awesome-grpc-that-works 0.12.2 → 0.14.0.dev

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c

@@ -0,0 +1,805 @@
+/* v3_purp.c */
+/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+ * project 2001.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/thread.h>
+#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#include "../internal.h"
+
+
+#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
+#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
+	(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
+#define xku_reject(x, usage) \
+	(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
+#define ns_reject(x, usage) \
+	(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
+
+static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x);
+
+static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x);
+static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+
+static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE **a, const X509_PURPOSE **b);
+static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p);
+
+static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = {
+	{X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, check_purpose_ssl_client, (char *) "SSL client", (char *) "sslclient", NULL},
+	{X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ssl_server, (char *) "SSL server", (char *) "sslserver", NULL},
+	{X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, (char *) "Netscape SSL server", (char *) "nssslserver", NULL},
+	{X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign, (char *) "S/MIME signing", (char *) "smimesign", NULL},
+	{X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_encrypt, (char *) "S/MIME encryption", (char *) "smimeencrypt", NULL},
+	{X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign, (char *) "CRL signing", (char *) "crlsign", NULL},
+	{X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, (char *) "Any Purpose", (char *) "any", NULL},
+	{X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper, (char *) "OCSP helper", (char *) "ocsphelper", NULL},
+	{X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, check_purpose_timestamp_sign, (char *) "Time Stamp signing", (char *) "timestampsign", NULL},
+};
+
+#define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE))
+
+static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL;
+
+static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE **a, const X509_PURPOSE **b)
+{
+	return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose;
+}
+
+/* As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509*
+ * I really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const
+ * things. */
+int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca)
+{
+	int idx;
+	const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
+	if(!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
+		x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
+	}
+	if(id == -1) return 1;
+	idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
+	if(idx == -1) return -1;
+	pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+	return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca);
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose)
+{
+	if(X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) {
+		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	*p = purpose;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void)
+{
+	if(!xptable) return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
+	return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
+}
+
+X509_PURPOSE * X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx)
+{
+	if(idx < 0) return NULL;
+	if(idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) return xstandard + idx;
+	return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT);
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname)
+{
+	int i;
+	X509_PURPOSE *xptmp;
+	for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
+		xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
+		if(!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname)) return i;
+	}
+	return -1;
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose)
+{
+	X509_PURPOSE tmp;
+	size_t idx;
+
+	if((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX))
+		return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN;
+	tmp.purpose = purpose;
+	if(!xptable) return -1;
+
+	if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &idx, &tmp))
+		return -1;
+	return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags,
+			int (*ck)(const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int),
+					char *name, char *sname, void *arg)
+{
+	int idx;
+	X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
+	char *name_dup, *sname_dup;
+
+	/* This is set according to what we change: application can't set it */
+	flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
+	/* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
+	flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME;
+	/* Get existing entry if any */
+	idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
+	/* Need a new entry */
+	if(idx == -1) {
+		if(!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) {
+			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
+	} else ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+
+	/* Duplicate the supplied names. */
+	name_dup = BUF_strdup(name);
+	sname_dup = BUF_strdup(sname);
+	if (name_dup == NULL || sname_dup == NULL) {
+		OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		if (name_dup != NULL)
+			OPENSSL_free(name_dup);
+		if (sname_dup != NULL)
+			OPENSSL_free(sname_dup);
+		if (idx == -1)
+			OPENSSL_free(ptmp);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
+	if(ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
+		OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name);
+		OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname);
+	}
+	/* dup supplied name */
+	ptmp->name = name_dup;
+	ptmp->sname = sname_dup;
+	/* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
+	ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
+	/* Set all other flags */
+	ptmp->flags |= flags;
+
+	ptmp->purpose = id;
+	ptmp->trust = trust;
+	ptmp->check_purpose = ck;
+	ptmp->usr_data = arg;
+
+	/* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
+	if(idx == -1) {
+		if(!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) {
+			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			xptable_free(ptmp);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) {
+			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			xptable_free(ptmp);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p)
+	{
+	if(!p) return;
+	if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) 
+		{
+		if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
+			OPENSSL_free(p->name);
+			OPENSSL_free(p->sname);
+		}
+		OPENSSL_free(p);
+		}
+	}
+
+void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free);
+	for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++) xptable_free(xstandard + i);
+	xptable = NULL;
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
+{
+	return xp->purpose;
+}
+
+char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
+{
+	return xp->name;
+}
+
+char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
+{
+	return xp->sname;
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
+{
+	return xp->trust;
+}
+
+static int nid_cmp(const void *void_a, const void *void_b)
+	{
+	const int *a = void_a, *b = void_b;
+
+	return *a - *b;
+	}
+
+int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex)
+	{
+	/* This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions:
+	 * that is those which are used by the verify process. If
+	 * an extension is critical and doesn't appear in this list
+	 * then the verify process will normally reject the certificate.
+	 * The list must be kept in numerical order because it will be
+	 * searched using bsearch.
