awesome-grpc-that-works 0.12.2 → 0.14.0.dev

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/t1_enc.c

@@ -0,0 +1,708 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+/* tls1_P_hash computes the TLS P_<hash> function as described in RFC 5246,
+ * section 5. It XORs |out_len| bytes to |out|, using |md| as the hash and
+ * |secret| as the secret. |seed1| through |seed3| are concatenated to form the
+ * seed parameter. It returns one on success and zero on failure. */
+static int tls1_P_hash(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const EVP_MD *md,
+                       const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len,
+                       const uint8_t *seed1, size_t seed1_len,
+                       const uint8_t *seed2, size_t seed2_len,
+                       const uint8_t *seed3, size_t seed3_len) {
+  HMAC_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp, ctx_init;
+  uint8_t A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  unsigned A1_len;
+  int ret = 0;
+
+  size_t chunk = EVP_MD_size(md);
+
+  HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
+  HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
+  HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx_init);
+  if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_init, secret, secret_len, md, NULL) ||
+      !HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, &ctx_init) ||
+      !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len) ||
+      !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len) ||
+      !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len) ||
+      !HMAC_Final(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  for (;;) {
+    unsigned len;
+    uint8_t hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    if (!HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, &ctx_init) ||
+        !HMAC_Update(&ctx, A1, A1_len) ||
+        /* Save a copy of |ctx| to compute the next A1 value below. */
+        (out_len > chunk && !HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx_tmp, &ctx)) ||
+        !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len) ||
+        !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len) ||
+        !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len) ||
+        !HMAC_Final(&ctx, hmac, &len)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    assert(len == chunk);
+
+    /* XOR the result into |out|. */
+    if (len > out_len) {
+      len = out_len;
+    }
+    unsigned i;
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+      out[i] ^= hmac[i];
+    }
+    out += len;
+    out_len -= len;
+
+    if (out_len == 0) {
+      break;
+    }
+
+    /* Calculate the next A1 value. */
+    if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+  HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
+  HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_init);
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1));
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int tls1_prf(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const uint8_t *secret,
+             size_t secret_len, const char *label, size_t label_len,
+             const uint8_t *seed1, size_t seed1_len,
+             const uint8_t *seed2, size_t seed2_len) {
+
+  if (out_len == 0) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  memset(out, 0, out_len);
+
+  uint32_t algorithm_prf = ssl_get_algorithm_prf(s);
+  if (algorithm_prf == SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT) {
+    /* If using the MD5/SHA1 PRF, |secret| is partitioned between SHA-1 and
+     * MD5, MD5 first. */
+    size_t secret_half = secret_len - (secret_len / 2);
+    if (!tls1_P_hash(out, out_len, EVP_md5(), secret, secret_half,
+                     (const uint8_t *)label, label_len, seed1, seed1_len, seed2,
+                     seed2_len)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Note that, if |secret_len| is odd, the two halves share a byte. */
+    secret = secret + (secret_len - secret_half);
+    secret_len = secret_half;
+  }
+
+  if (!tls1_P_hash(out, out_len, ssl_get_handshake_digest(algorithm_prf),
+                   secret, secret_len, (const uint8_t *)label, label_len,
+                   seed1, seed1_len, seed2, seed2_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) {
+  return s->enc_method->prf(s, out, out_len, s->session->master_key,
+                            s->session->master_key_length,
+                            TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
+                            TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
+                            s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+                            s->s3->client_random,
+                            SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+}
+
+int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) {
+  /* is_read is true if we have just read a ChangeCipherSpec message - i.e. we
+   * need to update the read cipherspec. Otherwise we have just written one. */
+  const char is_read = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0;
+  /* use_client_keys is true if we wish to use the keys for the "client write"
+   * direction. This is the case if we're a client sending a ChangeCipherSpec,
+   * or a server reading a client's ChangeCipherSpec. */
+  const char use_client_keys = which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE ||
+                               which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
+  const uint8_t *client_write_mac_secret, *server_write_mac_secret, *mac_secret;
+  const uint8_t *client_write_key, *server_write_key, *key;
+  const uint8_t *client_write_iv, *server_write_iv, *iv;
+  const EVP_AEAD *aead = s->s3->tmp.new_aead;
+  size_t key_len, iv_len, mac_secret_len;
+  const uint8_t *key_data;
+
+  /* Reset sequence number to zero. */
+  if (is_read) {
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+      s->d1->r_epoch++;
+      memset(&s->d1->bitmap, 0, sizeof(s->d1->bitmap));
+    }
+    memset(s->s3->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence));
+  } else {
+    if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+      s->d1->w_epoch++;
+      memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence,
+             sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+    }
+    memset(s->s3->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+  }
+
+  mac_secret_len = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_len;
+  iv_len = s->s3->tmp.new_fixed_iv_len;
+
+  if (aead == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
+  if (mac_secret_len > 0) {
+    /* For "stateful" AEADs (i.e. compatibility with pre-AEAD cipher
+     * suites) the key length reported by |EVP_AEAD_key_length| will
