+  // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/275): Having to adjust the overhead
+  // everywhere is tedious. Change fuzzer mode to append a fake tag but still
+  // otherwise be cleartext, refresh corpora, and then inline this function.
+  return 0;
+#else
+  return EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(EVP_HPKE_AEAD_aead(aead));
+#endif
+}
+
+// random_size returns a random value between |min| and |max|, inclusive.
+static size_t random_size(size_t min, size_t max) {
+  assert(min < max);
+  size_t value;
+  RAND_bytes(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(&value), sizeof(value));
+  return value % (max - min + 1) + min;
+}
+
+static bool setup_ech_grease(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+  assert(!hs->selected_ech_config);
+  if (hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION || !hs->config->ech_grease_enabled) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  const uint16_t kdf_id = EVP_HPKE_HKDF_SHA256;
+  const EVP_HPKE_AEAD *aead = EVP_has_aes_hardware()
+                                  ? EVP_hpke_aes_128_gcm()
+                                  : EVP_hpke_chacha20_poly1305();
+  static_assert(ssl_grease_ech_config_id < sizeof(hs->grease_seed),
+                "hs->grease_seed is too small");
+  uint8_t config_id = hs->grease_seed[ssl_grease_ech_config_id];
+
+  uint8_t enc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN];
+  uint8_t private_key_unused[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN];
+  X25519_keypair(enc, private_key_unused);
+
+  // To determine a plausible length for the payload, we estimate the size of a
+  // typical EncodedClientHelloInner without resumption:
+  //
+  //   2+32+1+2   version, random, legacy_session_id, legacy_compression_methods
+  //   2+4*2      cipher_suites (three TLS 1.3 ciphers, GREASE)
+  //   2          extensions prefix
+  //   5          inner encrypted_client_hello
+  //   4+1+2*2    supported_versions (TLS 1.3, GREASE)
+  //   4+1+10*2   outer_extensions (key_share, sigalgs, sct, alpn,
+  //              supported_groups, status_request, psk_key_exchange_modes,
+  //              compress_certificate, GREASE x2)
+  //
+  // The server_name extension has an overhead of 9 bytes. For now, arbitrarily
+  // estimate maximum_name_length to be between 32 and 100 bytes. Then round up
+  // to a multiple of 32, to match draft-ietf-tls-esni-13, section 6.1.3.
+  const size_t payload_len =
+      32 * random_size(128 / 32, 224 / 32) + aead_overhead(aead);
+  bssl::ScopedCBB cbb;
+  CBB enc_cbb, payload_cbb;
+  uint8_t *payload;
+  if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), 256) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(cbb.get(), kdf_id) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(cbb.get(), EVP_HPKE_AEAD_id(aead)) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(cbb.get(), config_id) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &enc_cbb) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&enc_cbb, enc, sizeof(enc)) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &payload_cbb) ||
+      !CBB_add_space(&payload_cbb, &payload, payload_len) ||
+      !RAND_bytes(payload, payload_len) ||
+      !CBBFinishArray(cbb.get(), &hs->ech_client_outer)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool ssl_encrypt_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<const uint8_t> enc) {
+  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (!hs->selected_ech_config) {
+    return setup_ech_grease(hs);
+  }
+
+  // Construct ClientHelloInner and EncodedClientHelloInner. See
+  // draft-ietf-tls-esni-13, sections 5.1 and 6.1.
+  ScopedCBB cbb, encoded_cbb;
+  CBB body;
+  bool needs_psk_binder;
+  Array<uint8_t> hello_inner;
+  if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
+      !CBB_init(encoded_cbb.get(), 256) ||
+      !ssl_write_client_hello_without_extensions(hs, &body,
+                                                 ssl_client_hello_inner,
+                                                 /*empty_session_id=*/false) ||
+      !ssl_write_client_hello_without_extensions(hs, encoded_cbb.get(),
+                                                 ssl_client_hello_inner,
+                                                 /*empty_session_id=*/true) ||
+      !ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(hs, &body, encoded_cbb.get(),
+                                  &needs_psk_binder, ssl_client_hello_inner,
+                                  CBB_len(&body)) ||
+      !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &hello_inner)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (needs_psk_binder) {
+    size_t binder_len;
+    if (!tls13_write_psk_binder(hs, hs->inner_transcript, MakeSpan(hello_inner),
+                                &binder_len)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    // Also update the EncodedClientHelloInner.
