awesome-grpc-that-works 0.12.2 → 0.14.0.dev

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/custom_extensions.c

@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+void SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_free(SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION *custom_extension) {
+  OPENSSL_free(custom_extension);
+}
+
+static const SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION *custom_ext_find(
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION) *stack,
+    unsigned *out_index, uint16_t value) {
+  size_t i;
+  for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_num(stack); i++) {
+    const SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION *ext = sk_SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_value(stack, i);
+    if (ext->value == value) {
+      if (out_index != NULL) {
+        *out_index = i;
+      }
+      return ext;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+/* default_add_callback is used as the |add_callback| when the user doesn't
+ * provide one. For servers, it does nothing while, for clients, it causes an
+ * empty extension to be included. */
+static int default_add_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned extension_value,
+                                const uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len,
+                                int *out_alert_value, void *add_arg) {
+  if (ssl->server) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  *out_len = 0;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int custom_ext_add_hello(SSL *ssl, CBB *extensions) {
+  STACK_OF(SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION) *stack = ssl->ctx->client_custom_extensions;
+  if (ssl->server) {
+    stack = ssl->ctx->server_custom_extensions;
+  }
+
+  if (stack == NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  size_t i;
+  for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_num(stack); i++) {
+    const SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION *ext = sk_SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_value(stack, i);
+
+    if (ssl->server &&
+        !(ssl->s3->tmp.custom_extensions.received & (1u << i))) {
+      /* Servers cannot echo extensions that the client didn't send. */
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    const uint8_t *contents;
+    size_t contents_len;
+    int alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    CBB contents_cbb;
+
+    switch (ext->add_callback(ssl, ext->value, &contents, &contents_len, &alert,
+                              ext->add_arg)) {
+      case 1:
+        if (!CBB_add_u16(extensions, ext->value) ||
+            !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(extensions, &contents_cbb) ||
+            !CBB_add_bytes(&contents_cbb, contents, contents_len) ||
+            !CBB_flush(extensions)) {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+          ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned) ext->value);
+          if (ext->free_callback && 0 < contents_len) {
+            ext->free_callback(ssl, ext->value, contents, ext->add_arg);
+          }
+          return 0;
+        }
+
+        if (ext->free_callback && 0 < contents_len) {
+          ext->free_callback(ssl, ext->value, contents, ext->add_arg);
+        }
+
+        if (!ssl->server) {
+          assert((ssl->s3->tmp.custom_extensions.sent & (1u << i)) == 0);
+          ssl->s3->tmp.custom_extensions.sent |= (1u << i);
+        }
+        break;
+
+      case 0:
+        break;
+
+      default:
+        ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_ERROR);
+        ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned) ext->value);
+        return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int custom_ext_add_clienthello(SSL *ssl, CBB *extensions) {
+  return custom_ext_add_hello(ssl, extensions);
+}
+
+int custom_ext_parse_serverhello(SSL *ssl, int *out_alert, uint16_t value,
+                                 const CBS *extension) {
+  unsigned index;
+  const SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION *ext =
+      custom_ext_find(ssl->ctx->client_custom_extensions, &index, value);
+
+  if (/* Unknown extensions are not allowed in a ServerHello. */
+      ext == NULL ||
+      /* Also, if we didn't send the extension, that's also unacceptable. */
+      !(ssl->s3->tmp.custom_extensions.sent & (1u << index))) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
+    ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)value);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (ext->parse_callback != NULL &&
+      !ext->parse_callback(ssl, value, CBS_data(extension), CBS_len(extension),