+     * include the MAC and IV key bytes. */
+    if (key_len < mac_secret_len + iv_len) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    key_len -= mac_secret_len + iv_len;
+  }
+
+  key_data = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
+  client_write_mac_secret = key_data;
+  key_data += mac_secret_len;
+  server_write_mac_secret = key_data;
+  key_data += mac_secret_len;
+  client_write_key = key_data;
+  key_data += key_len;
+  server_write_key = key_data;
+  key_data += key_len;
+  client_write_iv = key_data;
+  key_data += iv_len;
+  server_write_iv = key_data;
+  key_data += iv_len;
+
+  if (use_client_keys) {
+    mac_secret = client_write_mac_secret;
+    key = client_write_key;
+    iv = client_write_iv;
+  } else {
+    mac_secret = server_write_mac_secret;
+    key = server_write_key;
+    iv = server_write_iv;
+  }
+
+  if (key_data - s->s3->tmp.key_block != s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (is_read) {
+    SSL_AEAD_CTX_free(s->aead_read_ctx);
+    s->aead_read_ctx = SSL_AEAD_CTX_new(
+        evp_aead_open, ssl3_version_from_wire(s, s->version),
+        s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, key, key_len, mac_secret, mac_secret_len, iv,
+        iv_len);
+    return s->aead_read_ctx != NULL;
+  }
+
+  SSL_AEAD_CTX_free(s->aead_write_ctx);
+  s->aead_write_ctx = SSL_AEAD_CTX_new(
+      evp_aead_seal, ssl3_version_from_wire(s, s->version),
+      s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, key, key_len, mac_secret, mac_secret_len, iv,
+      iv_len);
+  return s->aead_write_ctx != NULL;
+}
+
+int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) {
+  uint8_t *p;
+  const EVP_AEAD *aead = NULL;
+  int ret = 0;
+  size_t mac_secret_len, fixed_iv_len, variable_iv_len, key_len;
+  size_t key_block_len;
+
+  if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
+    goto cipher_unavailable_err;
+  }
+
+  if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(&aead, &mac_secret_len, &fixed_iv_len,
+                               s->session->cipher,
+                               ssl3_version_from_wire(s, s->version))) {
+    goto cipher_unavailable_err;
+  }
+  key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
+  variable_iv_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead);
+  if (mac_secret_len > 0) {
+    /* For "stateful" AEADs (i.e. compatibility with pre-AEAD cipher suites) the
+     * key length reported by |EVP_AEAD_key_length| will include the MAC key
+     * bytes and initial implicit IV. */
+    if (key_len < mac_secret_len + fixed_iv_len) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    key_len -= mac_secret_len + fixed_iv_len;
+  } else {
+    /* The nonce is split into a fixed portion and a variable portion. */
+    if (variable_iv_len < fixed_iv_len) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    variable_iv_len -= fixed_iv_len;
+  }
+
+  assert(mac_secret_len < 256);
+  assert(fixed_iv_len < 256);
+  assert(variable_iv_len < 256);
+
+  s->s3->tmp.new_aead = aead;
+  s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_len = (uint8_t)mac_secret_len;
+  s->s3->tmp.new_fixed_iv_len = (uint8_t)fixed_iv_len;
+  s->s3->tmp.new_variable_iv_len = (uint8_t)variable_iv_len;
+
+  key_block_len = key_len + mac_secret_len + fixed_iv_len;
+  key_block_len *= 2;
+
+  ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+  p = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(key_block_len);
+  if (p == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = key_block_len;
+  s->s3->tmp.key_block = p;
+
+  if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p, key_block_len)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  return ret;
+
+cipher_unavailable_err:
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, uint8_t *out) {
+  const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx_template;
+  if (md_nid == NID_md5) {
+    ctx_template = &s->s3->handshake_md5;
+  } else if (md_nid == EVP_MD_CTX_type(&s->s3->handshake_hash)) {
+    ctx_template = &s->s3->handshake_hash;
+  } else {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+  if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, ctx_template)) {
+    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  unsigned ret;
+  EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret);
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int append_digest(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+                         size_t max_out) {
+  int ret = 0;
+  EVP_MD_CTX ctx_copy;
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_copy);
+
+  if (EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx) > max_out) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    goto err;
+  }
+  unsigned len;
+  if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx_copy, ctx) ||
+      !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx_copy, out, &len)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  assert(len == EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx));
+
+  *out_len = len;
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_copy);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/* tls1_handshake_digest calculates the current handshake hash and writes it to
+ * |out|, which has space for |out_len| bytes. It returns the number of bytes
+ * written or -1 in the event of an error. This function works on a copy of the
+ * underlying digests so can be called multiple times and prior to the final
+ * update etc. */
+int tls1_handshake_digest(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) {
+  size_t md5_len = 0;
+  if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(&s->s3->handshake_md5) != NULL &&
+      !append_digest(&s->s3->handshake_md5, out, &md5_len, out_len)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  size_t len;
+  if (!append_digest(&s->s3->handshake_hash, out + md5_len, &len,
+                     out_len - md5_len)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  return (int)(md5_len + len);
+}
+
+int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int slen, uint8_t *out) {
+  uint8_t buf[2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  int err = 0;
+  int digests_len;
+
+  /* At this point, the handshake should have released the handshake buffer on
+   * its own. */
+  assert(s->s3->handshake_buffer == NULL);
+
+  digests_len = tls1_handshake_digest(s, buf, sizeof(buf));
+  if (digests_len < 0) {
+    err = 1;
+    digests_len = 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!s->enc_method->prf(s, out, 12, s->session->master_key,
+                          s->session->master_key_length, str, slen, buf,
+                          digests_len, NULL, 0)) {
+    err = 1;
+  }
+
+  if (err) {
+    return 0;
+  } else {
+    return 12;
+  }
+}
+