+    auto encoded_binder =
+        MakeSpan(const_cast<uint8_t *>(CBB_data(encoded_cbb.get())),
+                 CBB_len(encoded_cbb.get()))
+            .last(binder_len);
+    auto hello_inner_binder = MakeConstSpan(hello_inner).last(binder_len);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(encoded_binder.data(), hello_inner_binder.data(),
+                   binder_len);
+  }
+
+  if (!hs->inner_transcript.Update(hello_inner)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Pad the EncodedClientHelloInner. See draft-ietf-tls-esni-13, section 6.1.3.
+  size_t padding_len = 0;
+  size_t maximum_name_length = hs->selected_ech_config->maximum_name_length;
+  if (ssl->hostname) {
+    size_t hostname_len = strlen(ssl->hostname.get());
+    if (hostname_len <= maximum_name_length) {
+      padding_len = maximum_name_length - hostname_len;
+    }
+  } else {
+    // No SNI. Pad up to |maximum_name_length|, including server_name extension
+    // overhead.
+    padding_len = 9 + maximum_name_length;
+  }
+  // Pad the whole thing to a multiple of 32 bytes.
+  padding_len += 31 - ((CBB_len(encoded_cbb.get()) + padding_len - 1) % 32);
+  Array<uint8_t> encoded;
+  if (!CBB_add_zeros(encoded_cbb.get(), padding_len) ||
+      !CBBFinishArray(encoded_cbb.get(), &encoded)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Encrypt |encoded|. See draft-ietf-tls-esni-13, section 6.1.1. First,
+  // assemble the extension with a placeholder value for ClientHelloOuterAAD.
+  // See draft-ietf-tls-esni-13, section 5.2.
+  const EVP_HPKE_KDF *kdf = EVP_HPKE_CTX_kdf(hs->ech_hpke_ctx.get());
+  const EVP_HPKE_AEAD *aead = EVP_HPKE_CTX_aead(hs->ech_hpke_ctx.get());
+  size_t payload_len = encoded.size() + aead_overhead(aead);
+  CBB enc_cbb, payload_cbb;
+  if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), 256) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(cbb.get(), EVP_HPKE_KDF_id(kdf)) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(cbb.get(), EVP_HPKE_AEAD_id(aead)) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(cbb.get(), hs->selected_ech_config->config_id) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &enc_cbb) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&enc_cbb, enc.data(), enc.size()) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &payload_cbb) ||
+      !CBB_add_zeros(&payload_cbb, payload_len) ||
+      !CBBFinishArray(cbb.get(), &hs->ech_client_outer)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Construct ClientHelloOuterAAD.
+  // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/275): This ends up constructing the
+  // ClientHelloOuter twice. Instead, reuse |aad| for the ClientHello, now that
+  // draft-12 made the length prefixes match.
+  bssl::ScopedCBB aad;
+  if (!CBB_init(aad.get(), 256) ||
+      !ssl_write_client_hello_without_extensions(hs, aad.get(),
+                                                 ssl_client_hello_outer,
+                                                 /*empty_session_id=*/false) ||
+      !ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(hs, aad.get(), /*out_encoded=*/nullptr,
+                                  &needs_psk_binder, ssl_client_hello_outer,
+                                  CBB_len(aad.get()))) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // ClientHelloOuter may not require a PSK binder. Otherwise, we have a
+  // circular dependency.
+  assert(!needs_psk_binder);
+
+  // Replace the payload in |hs->ech_client_outer| with the encrypted value.