+                           out_alert, ext->parse_arg)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_ERROR);
+    ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)ext->value);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int custom_ext_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, int *out_alert, uint16_t value,
+                                 const CBS *extension) {
+  unsigned index;
+  const SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION *ext =
+      custom_ext_find(ssl->ctx->server_custom_extensions, &index, value);
+
+  if (ext == NULL) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  assert((ssl->s3->tmp.custom_extensions.received & (1u << index)) == 0);
+  ssl->s3->tmp.custom_extensions.received |= (1u << index);
+
+  if (ext->parse_callback &&
+      !ext->parse_callback(ssl, value, CBS_data(extension), CBS_len(extension),
+                           out_alert, ext->parse_arg)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_ERROR);
+    ERR_add_error_dataf("extension: %u", (unsigned)ext->value);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int custom_ext_add_serverhello(SSL *ssl, CBB *extensions) {
+  return custom_ext_add_hello(ssl, extensions);
+}
+
+/* MAX_NUM_CUSTOM_EXTENSIONS is the maximum number of custom extensions that
+ * can be set on an |SSL_CTX|. It's determined by the size of the bitset used
+ * to track when an extension has been sent. */
+#define MAX_NUM_CUSTOM_EXTENSIONS \
+  (sizeof(((struct ssl3_state_st *)NULL)->tmp.custom_extensions.sent) * 8)
+
+static int custom_ext_append(STACK_OF(SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION) **stack,
+                             unsigned extension_value,
+                             SSL_custom_ext_add_cb add_cb,
+                             SSL_custom_ext_free_cb free_cb, void *add_arg,
+                             SSL_custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb,
+                             void *parse_arg) {
+  if (add_cb == NULL ||
+      0xffff < extension_value ||
+      SSL_extension_supported(extension_value) ||
+      /* Specifying a free callback without an add callback is nonsensical
+       * and an error. */
+      (*stack != NULL &&
+       (MAX_NUM_CUSTOM_EXTENSIONS <= sk_SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_num(*stack) ||
+        custom_ext_find(*stack, NULL, extension_value) != NULL))) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION *ext = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION));
+  if (ext == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  ext->add_callback = add_cb;
+  ext->add_arg = add_arg;
+  ext->free_callback = free_cb;
+  ext->parse_callback = parse_cb;
+  ext->parse_arg = parse_arg;
+  ext->value = extension_value;
+
+  if (*stack == NULL) {
+    *stack = sk_SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_new_null();
+    if (*stack == NULL) {
+      SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_free(ext);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!sk_SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_push(*stack, ext)) {
+    SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_free(ext);
+    if (sk_SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_num(*stack) == 0) {
+      sk_SSL_CUSTOM_EXTENSION_free(*stack);
+      *stack = NULL;
+    }
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned extension_value,
+                                  SSL_custom_ext_add_cb add_cb,
+                                  SSL_custom_ext_free_cb free_cb, void *add_arg,
+                                  SSL_custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb,
+                                  void *parse_arg) {
+  return custom_ext_append(&ctx->client_custom_extensions, extension_value,
+                           add_cb ? add_cb : default_add_callback, free_cb,
+                           add_arg, parse_cb, parse_arg);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned extension_value,
+                                  SSL_custom_ext_add_cb add_cb,
+                                  SSL_custom_ext_free_cb free_cb, void *add_arg,
+                                  SSL_custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb,
+                                  void *parse_arg) {
+  return custom_ext_append(&ctx->server_custom_extensions, extension_value,
+                           add_cb ? add_cb : default_add_callback, free_cb,
+                           add_arg, parse_cb, parse_arg);
+}

data/third_party/boringssl/ssl/d1_both.c

@@ -0,0 +1,880 @@
+/*
+ * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
+ * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. 