+	 */
+
+	static const int supported_nids[] = {
+		NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */
+        	NID_key_usage,		/* 83 */
+		NID_subject_alt_name,	/* 85 */
+		NID_basic_constraints,	/* 87 */
+		NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */
+        	NID_ext_key_usage,	/* 126 */
+		NID_policy_constraints,	/* 401 */
+		NID_proxyCertInfo,	/* 663 */
+		NID_name_constraints,	/* 666 */
+		NID_policy_mappings,	/* 747 */
+		NID_inhibit_any_policy	/* 748 */
+	};
+
+	int ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex));
+
+	if (ex_nid == NID_undef) 
+		return 0;
+
+	if (bsearch(&ex_nid, supported_nids, sizeof(supported_nids)/sizeof(int), sizeof(int), nid_cmp) != NULL)
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+static void setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp)
+	{
+	X509_NAME *iname = NULL;
+	size_t i;
+	if (dp->reasons)
+		{
+		if (dp->reasons->length > 0)
+			dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0];
+		if (dp->reasons->length > 1)
+			dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8);
+		dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
+		}
+	else
+		dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
+	if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1))
+		return;
+	for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
+		{
+		GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
+		if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME)
+			{
+			iname = gen->d.directoryName;
+			break;
+			}
+		}
+	if (!iname)
+		iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+
+	DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname);
+
+	}
+
+static void setup_crldp(X509 *x)
+	{
+	size_t i;
+	x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL);
+	for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
+		setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i));
+	}
+
+/* g_x509_cache_extensions_lock is used to protect against concurrent calls to
+ * |x509v3_cache_extensions|. Ideally this would be done with a |CRYPTO_once_t|
+ * in the |X509| structure, but |CRYPTO_once_t| isn't public.
+ *
+ * Note: it's not entirely clear whether this lock is needed. Not all paths to
+ * this function took a lock in OpenSSL. */
+static struct CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX g_x509_cache_extensions_lock =
+    CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_INIT;
+
+static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
+{
+	BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
+	PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci;
+	ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage;
+	ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns;
+	EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
+	X509_EXTENSION *ex;
+	size_t i;
+	int j;
+
+	CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(&g_x509_cache_extensions_lock);
+
+	if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)
+		{
+		CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock(&g_x509_cache_extensions_lock);
+		return;
+		}
+
+	X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL);
+	/* V1 should mean no extensions ... */
+	if(!X509_get_version(x)) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1;
+	/* Handle basic constraints */
+	if((bs=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) {
+		if(bs->ca) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA;
+		if(bs->pathlen) {
+			if((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
+						|| !bs->ca) {
+				x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+				x->ex_pathlen = 0;
+			} else x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
+		} else x->ex_pathlen = -1;
+		BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs);
+		x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS;
+	}
+	/* Handle proxy certificates */
+	if((pci=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) {
+		if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA
+		    || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0
+		    || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) {
+			x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+		}
+		if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) {
+			x->ex_pcpathlen =
+				ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint);
+		} else x->ex_pcpathlen = -1;
+		PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
+		x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY;
+	}
+	/* Handle key usage */
+	if((usage=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
+		if(usage->length > 0) {
+			x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0];
+			if(usage->length > 1) 
+				x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8;
+		} else x->ex_kusage = 0;
+		x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE;
+		ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
+	}
+	x->ex_xkusage = 0;
+	if((extusage=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
+		x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE;
+		for(i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
+			switch(OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage,i))) {
+				case NID_server_auth:
+				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER;
+				break;
+
+				case NID_client_auth:
+				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT;
+				break;
+
+				case NID_email_protect:
+				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME;
+				break;
+
+				case NID_code_sign:
+				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN;
+				break;
+
+				case NID_ms_sgc:
+				case NID_ns_sgc:
+				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC;
+				break;
+
+				case NID_OCSP_sign:
+				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN;
+				break;
+
+				case NID_time_stamp:
+				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP;
+				break;
+
+				case NID_dvcs:
+				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS;
+				break;
+
+				case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage:
+				x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+	}
+
+	if((ns=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) {
+		if(ns->length > 0) x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0];
+		else x->ex_nscert = 0;
+		x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT;
+		ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns);
+	}
+	x->skid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
+	x->akid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
+	/* Does subject name match issuer ? */
+	if(!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x)))
+			{
+			x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI;
+			/* If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed */
+			if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK &&
+				!ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
+				x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS;
+			}
+	x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+	x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &j, NULL);
+	if (!x->nc && (j != -1))
+		x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+	setup_crldp(x);
+
+	for (j = 0; j < X509_get_ext_count(x); j++)
+		{
+		ex = X509_get_ext(x, j);
+		if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex))
+					== NID_freshest_crl)
+			x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST;
+		if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex))
+			continue;
+		if (!X509_supported_extension(ex))
+			{
+			x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
+			break;
+			}
+		}
+	x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
+
+	CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock(&g_x509_cache_extensions_lock);
+}
+
+/* CA checks common to all purposes
+ * return codes:
+ * 0 not a CA
+ * 1 is a CA
+ * 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA
+ * 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1.