+  auto payload_span = MakeSpan(hs->ech_client_outer).last(payload_len);
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+  // In fuzzer mode, the server expects a cleartext payload.
+  assert(payload_span.size() == encoded.size());
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(payload_span.data(), encoded.data(), encoded.size());
+#else
+  if (!EVP_HPKE_CTX_seal(hs->ech_hpke_ctx.get(), payload_span.data(),
+                         &payload_len, payload_span.size(), encoded.data(),
+                         encoded.size(), CBB_data(aad.get()),
+                         CBB_len(aad.get())) ||
+      payload_len != payload_span.size()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+#endif // BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+using namespace bssl;
+
+void SSL_set_enable_ech_grease(SSL *ssl, int enable) {
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    return;
+  }
+  ssl->config->ech_grease_enabled = !!enable;
+}
+
+int SSL_set1_ech_config_list(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *ech_config_list,
+                             size_t ech_config_list_len) {
+  if (!ssl->config) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  auto span = MakeConstSpan(ech_config_list, ech_config_list_len);
+  if (!ssl_is_valid_ech_config_list(span)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_ECH_CONFIG_LIST);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return ssl->config->client_ech_config_list.CopyFrom(span);
+}
+
+void SSL_get0_ech_name_override(const SSL *ssl, const char **out_name,
+                                size_t *out_name_len) {
+  // When ECH is rejected, we use the public name. Note that, if
+  // |SSL_CTX_set_reverify_on_resume| is enabled, we reverify the certificate
+  // before the 0-RTT point. If also offering ECH, we verify as if
+  // ClientHelloInner was accepted and do not override. This works because, at
+  // this point, |ech_status| will be |ssl_ech_none|. See the
+  // ECH-Client-Reject-EarlyDataReject-OverrideNameOnRetry tests in runner.go.
+  const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs.get();
+  if (!ssl->server && hs && ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_rejected) {
+    *out_name = reinterpret_cast<const char *>(
+        hs->selected_ech_config->public_name.data());
+    *out_name_len = hs->selected_ech_config->public_name.size();
+  } else {
+    *out_name = nullptr;
+    *out_name_len = 0;
+  }
+}
+
+void SSL_get0_ech_retry_configs(
+    const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_retry_configs,
+    size_t *out_retry_configs_len) {
+  const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs.get();
+  if (!hs || !hs->ech_authenticated_reject) {
+    // It is an error to call this function except in response to
+    // |SSL_R_ECH_REJECTED|. Returning an empty string risks the caller
+    // mistakenly believing the server has disabled ECH. Instead, return a
+    // non-empty ECHConfigList with a syntax error, so the subsequent
+    // |SSL_set1_ech_config_list| call will fail.
+    assert(0);
+    static const uint8_t kPlaceholder[] = {
+        kECHConfigVersion >> 8, kECHConfigVersion & 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff};
+    *out_retry_configs = kPlaceholder;
+    *out_retry_configs_len = sizeof(kPlaceholder);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  *out_retry_configs = hs->ech_retry_configs.data();
+  *out_retry_configs_len = hs->ech_retry_configs.size();
+}
+
+int SSL_marshal_ech_config(uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len, uint8_t config_id,
+                           const EVP_HPKE_KEY *key, const char *public_name,
+                           size_t max_name_len) {
+  Span<const uint8_t> public_name_u8 = MakeConstSpan(
+      reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(public_name), strlen(public_name));
+  if (!ssl_is_valid_ech_public_name(public_name_u8)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_ECH_PUBLIC_NAME);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // The maximum name length is encoded in one byte.
+  if (max_name_len > 0xff) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // See draft-ietf-tls-esni-13, section 4.