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+/* TODO(davidben): 28 comes from the size of IP + UDP header. Is this reasonable
+ * for these values? Notably, why is kMinMTU a function of the transport
+ * protocol's overhead rather than, say, what's needed to hold a minimally-sized
+ * handshake fragment plus protocol overhead. */
+
+/* kMinMTU is the minimum acceptable MTU value. */
+static const unsigned int kMinMTU = 256 - 28;
+
+/* kDefaultMTU is the default MTU value to use if neither the user nor
+ * the underlying BIO supplies one. */
+static const unsigned int kDefaultMTU = 1500 - 28;
+
+/* kMaxHandshakeBuffer is the maximum number of handshake messages ahead of the
+ * current one to buffer. */
+static const unsigned int kHandshakeBufferSize = 10;
+
+static hm_fragment *dtls1_hm_fragment_new(size_t frag_len, int reassembly) {
+  hm_fragment *frag = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment));
+  if (frag == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  memset(frag, 0, sizeof(hm_fragment));
+
+  /* If the handshake message is empty, |frag->fragment| and |frag->reassembly|
+   * are NULL. */
+  if (frag_len > 0) {
+    frag->fragment = OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len);
+    if (frag->fragment == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (reassembly) {
+      /* Initialize reassembly bitmask. */
+      if (frag_len + 7 < frag_len) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+        goto err;
+      }
+      size_t bitmask_len = (frag_len + 7) / 8;
+      frag->reassembly = OPENSSL_malloc(bitmask_len);
+      if (frag->reassembly == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+      }
+      memset(frag->reassembly, 0, bitmask_len);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return frag;
+
+err:
+  dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag) {
+  if (frag == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+  OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
+  OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
+  OPENSSL_free(frag);
+}
+
+#if !defined(inline)
+#define inline __inline
+#endif
+
+/* bit_range returns a |uint8_t| with bits |start|, inclusive, to |end|,
+ * exclusive, set. */
+static inline uint8_t bit_range(size_t start, size_t end) {
+  return (uint8_t)(~((1u << start) - 1) & ((1u << end) - 1));
+}
+
+/* dtls1_hm_fragment_mark marks bytes |start|, inclusive, to |end|, exclusive,
+ * as received in |frag|. If |frag| becomes complete, it clears
+ * |frag->reassembly|. The range must be within the bounds of |frag|'s message
+ * and |frag->reassembly| must not be NULL. */
+static void dtls1_hm_fragment_mark(hm_fragment *frag, size_t start,
+                                   size_t end) {
+  size_t i;
+  size_t msg_len = frag->msg_header.msg_len;
+
+  if (frag->reassembly == NULL || start > end || end > msg_len) {
+    assert(0);
+    return;
+  }
+  /* A zero-length message will never have a pending reassembly. */
+  assert(msg_len > 0);
+
+  if ((start >> 3) == (end >> 3)) {
+    frag->reassembly[start >> 3] |= bit_range(start & 7, end & 7);
+  } else {
+    frag->reassembly[start >> 3] |= bit_range(start & 7, 8);
+    for (i = (start >> 3) + 1; i < (end >> 3); i++) {
+      frag->reassembly[i] = 0xff;
+    }
+    if ((end & 7) != 0) {
+      frag->reassembly[end >> 3] |= bit_range(0, end & 7);
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Check if the fragment is complete. */
+  for (i = 0; i < (msg_len >> 3); i++) {
+    if (frag->reassembly[i] != 0xff) {
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+  if ((msg_len & 7) != 0 &&
+      frag->reassembly[msg_len >> 3] != bit_range(0, msg_len & 7)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
+  frag->reassembly = NULL;
+}
+
+static void dtls1_update_mtu(SSL *ssl) {
+  /* TODO(davidben): What is this code doing and do we need it? */
+  if (ssl->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu() &&
+      !(SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
+    long mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
+    if (mtu >= 0 && mtu <= (1 << 30) && (unsigned)mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu()) {
+      ssl->d1->mtu = (unsigned)mtu;
+    } else {
+      ssl->d1->mtu = kDefaultMTU;
+      BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU, ssl->d1->mtu, NULL);
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* The MTU should be above the minimum now. */
+  assert(ssl->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu());
+}
+
+/* dtls1_max_record_size returns the maximum record body length that may be
+ * written without exceeding the MTU. It accounts for any buffering installed on
+ * the write BIO. If no record may be written, it returns zero. */
+static size_t dtls1_max_record_size(SSL *ssl) {
+  size_t ret = ssl->d1->mtu;
+
+  size_t overhead = ssl_max_seal_overhead(ssl);
+  if (ret <= overhead) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  ret -= overhead;
+
+  size_t pending = BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(ssl));
+  if (ret <= pending) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  ret -= pending;
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int dtls1_write_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl,