+int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *premaster,
+                                size_t premaster_len) {
+  if (s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret) {
+    uint8_t digests[2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    int digests_len = tls1_handshake_digest(s, digests, sizeof(digests));
+    if (digests_len == -1) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!s->enc_method->prf(s, out, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, premaster,
+                            premaster_len, TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+                            TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, digests,
+                            digests_len, NULL, 0)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  } else {
+    if (!s->enc_method->prf(s, out, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, premaster,
+                            premaster_len, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+                            TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
+                            s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+                            s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE;
+}
+
+int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
+                                const char *label, size_t label_len,
+                                const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len,
+                                int use_context) {
+  if (!s->s3->have_version || s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  size_t seed_len = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+  if (use_context) {
+    if (context_len >= 1u << 16) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    seed_len += 2 + context_len;
+  }
+  uint8_t *seed = OPENSSL_malloc(seed_len);
+  if (seed == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  memcpy(seed, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+  memcpy(seed + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+  if (use_context) {
+    seed[2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE] = (uint8_t)(context_len >> 8);
+    seed[2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1] = (uint8_t)context_len;
+    memcpy(seed + 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 2, context, context_len);
+  }
+
+  int ret = s->enc_method->prf(s, out, out_len, s->session->master_key,
+                               s->session->master_key_length, label, label_len,
+                               seed, seed_len, NULL, 0);
+  OPENSSL_free(seed);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int tls1_alert_code(int code) {
+  switch (code) {
+    case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
+      return SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
+
+    case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
+      return SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+
+    case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
+      return SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
+
+    case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
+      return TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+
+    case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
+      return TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+
+    case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
+      return SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
+
+    case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
+      return SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+
+    case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
+      return -1;
+
+    case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
+      return SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+
+    case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
+      return SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
+
+    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
+      return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
+
+    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
+      return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
+
+    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
+      return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
+
+    case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
+      return SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+
+    case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
+      return TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
+
+    case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
+      return TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
+
+    case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
+      return TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+
+    case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
+      return TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+    case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
+      return TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
+
+    case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
+      return TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+
+    case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
+      return TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
+
+    case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+      return TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+    case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
+      return TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED;
+
+    case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
+      return TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
+
+    case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
+      return TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+
+    case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
+      return TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE;
+
+    case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
+      return TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+
+    case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
+      return TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
+
+    case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
+      return TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE;
+
+    case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
+      return TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+
+    case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:
+      return SSL3_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
+
+    default:
+      return -1;
+  }
+}