+  ScopedCBB cbb;
+  CBB contents, child;
+  uint8_t *public_key;
+  size_t public_key_len;
+  if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), 128) ||  //
+      !CBB_add_u16(cbb.get(), kECHConfigVersion) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &contents) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(&contents, config_id) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&contents, EVP_HPKE_KEM_id(EVP_HPKE_KEY_kem(key))) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &child) ||
+      !CBB_reserve(&child, &public_key, EVP_HPKE_MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH) ||
+      !EVP_HPKE_KEY_public_key(key, public_key, &public_key_len,
+                               EVP_HPKE_MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH) ||
+      !CBB_did_write(&child, public_key_len) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &child) ||
+      // Write a default cipher suite configuration.
+      !CBB_add_u16(&child, EVP_HPKE_HKDF_SHA256) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&child, EVP_HPKE_AES_128_GCM) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&child, EVP_HPKE_HKDF_SHA256) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&child, EVP_HPKE_CHACHA20_POLY1305) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(&contents, max_name_len) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &child) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&child, public_name_u8.data(), public_name_u8.size()) ||
+      // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/275): Reserve some GREASE extensions
+      // and include some.
+      !CBB_add_u16(&contents, 0 /* no extensions */) ||
+      !CBB_finish(cbb.get(), out, out_len)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+SSL_ECH_KEYS *SSL_ECH_KEYS_new() { return New<SSL_ECH_KEYS>(); }
+
+void SSL_ECH_KEYS_up_ref(SSL_ECH_KEYS *keys) {
+  CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&keys->references);
+}
+
+void SSL_ECH_KEYS_free(SSL_ECH_KEYS *keys) {
+  if (keys == nullptr ||
+      !CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&keys->references)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  keys->~ssl_ech_keys_st();
+  OPENSSL_free(keys);
+}
+
+int SSL_ECH_KEYS_add(SSL_ECH_KEYS *configs, int is_retry_config,
+                     const uint8_t *ech_config, size_t ech_config_len,
+                     const EVP_HPKE_KEY *key) {
+  UniquePtr<ECHServerConfig> parsed_config = MakeUnique<ECHServerConfig>();
+  if (!parsed_config) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (!parsed_config->Init(MakeConstSpan(ech_config, ech_config_len), key,
+                           !!is_retry_config)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (!configs->configs.Push(std::move(parsed_config))) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_ECH_KEYS_has_duplicate_config_id(const SSL_ECH_KEYS *keys) {
+  bool seen[256] = {false};
+  for (const auto &config : keys->configs) {
+    if (seen[config->ech_config().config_id]) {
+      return 1;
+    }
+    seen[config->ech_config().config_id] = true;
+  }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_ECH_KEYS_marshal_retry_configs(const SSL_ECH_KEYS *keys, uint8_t **out,
+                                       size_t *out_len) {
+  ScopedCBB cbb;
+  CBB child;
+  if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), 128) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &child)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return false;
+  }
+  for (const auto &config : keys->configs) {
+    if (config->is_retry_config() &&
+        !CBB_add_bytes(&child, config->ech_config().raw.data(),
+                       config->ech_config().raw.size())) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  return CBB_finish(cbb.get(), out, out_len);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_ech_keys(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_ECH_KEYS *keys) {
+  bool has_retry_config = false;
+  for (const auto &config : keys->configs) {
+    if (config->is_retry_config()) {
+      has_retry_config = true;
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+  if (!has_retry_config) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ECH_SERVER_WOULD_HAVE_NO_RETRY_CONFIGS);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  UniquePtr<SSL_ECH_KEYS> owned_keys = UpRef(keys);
+  MutexWriteLock lock(&ctx->lock);
+  ctx->ech_keys.swap(owned_keys);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_ech_accepted(const SSL *ssl) {
+  if (SSL_in_early_data(ssl) && !ssl->server) {
+    // In the client early data state, we report properties as if the server
+    // accepted early data. The server can only accept early data with
+    // ClientHelloInner.
+    return ssl->s3->hs->selected_ech_config != nullptr;
+  }
+
+  return ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_accepted;
+}