+                                          enum dtls1_use_epoch_t use_epoch) {
+  dtls1_update_mtu(ssl);
+
+  /* During the handshake, wbio is buffered to pack messages together. Flush the
+   * buffer if the ChangeCipherSpec would not fit in a packet. */
+  if (dtls1_max_record_size(ssl) == 0) {
+    ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+    int ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(ssl));
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+      return ret;
+    }
+    ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+  }
+
+  static const uint8_t kChangeCipherSpec[1] = {SSL3_MT_CCS};
+  int ret = dtls1_write_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, kChangeCipherSpec,
+                              sizeof(kChangeCipherSpec), use_epoch);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->msg_callback != NULL) {
+    ssl->msg_callback(1 /* write */, ssl->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+                      kChangeCipherSpec, sizeof(kChangeCipherSpec), ssl,
+                      ssl->msg_callback_arg);
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int dtls1_do_handshake_write(SSL *ssl, enum dtls1_use_epoch_t use_epoch) {
+  dtls1_update_mtu(ssl);
+
+  int ret = -1;
+  CBB cbb;
+  CBB_zero(&cbb);
+  /* Allocate a temporary buffer to hold the message fragments to avoid
+   * clobbering the message. */
+  uint8_t *buf = OPENSSL_malloc(ssl->d1->mtu);
+  if (buf == NULL) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* Consume the message header. Fragments will have different headers
+   * prepended. */
+  if (ssl->init_off == 0) {
+    ssl->init_off += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+    ssl->init_num -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+  }
+  assert(ssl->init_off >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+  do {
+    /* During the handshake, wbio is buffered to pack messages together. Flush
+     * the buffer if there isn't enough room to make progress. */
+    if (dtls1_max_record_size(ssl) < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) {
+      ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+      int flush_ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(ssl));
+      if (flush_ret <= 0) {
+        ret = flush_ret;
+        goto err;
+      }
+      ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+      assert(BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(ssl)) == 0);
+    }
+
+    size_t todo = dtls1_max_record_size(ssl);
+    if (todo < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) {
+      /* To make forward progress, the MTU must, at minimum, fit the handshake
+       * header and one byte of handshake body. */
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MTU_TOO_SMALL);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    todo -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+    if (todo > (size_t)ssl->init_num) {
+      todo = ssl->init_num;
+    }
+    if (todo >= (1u << 24)) {
+      todo = (1u << 24) - 1;
+    }
+
+    size_t len;
+    if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, buf, ssl->d1->mtu) ||
+        !CBB_add_u8(&cbb, ssl->d1->w_msg_hdr.type) ||
+        !CBB_add_u24(&cbb, ssl->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len) ||
+        !CBB_add_u16(&cbb, ssl->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq) ||
+        !CBB_add_u24(&cbb, ssl->init_off - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) ||
+        !CBB_add_u24(&cbb, todo) ||
+        !CBB_add_bytes(
+            &cbb, (const uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data + ssl->init_off, todo) ||
+        !CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &len)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    int write_ret = dtls1_write_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, buf, len,
+                                      use_epoch);
+    if (write_ret <= 0) {
+      ret = write_ret;
+      goto err;
+    }
+    ssl->init_off += todo;
+    ssl->init_num -= todo;
+  } while (ssl->init_num > 0);
+
+  if (ssl->msg_callback != NULL) {
+    ssl->msg_callback(
+        1 /* write */, ssl->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, ssl->init_buf->data,
+        (size_t)(ssl->init_off + ssl->init_num), ssl, ssl->msg_callback_arg);
+  }
+
+  ssl->init_off = 0;
+  ssl->init_num = 0;
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+  OPENSSL_free(buf);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/* dtls1_is_next_message_complete returns one if the next handshake message is
+ * complete and zero otherwise. */
+static int dtls1_is_next_message_complete(SSL *s) {
+  pitem *item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
+  if (item == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  hm_fragment *frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+  assert(s->d1->handshake_read_seq <= frag->msg_header.seq);
+
+  return s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq &&
+      frag->reassembly == NULL;
+}
+
+/* dtls1_discard_fragment_body discards a handshake fragment body of length
+ * |frag_len|. It returns one on success and zero on error.