+ * 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted.
+ */
+
+static int check_ca(const X509 *x)
+{
+	/* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */
+	if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) return 0;
+	if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) {
+		if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) return 1;
+		/* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */
+		else return 0;
+	} else {
+		/* we support V1 roots for...  uh, I don't really know why. */
+		if((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) return 3;
+		/* If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it */
+		else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) return 4;
+		/* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */
+		else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT
+			 && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) return 5;
+		/* can this still be regarded a CA certificate?  I doubt it */
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+
+int X509_check_ca(X509 *x)
+{
+	if(!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
+		x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
+	}
+
+	return check_ca(x);
+}
+
+/* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */
+static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x)
+{
+	int ca_ret;
+	ca_ret = check_ca(x);
+	if(!ca_ret) return 0;
+	/* check nsCertType if present */
+	if(ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) return ca_ret;
+	else return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
+{
+	if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0;
+	if(ca) return check_ssl_ca(x);
+	/* We need to do digital signatures or key agreement */
+	if(ku_reject(x,KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) return 0;
+	/* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */	
+	if(ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+/* Key usage needed for TLS/SSL server: digital signature, encipherment or
+ * key agreement. The ssl code can check this more thoroughly for individual
+ * key types.
+ */
+#define KU_TLS \
+	KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT
+
+static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
+{
+	if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SSL_SERVER|XKU_SGC)) return 0;
+	if(ca) return check_ssl_ca(x);
+
+	if(ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER)) return 0;
+	if(ku_reject(x, KU_TLS)) return 0;
+	
+	return 1;
+
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
+{
+	int ret;
+	ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca);
+	if(!ret || ca) return ret;
+	/* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */
+	if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* common S/MIME checks */
+static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca)
+{
+	if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SMIME)) return 0;
+	if(ca) {
+		int ca_ret;
+		ca_ret = check_ca(x);
+		if(!ca_ret) return 0;
+		/* check nsCertType if present */
+		if(ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) return ca_ret;
+		else return 0;
+	}
+	if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
+		if(x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) return 1;
+		/* Workaround for some buggy certificates */
+		if(x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT) return 2;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
+{
+	int ret;
+	ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
+	if(!ret || ca) return ret;
+	if(ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_NON_REPUDIATION)) return 0;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
+{
+	int ret;
+	ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
+	if(!ret || ca) return ret;
+	if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
+{
+	if(ca) {
+		int ca_ret;
+		if((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2) return ca_ret;
+		else return 0;
+	}
+	if(ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN)) return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that
+ * each CA is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain.
+ */
+
+static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
+{
+	/* Must be a valid CA.  Should we really support the "I don't know"
+	   value (2)? */
+	if(ca) return check_ca(x);
+	/* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+					int ca)
+{
+	int i_ext;
+
+	/* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */
+	if (ca) return check_ca(x);
+
+	/* 
+	 * Check the optional key usage field:
+	 * if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature 
+	 * and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall
+	 * be rejected).
+	 */
+	if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
+	    && ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) ||
+		!(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */
+	if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */
+	i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *) x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1);
+	if (i_ext >= 0)
+		{
+		X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *) x, i_ext);
+		if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext))
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second.
+ * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates
+ * which have been looked up using some simple method such as by
+ * subject name.
+ * These are:
+ * 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer)
+ * 2. If akid(subject) exists check it matches issuer
+ * 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing
+ * returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match
+ * codes for X509_verify_cert()
+ */
+
+int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
+{
+	if(X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
+			X509_get_issuer_name(subject)))
+				return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
+	x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer);
+	x509v3_cache_extensions(subject);
+
+	if(subject->akid)
+		{
+		int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid);
+		if (ret != X509_V_OK)
+			return ret;
+		}
+
+	if(subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
+		{
+		if(ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
+			return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
+		}
+	else if(ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
+		return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN;
+	return X509_V_OK;
+}
+
+int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
+	{
+
+	if(!akid)
+		return X509_V_OK;
+
+	/* Check key ids (if present) */
+	if(akid->keyid && issuer->skid &&
+		 ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid) )
+				return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
+	/* Check serial number */
+	if(akid->serial &&
+		ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial))
+				return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
+	/* Check issuer name */
+	if(akid->issuer)
+		{
+		/* Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes
+		 * SEQUENCE OF GeneralName. So look for a DirName.
+		 * There may be more than one but we only take any
+		 * notice of the first.
+		 */
+		GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
+		GENERAL_NAME *gen;
+		X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
+		size_t i;
+		gens = akid->issuer;
+		for(i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
+			{
+			gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
+			if(gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME)
+				{
+				nm = gen->d.dirn;
+				break;
+				}
+			}
+		if(nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)))
+			return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
+		}
+	return X509_V_OK;
+	}
+