+ *
+ * TODO(davidben): This function will go away when ssl_read_bytes is gone from
+ * the DTLS side. */
+static int dtls1_discard_fragment_body(SSL *s, size_t frag_len) {
+  uint8_t discard[256];
+  while (frag_len > 0) {
+    size_t chunk = frag_len < sizeof(discard) ? frag_len : sizeof(discard);
+    int ret = dtls1_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, discard, chunk, 0);
+    if (ret != (int) chunk) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    frag_len -= chunk;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+/* dtls1_get_buffered_message returns the buffered message corresponding to
+ * |msg_hdr|. If none exists, it creates a new one and inserts it in the
+ * queue. Otherwise, it checks |msg_hdr| is consistent with the existing one. It
+ * returns NULL on failure. The caller does not take ownership of the result. */
+static hm_fragment *dtls1_get_buffered_message(
+    SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) {
+  uint8_t seq64be[8];
+  memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
+  seq64be[6] = (uint8_t)(msg_hdr->seq >> 8);
+  seq64be[7] = (uint8_t)msg_hdr->seq;
+  pitem *item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
+
+  hm_fragment *frag;
+  if (item == NULL) {
+    /* This is the first fragment from this message. */
+    frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->msg_len,
+                                 1 /* reassembly buffer needed */);
+    if (frag == NULL) {
+      return NULL;
+    }
+    memcpy(&frag->msg_header, msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
+    item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
+    if (item == NULL) {
+      dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+      return NULL;
+    }
+    item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+    /* |pqueue_insert| fails iff a duplicate item is inserted, but |item| cannot
+     * be a duplicate. */
+    assert(item != NULL);
+  } else {
+    frag = item->data;
+    assert(frag->msg_header.seq == msg_hdr->seq);
+    if (frag->msg_header.type != msg_hdr->type ||
+        frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) {
+      /* The new fragment must be compatible with the previous fragments from
+       * this message. */
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_FRAGMENT_MISMATCH);
+      ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+      return NULL;
+    }
+  }
+  return frag;
+}
+
+/* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
+ * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may
+ * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */
+static size_t dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s) {
+  size_t max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
+  if (max_len < s->max_cert_list) {
+    return s->max_cert_list;
+  }
+  return max_len;
+}
+
+/* dtls1_process_fragment reads a handshake fragment and processes it. It
+ * returns one if a fragment was successfully processed and 0 or -1 on error. */
+static int dtls1_process_fragment(SSL *s) {
+  /* Read handshake message header. */
+  uint8_t header[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
+  int ret = dtls1_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, header,
+                             DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0);
+  if (ret <= 0) {
+    return ret;
+  }
+  if (ret != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* Parse the message fragment header. */
+  struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
+  dtls1_get_message_header(header, &msg_hdr);
+
+  /* TODO(davidben): dtls1_read_bytes is the wrong abstraction for DTLS. There
+   * should be no need to reach into |s->s3->rrec.length|. */
+  const size_t frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
+  const size_t frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
+  const size_t msg_len = msg_hdr.msg_len;
+  if (frag_off > msg_len || frag_off + frag_len < frag_off ||
+      frag_off + frag_len > msg_len ||
+      msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s) ||
+      frag_len > s->s3->rrec.length) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (msg_hdr.seq < s->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
+      msg_hdr.seq > (unsigned)s->d1->handshake_read_seq +
+                    kHandshakeBufferSize) {
+    /* Ignore fragments from the past, or ones too far in the future. */
+    if (!dtls1_discard_fragment_body(s, frag_len)) {
+      return -1;
+    }
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  hm_fragment *frag = dtls1_get_buffered_message(s, &msg_hdr);
+  if (frag == NULL) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  assert(frag->msg_header.msg_len == msg_len);
+
+  if (frag->reassembly == NULL) {
+    /* The message is already assembled. */
+    if (!dtls1_discard_fragment_body(s, frag_len)) {
+      return -1;
+    }
+    return 1;
+  }
+  assert(msg_len > 0);
+
+  /* Read the body of the fragment. */
+  ret = dtls1_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, frag->fragment + frag_off,
+                         frag_len, 0);
+  if (ret != (int) frag_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  dtls1_hm_fragment_mark(frag, frag_off, frag_off + frag_len);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+/* dtls1_get_message reads a handshake message of message type |msg_type| (any
+ * if |msg_type| == -1), maximum acceptable body length |max|. Read an entire
+ * handshake message. Handshake messages arrive in fragments. */
+long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int msg_type, long max,
+                       enum ssl_hash_message_t hash_message, int *ok) {
+  pitem *item = NULL;
+  hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
+  int al;
+
+  /* s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused
+   * by the absence of an optional handshake message */
+  if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) {
+    /* A ssl_dont_hash_message call cannot be combined with reuse_message; the
+     * ssl_dont_hash_message would have to have been applied to the previous
+     * call. */
+    assert(hash_message == ssl_hash_message);
+    s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0;
+    if (msg_type >= 0 && s->s3->tmp.message_type != msg_type) {
+      al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+      goto f_err;
+    }
+    *ok = 1;
+    s->init_msg = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+    s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
+    return s->init_num;
+  }
+
+  /* Process fragments until one is found. */
+  while (!dtls1_is_next_message_complete(s)) {
+    int ret = dtls1_process_fragment(s);
+    if (ret <= 0) {
+      *ok = 0;
+      return ret;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Read out the next complete handshake message. */
+  item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
+  assert(item != NULL);
+  frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+  assert(s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq);
+  assert(frag->reassembly == NULL);
+
+  if (frag->msg_header.msg_len > (size_t)max) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* Reconstruct the assembled message. */
+  size_t len;
+  CBB cbb;
+  CBB_zero(&cbb);
+  if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
+                    (size_t)frag->msg_header.msg_len +
+                    DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) ||
+      !CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_buf->max) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(&cbb, frag->msg_header.type) ||
+      !CBB_add_u24(&cbb, frag->msg_header.msg_len) ||
+      !CBB_add_u16(&cbb, frag->msg_header.seq) ||
+      !CBB_add_u24(&cbb, 0 /* frag_off */) ||
+      !CBB_add_u24(&cbb, frag->msg_header.msg_len) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, frag->fragment, frag->msg_header.msg_len) ||
+      !CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &len)) {
+    CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+  assert(len == (size_t)frag->msg_header.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+  s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
+
+  /* TODO(davidben): This function has a lot of implicit outputs. Simplify the
+   * |ssl_get_message| API. */
+  s->s3->tmp.message_type = frag->msg_header.type;
+  s->s3->tmp.message_size = frag->msg_header.msg_len;
+  s->init_msg = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+  s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len;
+
+  if (msg_type >= 0 && s->s3->tmp.message_type != msg_type) {
+    al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    goto f_err;
+  }
+  if (hash_message == ssl_hash_message && !ssl3_hash_current_message(s)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (s->msg_callback) {
+    s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
+                    s->init_num + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
+                    s->msg_callback_arg);
+  }
+
+  pitem_free(item);
+  dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+
+  s->state = stn;
+  *ok = 1;
+  return s->init_num;
+
+f_err:
+  ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+err:
+  pitem_free(item);
+  dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+  *ok = 0;
+  return -1;
+}
+
+int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code) {
+  if (code > 0) {
+    assert(0);
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s)) {
+    /* not a timeout, none of our business, let higher layers handle this. In
+     * fact, it's probably an error */
+    return code;
+  }
+
+  if (!SSL_in_init(s)) {
+    /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
+    BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ);
+    return code;
+  }
+
+  return DTLSv1_handle_timeout(s);
+}
+
+static uint16_t dtls1_get_queue_priority(uint16_t seq, int is_ccs) {
+  assert(seq * 2 >= seq);
+
+  /* The index of the retransmission queue actually is the message sequence
+   * number, since the queue only contains messages of a single handshake.
+   * However, the ChangeCipherSpec has no message sequence number and so using
+   * only the sequence will result in the CCS and Finished having the same
+   * index. To prevent this, the sequence number is multiplied by 2. In case of
+   * a CCS 1 is subtracted. This does not only differ CSS and Finished, it also
+   * maintains the order of the index (important for priority queues) and fits
+   * in the unsigned short variable. */
+  return seq * 2 - is_ccs;
+}
+
+static int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, hm_fragment *frag) {
+  /* DTLS renegotiation is unsupported, so only epochs 0 (NULL cipher) and 1
+   * (negotiated cipher) exist. */
+  assert(s->d1->w_epoch == 0 || s->d1->w_epoch == 1);
+  assert(frag->msg_header.epoch <= s->d1->w_epoch);
+  enum dtls1_use_epoch_t use_epoch = dtls1_use_current_epoch;
+  if (s->d1->w_epoch == 1 && frag->msg_header.epoch == 0) {
+    use_epoch = dtls1_use_previous_epoch;
+  }
+
+  /* TODO(davidben): This cannot handle non-blocking writes. */
+  int ret;
+  if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs) {
+    ret = dtls1_write_change_cipher_spec(s, use_epoch);
+  } else {
+    /* Restore the message body.
+     * TODO(davidben): Make this less stateful. */
+    memcpy(s->init_buf->data, frag->fragment,
+           frag->msg_header.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+    s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+    dtls1_set_message_header(s, frag->msg_header.type,
+                             frag->msg_header.msg_len, frag->msg_header.seq,
+                             0, frag->msg_header.frag_len);
+    ret = dtls1_do_handshake_write(s, use_epoch);
+  }
+
+  /* TODO(davidben): Check return value? */
+  (void)BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+  return ret;
+}
+
+
+int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s) {
+  pqueue sent = s->d1->sent_messages;
+  piterator iter = pqueue_iterator(sent);
+  pitem *item;
+
+  for (item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; item = pqueue_next(&iter)) {
+    hm_fragment *frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+    if (dtls1_retransmit_message(s, frag) <= 0) {
+      return -1;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+/* dtls1_buffer_change_cipher_spec adds a ChangeCipherSpec to the current
+ * handshake flight, ordered just before the handshake message numbered
+ * |seq|. */
+static int dtls1_buffer_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl, uint16_t seq) {
+  hm_fragment *frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(0 /* frag_len */,
+                                            0 /* no reassembly */);
+  if (frag == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  frag->msg_header.is_ccs = 1;
+  frag->msg_header.epoch = ssl->d1->w_epoch;
+
+  uint16_t priority = dtls1_get_queue_priority(seq, 1 /* is_ccs */);
+  uint8_t seq64be[8];
+  memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
+  seq64be[6] = (uint8_t)(priority >> 8);
+  seq64be[7] = (uint8_t)priority;
+
+  pitem *item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
+  if (item == NULL) {
+    dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  pqueue_insert(ssl->d1->sent_messages, item);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s) {
+  /* this function is called immediately after a message has
+   * been serialized */
+  assert(s->init_off == 0);
+
+  hm_fragment *frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0);
+  if (!frag) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
+
+  assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH ==
+         (unsigned int)s->init_num);
+
+  frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
+  frag->msg_header.seq = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq;
+  frag->msg_header.type = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.type;
+  frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
+  frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
+  frag->msg_header.is_ccs = 0;
+  frag->msg_header.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
+
+  uint16_t priority = dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
+                                               0 /* handshake */);
+  uint8_t seq64be[8];
+  memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
+  seq64be[6] = (uint8_t)(priority >> 8);
+  seq64be[7] = (uint8_t)priority;
+
+  pitem *item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
+  if (item == NULL) {
+    dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  pqueue_insert(s->d1->sent_messages, item);
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b) {
+  if (s->state == a) {
+    /* Buffer the message to handle retransmits. */
+    s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
+    dtls1_buffer_change_cipher_spec(s, s->d1->handshake_write_seq);
+    s->state = b;
+  }
+
+  return dtls1_write_change_cipher_spec(s, dtls1_use_current_epoch);
+}
+
+/* call this function when the buffered messages are no longer needed */
+void dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s) {
+  pitem *item;
+
+  for (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages); item != NULL;
+       item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) {
+    dtls1_hm_fragment_free((hm_fragment *)item->data);
+    pitem_free(item);
+  }
+}
+
+/* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */
+void dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, uint8_t mt, unsigned long len,
+                              unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off,
+                              unsigned long frag_len) {
+  struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
+
+  msg_hdr->type = mt;
+  msg_hdr->msg_len = len;
+  msg_hdr->seq = seq_num;
+  msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
+  msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
+}
+
+unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void) {
+  return kMinMTU;
+}
+
+void dtls1_get_message_header(uint8_t *data,
+                              struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) {
+  memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
+  msg_hdr->type = *(data++);
+  n2l3(data, msg_hdr->msg_len);
+
+  n2s(data, msg_hdr->seq);
+  n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_off);
+  n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len);
+}